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IN THE PRESS. 



THE 

PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE: 

PART II. 

GLOSSOLOGY; 

OR, 

THE HISTORICAL RELATIONS OF LANGUAGES. 

COMPREHENDING 

1. The Etymology, or derivation, of particular words. 

2. The different modes of their Construction in different languages. 

3. The comparative similarities and dissimilarities of words and construction 

in those languages. 

4. The theoretical origin of languages in one or more sources. 

5. The possibility and probability of forming from the existing languages, or 

otherwise, an Universal Language. 



Sik JOHN STODDART, Kxt., LL.D. 



ENCYCLOPEDIA METROPOLITAN: 



System of Unihexml l^nolnletjge 



OX A METHODICAL PLAX 



PKOJECTED BY SAMUEL TAYLOR COLERIDGE. 



SECOND EDITION, EEVISED. 



jfet DiniBtmL 1(kn mmxw. 



PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE, 




LONDON: 
PUBLISHED BY JOHN JOSEPH GEIFFIN AND CO, 

53 BAKER-STREET, PORTMAN SQUARE ', 

AND EICHAED GRIFFIN AND CO., GLASGOW. 
1849. 



^\ 



5 ~ ; 



CL^ 



LONDON : PRINTED BY WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS, STAMFORD STREET. 



3T 



UX- 



THE 

PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE; 



COMPREHENDING 



UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR, 

OR THE PURE SCIENCE OF LANGUAGE; 

AND 

GLOSSOLOGY, 

OR THE HISTORICAL RELATIONS OF LANGUAGES. 

By Sir JOHN STODDART, Knt., LL.D. 

SECOND EDITION, 
REVISED BY THE AUTHOR, AND EDITED BY 

WILLIAM HAZLITT, Esq., 

BAKKISTEE-AT-LA'W. 



PREFACE, 



The present work was originally composed for the Encyclopaedia 
Metropolitana, a publication which was designed to have been 
produced under the editorial care of the late Samuel Taylor 
Coleridge. That accomplished scholar, distinguished poet, and 
profound metaphysician, was unfortunately prevented by ill 
health, and other adverse circumstances, from carrying the 
intended editorship into effect. He, however, not only devised 
the comprehensive plan which was described in the Prospectus 
of the Encyclopaedia, but furnished the original materials for a 
general introduction, which his friend, my uncle, Sir John 
Stoddart, undertook, at the desire of the proprietors, to arrange 
for publication, in the form in which it eventually appeared. 

My uncle was led, from this circumstance, to draw up an 
article on Grammar, which, though hastily executed, in the 
intervals of a laborious profession, was deemed by Mr. Cole- 
ridge not unworthy to occupy a place in the Encyclopaedia. 
The subject was one which had attracted the author's atten- 
tion at a very early period. He was educated at the school in 
the Close of Salisbury, an institution attached to the Cathedral, 
and of which a Minor Canon, Dr. Skinner, was Master, and the 
Rev. E. Coleridge (an elder brother of the poet), Under Master. 
Grammar was then taught on the ancient plan of the once 



VI PREFACE. 

famous William Lilly, whose Propria qua? maribus and As 
in prcesenti English boys were, for centuries, compelled to 
repeat by rote, without the slightest suspicion that they 
involved anything like a rational principle. Fortunately, 
however, for my uncle, his godfather, Mr. Benson Earle, was a 
sound classical scholar, and had been a ward of the celebrated 
James Harris, the author of Hermes. This book Mr. Earle put 
into the hands of his godson, then about fourteen years of age, 
and the young student, on opening it, 'felt as if his mental eye 
had been couched, discovering with surprise that the lessons 
which had appeared to him, of all his scholastic tasks, the driest 
and most unmeaning, involved many profound speculations of 
intellectual philosophy. Of course he was not yet in a capacity 
to judge of the correctness of all Mr. Harris's theories; but 
he saw enough to convince him that Hermes contained much 
of that acute investigation, perspicuous explication, and ele- 
gance of method for which it had been celebrated by Dr. Lowth. 
His classical pursuits at Christchurch, Oxford, of which college 
he was elected a Student, somewhat moderated, though they 
did not wholly extinguish, his estimation of Mr. Harris's 
work ; and the perusal of Hickes's Thesaurus, in the Bodleian 
Library, showed him that the northern languages afforded a 
new field for grammatical research. On his subsequent arrival 
in London, to follow the study of the law, he found the literary 
circles of the day much occupied with Mr. Home Tooke's Diver- 
sions of Purley, a work which promised great results from the 
cultivation of Gothic, Anglo-Saxon, and Old English etymolo- 
gies. Falling into company with Mr. Porson, he consulted him 
on its merits. The Professor said, that, on the first appearance 
of Mr. Tooke's Letter to Dunning, he had been struck with 
the originality of its views; but though the Diversions of 
Purley (of which only the first volume had then appeared) 



PEEFACE. VTL 

certainly contained some new and curious matter, lie did not 
perceive that it effected much toward the development of the 
principle set forth in the early pamphlet. This opinion con- 
firmed my uncle in his resolution to investigate the subject for 
himself. Having chosen the Ecclesiastical and Admiralty 
Courts for the future scene of his professional exertions, he had 
some time before him for miscellaneous study ; and as he had 
devoted part of his leisure at Oxford to the Bodleian Library, 
he employed much more in London among the Anglo-Saxon 
and Old English manuscripts of the British Museum ; until he 
was called to the Bar in Doctors' Commons, from which period 
he was for several years too much occupied, first with his pro- 
fessional duties and subsequently with political discussions, to 
do more towards Philology than add an occasional article to the 
large mass of notes which he had previously collected. Several 
of these articles, however, threw no small light on the legal 
institutions, as well of England as of other countries. For 
instance, he traced the word cavere from its use in the Twelve 
Tables, the earliest monument of Eoman Legislation, to the 
Mediaeval cautio, the Italian cauzione, the Spanish caugion, the 
French cautionnement, the Scotch cautioner, the English ca- 
veat, and writ cautione admittenda, and numerous other legal 
terms, ancient and modern, derived from the same source. So 
he found the vades publicus (a security first given at Eome, as 
Livy, Book iii. cap. 13, tells us, 460 years before the Christian 
era) to agree in origin with the Italian vas, vadari, vadimo- 
nium ; the Mediaeval vadium-mortuum, gadiator, contragagia- 
mentum; the Italian gaggio, gaggio-morto, ingaggiare ; the 
French gage, gages, engager ; the Scotch wad, wadset, wad- 
setter ; the English wed, wedding, wedlock, gage, mortgage, 
engagement, wages, wager, wager of law, wager of battle, 
&c. &c. Again, in the Italian subastatore (an auctioneer), he 



VUl PEEFACE. 

recognized the Prasco, to whose " most bitter voice " (as Cicero 
says) the goods of the great Pompey were subjected sub hastd. 
Many other such investigations kept alive, amidst the more 
serious occupations of the law, Iris regard for the study of 
language ; and it was under these circumstances that he was 
applied to for that treatise on Grammar which appeared in the 
Encyclopaedia Metropolitana. A few years afterwards he was 
raised to the high station of Chief Justice of Malta; the 
arduous duties of which, office absorbed, for many years, nearly 
the whole of his time. At length, in 1839, he was relieved 
from that important charge, and left to close a long life in the 
otium cum dignitate which he still enjoys. 

For the last ten years he has not been an inattentive 
observer of the very valuable accessions which, this branch of 
literature has received, not only on the Continent but in our 
own country. Many ages elapsed before Philology ventured 
beyond the classic circle of the Greek and Eoman tongues. 
The languages of modern Europe were long thought unworthy 
of the grammarian's attention ; and when they were first sub- 
jected to rules, it was in the vain endeavour to make them 
march only in the Greek or Roman step. Some zealous 
Divines put in a claim for the supremacy of Hebrew, which 
they essayed to prove was the language of our first parents ; 
but this theory made little impression on the scholastic systems 
then or since in use. CoXRAD Gesner had the merit of first 
extending philological speculation very far beyond the classical 
or judaical bounds. In 1555 appeared his Mithridates, a 
treatise in Latin, " De differentiis linguarum turn veterum 
turn quae hodie apud diversas nationes in toto orbe terrarum in 
usu sunt.'" His notices of various languages, however, were, 
as might be expected from the then limited knowledge of the 
different countries, very slight, and led to little that was con- 



PREFACE. IX 

elusive in point of principle. Nor can anything be more grati- 
fying, in this branch of study, than to observe the vast progress 
which had been made between the Mitliridates of Gesner, in 
the 16th century, and the Mitliridates of Adelung, in the 
19th. In the 16th century, too, GOROPIUS Becakus per- 
ceived, though indistinctly, that affinity between the Indian 
and Teutonic languages, which has, in our day, been so clearly 
made out by Grimm, Bopp, Schlegel, Eichhoff, &c, and 
recently in our own country by the very learned Dr. Bosworth, 
in his Origin of the English, German, and Scandinavian 
Languages and Nations. 

To these, as well as to the ingenious speculations ol 
Drs. Jamieson, Latham, and Pritchard, Messrs. Johnes, 
Welsford, and others, my uncle has paid much attention, 
and has from time to time availed himself of their learned 
labours, in correcting and extending his own views, as well of 
the philosophy as of the history of language. "When, therefore, 
Messrs. Griffin, in the prosecution of their energetic purpose to 
reproduce, in an improved shape, both as to matter and 
form, the Encyclopaedia Metropolitana, of which they had 
become the proprietors, invited my uncle to revise his Treatise 
on Grammar, desirous of doing full justice to the subject, he 
resolved not simply on correcting the Treatise as originally 
printed, and inserting such notes as had since occurred to him, 
but on entirely reconstructing the work, and dividing the 
purely Scientific part from the Historical. This, therefore, he 
did; but as he felt that, at his advanced age, the labour of 
editing the whole would be more than he could prudently 
undertake, he devolved that task on me; placing at my dis- 
posal all the materials which, in a long course of years, he had 
collected, and giving me every facility for the fulfilment of my 
humble share in the work. 



X PREFACE. 

From what lias been said, it is seen that the Treatise on the 
Philosophy of Language, now presented to the public, 
amounts, in manner, certainly, and, to a large extent, in 
matter, to a new work, bringing up our knowledge on this 
most important subject to the present day. 

WILLIAM HAZLITT, 

Chelsea, Nov., 1849. 



CONTENTS. 



PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. 



PAGE 

Introduction 1 

PART I. UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR. 

Chap. I. — Preliminary View of those Faculties of the Intellect 
and Will on which the Science of Language 

depends 5 

Chap. II.— Of Sentences 24 

Chap. III.— Of Words, as Parts of Speech .... 30 

Chap. IV.— Of Nouns 47 

Chap. V. — Of Nouns Substantive 53 

Chap. VI. — Of Nouns Adjective 93 

Chap. VII.— Of Participles 103 

Chap. VIII.— Of Pronouns 108 

Chap. IX.— Of Verbs 119 

Chap. X.— Of Articles 157 

Chap. XI.— Of Prepositions 168 

Chap. XII.— Of Conjunctions 196 

Chap. XIII.— Of Adverbs 221 

Chap. XIV.— Of Interjections 266 

Chap. XV.— Of Participles 278 

Chap. XVI.— Of the Mechanism of Speech . . . .287 



PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. 



INTRODUCTION. 

1. Iisr attempting to treat of any subject philosophically, it is advisable Method, 
first to define the term or terms employed to designate that subject, 
and then to explain the pliilosophical method of treating it which the 
author intends to pursue. 

2. The word " Language," which comes immediately to us from Language. 
the French word langage, originates in the Latin lingua, " the 
tongue ;" and therefore anciently signified only the use of the tongue 

in speech. A just analogy, however, has extended its meaning to all 
intentional modes of communicating the movements of the mind : 
thus we use the expressions, " articulate language," " written lan- 
guage," "the language of gesture," &c. ; for man is formed as well 
internally, as externally, for the communication of thoughts and 
feelings. He is urged to it by the necessity of receiving, and by the 
desire of imparting, whatever is useful or pleasant. His wants and 
wishes cannot be satisfied by individual power : his joys and sorrows 
cannot be limited to individual emotion. The fountains of his wis- 
dom and of his love spontaneously flow to fertilize the neighbouring 
soil, and to augment the distant ocean. 

3. But the thoughts and feelings of man, which belong to his 
mental and spiritual nature, can only be communicated by means of 
corporeal acts and objects — by gestures, sounds, characters more or 
less expressive and permanent, instruments not merely useful, as 
signs, for this particular purpose, but many times pleasing in them- 
selves, or rendered so, by the long-continued operation of habit. 
These, reason, the peculiar gift to man of his Creator, enables him to 
select, to combine, to arrange ; and the result is a language. 

4. Speech, the language of articulate sounds, is the most wonderful, Speech, 
the most delightful of the arts which adorn and elevate our being. 

It is also the rnpsLperfect* y<Jt enables us, as it were, to express things 
beyond the reach of expression, the infinite range of existence, the 
exquisite fineness of emotion, the intricate subtleties of thought. Of 
such effect are those shadows of the soul, those living sounds, which 

2. B 



INTRODUCTION. 



Words, how 
elective. 



Speech, its 
diversities. 



Method of 
study. 



we call words ! Compared with them, how poor are all other monu- 
ments of human power, or perseverance, or skill, or genius ! They 
render the mere clown an artist ; nations immortal ; orators, poets, 
philosophers, divine ! 

5. Yet it is not to be supposed that spoken language, " with all 
appliances and means to boot," can always fully convey to others the 
conceptions or emotions of the speaker ; and much less that it always 
does so. Joys beyond expression, and griefs too sad to vent themselves 
in words, are of every day's occurrence. On the other hand, there are 
persons, who habitually wrap up their thoughts in the language of 
mystery, equivocation, or falsehood, for the very purpose, or at least 
with the constant result, of misleading their hearers : and there are 
words and phrases susceptible of so many different interpretations, 
that nothing but an attentive comparison of them with the whole 
context, or with all the concomitant circumstances, can enable any one 
to comprehend their full force and effect. Dugald Stewart has well 
observed that, in consulting Johnson's Dictionary, the reader may 
meet with a multitude of words with five, six, or more significations 
attached to each of them, and after all the pains that the lexicographer 
has taken, may perhaps find no one of the definitions applicable to the 
passage which he has in view ; and yet when he considers the whole 
passage together he may have no difficulty whatever in comprehending 
the intended sense of the particular word. This proves that the pow- 
erful effects of speech are not owing to the mere signification of sepa- 
rate Words, but to the activity of the Mind in seizing on the relations 
which they bear to each other, and in giving scope to the thoughts and 
feelings they are meant to excite. 

6. Again, the dialects, or systems of speech adopted by various 
races of men, in different ages and countries, have been, in many 
respects, strikingly distinguishable. We may remark the copious 
Arabic, the high-sounding Spanish, the broad Dutch r the voluble 
French, the soft Italian : we may trace minute gradations from the 
monosyllables of the Chinese, to the long paragraph words of the 
Sanscrit ; or we may rise, still more gradually, in the scale of expres- 
sion, from the barbarous muttering of a poor Esquimaux in his solitary 
canoe, to the thunders of Athenian eloquence, and those delightful 
strains of our own Shakspeare, which are " musical as is Apollo's 
lute," and " a perpetual feast of nectar'd sweets." Nor is this all : a 
thousand collateral circumstances tend still further to diversify the 
numerous spoken languages of the world. Not only does time produce 
gradual progress, or sudden change in their forms ; but their effect is 
endlessly modified by combination with other arts of expression, with 
looks and actions, with sights and sounds. 

7. In this labyrinth of interesting observations, what objects have 
we to pursue ; what clue to guide us ? Shall we be content to learn 
one or two dialects by rote ; to burthen the memory without exer- 
cising the understanding ? Or, if we would rise above this, to a know- 



INTRODUCTION. 3 

ledge of their construction, must we draw our general principles from 
the minute comparison of those numberless particulars, which the 
longest life would be too short even to contemplate, and which the 
united wisdom of ages has never attempted to arrange ? The very 
statement of these questions is a sufficient solution of them. They 
indicate at once the necessity of assuming some comprehensive princi- 
ples as the rule and basis of our farther inquiries. These first elements 
of our reasoning must afterwards be followed oat into all their concrete 
forms. The history of language must verify the science; but the 
science must precede. 

8. Obvious as is the distinction between science and history, be- The science 
tween a principle and an event ; yet several writers on language, hfctor/of 
especially within the last seventy or eighty years, and particularly in lan ^ ua s e - 
England, have strangely confounded these two modes of knowledge. 
Whether there be two parts of speech, or twenty, or any other number, 

and how they are to be distinguished from each other, are questions 
of science : whether a given word in one language be derived from 
another given word in the same or a different language, or whether 
both be derived from a common source, and through what tran- 
sitions and changes of sound or meaning they have respectively 
passed, are questions of history. The method which I propose to 
pursue, is to treat of the former topics first, and afterwards of the 
latter; but in like manner as it would not be easy to acquire a know- 
ledge of Geometry (at least in its early stages) without the aid of 
diagrams, so there might be some difficulty in making the first prin- 
ciples of the science of Language intelligible, without occasional 
reference to examples drawn from particular languages. 

9. The science of Language has for some centuries been usually Grammar, 
known by the name of Grammar, a word which, like the word 
Language, we have borrowed from the French ; but which (like the 

word Language also) is far removed from its original source. The 
Greek word ypcupu), " I write," is connected with many Teutonic 
words, signifying to cut into, or engrave; and was, no doubt, first 
applied to engraving on stone. Signs or letters, hieroglypliical, sym- 
bolical, or alphabetical, so engraved, were, according to a common 
analogy in the Greek tongue, called ypa^xara, " things engraved," 
and that term being afterwards extended to letters written, as well as 
engraved, a knowledge of reading and writing letters in general was 
called ypa/i/xa-tfc}), " the grammatical art." In the course of time, 
teachers of reading and writing, in any one language, found it neces- 
sary to lay down rules for reading and writing it well, which rules 
were deemed the Grammatice, or Grammar, of that Language ; and 
these again were found to result from certain common principles, 
which constitute the science of Universal Grammar, and of which I 
intend to speak in the first part of the following treatise. The rules 
which form the Grammar of a particular language, in so far as they 
differ from those of any other, are owing to accidental and temporary 

b2 



4 INTRODUCTION. 

circumstances, the investigation of which belongs rather to the history 
than to the science of Language. Universal Grammar, on the con- 
trary, disregarding that which is peculiar to the speech of this or that 
individual, tribe, nation, or race, considers only what is common to 
man in all ages and countries, both as to the arrangement of his 
thoughts and feelings, with a view to their communication to others, 
and also as to the bodily organs, or instruments, with which the 
Almighty has furnished him, for the purpose of such communication. 
Glossology. 10. The History of Language, in all its various bearings, may be 
not improperly designated by the term Glossology, which I prefer to 
Glottology, a word recently employed by some continental writers ; first, 
because the former sounds to English ears less harsh ; and, secondly, 
because it suits better with several words which we already possess, 
such as Gloss, Glosser, Glossator, Glossographer, Glossography, all 
derived from the common Greek word yXwcrara. (Attice, ykwrra), the 
Tongue. Glossology, then, will form the subject of my second 
treatise, comprehending, — 

1. The Etymology, or derivation, of particular words. 

2. The different modes of their Construction in different lan- 

guages. 

3. The comparative similarities and dissimilarities of words and 

construction in those languages. 

4. The theoretical origin of languages in one or more sources. 

5. The possibility and probability of forming from the existing 

languages, or otherwise, an Universal Language. 



UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR, 



CHAPTER I. 

PKELIMLNARY VIEW OF THOSE FACULTIES OF THE INTELLECT AND 
WILL ON WHICH THE SCIENCE OF LANGUAGE DEPENDS. 

11. In order to study Universal Grammar with effect, it is necessary 
to take a preliminary view of those faculties of the intellect and will 
on which the science of language depends. 

12. In the mind of man the consciousness of simple existence is the Conscious- 
source and necessary condition of all other powers ; as in language, ness * 
the expression of that consciousness by the verb to be, is at the root of 

all connected expression. 

13. But we are conscious of different states of existence, in some 
of which we act, and in others we are acted upon : and thus in lan- 
guage, a verb is a word which signifies to do, or to suffer, as well as to 
be. No language, indeed, ever was, or ever could be, formed without 
such verbs ; but the case is different with regard to theories of lan- 
guage, and systems of Grammar. These may be, and have been con- 
structed, on the hypothesis, that the mind of man is a mere passive 
recipient of mechanical impressions ; a something which may be im- 
pelled like a foot-ball, but which cannot give to itself, or to anything 
else, the slightest impulse beyond that which it has first received. 
On such a question as this, the only appeal lies to the common sense 
and daily experience of mankind ; and the result of that experience is 
clearly attested by all languages, living and dead — a species of evidence 
which is the less to be resisted, because it is not the result of any 
common agreement. Every language in the world has grown up from 
the necessities of those who have used it, and not from intention ; 
from accident, and not from theory; and yet there is among them 
an universal acquiescence in certain fundamental principles : these 
principles, then, are indisputably founded on the common constitution 
of the human mind. 

14. The mind is, no doubt, passive in some respects. If I open Sensations 
my eye to the light, I cannot choose but see ; if a sound strikes my Amotions, 
ear, I cannot help hearing. These, and many like states of existence, 
derived from the bodily organs, are called sensations ; there are other 
states, in which we are more or less passive, derived from the mind, 

and commonly called emotions. When we come to analyse these 
latter, we shall easily discover that we are not so entirely passive in 
their reception, as is often supposed: nevertheless, as we in both 
cases " suffer," that is to say, are acted upon by external causes, we 



6 FACULTIES OF THE MIND [ CHAP - T - 

Feeling, may not improperly include sensation and emotion as modes of the 
passive principle, under the common name of feeling. The states of 
sensation, which are agreeable to our nature, we properly call plea- 
sure, those of an opposite kind we call pain ; and the same names are 
naturally transferred to those emotions of the mind which seem analo- 
gous to the respective sensations of the body. Thus the feeling of 
guilt is called painful, and that of joy pleasant. The pleasurable 
sensations and emotions, and their real or supposed causes, are all 
called by the common name of good, and their opposites by that of 
evil. The expression of feeling is what constitutes in language the 
passive verb. 

WiU - 15. As I have called the passive principle, feeling; so I call the 

active principle will, or volition. It is this principle, which may truly 
be called the life of the human mind ; it is this, which forms and 
fashions the mind ; it is this, which impels and governs the man. The 
conscious being, in his active state, has a power : he says, I do this or 
that : and hence arises the active verb. Hence also arises the pronoun : 
for the very idea of an act involves the idea of a cause ; and it has been 
clearly enough shown by different writers, that if the idea of a cause did 
not exist within the mind, it could never be suggested from without. 
16. The will, in its growth, becomes a moral energy; that is, it 
impels us to good, as good, and consequently to the greater good 
rather than to the less. To choose the greater good is to do right, to 
choose the less good is to do wrong. Let philosophers argue, as they 
please, on liberty and necessity ; let them reconcile, as they can, those 
high doctrines 

Of Providence, foreknowledge, will, and fate, 
Fix'd fate, free will, foreknowledge absolute ; 

still the individual, from the first dawnings of reason, distinguishes 
right from wrong, and knows that he is a cause of the one, or of the 
other ; and feels that the power which he exercises as a cause, is a 
talent for which he is responsible. Thus is formed Conscience, the 
light and guide of life. I have not now to discuss at length the nature 
and effects of this precious faculty : other and fitter occasions may be 
found for that investigation ; but I cannot avoid noticing, that as the 
ideas of right and wrong are seated not merely in the mind, but in the 
first and elementary rudiments of the mind, it is a dangerous and fatal 
error to represent them as contrivances of language, to say that 
" Right is no other than the past participle of the Latin verb r eg ere," 
and that " Wrong is merely the past tense of the verb to wring" 
This is part of the history of words : it is no part of their philosophy. 
Reason. 17. Neither will nor feeling has in itself any limit. The stream 
of conscious being is continuous ; it exists alike amid the roar of 
cannon, and in the soft breathing of the vernal air : in the deep, pro- 
tracted meditation of a Newton, and in the brief glimpse that is 
caught of 

The snow that falls upon the river, 

A moment white, then lost for ever. 



CHAP. I.J ON WHICH LANGUAGE DEPENDS. 7 

What is it, then, that reduces the chaos of will and feeling first into 
distinguishable elements, and then into individual masses ? It is the 
forming and shaping power within us. It is the divine faculty, 
" looking before and after," to which in its perfection we give the 
name of reason. Reason holds, as it were, the balance between the 
passive and active powers of the mind. It is fed and nourished by the 
impressions of the one : it grows and moves by the energy of the 
other. It has several stages or degrees, of which the first is Conception. 

18. By conception, I mean that faculty which enables the mind to Conception, 
apprehend one portion of existence, separately from all others. In other 
words, the first act, or exercise of the reasoning power is to conceive 
one object, or thing, as one. Hence arises in language the noun ; for 
" the noun is the name of a thing." Here it is that many modern 
writers on Grammar have erred. They seem to have considered no 
such power in the mind to be necessary, and no such act to be per- 
formed. They seem to have supposed that things, or objects, affected 
the mind as such, by their own power ; and that the mind was quite 
passive in this respect. When we come to examine this fundamental 
part of their system, we find the greatest possible confusion of terms. 
According to one, the first elements of thought are ideas, another calls 
them objects, a third sensations, and so forth. If you ask what is 
meant by these respective terms, you are still more bewildered. ' ' An 
idea," says one, " is that which the mind is applied about whilst 
thinking." A most vague and insignificant expression, then, it must 
surely be; and yet it has been justly observed, that " vague and 
insignificant forms of speech and abuse of language have so long 
passed for mysteries of science ; and hard and misapplied words, with 
little or no meaning, have by prescription such a right to be mistaken 
for deep learning and height of speculation, that it will not be easy to 
persuade either those who speak or those who hear them, that they 
are but the covers of ignorance and hinderance of true knowledge." 
All this is eminently true of the abuse and misapplication of the word 
idea, which had a perfectly distinct and specific meaning, until it was 
in an evil hour made " to stand for whatsoever is the object of the 
understanding when a man thinks," or " whatever is meant by phan- 
tasm, notion, species, or whatever it is which the mind can be 
employed about in thinking." 

19. Some of these ideas, it has been said, are simple, and some 
complex. In the former the mind is passive, in the latter there is an 
act of the mind combining several simple ideas into one complex one ; 
but this distinction has been altogether denied, in more recent times ; 
and we have been tcld, that " it is as improper to speak of a complex 
idea, as it would be to call a constellation a complex star." Be these 
ideas, however, simple or complex ; be they ideas of sensation, or ideas 
of reflection ; ideas of mode, of substance, or of relation, the great dif- 
ficulty is to understand in every case how each idea exists as one; how 
it is bounded, limited, and set out in the mind; and this, I say, 



8 FACULTIES OF THE MIND [CHAP. I. 



cannot be done, in any case, without an act of the mind, an exercise of 
the peculiar faculty which I call conception. 

objects. 20. What one set of writers say of ideas, another set say of 

objects. " An object, in general," says Condillac, " is whatever is 
presented to the senses, or to the mind." But still the question 
returns : What constitutes one object ? What is meant by one pre- 
sentation? Is it the sensation, or thought, which takes place in a 
minute, in a second, or in any other portion of time ? Is it the 
impression made on one sense, or on one part of the organ of that 
sense ? Is it the sensation of warmth, for instance, experienced by 
the whole body ; or that of light experienced by the whole eye ? 
Is it the impression made on the retina by a house, by the door of the 
house, by the panel of the door, or the pane of the window ? Is it the 
altitude of the building, or the colour of the brick ? These questions 
are endless, .and perfectly insoluble, if that which makes an object one 
thing to the mind be not an act of the mind itself; but if it be an act 
of the mind, then it follows, that with regard to the very first mate- 
rials of our knowledge, the mind is not wholly passive, but exer- 
cises some peculiar faculty ; which faculty I call conception. 

Attention. 21. Mons. Condillac, indeed, admits that objects are only distin- 
guished by remarking some one or other of them particularly ; and 
this particular remarking he calls attention ; and attention, according 
to him, is a simple faculty, acting only in one mode, and acting 
necessarily from an external cause. Thus he states that the cause 
of attention to sensible objects is an accidental direction of the organs ; 
manifestly, therefore, according to him, the mind is no less passive 
in attention than in sensation. 

Conception. 22. I say, on the contrary, that in conception the mind acts. The 
word " to conceive," in its origin, affords an easy explanation of the 
mode of action. This word, which is derived from con and capio, 
expresses the action by which I take up together a portion of our 
sensations, as it were water, in some vessel adapted to contain a cer- 
tain quantity ; for I have before observed that sensation is in itself 
continuous, as an ocean, without shore or soundings : it does not divide 
itself into separate portions, but is divided by the proper faculty of 
the mind. The faculty of conception, like all other faculties, operates 
by certain laws, in a certain direction, and in a certain manner ; for 
such is its constitution. It cannot enable us to view things temporal 
under the form of eternity, to conceive that a certain time occupies a 
certain space ; or that an emotion belongs to the class of sensations ; 
that jealousy, for instance, is red, or green, or blue, or smooth, or 
rough, or square, or triangular. These laws, which regulate the 
power of conceiving thoughts, it will be necessary for a while to con- 
sider. 

Space. 23. The first law that I shall notice, is that of extension. We are 

so constituted, that we cannot conceive certain objects otherwise than 
as occupying space. The faculty of conceiving them, therefore, pre- 



CHAP. I.] ON WHICH LANGUAGE DEPENDS. 9 

supposes in the mind a sense of space ; but this sense has again its 
necessary laws or modes of operation. In other words, we cannot 
conceive space but as extending in length, and breadth, and thickness, 
and bounded by points, and lines, and surfaces. It is by applying 
these laws to certain objects, that we conceive them to be more or 
less extended, and to possess different shapes and forms. To say that 
we get the idea of space by the sense of sight or touch, is to con- 
found our notions of sense, which imply an existence in space ; it is 
to reverse the order of knowledge ; for if the mind were originally 
unfurnished with a peculiar faculty, enabling, and indeed compelling 
it to refer the sensations of sight and touch to some part of space, it 
could no more acquire an idea of space from those sensations, than 
from the emotions of gratitude or fear. This peculiar faculty, 
applied to the sensations of sight and touch, of hearing, taste, and 
smell, enables us to conceive our own bodily existence, and that of 
the external world. According as we apply it more or less compre- 
hensively, we conceive the existence of objects larger or more minute : 
and according as we exercise it with more or less care and attention, 
the external forms and disposition of objects appear to us more or 
less accurately defined. It is not, therefore, the external object which 
necessarily gives shape and form to the conception ; but the con- 
ception, which by its own act embraces a given portion of space, and 
thus gives shape and form to the external object. 

24. Similar observations may be made on the law of duration, or Time. 
time. To say that time is a complex idea gathered from reflection on 

the train of other ideas, is to forget that the very notion of a train is 
that of a succession in time, and therefore presupposes what it is 
adduced to prove. There is nothing complex in the nature of time 
or duration, but it is a form under which we are necessarily forced to 
contemplate all things external to us, and some things within our- 
selves. It is a law of our nature, and so far as regards its peculiar 
objects, is inseparable from the human mind. But again, it is not 
the lapse of any particular portion of time which necessarily limits 
the duration of any object of our thoughts, for we can as easily think 
and speak of a century as of a second : it is the mind which con- 
ceives, as one object, the life of a man, or the gleam of the lightning, 
a long year of toil, or a brief moment of delight. 

25. By these laws of simple conception, whatever occupies a certain Number, 
portion of time, or of space, or of both, may be considered as one thing, 

or one thought ; but things or thoughts succeed each other incessantly, 
and by dividing sensation into units, we have done no more than we 
should do by dividing the ocean into drops, or the sand into grains. 
A further law of conception succeeds. This faculty takes a more com- 
plex form. We distinguish conceptions by their number ; and hence, 
in all languages, the noun has a plural number as well as a singular, 
in signification, and generally in form. But as the plural is derived 
from the singular, so the power of conceiving many depends on the 



Identity. 



Substantive 

and 

adjective. 



10 FACULTIES OF THE MIND [CHAP. I. 

power of conceiving one. It has been justly observed by Mr. Locke, 
that "there is no idea more simple than that of unity, or one." — 
" Every object our senses are employed about," says he, " every 
idea in our understandings, every thought in our minds brings this 
idea along with it." Now since this is the case, since no object, no 
idea, no thought, ever is conceived in our minds without this impres- 
sion of unity, why should we imagine that any can be so conceived ? 
And if it cannot be conceived without such impression, then must we 
consider the power by which that impression is produced as essential 
to the conception. Before we can speak or think of anything, we 
must first conceive it to be one. This one may be finite or infinite ; 
that is, our conception may be perfect or imperfect — but still, in 
order to become an element of reason, it must exist, as one, in the 
mind. Even the conception of many exists in the mind as that of one 
multitude ; and if that multitude be divided into distinct parts, so as 
to be numerically reckoned, the number, whatever it may be, is still 
contemplated as one number. Simple conception, indeed, could never 
have advanced us beyond the notion of an unit or integer ; it is by 
the aid of the other reasoning faculties, which I shall hereafter 
notice, that we are enabled to form the complex conceptions of 
number, and so to build up the whole science of Arithmetic. 

26. Conceptions succeed each other indifferently, whether they are 
like or unlike ; but the mind can only number them by classing 
them, and can only class them by their similarity ; which similarity, 
when complete, is in the contemplation of the mind Identity. Much 
has been said of the source from whence we derive the notion of our 
own personal identity. Surely if anything is essential, not only to 
reason, but to feeling, to will, and even to consciousness, it is this 
notion. When Descartes invented his famous reasoning, Cogito, ergo 
sum, he clearly assumed his personal identity : and it is utterly im- 
possible for a human being to reason or think at all, without such an 
assumption. Even in madness, though the actual identity is often 
confounded, though a man may fancy himself to be Alexander the 
Great, or even to be the Almighty, he has before his mind an ima- 
ginary identity : he thinks and acts as one being, and not as two : 
and again, in dreams, when we sometimes see ourselves dead, or 
alive, yet the self which we contemplate is a mere imaginary person- 
age, with whom we have a strong sympathy, as we have with the 
hero of a romance. The contemplator always seems to think and act 
as a separate individual, and never loses the deep sense of identity. 

27. If we next inquire into the different kinds of conception thus 
formed, we shall find that the ancients were right in dividing them 
into two, namely, substance and attribute; whence arise in language 
the substantive and adjective. It must be remembered that we first 
conceive, as one thing or one thought, a given portion of sensation, 
and that those sensations in their simplest form are limited by the 
laws of time and space ; but those laws are always operating on the 



CHAP. I.j ON WHICH LANGUAGE DEPENDS. 11 

mind together, though not always with equal force. Sensations Substance, 
which spread over a large extent of space may occupy a short time, 
and those which continue for a long time may lie within very narrow 
bounds of space. Many parts of space too may be contemplated in 
one moment of time, and many portions of time may refer to the 
same point of space. Our first notion of substance is personal, unless 
we should prefer saying that the notion of substance is derived from 
that of person ; which might perhaps be a more philosophical mode 
of speaking ; though the former more immediately applies to the 
common arrangements of grammarians. We refer all our states of 
being to a substance called self, to which each man gives the name of 
I: and thus I feel and know that I am the cause of all the active 
states of my being. By an inevitable necessity of my nature I am 
led to believe that there must be a cause or causes foreign to me of 
all the impressions made on me without my own act. With respect 
to myself, the conceptions which are limited by time and space give 
me the notions of matter and motion as belonging to me ; those which 
are not so limited give me the notion of mind. To external causes, 
therefore, I attribute the same distinctions of character : and hence 
the most general notion of external substance is that of a cause of the 
impressions formed in me. But one cause often appears to be com- 
mon to several different sensations. I therefore conclude that it is 
one thing. I have, for instance, the sensations of heat, and light, and 
colour, cotemporaneously, and this not once, but often : and I con- 
clude, that there is some common cause of all these sensations, to 
which cause I give the name of Fire. 

28. The notion of material substance it is said is obscure ; it is no Material 
otherwise obscure, than as a thinking and sentient being cannot sym- su s lce " 
pathise with an unthinking and insentient one. Obscure as it is said 

to be by philosophers, it is what the common bulk of mankind con- 
sider as the very plainest and clearest of all their notions. A common 
man is never troubled with any doubts of the existence of the table 
or chair that he sees before him, any more than he is of his own per- 
sonal identity. 

29. Others again think, that they have a very clear notion of the Abstract 
existence of these external objects or substances. They think that ldeas * 
they can easily understand how the mind conceives the cause of a 
particular sensation of heat, and a particular sensation of light, to 

be one object, called fire, and contemplates that object as separate 
from the sensations produced by it; but they cannot understand 
how the mind should conceive as one thing, or thought, or one object 
of contemplation, a notion common to all similar sensations. Yet it 
is certain that men frequently use words expressive of such notions, 
e. g. Gr. owtypoavvrj, Lat. temperantia, Eng. temperance — so, Gr. 
XevKorng, Lat. albitudo, Eng. whiteness, &c. These notions are by 
some writers called " abstract ideas," and supposed to be formed by a 
process of generalisation, in which the mind, after contemplating several 



Abstract 

ideas. 



12 FACULTIES OF THP] MIND [CHAP. I. 

particular objects, abstracts from each some one quality, in which they 
all agree, and regards it as "a sort of Universal, or One Being in 
Many," " ut universale quiddam, sive Ens unum in multis." But this 
neither accords with the old signification of abstract, as distinguished 
from concrete ; nor with the proper meaning of Idea : and the greater 
part of the conceptions represented to be so formed, may be shown 
to be produced in a totally different manner. Thus the conception of 
a straight line, and the consequent conception of straightness in general, 
is certainly not formed by abstracting it from various lines of various 
inequality ; for if it were so, every man would have a different notion 
of a straight line from every other man, and every man would go on 
abstracting, and consequently improving his conception of straightness 
as long as he lived. Whereas, in truths the idea of a straight line, 
as soon as it is once steadily contemplated in the mind, is perfect, and 
is equally so in all minds. This could not be the case if all minds 
did not act by some general laws ; and since we are so constituted as 
to be able to reflect on such laws, we may separate those reflections 
from the general mass of consciousness, as easily as we can separate 
a particular sensation from the same mass ; we may form of each, 
a conception, a thought, as distinct from all other thoughts as one 
external object is conceived to be separate from all other external 
objects. 

30. It is indeed objected, that these laws have no real existence ; 
that there is no truth but that of opinion, and consequently, that 
' ' two persons may contradict each other, and yet both speak truth ; " 
for such are the precise words of Mr. Home Tooke. (Vol. ii. p. 
404.) The same objection may be made with much more force 
against the existence of the external world ; for the learned and pious 
Bishop Berkeley has fully shown, that we have no assurance of the 
reality of matter or motion, but that which depends on our intui- 
tive conception of their existence, as causes of the changes which we 
experience in ourselves. But as we are utterly unable to believe, 
that there is no truth in our own existence ; and, as we find it hard 
to imagine, that this " goodly frame, the earth," this most " excellent 
canopy, the air," this "brave o'erhanging firmament," this " majes- 
tical roof fretted with golden fires," are all fictions and nonentities ; 
so it is difficult for us to imagine, that truth and virtue, beauty and 
wisdom, glory and happiness, are all empty names : we cannot well 
believe that time and space are mere fictions of our own minds ; and 
yet it is easier to believe this, than to conceive their existence ac- 
cording to laws different from those which we actually experience ; 
it is easier, for instance, to conceive that there is no real existence in 
space, than that if it exists, a straight line in space is not the shortest 
that can lie between two given points, or that a figure may be com- 
pletely bounded by two straight lines, or that the radii of a circle are 
unequal, or that the three angles of a right-lined triangle are greater 
or less than two right angles. 



CHAP. I.J ON WHICH LANGUAGE DEPENDS. 13 

31. Hence arises the distinction of subjective and objective truth. Subjective 
The former we consider as existing in ourselves, the latter as existing truth. 

in objects out of ourselves ; the truth of a mere opinion is subjective, 
the truth of the fact to which that opinion relates is objective ; but if 
all truth were merely subjective, each man's mind would be the only 
universe, and it would be a solitary universe, without a creator, with- 
out time, or space, or matter, or motion, or men, or angels, or 
heaven, or earth, or virtue, or vice, or beginning, or ending — one 
wild delusion without even a framer of the monstrous spell ! Now, 
since it is utterly impossible to believe this, either deliberately or in- 
stinctively, it follows that there is some objective truth, and that 
what a man tryeth, troweth, or trusteth to (for these are all said to be 
of the etymological family of the word truth) is in itself, more or less, 
substantial and permanent. But if this be the case with our conception 
of a stone, why not of a man ? And if of the motion of a stone, why 
not of the thoughts of a man ? And if of thoughts bounded by the 
laws of time and space, of number and identity, of good and evil, 
why not of those laws themselves ? For the purposes of Grammar, 
it is hardly necessary to press this argument ; for language has been 
made by men, according to their instinctive opinions ; and certainly 
the prevalent opinion has always been, that there is something which 
the mind contemplates, when it reasons on man in general, as well as 
when it reasons on Peter or John. It is probable that Sir Isaac 
Newton had some object before his mind when he argued on light 
and colours, as well as a lamp-lighter has, when he lights a lamp ; or 
as a country lass has, when she buys a yard of blue or red ribbon at 
a fair. 

32. Conceptions are either particular, general, or universal. In Particular 
strictness of speech nothing is particular, but that which occupies only concep ' IOnb • 
one given portion of time, or of space, or of both. Thus the emotion 

of fear at a certain moment of time ; the sensation of warmth at a 
given moment, and in a certain part of the body ; or the sensation of 
brightness in a particular part of the retina, are all particular concep- 
tions ; and it is somewhat remarkable in language, that men (in early 
ages, and before they had much turned their thoughts to reflection), 
so entirely confounded the subjective and objective truth, both of sen- 
sations and emotions, that they used the same word to denote both. 
A man, for instance, would say indifferently, " I am hot" or " the 
fire is hot." So, in common parlance, we say " the bird fears the 
scarecrow ; " but Shakspeare uses the verb fears in a sense still preva- 
lent in some parts of the country, 

We must not make a scarecrow of the law, 
Setting it up to fear the birds of prey. 

33. Nor is it only a single sensation or emotion, of which we may 
form a particular conception. We may certainly conceive as one 
thing, a substance ; that is, many sensations or emotions united in 



14 



FACULTIES OF THE MIND 



Particular 
conceptions. 



General 
conceptions. 



Universal 
conceptions. 



[chap. t. 

one common substratum ; whether that substratum be active as a 
person, or passive as a thing ; for the notion of a person is founded 
on self, as an active being, and that of a thing on the same self, as 
passive. 

34. These, I say, are the only conceptions which, in strictness of 
speech, are absolutely particular ; but almost all writers call those 
persons or things particular, which they consider to be identical : 
thus Peter or John is said, perhaps, to be a particular individual, 
though the name Peter, or John, may be given to an object which I 
have only seen on some particular occasions, and only known to be 
identical by reflection and comparison. In like manner, Pall Mall is 
the name of a particular street, though consisting of many houses ; 
and the Thames is a particular river, though flowing through several 
counties. I dwell the more on this observation, because it shows 
that those who strongly contend for the existence of nothing but par- 
ticular objects, overlook the fact, that what they call particulars are 
not such in strictness of speech ; and that, if the only business of 
the mind were to receive impressions, we could never acquire 
even what they call a particular idea or conception ; we could never 
know that the John of to-day was the same person as the John of 
yesterday. 

35. This latter species of particulars, however, is the first element 
of language. We employ signs, not to indicate a single impression, 
but the same impression often repeated ; and these are of three kinds, 
the simple sensation or simple quality producing it, which we call an 
adjective ; the simple action, which we call a participle ; and the 
person or substance in which the cause of sensation or of action 
resides, which we call a substantive, or personal pronoun. 

36. To these particulars we may add the notion of numbers, either 
distinct or confused ; for the notion of many objects or many qualities 
may still be viewed as a particular notion : and hence arise, not only 
the plural of nouns, but the singulars which imply plurality, and are 
commonly called nouns of multitude, as a troop, an army, a crowd. 

37. I have shown that a particular conception is formed by the 
mind separating and sorting its sensations and emotions according to 
certain necessary laws ; and arranging them in certain forms more or 
less distinct. Thus a certain form is that of Peter ; but the same 
form applies nearly to John, the same nearly, though with some other 
difference, to William; and so on. Now, when we contemplate 
this form as possibly applicable to a variety of particulars, it consti- 
tutes what may be called a general conception ; and these general 
conceptions, duly ordered and arranged one within the other, form 
genera and species ; and of these, more or less distinct, opinion is 
chiefly formed. 

38. But there is yet one higher step in the power of conception, 
namely, the Universal. This is when we contemplate the form itself 
in which our lower conceptions were cast, the law which governs it 



CHAP. I.J ON WHICH LANGUAGE DEPENDS. 15 

Thus, there is a certain law by which the mind can only conceive a 
straight line in a certain manner, namely, as length, and as partaking 
in no degree of curvature, nor interrupted, nor distorted in any man- 
ner whatsoever. Now, the first line that we actually conceive to be 
straight, is not exactly so, yet it approaches to the form in the mind 
sufficiently to make us give it the name of straight. The second, the 
third, the fourth, and all successive lines, are perhaps equally defi- 
cient ; and, by comparing them with each other, were there no 
common standard to refer them to, we should never attain the know- 
ledge of a simple straight line. All the lines which we actually see, 
have breadth together with their length, all have some curvature or 
irregularity ; but reflection shows us in the mind, a line, which is 
merely length without breadth, and which lies evenly between its 
points. Of this we are able to make a distinct conception, which, 
when we have once attained to, we find it entirely independent of 
time or space, always the same, necessarily true in all its relations, 
equally applicable to all the particulars which fall under it — a law of 
the mind — in short, what was alone and properly called by the 
ancients, and ought still to be called — an idea. The higher, the 
nobler, the purer these ideas are, the more difficult is it for man to 
conceive them. They are never conceived without meditation and 
effort ; and the deepest meditation, the highest stretch of our facul- 
ties, leaves us lost in admiration and awe at the great overpowering 
idea of our Almighty Father. 

39. Conceptions present themselves to our minds, either as accom- Conceptions, 
panied, or not accompanied, with a sense of objective reality. If panted to 
they are not so accompanied, they are mere creatures of the imagi- the mmd " 
nation : if they are so accompanied, then, if the object producing them 

is past, they are conceptions of memory, and if yet to come, of expec- 
tation ; but, when the object is present, the conception becomes a 
perception, whether it be of an external thing, or of a general notion, 
or of an idea. 

40. I have hitherto spoken only of the faculty of conception, by Assertion: 
which the mmd gives its thoughts then separate forms ; but we have tie ver ' 
next to see these forms put into action, and rendered, as it were, living 

and operative. Thoughts and opinions come to us in the mass ; and it 
is by resolving them into their constituent parts that we ourselves 
understand them ; but in order to communicate them to others, we 
must pursue the contrary process ; we must state the parts, and assert 
their union. Assertion, then, is the faculty which we have next to 
consider : it is, as it were, the uniting and marrying together of two 
thoughts, and pronouncing them to be one. Hence the word, which 
expresses that function of the mind, is called, by some writers, the 
copula, or bond ; but in common Grammars, the verb : and I rather 
adopt the latter term, because the former may be apt to lead to the 
erroneous conclusion, that the mind in assertion, passively contem- 
plates two thoughts as united, whereas, it is active in declaring that 



16 FACULTIES OF THE MIND [CHAP. I. 

union, ay it were, by its proper authority ; an authority, indeed, often 
exercised hastily and amiss, but still the proper act of the mind itself. 
Conception, then, forms nouns, including under that term substantives, 
adjectives, and even pronouns and participles ; but these nouns lie dead 
and inoperative to any purpose of reasoning, till they are vivified by 
the verb, which pronounces their existence to be a truth. Thus John, 
existing, good, loving, are all perfectly intelligible as conceptions of the 
mind ; yet so long as they stand alone, we see not what use is to be 
made of them in reasoning ; but let us introduce the verb, and a truth 
immediately flows from the mind, whence possibly some etymologists 
might derive pfjfxa, a verb, and reor, to think, from piiv, to flow. 
Thus we say, John exists, John is good, John loves, and each of these 
assertions at once takes the form of a truth, and becomes, as will be 
hereafter shown, the germ and seed of otlier truths in the mind. 

Affirmative 41. To assertion belong affirmation and negation. We assert, that 
' conceptions exist, or that they do not exist ; and the one of these 
excludes the other. A thing cannot be, and not be at the same time ; 
" such is the 7rpog uXXrjXa avracELfxeviov clvtiSeglq, which the Eleatic 
Philosopher, in Plato's ' Sophist,' applies to the ideas of existence 
and non-existence, and which accompanies every other idea as its 
shadow, whether in physics, in intellect, or in morals ; for the finite 
is necessarily opposed to the infinite, the false to the true, the evil to 
the good," &c. And as these conceptions are the opposites of each 
other, so affirming the one is denying the other. To say that black is 
white, is therefore, in common parlance, to utter a gross and palpable 
untruth. 

Moods. 42. Neither affirmation nor negation, however, is always positive. 

The mind contemplates some truths as actual, that is to say, it con- 
ceives the subjective truth within itself to be certainly agreeing with 
the objective truth in the nature of things, and therefore pronounces 
unhesitatingly and distinctly upon its existence ; but of other sub- 
jective truths it sees no objective counterpart, and therefore pronounces 
them not actual, but hypothetical, that is probable, or merely possible. 
On this distinction depend certain differences in the moods of verbs. 

Tenses. 43, Again, we assert truths either with or without reference to the 

time in which we speak. When we speak with such reference, as 
we most frequently do when we speak of particulars, we are neces • 
sarily compelled to distinguish the present from the past and future ; 
and hence the origin of tenses; but when we assert anything of 
ideas, we speak of a truth ever present, and therefore we use the 
present tense in its most comprehensive import. Thus, when we say 
John is good, we imply a possibility that he might at some other 
time be bad ; and when we say John is writing, we imply a certainty 
that he was not writing at some previous time, and will not be writing 
at some future time ; but when we say two and two are four, we not 
only assert a truth of to-day, or of this year, or of this century, but 
a truth which must be ever present; since we cannot conceive it 



CHAP, I.] ON WHICH LANGUAGE DEPENDS. 17 

ever to have beginning or ending. This remark is sufficient to show- 
that those grammarians are in error, who make the signification of 
time a necessary characteristic of the verb. 

44. In whatever way we assert anything, the assertion is a de- ™f v ™? nd 
daring of some truth, real or supposed ; it is a propounding of that assertion, 
truth, or, in the language of logicians, it is the enunciating of a pro- 
position. This is not done by a peculiar word, as for instance the 

word be ; but by the force and effect of the word in construction; 
for the word be, in some of its forms, as, to be, and being, is the mere 
name of a conception ; and so are the words love, hate, walk, and in- 
deed all others which may be used as verbs. Every verb, therefore, 
includes a noun; or, as has been truly said, it is "a noun, and some- 
thing more." What that "something more" is, has been much 
disputed ; but it is clearly something w T hich shows the mind of man 
to be active, not only in forming conceptions, but in uttering, pro- 
pounding, predicating, declaring, asserting them to be truths. 

45. The truth declared or asserted, regards either existence or Existence 
action. If the former, we either assert it simply of a conception, as 

" God exists;" or we assert it conjointly of two conceptions, which 
are of a nature to exist together, as the substance with its attribute, 
or the whole with all its parts, or the universal with the particular. 
Thus we say " God is good," " two and two are four," " gratitude 
is a virtue." If we assert an action, we must consider it either as 
proceeding from its cause, or as received by its passive object, that is 
to say, we must employ either the active or the passive verb ; and 
whichever we employ primarily, we may (if such be the nature of 
the action) add the other secondarily. There are, indeed, actions 
which rest in their causes ; and the verbs expressing these, whether 
active or passive, in construction, are really of the kind called neuter, 
or intransitive, such as, " to rejoice," " to sing," and the like. 

46. A truth asserted leads to a further truth, by that faculty, Conclusion, 
which Shakspeare calls " discourse," from the ancient scholastic 

and accurate term discursus. Hence that beautiful and philosophic 
passage — 

He that made us with such large discourse, 

Looking before and after, gave us not 

That capability and godlike reason 

To rust in us unused. 

The power of forming conceptions, and that of giving life and 
animation to them by assertions, would leave human reason barren 
and useless for the purposes for which it was conferred on mankind, 
without the additional power of drawing from them conclusions. All 
human beings exercise this last-mentioned power more or less dis- 
tinctly ; but it is still matter of dispute among very able writers on 
what principle its correct exercise is to be explained. Without enter- 
ing into this discussion, I shall here assume that the most perfect form 
oT reasoning or argument is that known by the name of Syllogism, 
2 c 



Review. 



Secondary 
parts of 
speech. 



18 FACULTIES OF THE MIND [CHAT. I. 

which may be shortly described as the inferring of a particular con- 
ception from an universal or general : and even in the Enthymeme, 
which is an imperfect syllogism, the universal or general, if not 
expressed is understood. The inference may be made either from 
positive, or from hypothetical premises. Hence arises a further expla- 
nation of the use of moods in the verb. We assert a truth, not as 
actual, but as possible, and the consequence which we deduce becomes 
a contingency, necessarily following from the premises, but not neces- 
sarily true, because the premises themselves are not necessarily so. 

47. Thus have I enumerated the three faculties which go to the 
making up of the reasoning power, and which are conception, asser- 
tion, and conclusion, answering to the simplex apprehensio, judicium, 
and discursus of the logicians. All continued exercise of reason re- 
solves itself into a repeated exertion of these faculties ; and the only 
difference is, that the truths produced by one conclusion serve to 
enlarge or improve the conceptions which are employed in framing 
other assertions and conclusions. 

48. Hitherto I have had occasion to notice only those operations of 
the mind, as giving birth to the primary parts of speech, the noun and 
the verb, the substantive and the adjective, the pronoun and the parti- 
ciple, which are in most cultivated languages distinguished from the 
adverb, the conjunction, and the preposition, by being subject .. to 
inflection or change of form, either in the beginning, the middle, or 
the end of the words by which they are expressed. This latter cir- 
cumstance, however, is merely accidental, and with respect to the 
essential difference of the adverb, conjunction, and preposition, from 
the other parts of speech before mentioned, I must repeat what I have 
before stated, that the mind contemplates truths at first in the mass, 
and then by reflection breaks down that mass into certain portions 
which again are subdivisible ; so that, in asserting one truth, we cast 
as it were a rapid glance over the subordinate branches of which it is 
composed; as in viewing the whole beauty and proportion of the 
Apollo Belvidere, we see at once the graceful turn of the head, the 
animated advance of the arm, and the receding of the opposite foot ; 
or as in contemplating the agonised frame of the Laocoon, the two 
sons, with the folds of the serpents which twine around them, occupy 
a secondary place in the imagination. When we come to develop 
these secondary parts of the composition, we find in them the same 
principles of unity and connexion, as in the general outline of the 
whole group : and so it is with the subordinate parts of a sentence ; 
which are, if we may use the expression, truths within truths, asser- 
tions within assertions. Thus even the long and flowing sentences of 
Milton's prose are each reducible either to an assertion, or at most to 
a conclusion, as their ground-work ; but upon that ground-work are 
built many other assertions, which are assumed, though not formally 
stated as such. Each adverb, each conjunction, each preposition, 
contains such subordinate assertion, and of course involves a con- 



CHAP. I.] OX WHICH LANGUAGE DEPENDS. 19 

ception ; it is therefore true, that these parts of speech ultimately 
resolve themselves into nouns and verbs — ultimately, I say, but in 
the first glance and motion of the mind, as it were, they only appear 
in their secondary character, as helps and expletives to the principal 
words in the sentence. 

49. The passions must not be overlooked, in considering the mind Operation of 

, . -T , T ~ , , , T^ 3 the Passions. 

in its relation to language. It often happens that an abruptness, a 
transposition, and that which might be called an irregularity, if we 
referred only to the operations of reason, become appropriate, and 
even necessary forms of speech, when the mind is under the influence 
of passion. The reasoning powers are then disturbed and imperfect : 
the emotions become inordinate, the will obtains a preternatural force. 
Hence arises the interjection, which some grammarians have refused to 
reckon among the parts of speech ; but then refusal is vain : so long 
as there are men with human passions and affections, there will be 
interjections in their speech, words which stand out from the rest, 
very significant of emotion though not of conception, defying the 
ordinary rules of construction and arrangement, because such rules 
bear reference principally to the power of reason, which is suspended 
or superseded, whenever passion produces the animated and expres- 
sive interjection. Passion, too, has given birth to what we commonly 
(though not always very appropriately) call the imperative mood. 
When Esau says, " Bless me, even me also, oh, my father !" we 
feel the earnestness of the prayer, widely different as it is from a 
command. Again, this same example shows us, that the vocative case 
of the noun is of similar origin. " Oh, my father," is a strong ex- 
pression of passion ; but it is totally dissevered in construction from 
the enunciation of any truth, and has no immediate relation to any 
operation of reason. Many other forms and modes of speech take 
then character from passion ; as may be particularly observed of the 
interrogative, so often the result of an eager desire to know the very 
fact, which, it may be, we fear and tremble to assert. 

50. It is to be observed, that all the exercises of all the human Conclusion, 
faculties may be clear or obscure, distinct or confused. Our very 
consciousness may be that of mere dotage, our feelings may be 
blunted, our will wavering and undetermined, our conceptions vague, 

our assertions doubtful, our conclusions uncertain, our passions a 
chaos. It has been elsewhere said, that " the thousand nameless 
affections, and vague opinions, and slight accidents which pass by us 
' like the idle wind,' are gradations in the ascent from nothingness to 
infinity ; these dreams and shadows, and bubbles of our nature, are a 
great part of its essence, and the chief portion of its harmony, and 
gradually acquire strength and firmness ; and pass, by no perceptible 
steps, into rooted habits and distinctive characteristics." Still the 
channels in which the stream of mind flows, so long as it has any 
current, remain always the same : the mental faculties which we 
exercise, so long as we can exercise any, are subordinated to the same 

g2 



20 FACULTIES OF THE MIND [CHAP. I. 

laws, and display themselves in the same manner. Hence speech is, 
in all nations, necessarily formed on the same principles ; and though 
no one language was ever constructed artificially, yet it is astonishing 
how distinctly all present the traces of the same mental powers, 
operating, in the same manner, on materials so exceedingly different. 

51. The general view thus taken of the human mind, appeared to 
me to be indispensable toward a right understanding of the science of 
language ; for as I consider language to be a signifying or showing 
forth of the mind, it would have been impossible for me to have ren- 
dered myself intelligible, in explaining the laws or modes of significa- 
tion, had I not first stated what I understood to be the nature of 
the thing signified. 
Gradations 52. In different languages there are some things accidentally dif- 
cience. f erent) an( j some things essentially the same. It has been owing to 
accidental circumstances in the history of mankind, for instance, that 
the name of the Universal Creator, among the Jews, was Jehovah ; 
that it is in France Dieu, and in English God ; and that the Latin 
words locum tenens came to be changed into the Italian word luogo- 
tenente, the French word lieutenant, and the English word, which we 
spell like the French, but pronounce leftenant. It is also by accident, 
that the word luogotenente signifies, in some parts of Italy, the civil 
magistrate of a small community ; that in France and England the 
word lieutenant expresses a rank in the military and marine services ; 
and that in Ireland it is applied to the viceroy, or chief representative 
of the sovereign. On the other hand it is owing to causes which 
exist more or less permanently in human nature, that in the sounds 
uttered as language by an Esquimaux, a Hottentot, or a Chinese, 
there are certain qualities common to them with the eloquent voices of 
a Cicero or a Demosthenes. Though their articulations vary in many 
respects, they all articulate ; and the nations that whistled like birds, 
or hissed like serpents, never existed but in the inventions of the same 
sort of travellers, as those who told of Cynocephali and Cyclops, and 
of men who sheltered their whole body while they slept, by the shade 
of one enormous foot. Cicero or Demosthenes, Plato or Newton, 
Dante or Shakspeare, might express sublimer, bolder, clearer, lovelier 
thoughts than men of a common stamp, but they could only express 
them according to the laws by which every human mind must neces- 
sarily act in conceiving and uttering thought. Here then we arrive at 
Universal Grammar, at the pure science, which places this part of 
knowledge on an immoveable basis, renders it demonstrable and 
certain, and connects it with that truth, which is one and uniform 
through all ages, and which rashness and ignorance perpetually assail, 
but can never subdue. 
Universal 53. It is necessary to keep in view the distinction between 

Parttaluur an(i Universal Grammar, such as it is here described, and the Particular 
crinSe^**" Grammars of different nations, ancient and modern. The word 
Grammar, taken in its most comprehensive sense, may be briefly de- 



CHAP. I.] OX WHICH LANGUAGE DEPENDS. 21 

fined, the science of the relations of language considered as significant ; 
or more accurately, the science of the relations, which the constituent parts 
of speech bear to each other in significant combination. ISTow, of those 
relations in any particular language, for instance the English, some 
are peculiar to that language, some are common to it with certain 
other languages, but not with all, and some are common to all lan- 
guages. Every particular Grammar then has to do with all these 
three classes of relations ; but Universal Grammar with the last only. 
It has been disputed whether Grammar be a science or an art. 
Universal Grammar is a science, Particular Grammar is an art ; 
though like all other arts its foundations must be laid in science ; and 
the science on which it rests is Universal Grammar. 

54. I am far from asserting that Universal Grammar has been Writers on 
hitherto so successfully cultivated, as to leave to future investigators Grammar. 
no hope of improving this science. Its principles have certainly been 
nowhere laid down with that happy and lucid order, which has ren- 
dered Euclid's Elements, for above two thousand years, a text-book 

in geometry. Much, however, has been done. The ancient Greek 
and Latin writers have traced all the principal paths of the labyrinth, 
and elegant edifices of science have been raised in modern times by 
such writers as Saxctitjs, Vossros, the writers of Port Royal, and 
the learned and amiable Harris. These grammarians, as well as 
those who in the middle ages cultivated the Arabic and its kindred 
dialects, and those whose disquisitions on Indian Philology have been 
laid open to us by recent discoveries, all agree in founding the science 
of Grammar, on that of the mental operations. 

55. Recent authors have rashly called in question the utility of these fallacies of 
learned labours. It is not to be denied, that the many new sources writers. 
of information opened to us in modern times, the numerous dialects, 
barbarous and polished, which we have the means of studying, the 
progress of the same language through many successive ages, which 

we are enabled historically to trace, and, in short, the extended sphere 
of our experimental investigations in language, may have served to 
correct some errors and oversights even in our scientific views of Uni- 
versal Grammar. But if the ancients failed (as they generally did fail) 
in what regards the history of language, some modern writers have 
much more lamentably failed in what regards its science. Instead of 
founding language on the mind, they most preposterously found the 
mind on language. " The business of the mind (says one) as far 
as it concerns language, is very simple : it extends no further than to 
receive impressions, that is, to have sensations, or feelings. What 
are called its operations, are merely the operations of language." * 
Another says : " We cannot distinguish our sensations, but by at- 
taching to them signs which represent and characterise them. This 
is what made Condillac say, that we cannot think at all without the 
help of language. I repeat it, without signs there exists neither 
* Diversions of Purler, vol. i. p. 70. 



22 FACULTIES OF THE MIND [CHAP. [. 

thought, nor perhaps even, to speak properly, any true sensation. 
In order to distinguish a sensation, we must compare it with a different 
sensation : now their relation cannot be expressed in our mind, unless 
by an artificial sign, since it is not a direct sensation." * 
Origm of 56. It is somewhat difficult to deal seriously with phrases so inco- 

herent. But let us ask, what can be meant by " the operations of 
language ? " Every operation must have an operator ; and it is the 
operator that causes the operation, and not the contrary. It is not 
the amputation that causes the surgeon, but the surgeon that performs 
the amputation. It is not the furrow that directs the ploughman ; 
but the ploughman who guiding his plough gives shape to the furrow. 
True it is, that every person who uses a word is not its inventor ; 
but somebody must have invented it. True also it is, that an indi- 
vidual may have many thoughts winch never would have entered his 
mind, had they not been first excited in it by words : he might never 
have thought of such a place as Timbuctoo, or such an animal as the 
Ornithorhynchus had he not read or heard of them ; but the name 
of the place or of the animal did not start into existence of itself. It 
was imposed by some person, and for some reason existing in that 
person's mind. 
Sensations, 57. Again, it sounds absurd to say that we cannot distinguish 
gushed? 11 " our sensations otherwise than by attaching signs to them. A burnt 
child dreads the fire because he has felt the sensation of burning, and 
not because somebody may have spoken of it in his hearing by the 
word burnt, or brule, or brugiato. Still more absurd is it to say that 
without a sign there exists neither sensation nor thought. And as to 
the concluding assertion, that the relation between two sensations 
cannot be expressed in the mind except by an artificial sign, it seems 
to be altogether unintelligible. 
Active opera 58. The chief ground of these inconsistencies is an incapacity or 
Mind. ' unwillingness on the part, of their authors to view the human mind as 
anything more than an inert mass, receiving impressions from external 
objects, and returning them back, with some modification, perhaps, 
from the structure of the mental machine, but purely mechanical ; 
such, for instance, as the light of a candle might undergo, if thrown 
on a reflector of many facets. But — 

Cum ventum ad verum est, sensus, moresque repugnant. 

The practical testimony of all human conduct is against this theory. 
The fact that every human being has within him an active energy, 

* " On ne distingue les sensations qu'en leur attachant des signes, qui les repre- 
sented et les caracterisent. Voila ce qui fait dire a Coxdillac, qu'on ne pense 
point sans le secours des langues. Je le repete, sans signes il n'existe ni pensee, ni 
peutetre meme, a proprement parler, de veritable sensation. Pour distinguer une 
sensation il faut la comparer avec une sensation diffe'rente : or, leur rapport ne peut 
etre exprime' dans notre esprit que par un signe artificiel, puisque ce n'est pas une 
sensation direct-" — Cabanis. Rapports du Physique et du Moral de l'Homme, 
vol. i. p. 72. 



CHAP. I.] ON WHICH LANGUAGE DEPENDS. 23 

a self-moving power, in short a mind governed by its own laws, and 
burttiened with its own responsibilities, is a simple truth, obvious 
alike to every unprejudiced individual, high and low, learned and 
unlearned. 

The dull swain 
Treads on it daily with his clouted shoon ; 

and it was the chosen theme of Socrates — 

Whom, well-inspired, the Oracle pronounc'd 
Wisest of men. 

59. It is this active energy, this mind or spirit of man which gives Forms of 
to speech its forms ; that is to say, the characteristics of noun, of verb, Itldby^e 
and of those other constituent parts of speech which I have noticed as 
essential tc a combined signification of any thought or feeling. The 
matter of speech consists in the articulate sounds which serve to 
express the different forms. These sounds have certain properties 
common to the bodily organization of man in general, and others 
which have been differently employed by different nations and com- 
munities. The consideration of the former is necessary as a subordi- 
nate part of Universal Grammar ; the latter belongs to particular 
grammars, and consequently to the History of Language. 



( 24 ) 



CHAPTER II. 

OF SENTENCES. 

Forms of 60. The forms of speech to which I have above adverted, chough we 

needed by the employ them, with more or less accuracy, from the very dawn of our 
mass o man- reasonj are f ar £. om fog^g obvious to the great mass of mankind. It 
is a remarkable circumstance in the constitution of our nature, that 
the most complex things are most familiar to us, that the most general 
laws, by the very reason that they are most general, anc most con- 
stantly in action, become habitual to us without our reflecting upon, 
and consequently without our understanding them. We conform to 
the complex and intricate laws of sight, we judge of distances and 
magnitudes by the angles which objects subtend, and yet during a 
great part of our lives we have not the most distant suspicbn that any 
such things as angles exist, or that they are subtended on the retina ; 
nay, ninety-nine men out of a hundred, and probably a much greater 
proportion of mankind, exercise the power of vision throughout their 
whole lives, without so much as wasting a thought on its laws. So 
it is in regard to speech. All men, even the lowest, can speak their 
mother-tongue ; yet how many of this multitude can neither write 
nor read ; how many of those who read know nothing evea of the 
grammar of their own language ; and how many who ha/e been 
instructed so far, have never studied Universal Grammar ! The fact 
is, that men at first regard the practice of speech, as the exercise of 
some natural faculty, which proceeds spontaneously from tha wish 
of communicating their thoughts and feelings. By and bj they 
observe, that this faculty operates partly from sudden impulses, and 
gives birth to expressions not easily to be analysed into any com- 
ponent parts, as in the ejaculations of Philoctetes, which fill up many 
lines of the Greek tragedy, representing his sufferings ; and that, on 
the other hand, it is in far greater part the result of thought, and 
distinguishable into portions separately intelligible. In analysing 
these, we at once perceive that every discourse, however long, consists 
of sentences ; and therefore, before I proceed to analyse speech any 
further, it may be useful to notice the different kinds of sentences. 
The sentence- 61. Our word sentence is from the Latin sententia, and that from 
sentio to feel, to think, to judge ; whence in legal language a sentence 
signified primarily the judgment formed in the judge's mind, and then 
the same judgment pronounced by him. Grammatically, it answers 
to the Greek term \6yog, as defined by Aristotle, cfxovrj (rvyderr) 
arifiavTiKrj^ tjg evia fxip-}] /ca0' avra ar\fxaivei tl — " a complex significant 



CHAP. II.] OF SENTENCES. 25 

sound, of which certain parts are significant by themselves ; "* which 
definition, so far as it goes, is correct ; but for the fuller understand- 
ing of the subject, I would suggest the following : "A sentence is a 
number of words put together, and obtaining from their combination, 
a particular power of enunciating some truth, real or supposed, abso- 
lute or conditional, or else of expressing some distinct passion, together 
with its object." From this definition, it would follow, that the 
main distinction in classifying sentences should be into the enunciative, 
and the passionate ; or, as Harris calls them, sentences of assertion, 
and sentences of volition. Other writers have classed them somewhat 
differently, but yet with reference to similar principles. Thus Am- 
monius states that there are four kinds of sentences besides the 
enunciative, namely, the interrogative, the optative, the deprecatory, 
and the imperative ; but that in the enunciative alone is contained 
truth or falsehood. 

62. The enunciative sentence, like all others, obtains its power of ^l^ntence! 
expressing fact or opinion, by the connection of the words of which 

it is composed ; for Aristotle observes (what indeed is self-evident), 
that " of those words which are spoken without connection, there is 
no one either true or false ; as for instance, ' man ' — ' white ' — 
' runneth ' — ' conquereth.' " But let us put together only these two 
words — 

Jesus wept, 

and we have recorded an historical fact most affecting in itself, and 
furnishing abundant food for deep and interesting meditation. 
When we read in Shakspeare — 

The quality of mercy is not strained, 

we immediately perceive the enunciation of a beautiful truth, which 
is again presented under an expressive form to the imagination by the 
following lines — 

It droppeth as the gentle rain from heaven 
Upon the place beneath. 

So when Milton says — 

in the soul 

Are many lesser faculties, which serve 
Eeason, as chief, 

a truth respecting our intellectual (as the former did our moral) 
nature is distinctly asserted. 

63. This kind of sentence may enumerate many particulars, all 
bearing on one point of time, or referring to one general idea : such is 
the following picturesque delineation of what presented itself to young 
Orlando, when in pacing through the forest, chewing the cud of sweet 
and bitter fancy, he threw his eye aside — 

* Poetic, s. 34. 



26 OF SENTENCES. [CHAP. II. 

Under an oak, whose boughs were moss'd with age, 

And high top bald, of diy antiquity, 

A wretched ragged man, o'ergrown with hair, 

Lay sleeping on his back ; about his neck 

A green and gilded snake had wreath'd itself, 

Who, with her head, nimble in threats, approach'd 

The opening of his mouth ; but suddenly 

Seeing Orlando, it unlink'd itself, 

And with indented glides, did slip away 

Into a bush ; under which bush's shade 

A lioness, with udders all drawn dry, 

Lay couching, head on ground with cat-like watch, 

When that the sleeping man should stir. 

Such also is the following argumentative sentence m Bishop 
Taylor's Sermon on the Duties of the Tongue, urging the Christian 
office of administering consolation to the afflicted. : — 

God hath given us speech, and the endearments of society, and pleasantness of 
conversation, and powers of seasonable discourse, arguments to allay the sorrow bv 
abating our apprehensions, and taking out the sting ; or telling the periods of 
comfort ; or exciting hope ; or urging a precept, and reconciling our affections, 
and reciting promises ; or telling stories of the Divine mercy ; or changing it into 
duty ; or making the burden less by comparing it with greater, or by proving it to 
be less than we deserve, and that it is so intended and may become the instrument 
of virtue. 

The interro- 64. Under the head of enunciative sentences I include the interro- 
tence. gativc ; for the same fact which is simply asserted may be stated as 

beyond the sphere of the speaker's knowledge, or as being doubted by 
him, and desirable to be known. This is commonly effected in 
language by a slight transposition of the words, sometimes by a mere 
change of accentuation. As in Sterne's celebrated sermon, " We trust 
that we have a good conscience." — " Trust that we have a good con- 
science ? " Again, by transposing the lines above quoted, we make 
them interrogations — 

Is not the quality of mercy strained ? 
Droppeth it as the gentle rain from heaven ? 

But it is to be observed, that as some degree of emotion is implied 
in the very nature of an interrogation, so it is often used by the poets, 
orators, and others, to give life and animation to their style, although 
no doubt exists in their mind or that of then hearers, and the matter 
which is questioned in point of form, is meant to be asserted in point 
of fact. Thus when the poet says — 

who to dumb forgetfulness a prey, 

This pleasing, anxious being e'er resign'd ? 

he means positively to assert that no one ever quitted life with in- 
difference. The humorous speech of Falstaff, when personating the 
king, illustrates our observation — 

Shall the blessed sun of heaven prove a micher, and eat blackberries ? A 
question not to be asked. Shall the son of England prove a thief and take purses ? 
A question to be asked." 



CHAP. II.] OF SENTENCES. 27 

65. Again, the enunciative sentence may be conditional or con- T >e condi- 

& , . . t i t . i i . tional sen- 

tingent ; that is, it may be placed m dependence on, or in counter- tence. 
balance against, some other truth ; as in Macbeth — 

If it were done, when 'tis done, then t'were wel 
It were done quickly. 

Or in Hamlet — 

■ Duller should'st thou be than the fat weed 

That rots itself at ease by Lethe's stream, 
Wouldst thou not stir in this.' 

Or again in Macbeth, where the contingency takes place in spite of 
obstacles which might be supposed capable of preventing it — 

Though Birnam wood be come to Dunsinane, 
And thou oppos'd being of no woman born, 
Yet will I try the last. 

66. In all these and similar instances, the enunciation of a truth The passion 
is the immediate object in view : but another class of sentences owe ate sentence * 
their form and construction solely to some passion, of which they 
indicate the object. And it is to be observed, that the indication of 

an object of passion is essential to the constitutmg such sentences as 
these. Thus, when the Nurse, in Komeo and Juliet, on finding her 
young lady dead, cries and laments vociferously, and the parents 
enter, asking, " What noise is here? What is the matter?" Her 
answers, " lamentable day ! " " heavy day," are not sentences; 
for, though they plainly show the grief with which she is agitated, 
they do not at all express the cause or object of that grief. But 
when Hamlet cries — 

! that this too, too solid flesh would melt, 
Thaw and resolve itself into a dew ! 

we perceive a distinct expression of the wish to be delivered of life, 
as burthensome to him. The sentence is as complete and grammatical, 
and much more poetic, than if the place of the interjection O ! had 
been supplied by a verb ; for instead of an impassioned and beautiful 
line, it would have been perfectly absurd, if the poet had said — 

1 icish that this too solid flesh would melt ! 

67. We may observe, that these passionate sentences, combine 
quite as readily as the enunciative with dependent sentences, as 
" O ! that I had wings like a dove ! Then would I flee away and 
be at rest ; " which implies (but more forcibly) the same fact as the 
sentence, " If I had wings like a dove, I would flee away," &c. 

68. Sentences of the passionate kind either express a passive 
feeling, as admiration and its contrary, or an active volition, as desire 
and its contrary. Of the former kind, is that passage of the apostle, 
" O ! the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and knowledge 
of God ! " and the line of Milton, comparing the receptacle of the 
fallen Spirits with their former happy seat — 

! how unlike the place from whence they fell ! 



28 OF SENTENCES. [CHAP. II. 

It^slntenc"". Those sentences which express desire and aversion are commonly 
expressed by the mood called imperative ; but they as often imply 
humble supplication or mild intreaty, as authoritative command; 
and in such cases are called by some precative. Thus the poet describes 
Adam gently calling on Eve to awake — 

He, with voice 
Mild as when Zephyrus on Flora breathes, 
Her hand soft touching whisper'd thus : Awake, 
My fairest, my espous'd, my latest found, 
Heav'n's last, best gift, my ever new delight, 
Awake ! 

And again, when our first parents offer up in lowly adoration their 
morning orisons, they say — 

Hail, universal Lord, be bounteous still 
To give us only good ! 

But these emotions are widely different from others, expressed in 
the same form of sentence : as when King Henry says to Hotspur — 

Send us your prisoners by the speediest means, 
Or you shall hear from us in such a sort 
As may displease you. 

Or when Juliet exclaims — 

Gallop apace, ye fi'ry-footed steeds, 
To Pncebus' mansion ! 

Or when Macbeth cries to the ghost of Banquo — 

Avaunt! and quit my sight ! Let the earth hide thee ! 

69. Passionate sentences are generally short ; but their repetition 
in continuous succession is often a beauty of the highest kind, es- 
pecially in poetry. The mighty Master of Poetry, inimitable in this, 
as in all the vast variety of styles which he adopts, has given an 
instance of the passionate iteration of feeling, in one of his earliest 
productions, the " Rape of Lucrece." After a beautiful enunciation 
of the powerful effects of time — (" Time's glory is to calm contending 
kings," &c. &c) — Lucretia calls on Time to heap evils on the head 
of her ravisher — 

Disturb his hours of rest with restless trances ! 

Afflict him in his bed with bedrid groans ! 

Let there bechance him, pitiful mischances, 

To make him moan, but pity not his moans ! 

Stone him with harden' d hearts, harder than stones ! 
And let mild women to him lose their mildness, 
Wilder to him than tigers in their wildness ! 

Let him have time, to tear his curled hair ! 

Let him have time, against himself to rave ! 

Let him have time, of Time's help to despair ! 

Let him have time, a beggar's oris to crave ; 
And time to see one that by alms doth live, 
Disdain to him disdained scraps to give ! 



CHAP. II.] OF SENTENCES. 29 

Let him have time, to see his friends his foes, 

And merry fools to mock at him resort ! 

Let him have time, to mark how slow time goes 

In time of sorrow ; and how swift and short, 

His time of folly, and his time of sport ! 
And ever let his unrecalling crime 
Have time to wail th' abusing of his time ! 

The passion, which would dictate this terrific variety of imagery 
in its maledictions, might well arm the injured woman (Roman as she 
was) to the act of self-sacrifice so celebrated in history. 

70. The examples hitherto given are of perfect sentences ; but imperfect 
instances often occur in which a sentence is manifestly left imperfect, 
and that with great beauty, as in the well-known line of Virgil — 
Quos ego — sed motos praestat componere fmctus. 

And so Satan first addresses Beelzebub, in the opening of the 
Paradise Lost — 

If thou be'st he — but oh ! how chang'd, how fallen ! 
In both these cases, the words, though not in themselves fully and 
clearly expressive of the thought which we may suppose to be in the 
speaker's mind, are yet not wholly unconnected, and, therefore, show 
at once that they are parts of sentences which, indeed, it would be 
easy for the reader to fill up in his own imagination. 



( 30 ) 



CHAPTER III. 



OF WORDS, AS PARTS OF SPEECH. 



Words. 



Composition 
of words. 



71. The next step in the grammatical analysis of Speech is to resolve 
Sentences into their significant parts, namely Words ; for most per- 
sons will readily grant that a sentence consists of words ; and that 
every word has some separate force or meaning, as so used. The 
origin of our term " Word" is lost in the obscurity of ages. It comes 
to us from a Teutonic source, and appears in many dialects, as 
in Mceso-Gothic, Waurd; Anglo-Saxon, Word; Dutch, Woord; 
Frankish and Alamannic, Wort; Danish, Swedish, and Icelandic, 
Ord, whence it would seem not improbably to be allied to Oro, 
which in old Latin was to speak. Be this as it may, in its gram- 
matical import, as it will here be used, Word answers to the Latin 
Dictio, which that admirable grammarian Priscian defines " the 
least part of a constructed (that is, orderly-composed) sentence; 
understanding a part to be such in relation to the meaning of the whole 
sentence." 

72. Words themselves may, indeed, generally be subdivided as to 
sound into syllables, and these syllables into letters. But where a 
word is capable of such subdivision, the syllables or letters, though 
they may signify something separately in other sentences, are not 
separately significant with relation to the sentence in which the word is 
used. Thus, to take Priscian's instance, in Virgil's sentence, — 

Fama vires acquirit eundo ; 

the two syllables vi and res form parts of the word vires ; but they 
are only parts of its sound ; they have no separate signification with 
relation to the sentence here quoted. Yet, in other sentences, each of 
these syllables may form a word, if it be significant, in relation to the 
sentence in which it is used ; as — 

volat vi fervidus axis 

And elsewhere — 

Res dura et regni novitas me talia cogunt 
Moliri. 

So the English term handsome is to be taken as one word in a sen- 
tence, in relation to which it has one signification, e.g., comely, beau- 
tiful, or liberal ; but in another sentence, where hand signifies a 
portion of the human body, and some an indefinite quantity or num- 
ber, it forms two words. The same may sometimes be said even of 
a single letter ; for instance, the letter i, in most words, has no sepa- 



CHAI\ III.] OF WORDS, AS PARTS OF SPEECH. 31 

rate signification ; but when it stands alone, as a significant part of a 
sentence, it is then a word, as in the Latin — 

/, decus, i nostrum, melioribus utere fatis ! 

And so in the English — 

always / am Caesar. 

73. " If, therefore, all speech," says Harris, " whether in prose or Words, the 

,-. r ■ ,. J t r , smallest piirts 

verse, every whole, every section, every paragraph, every sentence, of speech, 
imply a certain meaning, divisible into other meanings, but words 
imply a meaning which is not so divisible, it follows that words will 
be the smallest parts of speech ; inasmuch as nothing less has any 
meaning at all." This argument would have been more accurately 
stated had the accomplished author inserted, after " a meaning not so 
divisible," the clause above employed, viz., " with relation to the 
sentences in which they are used." The want of some such explana- 
tory cause has led to much misapprehension of Mr. Harris's whole 
doctrine. It has been assumed that he meant by signification some- 
thing positive ; that a certain sound must be under all circumstances 
significant, or under all circumstances destitute of signification ; 
whereas the science of Grammar is relative; the signification of a 
sentence, be it a simple or a complex, a long or a short one, depends 
on the mutual relation of all its parts ; and the signification of one 
word in a sentence depends on its relation to another in the same 
sentence. In this sense, we must understand the proposition that 
words are the least parts of speech capable of grammatical classifi- 
cation; how they are to be classed remains to be considered, for 
some principles of classification are better than others. It is not suf- 
ficient that we comprehend all our notions on a given subject imder 
certain heads; but we must be prepared to show why we choose 
those heads rather than others. 

74. Take, for instance, Shakspeare's well-known lines — 

The man that hath no music in himself, 

Nor is not mov'd with concord of sweet sounds, 

Is fit for treasons 

Here we know that various grammatical writers call the word the Parts of 

SD66Cu.a 

an article ; man, music, concord, and sounds, substantives, or nouns 
substantive ; no, sweet, and fit, adjectives, or nouns adjective ; that, 
and himself, pronouns ; hath and is, verbs ; moved, a participle ; not, 
an adverb ; and, a conjunction ; in, with, and for, prepositions. 

75. The first question that occurs to us is, whether these classes 
themselves are all recognised in all languages, and by all grammarians ? 
And a very little experience will show that they are not. The same 
thing has happened in Grammar, which has happened in all other 
sciences. Some authors have divided speech into two parts, some 
into three, four, and so on to ten or twelve. Others again have made 
their division depend on the supposed utility of words; others on 



32 OF WORDS, AS PARTS OF SPEECH. [CHAP. III. 

Seech/ tneir variat i° n '> others on the external objects to which they refer, 
and others on the mental operations which they express. On this 
point, it is worth while to hear what Quintilian says, in the fourth 
chapter of his first book — "On the number of the parts of speech, 
there is but little agreement. For the ancients, amongst whom were 
Aristotle and Theodectes, laid it down, that there were only verbs 
and nouns, and combinatives (convinctiones) ; intimating that there was 
in verbs the force of speech, in nouns the matter (because what we 
speak is one thing, and what we speak about is another), and that 
the union of these was effected by the combinatives, which I know 
most persons call conjunctions ; but I think the former word answers 
better to the original Greek avvletr^og. By degrees the philosophers, 
and particularly the Stoics, augmented the number ; and first, they 
added to the combinative the article, then the preposition. To the 
noun they added the appellative, then the pronoun, and then the parti- 
ciple, being of a mixed nature with the verb ; and finally to the verb 
itself, they subjoined the adverb. Our (Latin) language does not 
require articles, and therefore they are scattered among the other parts 
of speech ; but we have added to the others the interjection. Some 
writers of good repute, however, follow the doctrine of the eight parts 
of speech, as Aristarchus, and in our own day Palamon, who have 
ranked the vocable, or appellative under the noun, as one of its species ; 
whilst those who divide it from the noun, make nine parts. Again 
there are others who divide the vocable from the appellative, calling 
by the former name all bodies distinguishable by sight and touch, as 
a bed, or a house, and by the latter what is not distinguishable by one 
or both these means, as the wind, heaven, virtue, God. These last- 
mentioned authors, too, add what they call asseverations, as (the 
Latin) Heu ! and attractations, as (the Latin) fasceatim ; but these 
distinctions I cannot approve. As to the question whether or not the 
vocable or appellative should be called irpoa-qyopia, and ranked under 
the noun, as it is a matter of little moment, I leave it to the free 
judgment of my readers." 

76. Although Quintilian, who only touches on Grammar incident- 
ally, speaks of Aristotle as maintaining that there were three parts of 
speech, yet Varro says truly that Aristotle asserted there were two 
parts of speech, the verb and the noun. In fact, Aristotle, in his 
book 7rep) epurjveiag, treats of these two alone ; considering that of 
them is made a perfect sentence, as "Socrates philosophises:" and 
therefore Priscian says " the parts of speech are, according to the 
logicians, two, viz., the noun and the verb, because these alone, con- 
joined by their own force, make up a full speech, or sentence ; but 
they called the other parts syncatagorematics, or consignificants. 
Priscian, himself, however, maintained that there were eight parts of 
speech; and he seems to have been implicitly followed for many 
centuries ; but, though it is of little consequence whether we give the 
name of parts to particular divisions or subdivisions, it is of great im- 



CHAP. III.] OF WORDS, AS PARTS OF SPEECH. 33 

portance to determine on what principle speech should be divided and 
subdivided. 

77. Recurring, therefore, to the sentence above quoted from Shak- 
speare, let us inquire how the words can be grammatically distin- 
guished: and many various modes will readily present themselves: — 

78. It may be observed that some of the words admit of varia- Variable and 
tion, and others do not. Thus man may be varied into mans and words. 
men : hath into have, hast, had, and having : sweet into sweeter, and 
sweetest, &c, and, on the contrary, the words the, in, and, not, &c, 

cannot be altered. But this is manifestly not an essential distinction, 
since it does not take place in the same manner in all languages ; but, 
on the contrary, every language is distinguished, more or less, from 
every other, by peculiar modes of varying its words. Thus the 
Gothic, Greek, Hebrew, Sanscrit, and Arabic languages, and it is said, 
those of Patagonia, Lapland, and Greenland, have a variation in some 
or all of their nouns to mark the dual number, which is unknown to 
our own and many other tongues. So the Greeks and Eomans 
varied their adjectives by the triple change of gender, number, and 
case ; whereas the English never vary them in any of those ways. 
If then the distinction of variable and invariable will not answer our 
purpose, let us look for one that is more essential. 

79. Having considered in the former instance the sound of the Affective and 
word, I shall now take a distinction which arises from its significa- pm-SoT 6 
tion. Thus M. Beauzee divides the parts of speech into two classes, speec ' 

of which he says " the first includes the natural signs of sentiment, the 
other the arbitrary signs of ideas : the former constitute the language 
of the heart, and may be called affective ; the latter belong to the lan- 
guage of the understanding, and are discursive" It is manifest that 
the principle of this distinction is universal ; for though M. Beauzee 
does not use the word " Ideas " in the senseless manner introduced 
by Descartes and followed by Locke, "pro omni re cogitata," but for 
acts of the understanding or reason alone, as distinguished from senti- 
ment or feeling, yet the two classes taken together are applicable to 
language in general ; for all men must be influenced by sentiment and 
understanding, and all languages must possess some means of distin- 
guishing these different faculties. But the question is, whether this 
distinction is sufficient to account for the different classes of words : 
and most assuredly it is not ; for though there are some words which 
express only the objects of sentiment, and others which express only 
the objects of knowledge, yet there are many which express both to- 
gether, and many which directly express neither. Nor is it always 
sufficient to use a word of one class in order to convey either an emo- 
tion or a truth. These circumstances more frequently depend upon 
the combination, than upon the distinction of words. 

80. Let us now come to a third distinction, that of the Port Royal Object and 
Grammarians, who say ' ' the greatest distinction of what passes in 

our minds, is to consider in it the objects of our thoughts, and the 
2. D 



34 OF WORDS, AS I' ARTS OF SPEECH. [CHAP. III. 

form or manner of our thoughts, of which latter the principal is rea- 
soning or judging ; but to this must be added the other movements of 
the soul, as desire, command, interrogation, &c." This, again, is a 
distinction universally applicable to language in point of signification : 
and when we come to apply it to existing languages, it will be found 
sufficiently accurate, 
woidfanci ^1. But it has been observed, that this may be done with more 

abbrevia- or less facility and despatch ; and that some words are absolutely 
necessary for the communication of thought, whilst others may be 
considered as abbreviations, in order to make the communication more 
rapid and easy; as a sledge may have been first constructed to 
draw along heavy goods, and may have been afterwards placed on 
wheels to add celerity to the motion. ' Such is the theory of Mr. 
Horne Tooke, and so far as we are here considering it, that theory 
is perfectly just. 
Principal and 82. The words which are necessary for communicating the thought 
words? ry in any given sentence with the utmost simplicity, may well be called 
principals, and those which only help to make out the thought 
more fully and distinctly may be called accessories. These are the 
terms employed by Mr. Harris, and consequently his theory so 
far coincides with that of Mr. Tooke. Mr. Harris, however, adds, 
that the principals are significant by themselves, and the accessories 
significant by relation : whereas, Mr. Tooke says that the necessary 
words are signs of things, and the abbreviations are signs of necessary 
words. I shall hereafter have occasion to enter more at large into 
this part of his doctrine. It is sufficient at present to observe, that 
the doctrine does not interfere with the fundamental principle of 
classification in all Grammars which deserve the name; that is to 
say, of all which have proceeded on the signification of words, and 
not merely on their sound. 
Noun and t 83. Now, this principle, in whatever terms it is clothed, is, that 
opinion. a ° 3 the noun and the verb are the primary parts of speech ; and that with- 
out them, neither can a truth be enunciated, nor a passion expressed, 
in combination with its object. This principle is the most ancient. 
It boasts the support of the greatest of philosophers, of him, whom 
for many ages, even Christianity recognised by the title of "the 
divine," as approaching the nearest of all heathens to the divine light 
of the Gospel. Plato, in his Dialogue called The Sophist, having 
most profoundly and unanswerably argued on the nature of truth, 
thus speaks of language : " We have in language two kinds of mani- 
festation respecting existence, the one called nouns, the othei verbs. 
We call the manifestation of action a verb ; but that sign of speech 
which is imposed on the agent himself a noun. Therefore, of nouns 
alone, uttered in any order, no sentence (or rational speech) can be 
composed, neither can it be composed of verbs without nouns ; thus 
* goes," * runs,' ' sleeps,' and such other words as signify action, 
even though they should all be repeated in succession, would not 



CHAP. in. J OF WORDS, AS PAETS OF SPEECH. 35 

make up a sentence. And again, if any one should say ' lion,' 
* stag,' ' horse,' or should repeat the names of all the things which 
do the actions before-mentioned, still no sentence would be made up 
by all this enumeration ; for, neither in the one way, nor in the other, Notm and 
do the words spoken manifest any real action, or inaction, or declare 
that anything exists, or does not exist, until the verbs are mixed with 
the nouns. Then, at length, the very first interweaving of them to- 
gether, makes a sentence, however short; thus, if any one should 
say, ' man leams,' you would pronounce at once that it was a sen- 
tence, though as short a one as possible ; for then, at last, something 
is declared which either exists, or has been done, or is doing, or will 
be done ; and the speaker does not merely name things, but limits 
and marks out their existence, by interweaving verbs with nouns, and 
then, at last, we say ' he discourses, and does not merely recite 
words.' " The only great name that for nearly 2000 years was ever 
brought into competition with Plato's, was that of his scholar Aeis- Aristotle's 
totle ; but Aristotle also, as has been seen, agreed with Plato, in 
stating the noun and the verb as the two primary parts of speech, and 
indeed the only parts necessary to be considered in the formation of a 
simple sentence. In other portions of his works, looking at the com- 
position of language in a more general point of view, he enumerated 
three parts, viz., the noun, the verb, and the connective ; and, finally, 
in his treatise on Poetry, s. 34, he enumerated two parts of speech as 
significant, viz., the noun and the verb ; and two as non-significant, 
viz., the article and conjunction. 

84. The doctrine that the noun and verb are the primary parts of o/ n ^i| dea 
speech, is incontestable. Apollonius, the grammarian, calls them 

the most animated ; and all grammarians concede to them, at least, 
the superiority over all the other parts of speech, in whatever manner 
they choose to account for their preference. I am not, however, 
inclined to adopt this, as the first step in a methodical arrangement ; 
because I conceive that by approaching to the most general idea of 
speech, it will be easier to reconcile the apparent differences, and to 
correct the real errors of the different grammatical systems. I have 
already defined speech to be the language of articulate sounds ; and 
language to be any intentional mode of communicating the mind. 
The most general idea of speech, therefore, is, that it is any inten- 
tional mode of communicating the mind by articulate sounds. Now, 
keeping in view this idea, let us see how it will apply to the doctrines 
of those grammarians whom I have already mentioned, in respect to 
the mode of distributing speech into its parts. 

85. When writers of any eminence advance a particular doctrine, Combination 
we may generally be persuaded, that it is not wholly destitute of oftheones - 
foundation ; although, from the natural partiality that men have for 

their own thoughts, they may probably rank such doctrines higher 
than they deserve. All the different theories that I have here noticed 

d2 



36 OF WORDS, AS PARTS OF SPEECH. [CHAP. III. 

are true, to a certain degree, and, by combining them together, the 
best and clearest view of our subject may perhaps be attained. 

combination 86. In the method which I am disposed to pursue, the principle 
of M. Beauzee first merits attention. There are words which are 
simply affective, namely, interjections ; all other words are discursive, 
inasmuch as they may be employed in expressing the operations of 
reason. Again, all words which are employed in reasoning must be 
considered either as principals, or as accessories, and thus the common 
principle of Harris and Tooke may be combined with that of 
Beauzee ; but with this caution, that the question whether a parti- 
cular word be a principal or an accessory, depends on the relation 
which that word hears to the sentence in which it is employed. I repeat 
this ; because it has been often overlooked by grammarians, many of 
whom seem not to have adverted to the circumstance that speech is 
an expression of the mind, when actually engaged in some operation. 
They treat words as if they were corporeal substances, cast in a 
mould, for use. Now, the very same words, that are principals in 
one sentence, may become accessories in the next. The principal 
words in a sentence are of course necessary for the communication of 
thought ; but we cannot communicate what we do not comprehend ; 
and as we cannot comprehend any thought without first conceiving it 
as an object, so we cannot communicate it to others, unless we either 
assert something concerning it, or express some emotion in connexion 
with it. Here, therefore, the theory of the Port Royal gram- 
marians properly finds its place ; for they include the assertion of a 
truth and the expression of an emotion under the words, " the 
manner of thinking." With respect to the writers who divide words, 
according as they are susceptible of variation, or the contrary, although 
it is true that such a quality exists in the words of most languages, 
yet it cannot be taken into consideration in treating of Universal 
Grammar, being a circumstance merely contingent and accidental. 

Recapituia- 87. The result, therefore, of the preceding remarks, is, that speech 
should be considered as intended to communicate either passion or 
reason : when it communicates mere passion, without any. precise 
object, it supplies the part of speech called the interjection ; when it 
communicates passion, and at the same time indicates an object, it 
indirectly reasons, and therefore employs some at least of the parts of 
speech, "which are required in reasoning. Now, the parts of speech 
required in reasoning are either such as are necessary to form a simple 
sentence, or such as serve for accessories, in order to give complexity 
to sentences ; but a simple sentence cannot be formed without a noun 
and a verb, and is immediately formed by putting a noun and a verb 
together. The noun and the verb then are the necessary parts of 
speech, the former serving to name the conception, the latter to 
supply in reasoning the assertion, or in passion the emotion. There 
is, however, one observation very important to be made with respect 



tion. 






CHAP. III.] OF WORDS, AS PARTS OF SPEECH. 37 

to the verb, namely, that it involves a noun; that is to say, we 
cannot assert a truth, or express an emotion, which truth or emotion 
may not be considered by the mind as a conception. Thus, if we 
say " God exists" we excite in the mind the two distinct conceptions 
of " God" and " Existence," as much as if we said, *' God is in 
existence ;" and so if we say " Come, Antony," we excite the con- 
ception of coming, as well as of Antony ; but the difference is, that 
the words " come" and " exists" are not presented to the hearer as 
mere objects of thought, but as modes of thinking about other objects, 
viz., " Antony" and " God." The principle, on which the noun and 
the verb are to be reckoned among the parts of speech, being thus 
fixed, will enable us to clear up several difficulties which occur in the 
subdivision of these classes. 

88. The old grammarians in general divided nouns into nouns sub- Substantive 
stantive and nouns adjective ; but R. Johnson, Harris, Lowth, and ^ d]ectlve> 
others, consider the substantive alone as a noun ; and Harris ranks 

the adjective with the verb, under the common name of attributive. 
Tooke asserts that the adjective is truly and simply a substantive : 
whilst a recent writer contends that primitive nouns are not names of 
things, at least not of substances or material objects, but of their 
qualities or attributes. The latter theory is so far plausible, that the 
names of many substances are derived from their qualities, as the 
words denoting a Fox, in English, German, and Sanscrit, signify a 
hairy animal, while those in Persian and Icelandic denote a thievish 
animal ; but this is a mere fact in the history of language, and involves 
no such necessity in the constitution of the human mind, as to render 
it a principle in the science of language. The question is, whether 
we cannot as readily form a conception of an attribute or quality, as 
of the substance to which it belongs, and vice versa. Now, if we 
appeal to common experience, we shall find that men of the most 
untutored or most uncultivated minds have as clear a conception ot 
the colour " blue," as they have of a garment, and can as readily 
distinguish " blue" from " red," as they can a " coat" from a 
" cloak." To every ordinary understanding, the "Sun," a " Horse," 
or a " Man," is an object of thought, and therefore may have a name, 
which name is a noun; but " bright," " swift," "wise," are also 
objects of thought, and therefore have names, which names should in 
like manner be deemed nouns. 

89. A noun is considered substantively, when in asserting anything Tsoun sub- 
concerning it, we make it the subject of the assertion, and regard it stantlve - 
as that to which some other noun relates, expressing a quality belong- 
ing to it, or an action done or suffered by it, or a class to which it 
belongs. Thus, when we say, " Socrates was wise," " the Horse is 
running," •' Prudence is a virtue," the words " Socrates," " Horse," 

and " Prudence," are nouns substantive. 

90. A noun is considered adjectively, when in asserting anything Nounadjec- 
concerning it, we refer it to some other noun, as that of which it lve * 



38 



OF WORDS, AS PARTS OF SPEECH. 



[CHAP. III. 



expresses a quality. Thus, when we say, " Socrates was wise," we 
contemplate wisdom only so far as it was a quality of Socrates ; and 
the noun " wise" is therefore a noun adjective. In this case, the 
assertion is direct; but the same consequence results where the 
assertion is merely implied ; for, if we say " wise Socrates dwelt at 
Athens," we impliedly assert that he was wise, though the direct 
assertion is only that he dwelt at Athens ; " wise/' therefore, in this 
instance also, is a noun adjective. As to the above-mentioned sen- 
tences, " the Horse is running," and " Prudence is a virtue," they 
will hereafter demand consideration, in a different point of view. 

Participles. 91. When we speak of Socrates as wise, we speak of him as pos- 
sessing a quality fixed and permanent ; but if, instead of saying 
Socrates is wise, we say " Socrates is speaking," or " is walking," or 
" was speaking " or " was walking," or " will be speaking " or " will 
be walking," we speak of a quality in action at a given time : and 
this difference of meaning has led grammarians to distinguish words of 
the latter class from nouns, and to call them participles ; because they 
participate of the nature of a noun, and also of the nature of a verb, as 
it will presently be explained. Since the word participle has been so 
long in use among grammarians as designating a separate part of 
speech, I shall not hesitate so to use it ; for although in some lan- 
guages (as it is said, in the Ethiopic) there is no peculiar form cor- 
responding to this distinction, there must always exist in the human 
mind a difference between the operations which answer to our word 
adjective, and those which answer to our word participle. It must be 
remembered, however, that both fall under the definition of a noun, as 
the mere name of a conception in the mind, without asserting that it 
does exist or does not ; for " Socrates walking" is no more an assertion 
than " Socrates wise," without the interposition of a verb, such as 
" is," or " has been," or " will be." Of the Latin gerunds and supines, 
which some reckon among participles, I shall speak hereafter. 

Pronouns. 92. Hitherto I have spoken of nouns substantive and adjective in 

their primary mode of use ; but there is a secondary operation of the 
mind, which makes certain nouns act as mere representatives (so to 
speak) of whole classes of other nouns. These representative, or 
secondary nouns, are called by -grammarians pronouns,, and form in all 
languages very conspicuous parts of speech. They are divided, like 
the primary nouns which they represent, into substantive and ad- 
jective ; thus, " I" "thou," and " Ae," are pronouns representing 
substantive nouns, namely, " I," the speaker, when speaking of him- 
self; "thou," the person to whom he directs his discourse; and 
" he," some other person. On the other hand, when we say " this 
man and that man," this and that are pronouns, the former represent- 
ing some noun adjective, such as "near," or "present," or "first," 
the latter representing a different noun adjective, such as " distant," 
or " absent," or " second." But these and other distinctions of 
the pronoun I shall presently consider more in detail. The Article, 



CHAP, in.] OF WOEDS, AS PAETS OF SPEECH. 39 

which has frequently been treated as a pronoun, and which, in those The Article, 
languages in which it exists, was originally a pronoun, represents the 
exercise of that faculty of the mind by which we limit an uni- 
versal or general conception to a particular conception. In this 
respect it differs from the pronoun, as well as from the adjective and 
substantive nouns, and may therefore properly be considered as a 
separate part of speech ; but inasmuch as it neither expresses an 
emotion, nor is necessary to form a simple sentence, I shall notice it 
among the accessories. 

93. Besides the noun, the only principal necessary part of speech, The Verb, 
is the Verb. Of this I shall hereafter speak at large. For the present, 

it is only material to remark that they who confound it with the 
adjective and the participle, overlook its peculiar function, which is 
that of asserting ; as the function of the noun, is that of naming. As 
to the separate chsses of verbs, the verb substantive, the transitive, 
the active, the passive, &c, since these have not been treated of by 
any grammarians as separate parts of speech, it will not be necessary 
to notice them in this chapter. 

94. The great dispute, especially in modern times, has been with Accessory 
respect to the accessory parts of speech, the nature of which has been speech, 
illustrated by a variety of similes. They have been said to be like 
stones in the summit or curve of an arch, or like the springs of a 
vehicle, or like tie flag of a ship, or like the hair of a man, or like 

the nails and cenent uniting the wood and stones of an edifice ; and 
hence some persens have contended that they are only significant by 
relation ; some tiat they are not parts of speech ; and some that they 
are not even woids but particles. — Thus Apueeius says, " they are 
no more to be considered as parts of speech than the flag is to be 
considered a part; of the ship, or the hair a part of the man ; or, at 
least, in the conpacting and fitting together of a sentence, they only 
perform the office of nails, or pitch, or mortar." Peisciax, however, 
one of the most acute and intelligent of grammarians, observes, that if 
these words are not to be considered as parts of speech because they 
serve to connec. together others which are parts, we must say that the 
muscles and shews of a man are no parts of a man ; and he, there- 
fore, concludes by declaring his opinion, that the noun and verb are 
the principal aid chief parts of speech, but that these others are the 
subordinate anl appendant parts. 

95. The decision of this and similar questions will be easily made, simple 
if we only advert to the mental operations which these accessory 
words express; and in order to explain this, we must first ask, what 
words in a sertence are accessories ? This question again is answered 

by referring tc what has been said of sentences. In a simple sentence, 
all the word; are principals. Thus " Man is fit," contains two 
nouns, which are the names of two conceptions, viz., "man" and 
" fitness," anl the assertion of their coincidence by the verb " is;" 
and moreover since the conception of fitness is regarded as existing 



40 OF WORDS, AS PARTS OF SPEECH. [CHAP. III. 

not separately but in the other conception, man, the word "fit" is an 
adjective and " man " is a substantive. The same would be the case 
if the place of the noun " man" were supplied by the pronoun " he" 
and that of the adjective " fit," by the participle suited. 

sentence ated ^* Such ^ s the case when the sentence is simple ; but we are next 
to consider how a simple sentence is rendered complex ; and this is no 
otherwise done than by engrafting on it other sentences : but in these 
latter the conceptions only are expressed, and the .assertive part is 
assumed or understood. Thus, if referring to the passage before 
quoted from Shakspeare, we say " Man is fit," we may be asked, 
of what kind is the aptitude of which you are speakirg ? The answer 
must be " it is treasonable" And again if we are asked, of what 
disposition is the man of whom you make this assertion ? We may 
say "he is unmusical ;" and suppressing the assertions in the two 
secondary sentences, we may form of the whole one complex sentence, 
thus, " unmusical men possess treasonable aptitudes." 

Further com- 97. In this first process of complication we find only words capable 

pica ion. Q £ k^g usec [ as principals, viz., nouns, substantive or adjective; 
pronouns, participles, and verbs ; but suppose we again resolve these 
into their constitutent conceptions and assertions; suppose we ask 
what do you mean when you speak of a treasonable fitness, or 
aptitude? We may answer, we mean that the fitness looks to 
treason ; treason is before the fitness (as its mark or object), the fitness 
is for treason. Here it is plain that the word "Jor" involves the 
conception of foreness (or objectiveness), and applies that conception 
to the other conception of treason : but it does so siill more rapidly 
and obscurely, than in the cases before supposed ; aid hence it is that 
in this second process of complication we meet with vords which are 
no longer thought significant, and therefore no longer called nouns or 
verbs, but articles, adverbs, conjunctions, and prepositions ; and these 
words are the more numerous and frequent of occurrence, in propor- 
tion as men become more civilised, and more frequently render their 
sentences complex by subdividing the primary truth into many others. 
Thus, as the word " treasonable " may be supplied by the words 
" for treasons," so the word " unmusical" may be stpplied first by 
the words " hath no music in himself," and secondly, by the words 
" is not moved with concord of sweet sounds;" both which, and 
many similar modes of speech, consist of various aggregations of sen- 
tences, in which the subordinate assertions are assumed by the mind in 
the manner already shown. 

t ^ M 8F e ttan ^' ^^ e worc ^ s > which, by use, come to be most frequently em- 
ployed in any particular language for these secondary purposes, often 
lose their primary signification, and perhaps undergo sone little change 
of sound ; from which circumstances a great dispute has arisen of late 
among grammarians whether they are significant words cr not. Thus 
the preposition for, which, as we have shown, conveys tie conception 
of foreness , is nothing more than the word fore in for&nost, before, 



CHAP. III.J OF WORDS, AS PARTS OF SPEECH. 41 

fore and aft, and the like words and phrases ; but by use, and by the 
slight change which it has undergone, it has come to lose the property 
of forming a principal part in a sentence. These circumstances, how- 
ever, it must be observed, are merely accidental ; they may happen 
to the. same conception in one language and not in another; and, 
therefore, they cannot form a just scientific criterion between the 
parts of speech ; but on the other hand, those parts may, and must, 
be distinguished by the different operations of mind which they 
express ; and as we have seen that the operations, expressed by the 
articles, adverbs, conjunctions, and prepositions, are clearly distin- 
guishable from those expressed by the nouns, pronouns, verbs, and 
participles, inasmuch as they relate to a subordinate step in the 
analysis of thought ; so there can be no impropriety in calling them 
accessories, with reference to the others, which we call principals. 

99. From what I have said, it will not appear strange, that the Etymology 
accessory words should be for the most part traceable to their origin words? ssory 
as principals ; that is to say, that the parts of speech last mentioned 
should in general be found to have been once used (with little or no 
difference of sound) as nouns and verbs. It has been supposed that 

this was a new discover of Mr. Horne Tooke's, and in many parts 
of his work he seems to have entertained that notion himself; how 
justly, may be seen from the following, among other authorities to the 
like effect. 

100. B. de Spinosa composed a Hebrew Grammar, published with Spinosa. 
his posthumous works in 1677. In this, he says, " Omnes Hebrosce 
voces, exceptis tantum Interjectio?iibus et Conjunctionibus, et una, aut 
altera particula, vim et proprietates Nominis habent." (p. 17.) 

101. The same doctrine is laid down in a treatise by C. Koerber, Koerber. 
printed at Jena, in 1712, entitled " Lexicon Particularum Ebrsearum, 

vel potius Nominum et Verborum, vulgo pro particulis habitorum." 
This writer says, in his preface, that his tutor Danzius taught that 
" most, if not all the separate particles, were in their own nature 
nouns;" that this was indeed a " new and unheard of hypothesis;" 
but that on investigation the reader would find reason to conclude 
universally (in respect to the Hebrew language at least) that " all the 
separate particles are either nouns or verbs." His words are these : 
" Particular separator si non omnes certe plerazque sua natura sunt 
Nomina" — " hanc thesin hactenus novam et inauditam;" and again, 
" Omnes omnino Ebr&orum particulas separatas aut nomina esse aut verba" 
Koerber illustrates his position by comparing the Hebrew particles 
with radical words, both in that and the cognate languages, particu- 
larly in the Arabic. Among the instances which he gives, are the 
following, viz. : — 

Juxta, near, being the same as Lotus, side. 

Prceter, beside or beyond {^efectus, deficiency. 

J [lerminus, boundary. 

Inter, between Distinctus, divided. 



42 OF WORDS, AS PARTS OF SPEECH. [CHAP. III. 

Post, after Tergum, the back. 

Quoque, also Adde, add. 

Vel, or JEUge, choose. 

He even explains the interjection Lo ! as being identical with the 
pronoun of the third person ; and suggests that the termination of the 
accusative case is a noun, signifying object. 

Bayer. 102. T. S. Bayer, in 1730, published his Museum Sinicum, in 

which he says the same of the Chinese Language — " JEadem vox et 
substantivum et adjectivum et verbum, et qualiscumque pars Orationis 
fieri potest, si id natura rei fert ; v. g. : Sien Sacrificium, sacrifico ; 
Hiisr Icetari, loetitia, Icetus, hilariter ; Xo mollities, emollesco, molliter ; 
Ca misceo, mixtura, mixti, confuse." (v. i v p. 17.) 

Lennep. ^03. In the posthumous work of J. D. van Lennep, who died in 
1771, on the Analogies of the Greek Language, is this passage : — 
" Ex octo igitur partibus orationis quas vulgo statuunt Grammatici, 
Verbum et Nomen principem locum obtinent, cum reliquas omnes 
facile ad harum alterutram referri queant, quare etiam Aristoteles, 
aliique e veteribus duos tantum partes orationis statuerunt. Addunt 
quidem nonnulli tertiam, utriusque nempe et verbi et nominis, ligamen- 
tum, quod nempe particulse aliseque ea pertinentia orationem veluti 
connectunt, sed qui attentius eas res consideraverit, facile animadvertet, 
omnia ferd, saltern quod ad exteriorem formam, referenda esse vel ad 
nominum vel ad verborum classem. Ita v. g. particula to ovv, ' igitur/ 
vere participium est contractum ex eov, quod a participio etav, verbi 
eta, unde elfi), adebque ad nominum classem proprie pertinet. Eadem 
ratio manifesta est in vocabulis iro\, 71-77, nov" &c. 

This treatise was probably written some years previously to the 
author's death; for in 1752 he delivered an academic discourse com- 
paring the analogies of language with those of the mental operations. 

Tooke. 104. Whether or not Mr. Tooke ever saw any of these treatises is 

immaterial. His discovery may, probably, have been a bond fide one, 
so far as regarded his own reflections, though not one that was new 
to the world. But he seems to have connected with it a very mate- 
rial error in Grammar, namely, that because a word was once a noun, 
it always remained so, and consequently that adverbs, conjunctions, 
&c, expressed no new or different operation of the mind, and were 
not to be considered as separate parts of speech, so far at least as re- 
lated to their signification. Had Mr. Tooke been as well acquainted 
with the writings of Plato, as he was with some old English and 
Saxon authors, he would hardly have fallen into this error ; for he 
would have perceived that speech receives its forms from the mind ; 
and would have acknowledged with that great philosopher that 
" thought and speech are the same ; only the internal and silent dis- 
course of the mind, with herself, is called by us Atayota, thought, or 
cogitation : but the effusion of the mind, through the lips, m articu- 
late sound, is called Aoyog, or rational speech," It is, therefore, the 
mind that shapes the sentence into its principal parts and accessories : 



CHAP. III.] OF WORDS, AS PARTS OF SPEECH. 43 

it is the mind which distributes alike the principal and the accessory 
parts into subdivisions, according as they are necessary to its own 
distinguishable operations, 

105. Those ancient grammarians who acknowledged only three Ancient 
parts of speech, viz., the noun, verb, and conjunction, ranked some of 

the parts which we here call accessories under the principal parts. 
Thus Apollonius of Alexandria, and Priscian, rank the adverb under 
the verb, and with them agrees Harris, who calls the adverb a se- 
condary attribute ; but Alexander Aphrodisiensis, who is followed by 
Boethius, observes, that it is sometimes more properly referred to the 
class of nouns ; and so Tooke asserts some adverbs to be nouns and 
some verbs. The preposition which was referred by Dionysius and 
Priscian to the conjunctions, is on a similar principle included by 
Harris with the common conjunction in the class of connectives ; and 
Tooke distributes both prepositions and conjunctions (in many instances 
rightly, as far as their etymology is concerned) among the verbs and 
nouns. Lastly, the article appears to have most disturbed the gram- 
marians in their arrangements : for Fabius says it was first reckoned 
among conjunctions ; and we have seen that, when Aristotle divided 
speech into four parts, he separated the article from the conjunction, 
making of it a class apart from the three other parts of speech. 
Vossius inclines to rank it among nouns, like a pronoun ; but Harris 
having divided the accessory parts of speech into definitives and con- 
nectives, makes the article a branch of the former. Tooke says that 
our article the is the imperative mood of the Anglo-Saxon verb thean, 
to take ! Lastly, Scaliger says, the article does not exist in Latin, is 
superfluous in Greek, and is, in French, the idle instrument of a chat- 
tering people. 

106. Since in this diversity of opinions, I can perceive no common New principle 
view of any principle which connects itself with the idea of language proposed - 
before laid down, I find myself compelled to seek a new division. I 

say, therefore, that the accessory parts of speech represent operations of 
the mind, which from their frequent recurrence have become habitual, 
and from their absolute "necessity in modifying other thoughts, must be 
found more or less in all cultivated languages. It is true, that these 
operations are not performed by all men with the same distinctness, 
and therefore do not exist among all nations in the same degree of 
perfection ; and lastly, it is true, that in some languages they are ex- 
pressed by separate words, and in other languages by different in- 
flections of the same word. Hence a close connection is found between 
the prepositions of one language, and the cases of another ; and between 
the auxiliary verbs of one language, and the tenses of another. Hence, 
too, the comparison of adjectives, usually effected in Latin by dif- 
ferent terminations, is often effected in English by adverbs prefixed to 
the adjectives. In short, numberless illustrations of this remark will 
easily occur to the recollection of any person at all acquainted with 
different languages, ancient or modern, barbarous or refined. 



44 OF WORDS, AS PARTS OF SPEECH. [CHAP. III. 

Article. 107. Of the mental operations above described, one, and that not 

the least essential, consists in determining whether we view any given 
conception as an universal, a general, or a particular ; and if as a 
particular, whether as a certain, or an uncertain one ; and if certain, 
whether of one known class, or another known class ; and so forth. 
Thus there is a certain conception of the mind expressed by the word 
*' man ;" but if we employ that expression for the purpose of commu- 
nicating the conception, it is necessary that those who hear us should 
know with what degree of particularity it is to be applied ; for it would 
be one thing to say, that, according to our idea of human nature, man 
is universally benevolent ; and another to say, that men in general are 
so ; and a third to say that any man, under- given circumstances, may 
be so ; and a fourth to say, that this or that man is so. Of these dif- 
ferent degrees of limitation some may be marked by separate words ; 
and of those words, some may express a conception so distinct and 
self-evident, as to be capable of forming a simple sentence, in which 
case we should reckon them as pronominal adjectives, among the 
principal parts of speech ; as when we say, " this man is good," 
" that man is bad," the words this and that, are pronominal adjectives. 
But since we cannot say "the is good," or "a is good," and since 
these words the and a, serve no other purpose but to define and par- 
ticularize some other conception, and do not even perform this function 
completely, without reference to some further conceptions, we may, 
in those languages in which they exist, reckon them as a separate, but 
accessorial part of speech, under the name of the article. 

Preposition. 108. The word Preposition is badly chosen from its use (and even 
that use not without exception) in the Latin language ; nevertheless, 
it has become sufficiently intelligible to signify a class of words which 
describe another sort of mental operation. When one object is placed 
in a certain relation to another object, whether it be a relation of 
time, of space, of instrumentality, causation, or the like, the con- 
ception of that relation serves as a bond to unite them in the secondary 
parts of a sentence. That expression may form part of a word, as 
" to overleap a fence ;" or it may constitute a separate word, as 
" to leap over a fence;" and in the latter instance the word over is 
called a preposition, which I therefore do not hesitate to rank as a 
separate part of speech. 

Conjunction. 109. As the preposition connects conceptions, the Conjunction con- 
nects assertions ; or, as it is commonly expressed, the preposition joins 
nouns, the conjunction verbs, and consequently sentences. By con- 
necting, in both instances, I mean showing the relations, whether of 
agreement or disagreement ; and these also may be expressed either in 
the form of the verb, or by means of a separate particle : of which a 
sentence before quoted affords an illustration — 

Duller should' st thou be than the fat weed, 
Wouldst thou not stir in this ; — 

where, if rendered into the more common expression, " if thou 



CHAP. HI.] OF WORDS, AS PARTS OF SPEECH. 45 

wouldst not stir," the relation between stirring in the cause, and being 
dull, would be expressed by the word if, to which I therefore give 
the name of a conjunction. Hence, it appears, that the conjunction 
may not improperly be reckoned a distinct part of speech, since it 
expresses a distinct operation of the mind. 

110. More doubt may perhaps exist as to the Adverb, a class in Adverb, 
which grammarians have often confounded words of very various effect 

and import, such as interjections and conjunctions. Neither do I, in 
this instance, any more than in those of the participle and preposition, 
pay much regard to the etymology of the word adverb ; but I take it 
as a word in common use, and applicable to a large class of words 
which describe operations of the mind very distinguishable from those 
which have been already considered. The adverb either expresses a 
conception which serves to modify another conception of quality or 
action ; or else it expresses a conception of time, place, or the like, by 
which the assertion itself is modified : in either case it serves to 
modify by its own force, and not, like the preposition, as an inter- 
mediate bond between other conceptions. 

111. The following Table will show how Words, as significant Classes of 
constituents of a complex sentence, may be distributed into classes, or 
Parts of Speech. 

I. Words used in enunciative sentences: 

I. principal words, 

1. The Noun, the name of a mental conception, 
i. primarily, 

1. Expressing a substance, (the Noun substantive). 

2. Expressing a quality. 

1. without action, (the Noun adjective). 

2. with action, (the Participle). 
secondarily, (the Pronoun). 

2. The Verb, asserting existence or action. 

II. accessorial words, 

1. limiting the extent of an universal or general conception 
to a particular (the Article). 

2. showing the relation, in a complex sentence, of one sub- 
stantive conception to another, or to an assertion, (the 
Preposition). 

3. connecting one assertion with another, according to their 
relations, (the Conjunction). 

4. modifying a conception of quality or an assertion, (the 
Adverb). 

II. Words used either in passionate sentences, or as separate ex- 
pressions of passion, (the Interjection). 

112. The mental operations which these various classes of words Mental opera- 
represent, are obviously distinct ; but it by no means follows from 

thence that the words themselves are so ; that a word which has been 
employed as a substantive may not also be employed as a conjunction ; 



46 OF WORDS, AS PARTS OF SPEECH. [CHAP. III. 

Mental opera- or that the very sound by which we have expressed an assertion may 
not be used as a preposition or an interjection. In short, there is no 
reason why one word should not successively travel through all the 
different classes here stated ; for it must be remembered, that words 
do not communicate thought by their separate power and effect only, 
but infinitely more so by their connection : and consequently the mode 
of connecting the signs, and not the signs themselves, determines their 
place in any given class. The first exercise of the reasoning power, 
we have seen, is conception; and of all our mental operations, whether 
relative to the external world, or to the laws of mind itself, con- 
ceptions may be formed ; and to all the conceptions which we form, 
names may be given ; and those names are nouns ; and therefore it is 
not surprising that all other words, except interjections, should be his- 
torically traceable to nouns as their origin. Nay, since reason and 
passion are so complicated in man, we must not wonder that a con- 
nection is often to be found even between interjections and nouns. 
Thus our substantive Woe, which is the Scottish Woe, agrees with the 
Latin interjection Vae ! probably pronounced by the Komans Wae ; 
and with many interjections and other parts of speech, in various 
Teutonic languages, as will be shown hereafter. Surely, this affords 
no proof, nor shadow of a proof, that the different uses of the same, 
or different words, do not depend on the different exercise of the 
mental faculties; but, on the contrary, it absolutely demonstrates the 
necessity of some mental operation to distinguish between the different 
meanings, force, and effect of the same sign, as, employed on different 
occasions. 



(47) 



CHAPTER IV. 

OF NOUNS. 

113. The classes of words, which form grammatically the Parts 
of Speech, being thus determined, I proceed to explain them in order, 
beginning with that which, according to all systems, stands first in 
importance, the Noun. 

114. "It is by nouns," says Cour de Gebelin, " that we desig- The Noun, 
nate all the beings which exist. We render them known instantly by 

these means, as if they were placed before our eyes. Thus, in the 
most solitary retreat, in the most profound obscurity, we are able to 
pass in review the universality of beings, to represent to ourselves our 
parents, our friends, all that we have most dear, all that has struck 
us, all that may instruct or amuse us ; and in pronouncing their names 
we may reason on them with our associates. We thus keep a register 
of all that is, and of all that we know ; even of those things which 
we have not seen, but which have been made known to us by means 
of their relation to other things already known to us. Let us not be 
astonished, then, that man, who speaks of every thing, who studies 
every thing, who takes note of every thing, should have given names 
to all things that exist, to his body and its different parts, to his soul, 
to his faculties, to that prodigious number of beings which cover the 
earth or are hid in its bosom, which fill the waters, and move in the 
air ; that he gives names to the mountains, the rivers, the rocks, the 
woods, the stars, to his dwellings, to his fields, to the fruits on which 
he feeds, to the instruments of all kinds with which he executes the 
greatest labours, to all the beings which compose his society, or, that 
the memory of those illustrious persons who deserve well of mankind 
by their benefactions, and their talents, is perpetuated by their names 
from age to age. Man does more. He gives names to objects not in 
existence, to multitudes of beings, as if they formed but a single in- 
dividual, and often to the qualities of objects, in order that he may be 
able to speak of them in the same manner as he does of objects really 
existing." 

115. This great power of the Noun is to be attributed solely Its origin, 
to that faculty of the mind by which it is formed : and that power I 

have called Conception. Every act of this power produces one 
thought, presents to our view one object, more or less distinct. We 
conceive a certain impression to which we give a name, be it " red" ^ 
or "white," "John" or "Peter," "man" or "woman," "animal" 
or "vegetable," "virtue" or vice;" or whatsoever else we can dis- 
tinguish from the mass of continued consciousness which constitutes 
our being. 

116. We do not name every impression that we receive, or eyery 



48 OF NOUNS. [chap. IV. 

act that we perform. In truth, we do not name any one separately 
and distinctly from all others. It would be useless to do so, in a 
single instance : it would be impossible to do so in all. But we name 
what often occurs to us. We have often a sensation of colour ; we 
call it "white:" we have often a feeling of pleasure; we call it 
"joyous :" we often see an object which affects us with peculiar sen- 
timents of regard or aversion ; we call it " father" or " enemy :" we 
often meditate on thoughts, which appear to us amiable or the re- 
verse; we call them "benevolence" or "hatred." In this manner it 
is that our catalogue of names is formed. 

117. Each of these thoughts or conceptions has its natural and 
proper limits ; but these we do not always very accurately observe. 
No man confounds "red" with "white," but he confounds "whitish" 
with " reddish." A boy does not think his hoop square, but he knows 
not whether it is circular or elliptical. Thus it is, that men do not 
agree in their opinions of many things, to which they nevertheless 
agree in giving some common names ; otherwise it would be impos- 
sible for them to communicate to each other anything like the thoughts 
or feelings which they respectively entertain. 

118. The relation between words and thoughts has been expressed 
in various ways by writers on language. Plato calls the Verb 
drjXojfxa, a " showing forth" and the Noun, aruneiov, a " sign;" Aris- 
totle sometimes calls a word ar]\xkiov, a sign, and sometimes av/j-fioXoy, 
a symbol ; Plotinus says, 6 kv tyiovTi Xoyog, jjljjirjfxa th Iv i^v^i}, " the 
word (or sentence) in the voice is an imitation of that in the soul ;" 
Cicero renders the avfifioXov of Aristotle by the Latin Nota, a 
" mark" More modern writers have described words as the Pictures, 
the Echoes, the Colours, the Vestments of thoughts, the representatives 
of thoughts, of ideas, of mental operations, &c. The author of a 
recent work, entitled " The Discovery of the Science of Languages," 
objects to all expressions which imply that words in any manner 
represent thoughts. He observes, that if words had this power, " we 
should have as many names for the same object, as we receive various 
impressions from it ;" that " no single person can ever see the same 
thing twice in the same manner ;" and that, " no two persons could 
ever have a common impression of it ;" consequently intelligible lan- 
guage would, on this supposition, be wholly impossible. The objection 
would be just, if we were to take such expressions, as those above 
quoted, in their literal sense ; but they are obviously figurative ; 
because we have no other means of explaining mental operations than 
by the analogies which we suppose them to bear to sensible acts and 
objects. What the authors in question mean is not that every word, 
as uttered by a speaker, is an exact representation of a thought existing 
in his mind at the time ; but that words in general serve to indicate 
what is passing in the human mind. And this indeed words do, 
partly by their separate signification, but more by their grammatical 
arrangement. 



CHAP. IV.] OF NOUNS. 49 

119. It is according to the place which a particular word occupies The Noun, 
in such an arrangement, and to the function which it therein exercises, 

that it receives its grammatical designation as a part of speech. A 
word is called a Noun when in a simple sentence it serves merely to 
name a conception, and not to assert anything concerning it. Indeed, 
the English word noun is nothing but a corrupt pronunciation of the 
French nom, which, like the Italian nome, was again a corruption of 
the Latin nomen, and this latter was of common origin with the Greek 
ovojia, which, both in the Iliad and Odyssey, signifies the name by 
which a person is distinguished from others ; the radix being found in 
the verb ve/jlu), to allot, attribute, or distribute. And as a personal 
name distinguishes the man, to whom it is allotted, from other men, 
so a noun distinguishes the thing or thought, to which it is allotted, 
from other things or thoughts. The trite definition of a noun, as 
" the name of a thing which may be seen, felt, heard, or understood" 
is equivocal ; for it may or may not include adjectives, and nouns 
commonly called abstract, according as the words " thing " and 
" understood " receive a stricter or more lax interpretation. I there- 
fore prefer defining a noun, the name of a conception ; and it has 
been seen that, by a conception, I mean whatsoever we can contem- 
plate in thought as one existence, either subjectively in the mind, or 
objectively in the external world, and either as substance, or as attri- 
bute ; for red is as much the name of a certain colour, as Peter is the 
name of a certain man, or England of a certain country ; and in like 
manner virtue is as much the name of a certain thought, as a ship is 
the name of a certain thing ; all these, therefore, and whatever other 
words serve, in a simple sentence, to name any conception of the 
mind, are nouns. 

120. It is next to be considered, how nouns may be best distri- Classes of 
buted into classes, with reference to the different kinds of conceptions, 
which they serve to name. " Many grammarians," says Vossius, 

" and among them some of the highest celebrity, first distribute the 
noun into proper and appellative, and then into substantive and adjec- 
tive ; but erroneously ; since even the proper noun is a substantive, 
inasmuch as it subsists by itself in speech. But let us seek our 
method from the schools. Our great Stagirite first divides to ov (or 
that which is) into that which subsists by itself, and is therefore 
called substance, and that which exists in another as in its subject, 
and is therefore called attribute. Afterwards he proceeds to distin- 
guish substance into primary and secondary, the primary being an 
individual, the secondary a genus or species. By parity of reason, 
therefore, we should divide the noun first into that which subsists by 
itself in speech, and is called substantive, and that which needs the 
addition of a substantive in speech, and is called adjective ; and after- 
wards we should distribute the substantive into that which belongs 
to a single thing, and is called proper, and that which comprehends 
many, and is commonly called appellative" 

2. E 



50 OF NOUNS. [CHAP. IV. 

Conceptions 121. The distribution proposed by Vossius seems most consonant 
minuted. to grammatical principle. I therefore begin with distinguishing sub- 
stantives from adjectives, and I call them both Nouns ; for they are 
both names of conceptions, and they are nothing more. They do not 
imply any assertion respecting these conceptions ; and herein they are 
clearly distinguished from verbs. It is true that the adjective agrees 
with the verb in expressing, not substance, but attribute ; and there- 
fore it is, that Harris, and some other grammarians, rank these 
two classes of words together under the title of attributives. I 
do not deny that this arrangement is so far correct ; but I say that it 
interferes with the method which I conceive it advisable to pursue, 
as the most direct and scientific. As 'Vossius justly postpones the 
consideration of the classes of substantives, to the distinction between 
substance and attribute ; so I postpone the consideration of the 
assertion of an attribute, to the consideration of those conceptions 
both of substance and of attribute, which must necessarily precede all 
assertion. This, I apprehend, is strictly the order of science. Lan- 
guage is a communication of the mind ; the mind, as far as it is capa- 
ble of communication, consists of thoughts and feelings. Thoughts 
are formed by the reasoning power. The reasoning power is divided 
into three faculties, conception, assertion, and conclusion ; but con- 
ception necessarily precedes assertion, because we cannot assert that 
anything exists, until we know what that thing is. 

122. Conceptions are either conceptions of substance, that is of 
something considered as subsisting of itself, or conceptions of attri- 
bute, that is of something considered as a quality or property of a 
substance. It may appear unnecessary to dwell on a distinction so 
obvious. , No man, it may be said, however ignorant, can suppose 
that in the phrase " a white horse," the word " white " does not 
denote a quality belonging to the " horse ;" or that in the phrase 
" glorious victory," the word " glorious " does not denote a quality 
belonging to victory. No man, when he says " the sun is shining," 
thinks of the sun as an attribute of shining ; but, on the contrary, he 
considers "shining" to be an energy, or property, or quality, or 
attribute of the sun. This is no doubt true ; but unfortunately there 
have been writers in modern times, who have treated the distinction 
in question as a " technical impertinence," and as resting on " false 
philosophy, and obscure because mistaken metaphysics ;" and it there- 
fore becomes necessary to examine the arguments on which their 
objection is founded. 
Substantive? 123. It has been contended that " the substantive and adjective are 
Actives frequently convertible without the smallest change of meaning" and in 
proof of this, it is asserted that we may indifferently say " a perverse 
nature," or a " natural perversity;" now surely, although I would not 
assert, that the person advancing such an illustration was altogether 
of " a perverse nature," I might without offence attribute his opinion, 
on this particular point, to a little " natural perversity." In the one 



not con- 
vertible, 



CHAP. IV.] OF NOUNS. 51 

case, the friends of the person in question would understand me to Substantives 
assert, that his whole mind was tainted with the vices of obstinacy Adjectives 
and self-willedness, that he wilfully shut his eyes against the truth, vertibfe. 
and maintained opinions which he knew to be wrong in literature, in 
philosophy, in politics, and in religion — a description of his character, 
which would naturally occasion them to take great offence. In the 
other case, they would understand me to give him credit for such 
reading and literary acquirements, as might well have corrected what 
I look upon as an error ; and they could hardly take it amiss that I 
attributed that error, rather to a slight defect, from which the best 
natures are not wholly exempt, than to gross ignorance, or total want 
of understanding. So much for the particular expressions quoted as 
proof that substantives and adjectives may be convertible without the 
smallest change of meaning : on the other hand, the well-known 
instance of a " chesnut horse," and a " horse chesnut," affords an 
example of a change of meaning produced by such convertibility, 
scarcely less ludicrous, than rendering into English the miles gloriosus 
of Plautus by the phrase " military glory." The fact is, that in all 
such instances, the views taken by the mind are different, according 
as it regards the one conception, or the other, as principal ; just as the 
man who is on the eastern side of the street considers the western to 
be the opposite side ; whilst he who is on the western side thinks the 
same of the eastern. We may speak of a "religious life," or of 
" vital religion." In the one case, we are considering the conception 
of " life," as that which must necessarily form the basis of our asser- 
tion, and which may be differently viewed, according as it is put in 
connexion with the conceptions of religion, irreligion, business, 
pleasure, or the like : in the other case, we take the conception of 
" religion " as the direct object of thought, and then limit it by the 
conception of life, or vitality. 

124. It is objected, that this limitation may as regularly be effected Sentence 
by a substantive as by an adjective ; and that " man's life," or " the complex. 8 
life of man " is exactly equivalent to " human life ;" which I by no 
means deny ; but then it must be observed, that the sentence takes a 
different form, and instead of simple becomes complex ; the termination 
('s) or the word (of) signifies " possession," or " belonging to," and 
renders one sentence resolvable into two. For instance, the propo- 
sition " the life of man is precious," includes two propositions — 

1. Life belongs to, or is possessed by, man. 

2. Life is precious. 

Dr. Wallis, indeed, in his valuable English Grammar, first published 
in 1653, treats the genitive "man's" as an adjective. He says, 
" Adjectivum possessivum fit a quo vis substantivo (sive singulari, sive 

plurali) addito s ut man's nature, the nature of man, natura 

humana vel hominis ; men's nature, the nature of men, natura humana 
vel hominum." But no other grammarian has adopted this notion, 

e2 



52 OF NOUNS. [chap. IV. 

and the principle on which it rests, would equally go to prove that 
all the oblique cases of substantives, in all languages, should be con- 
sidered as adjectives ; for Mr. Tooke has justly observed, that these 
cases cannot stand alone ; although he has not noticed that this is 
owing to the complexity of the sentences in which they are used. 
theory > . oke ' s 125. The last-mentioned writer contends, that " the adjective is 
equally and altogether as much the name of a thing, as the noun sub- 
stantive." If he means by thing, a conception of the mind, he is per- 
fectly right ; but if he means by thing, an external substance, such as 
" a horse," or " a man," or "the globe of the sun," or "a grain of 
the light dust of the balance," he is as clearly wrong. " Red" and 
" white," " soft" and " hard," " good" and " bad," " virtuous" and 
" wicked," do not represent any such things as the latter ; but they 
do represent conceptions of the mind, some of which conceptions may 
be considered as belonging exclusively to external bodies, others as 
belonging exclusively to mental existence, and others as common to 
both. Mr. Tooke says, he has " confuted the account given of the 
adjective by Messrs. de Port Royal," who " make substance and acci- 
dent the foundation of the difference between substantive and adjec- 
tive ;" but if so, he has confuted an account given not only by Messrs. 
de Port Royal, but by every grammarian who preceded them from 
the time of Aristotle; and whatever respect may be due to the 
abilities of Mr. Tooke, I must a little hesitate to think that he alone 
was right, and that so many men of extensive reading, deep reflection, 
and sound judgment, were all wrong. But how has he confuted this 
doctrine ? Why, truly, by showing that when a conception is not 
regarded as a substance, it may be regarded as an attribute ; and when 
it is not regarded as an attribute, it may be regarded as a substance. 
— " There is not any accident whatever," says he, " which has not a 
grammatical substantive for its sign, when it is not attributed ; nor is 
there any substance whatever which may not have a grammatical 
adjective for its sign, when there is occasion to attribute it ; " which is 
pretty much like saying, there is not any captain whatever who may 
not be degraded, and placed in the ranks ; nor any private soldier 
whatever who may not be raised from the ranks and honoured with a 
captain's commission; and therefore there is no difference between a 
captain and a private soldier. The premises are incontestable : the 
only fault is, that they have nothing to do with the conclusion. On 
this point, I trust, I have satisfactorily vindicated the principle laid 
down by Aristotle, and adopted by all grammarians from his time to 
that of Mr. Tooke, viz., that the noun substantive is the name of a 
conception, considered as possessing a substantial, that is, independent 
existence ; the noun adjective is the name of a conception, considered 
as a quality, or attribute of the former. 



( 53 ) 
CHAPTER V. 

OF NOUNS SUBSTANTIVE. 

126. The accounts given by different writers of trie noun substantive Various 
are remarkably different. According to Tooke, it would seem, that e tlons " 
with exception of the verb (if even that be excepted) the noun sub- 
stantive is to be considered as the only part of speech ; whilst a 
recent writer (Mr. Kavanagh) says " there are no such words as sub- 
stantives," and he afterwards maintains that the words called sub- 
stantives are " adjectives in the fourth degree of comparison." Harris, 
Lowth, S. Johnson, L. Murray and others, consider the substantive as 
the only noun ; Vossius and most earlier writers consider, as I have 
done, that the term noun comprehends both substantive and adjective. 
In this conflict of opinions, it is no wonder that the various defini- 
tions of substantive, or noun substantive, are not easily reconcilable 
together. Frischlin says it is a noun of one, or at most two genders, 
in contradistinction to a noun adjective, which has three. This defi- 
nition has nothing to do with Universal Grammar ; and is not cor- 
rect, even in the Latin language, to which he refers. A. Caucius 
defines a substantive that which signifies something by itself, " quod 
aliquod per se significat." But this definition may as well be applied 
to adjectives, verbs, or pronouns, and even to interjections, which by 
themselves signify emotion, if nothing else. Vossius says, " That is 
called a substantive which subsists by itself, in a sentence" — " sub- 
stautivum dicitur quod per se subsistit, in oratione." Harris speaks 
thus : " Substantives are all those principal words, which are signi- 
ficant of substances considered as substances." Lowth says, " A sub- 
stantive is the name of a thing, of whatever we' conceive in any way 
to subsist, or of which we have any notion." And Dr. Johnson de- 
fines substantive, " a noun betokening the thing, not a quality." 

127. In each of the four last-mentioned definitions there is an ap- New 
proach to accuracy, but neither of them is entirely satisfactory. It is JropoSd! 
proper to observe, with Vossius, that the grammatical character of a 
word is not necessarily attached to its sound, but to the function which 
it performs in a sentence. Particular languages indeed may appropriate 
certain forms to certain parts of speech, and therefore in the dictionaries 
of such languages we find words marked as substantives, adjectives, 
adverbs, &c; as, in Latin, Dominus is a substantive, jiebilis an ad- 
jective, prudenter an adverb : and these words cannot be used other- 
wise in that language ; but this is matter of particular Grammar, and 
not of universal. Again, we must agree with Harris, that substantives 
signify substances considered as substances; but it must be remem- 



Kinds of 
Substantives 



54 OF NOUNS SUBSTANTIVE. [CHAP. V. 

bered that the significance is not always direct. The word signifies 
primarily the conception, and if that conception be of an external 
object, the word signifies that object secondarily. Lowth introduces 
in his definition the word " Thing," which is equivocal ; but he for- 
tunately adds, by way of interpretation, " whatever we conceive :" and 
lastly, Johnson, who also employs the doubtful word " Thing," 
limits it, by adding that substantive does not betoken a quality. 
From all these considerations taken together, a noun substantive may 
not improperly be defined " a word employed in a sentence to name 
a conception, existing separately, and not involved as a quality in any 
other conception." 
Distribution 128. This definition will lead to a distribution of substantives ac- 
Substantives. cording to their differences essential or accidental. The essential 
differences exist in all languages, and may be classed under the heads 
of kind and of gradation : the accidental differences vary, as to their 
mode of expression, in different languages, and these include differ- 
ences of number, gender, and relation. 

129. The kinds of nouns substantive are differently considered by 
different grammarians. According to Harris, there are three sorts (01 
kinds) of substantives, representing as many sorts of substances, the 
natural, the artificial, and the abstract. To the natural (he says) be- 
long such words as " Animal," " Man," Alexander ; " to the artificial, 
" Edifice," Palace," " Vatican ;" and to the abstract, " Motion," 
" Flight," " this or that flight." This distinction, however, rests on 
no sound grammatical principle. A natural substance indeed may be 
either a thing or a person, whilst an artificial substance can only be a 
thing ; but the conception of each is contemplated by the mind as 
that of an individual substance limited by time and space, and existing 
out of the mind objectively ; and so far as regards Universal Grammar, 
both the one and the other sustains the same part in the construction 
of a sentence ; for we cannot speak of many Alexanders, or many 
Vaticans, otherwise than by a rhetorical figure of speech. On the 
other hand, the kinds of substance, which Harris calls natural, ex- 
pressed by such words as " Animal," " Man," or the artificial, as 
" Edifice," " Palace," without some definitive word or particle to 
individualize them, are neither individual things nor persons, and are 
not limited by time or space, nor have they any objective prototypes 
in the external world, but they are subjective conceptions of the mind, 
agreeing, in this respect, with the conceptions expressed by the words 
" motion " or " flight." 
Conceptions 130. It is unnecessary here to dwell on various logical distinctions 

bodily and i. -i i -, . i r /• i « • i i 

mental.- applicable to nouns substantive; such as those of words simple and 
complex," words " of the first intention, and of the second inten- 
tion," &c. But that difference of substantives, which I mean by the 
difference of kind, is between their expressing conceptions of bodily 
impression, and conceptions of mental action. To this, the ancient 
grammarians Chabjsius and Diomedes alluded, when they defined a 



CHAP. V.] OF NOUNS SUBSTANTIVE. 55 

noun a part of speech signifying a thing corporeal or incorporeal, 
" pars orationis signincans rem corporalem vel incorporalem :" and on 
this also rests the popular and ordinary distinction between a Thing 
and a Thought, as well as the more learned distinction between phe- 
nomena and noumena. This difference of kind, indeed, is denied by 
some persons to exist. They say that we can have no conceptions 
but those of bodily impression ; that nouns are only the names of 
Things ; and that there being (as they think) no incorporeal things 
existing, or at least none cognizable by human faculties, there cannot 
be any noun signifying an incorporeal thing. I answer, that Universal 
Grammar, as I understand it, rejects alike the two extreme theories, 
that everything is mind, and that everything is matter. It agrees 
with the common sense, and common experience of mankind, in 
assuming that there are certain Things, or objects external to us, and 
certain Thoughts, or mental acts, which we experience internally. Of 
both these, the human mind forms conceptions : and to conceptions of 
each kind names are attached, which names, when the conceptions are 
contemplated as existing substantially, are nouns substantive. 

131. Those nouns substantive, which simply express conceptions Substantives 
of things external to us are necessarily particular ; those which ex- Smo? 
press mental acts, whether employed on the generalization of external 

things, or on the internal operations of the mind, are either general or 
universal. Alexander was a particular human being, and the Vatican 
is a particular building ; but the word Conqueror designates a general 
conception of the mind applicable to Alexander and many other 
human beings, and the word Palace designates a conception of the 
mind applicable to the Vatican and many other buildings. Hence 
arises the ordinary distinction of grammarians between nouns sub- 
stantive proper, and common, or, as some say, proper and appellative; 
a distinction marked by Varro with the terms nomina and vocabula, 
and answering to the logical distinction of words singular and com- 
mon. 

132. A noun substantive proper is a name of the conception of a Substantives 
particular Thing. It must be remembered that our English word proper -' 

" Thing " may be used in different senses, and particularly in two, 
viz., first, as any external object contradistinguished to " Thought ;" 
and secondly, as an external object not personal, contradistinguished 
to " Person." I here use it in the former sense, including either an 
inanimate mass, for instance Mount Etna, or a person, for instance 
William the Conqueror. Every such particular thing, whether viewed 
as present, remembered as past, or imagined as possible, is considered 
to be always identical. Etna is, to the present gaze, the same vast 
mountain mass, which has towered over the surrounding region for 
ages beyond historical record ; William lives, in memory, as the same 
bold warrior, who nearly eight centuries ago won the battle of Hastings, 
and with it the crown of England ; and so long as our language lasts, 
even the fictitious Hamlet will remain the same wondrous creature of 



56 OF NOUNS SUBSTANTIVE. [cHAP. V. 

the mighty dramatist's imagination, as when he fiist formed it from 
his rude materials. I say, the noun substantive proper is the name 
not of a thing, but of the conception of a thing ; for though it would 
be an idle scepticism to doubt whether such a mountain as Etna 
exists, or whether such a warrior as William the Conqueror ever 
existed, yet it must be remembered that words (as has before been 
shown) represent primarily our thoughts, and secondarily the external 
objects of our thoughts, when any such exist. I speak of Etna such 
as I conceive it to be, and of William such as I conceive him to have 
been ; and hence arises one great source of misapprehension among 
men, when one man has formed a certain conception of a particular 
thing, and another man has formed of the same particular thing a 
very different conception. 
Examples 133. This will be the more obvious, when we consider how our 
formation, conceptions of particular external objects are formed. They are not 
stamped on the mind by the objects, as an impression is stamped on 
wax by a seal ; for, if so, every man's conception of the same object 
would be precisely the same, which is certainly not the case. But 
the process which takes place may be thus illustrated. . Let us sup- 
pose that a lofty mountain existed long ago in Sicily, and still exists 
there ; and that the first person who gave it the name of Etna had 
previously seen it ; how came he to give it a name ? Because he 
had formed a conception of it. And how came he to form such a 
conception? Because he had seen the mountain, as a distinct, ex- 
ternal thing. But what is seeing ? An affection of the nerves of the 
eye. Now it never happens, when we see any one thing distinctly, 
that it equally affects all the nerves of the eye. Therefore, when the 
" Mountain " was first seen, other things were also seen. What was 
it that distinguished these different affections of the eye into marks, 
signs, or thoughts of different things ? What was it that made the 
" Mountain," in particular, a thing, in the contemplation of the think- 
ing faculty. Could such an effect have been produced otherwise than 
by an act of the thinking faculty itself? And if this was an act of 
the thinking faculty, then the thought was parent of the thing, so far, 
at least, as grammar can have anything to do with it, namely, as 
capable of being known to the mind, and communicable by language. 
Let us pursue this investigation a little further. The word " Moun- 
tain " does not signify a thing only seen at one moment of our lives : 
let us suppose, then, that we do in fact see the same mountain several 
times ; it must necessarily happen, that we see it under very different 
circumstances. As. we approach to, or recede from it, every step 
makes it affect the eye differently, both as to form and colour. What 
is it that still makes us consider the cause of these different impres- 
sions as one thing ? Plainly the thinking faculty ; so that here again, 
and in a second degree, the thought is parent of the thing ; and, be it 
observed, that it is not until after this secondary process has been 
oftentimes repeated, that we give the thing a name. Now, what are 



CHAP. V.] OF NOUNS SUBSTANTIVE. 57 

the acts of the thinking faculty, by which we form the conception of 
this external object as one thing ? The applying to it certain laws 
of the mind, which enable us to discriminate not only between 
thoughts, but between things. By certain laws of the mind we know 
that an object subtending a given angle at a given distance is of a cer- 
tain altitude. The law may not be distinctly contemplated by us, 
but it so far governs our judgments that we must approximate to it 
more or less ; we cannot think the directly contrary. In like manner 
the laws of similarity, of contrast, of association, &c, enable us to say 
that the top of the mountain is white with snow, or tinged with a 
roseate hue from the beams of dawn, that the sides are dark with 
groves of ilex, the lower declivities bright with verdure; and by 
another law of our nature, we know that all these and numberless 
other impressions of sense are bound up together in one vast mate- 
rial mass forming the particular object, which we call by the proper 
name of Etna. 

134. It has been truly observed by Mr. Locke, that "it is im- ^ e JJ™ e * 
possible that every particular thing should have a distinct peculiar language, 
name ; for the signification and use of words depending on that con- 
nection which the mind makes between its internal operations and the 

sounds which it uses as signs of them, it is necessary, in the applica- 
tion of names to things, that the mind should have distinct conceptions 
of the things, and retain also the particular name that belongs to 
every one, with its peculiar appropriation to that conception. But 
it is beyond the power of human capacity to frame and retain distinct 
conceptions of all the particular things we meet with ; every bird and 
beast men saw, every tree and plant that affected the senses, could not 
find a place in the most capacious understanding. If it be looked on 
as an instance of a prodigious memory, that some generals have been 
able to call every soldier in their army by his proper name, we may 
easily find a reason why men have never attempted to give names to 
each sheep in their flock, or crow that flies over their heads, much less 
to call every leaf of plants, or grain of sand, that came in their way, 
by a peculiar name." So far Mr. Locke, in which quotation I have only 
taken the liberty to substitute for the word ideas, in one place internal 
operations, and in two others conceptions. The reasoning, however, is 
not affected by this change, and it is such reasoning as must carry 
conviction to every mind. I also agree fully with this writer, that to 
name every particular thing, if possible, would be useless for the 
purpose of communicating thought, unless every man could first teach 
the whole of his own endless vocabulary to every other man with 
whom he conversed, or for whose information he wrote. And again, 
supposing even this possible, it would not conduce at all to science ; 
for as Aristotle has said, " of particular things there is neither defini- 
tion nor demonstration, and consequently no science, since all definition 
is in its nature universal." 

135. Proper names are therefore comparatively few in number. ^^J mes 
They serve to denote a very small part of the immense multitude of common. 



58 OF NOUNS SUBSTANTIVE. [CHAP. V. 

particular objects which fall under our observation. Some of these, 
indeed, obtain a distinguished celebrity within a small circle ; they 
are 

Talked of far and near at home. 

But the poet, the orator, or the historian, may raise them to a prouder 
eminence. He may render them the symbols or representatives of 
the classes to which they belong. It is thus that " Alexander" 
becomes the synonym of a conqueror, and " Cicero" of an orator. 
Even proper names, however, have in general been given to indivi- 
duals from some quality or action not strictly peculiar to them. 
Hence the old English rhyme alluded to by Verstegan, in relation to 
the family name of Smith — 

Whence cometh Smith, albe he knight or squire, 
But from the Smith, that smiteth at the tire ? 

Nevertheless it must be admitted, that the common notion is soon 
lost in the particular application. Few people reflect, that George 
originally signified " a husbandman," or that Charles and Andrew 
both signified " manly" or " strong," the former from its Gothic, the 
latter from its Grecian etymology. These names have now come to 
indicate individuals ; and as even thus a single word is not found to 
answer the purpose sufficiently, we have the baptismal name and sur- 
name ; as the Romans had the prcenomen, the cognomen, and the 
agnomen. 

Common 136. The designation of common is usuallv given by Grammarians 

to all nouns substantive, except the proper. Consequently, under 
this term, common, are included alike words answering to general and 
to universal conceptions ; but these two classes I think it advisable 
to consider separately; as well because the distinction is in itself 
extremely important ; as because different writers have employed the 
terms expressing it in very different ways. Locke, for instance, calls 
all common nouns " general words." Harris uses the words 
" general and universal " as synonymous ; for he calls all common sub- 
stances " symbols of general or universal ideas." Other writers 
employ the term " universal" alone (including general) as the contra 
exponent to particular. 

General^ 137. Those nouns substantive which correspond to general concep- 

tions are names imposed on whole classes of individual substances, as 
Man, House, Mountain; all of which, notwithstanding each may 
have its peculiar qualities, agree in possessing some one or more dis- 
tinctive qualities. Mr. Locke says truly of these words, that they are 
" the inventions and creatures of the understanding ;" for it is no 
doubt a mental act which makes the word " Man" stand for Peter, 
James, John, and millions of other individuals, past, present, future 
and even imaginary. " Ay," says Macbeth to the murderers — 

Ay, in the catalogue ye go for men ; 
As hounds and greyhounds, mungrels, spaniels, curs, 
Shoughs, water-rugs, and demi-wolves are cleped 
All by the name of dogs. 



Substantives. 



Substantives. 



CHAP. V.] OF NOUNS SUBSTANTIVE. 59 

Yet the word " Man" or " Dog" alone would not designate this or 
that man or dog, without some addition which will presently be 
noticed. 

138. Nor is it only to classes of corporeal substances that such Corporeal 
nouns are applicable ; for it must be remembered that by the word incorporeal 
" substance," grammatically speaking, we mean not merely a material 
and bodily substance, which we can see, or handle, or weigh, or 
measure; but also any mental conception considered as having an 
independent and separate existence, and of which something may be 
affirmed or denied substantively, that is, without reference to any 
other tiling as its basis and necessary support. Nouns of this sort, 
therefore, form the great bulk of language ; since they comprehend 
not only such words, as man, house, mountain, or animal, plant, 
ship ; but also such as affection, thought, passion, delight, when 
spoken of as individuals of a class of particular conceptions. Thus 
Spenser says — 

What war so cruel, or what siege so sore, 
As that which strong Affections do apply- 



So Coleridge 



Against the fort of Eeason ? 



All Thoughts, all Passions, all Delights, 

Whatever stirs this mortal frame, 
All are but ministers of Love. 



139. Such words are formed by the process of generalisation de- ^particulars, 
scribed in a former chapter, and though they thus obtain a general 
signification, they are easily made to express a particular conception, 

or a number of particulars, by adding to them a definitive, or numeral, 
or an attribute, as " that Mountain," " these sza? men," " the ruling 
passion," " the domestic affections." On the other hand, they cannot 
form the subject of any proposition absolutely and universally true, 
however nearly it may approach to the truth. Thus it may seem at 
first sight that Hamlet's mother utters an universal truth, when she 
says to her son — 

Thou know'st 'tis common : all that live must die. 

But the instances of Enoch and Elijah destroy the universality of the 
proposition ; and even if no such instances had occurred hitherto, it 
would not necessarily follow, that some such might not occur here- 
after. Indeed, St. Paul expressly says, " we shall not all sleep," 
(meaning, die,) " but we shall all be changed in a moment, in the 
twinkling of an eye, at the last trump." 

140. The other class of nouns substantive common, namely, those Universal 
which correspond (as I maintain) to universal conceptions, have given conce P tlou * 
occasion to great diversities of opinion. To this class belong such 

words as " Flight," " Whiteness," " Temperance," " Motion," 
" Colour," " Virtue," when not used as individuals of a class. These 
Harris considers as expressing " abstract substances," or as others 
say " abstract ideas," and Johnson calls them " abstract names.' 1 



some 
Absti 
Ideas, 



60 OF NOUNS SUBSTANTIVE. [CHAP. V. 

But the term " abstract" in these expressions is of equivocal signifi- 
cation. By some, as has been before observed, abstraction is ex- 
plained as a process of generalisation, by which the same attribute 
being found to exist in many substances is contemplated as one sub- 
stance, forming as it were a part of each, just as a substance called 
saccharine forms part of the sugar-cane, and of various other plants, 
and may therefore give name to them as a class. Harris explains it 
somewhat differently as a refined operation of the mind, by which we 
abstract any attribute from its necessary subject, and consider it apart, 
devoid of its dependence. I do not deny the possibility of either of 
these operations ; but they do not explain the real character of the 
class of nouns under consideration, namely,' their universality. White- 
ness is so called, not because it is found to exist in snow, or in lilies, or 
in the foam of the sea, or in all these alike, but because it expresses 
the result of a certain physical law, which would exist if snow had 
never fallen, nor lilies blossomed, nor the sea cast up its foam. Tem- 
perance is a moral habit, and might be contemplated as such by a 
person who had unfortunately passed his whole life among gluttons 
and drunkards. And similar observations might be made on the 
other words of this class above quoted, 
called by 141. Certain modern writers have treated the nouns here called 

Attract universal, in a way which, I own, I cannot well understand. M. 
Condillac, for instance, supposes them to serve the purpose of what 
he calls " abstract ideas;" for he says that " abstract ideas are only 
denominations." On this notion, Mr. Tooke enlarges at great length. 
His several chapters on abstraction, which abound with much curious 
etymology, occupy above 400 quarto pages, in the course of which 
he is pleased to inform his readers, that " heaven and hell" are 
" merely participles poetically embodied and substantiated." What 
practical inference is to be drawn from this statement, I know not ; 
but Mr. Tooke's doctrine, so far as it relates to the nouns called 
abstract, appears to me confused and contradictory. It may be stated. 
I think, in the following propositions : — 

1. The verb is the noun, and something more (vol. ii. p. 514). 

2. The adjective is the noun, directed to be joined to another noun 
(vol. ii. p. 431). 

3. The participle is the verb adjectived, i. e. " it has all that the 
noun adjective has, and for the same reason, viz. for the purpose of 
adjection" (vol. ii. p. 468). 

4. The abstract nouns " are generally participles or adjectives used 
without any substantive to which they can be joined" (vol. ii. p. 17). 

The result of this seems to be, that when an abstract noun is a 
participle (as Mr. Tooke says heaven is) it is a noun and something 
more, converted into a noun directed to be joined to another noun, but 
used without any noun to which it can be joined. How far this mode of 
reasoning goes to show that there are not in the mind any such ideas, 
as " whiteness," " strength," " virtue," and the like ; or that these 



CHAP. V.] OF NOUNS SUBSTANTIVE. CI 

words do not serve to communicate anything but conceptions of solid, 
tangible, corporeal, substance, in an abbreviated form, must be left 
to the determination of the judicious reader ; for my own part, I 
cannot see that it tends much to enlighten what may be thought ob- 
scure, in the works of the ancient grammarians ; still less does it 
appear to me to cast a doubt on those principles, which the ancients 
have stated with great clearness and precision. 

142. An universal conception, as I have before said, is an Idea, in Ideas - 
the true and proper sense of that word ; a word which was used by 
Plato, and according to him by his great instructor Socrates, to express 

a Law of our conceptions, a Form which they must necessarily take, 
or to which they must at least make some approach, before they can 
be at all distinguished the one from the other. These laws are im- 
pressed on the mind of man in the same manner as the laws of 
vitality, of growth, and of varied action, are impressed on his bodily 
organs; that is to say, they exist from the first ^ moment of birth as 
faculties not yet put in action, and in that sense not innate, but 
capable, from the first, of development, each in its order and degree, 
and in that sense innate. 

So from the root 

Springs lighter the green stalk, from thence the leaves 

More airy, last the bright consummate flovv'r 

Spirits odorous breathes. 

Hence ideas were termed by the Stoics \6yoi atrip par ikoX, 
seminal reasons, or forms, of all natural things. So Cudworth says, 
that " the cognoscitive power of the mind contains within itself vir- 
tually, as the future plant is contained in the seed, general notions, 
which unfold or discover themselves, as proper circumstances occur." 
So Leibnitz says, " the germs of our acquired knowledge, or in other 
words, our Ideas and the eternal truths resulting from them, are con- 
tained in the mind itself; nor ought we to be surprised at this ; for 
if we examine our own consciousness, we shall find that we possess 
in ourselves the ideas of existence, of unity, of substance, of action, and 
all other ideas of the like nature." And so Thomson speaks of the 

■ Seeds of art deep in the mind 

Implanted. 

143. This analogy, which from its truthfulness has struck so many ^Luve 
individuals, suggests several important considerations regarding the 
class of conceptions in question. It intimates that, as on the one 
hand, the vivifying and shaping power, which gives form to our 
thoughts, is no material quality drawn by the organs of sense from 
surrounding objects, but an intangible and invisible principle in the 
mind itself; so, on the other hand, that principle may long remain 
inactive, and unfelt, whilst — 

In th' unconscious breast 

Sleep the lethargic powers. 
And yet it may be preserved 

Pure in the last recesses of the mind, 



62 



OF NOUNS SUBSTANTIVE. 



Laws 

regulating 
conceptions. 



Transcen- 
dental 
conceptions. 



[chap. V, 

and ready to burst forth into noble thoughts and high actions, under 
the invigorating impulses of the outward world. The human mind 
w r as not intended by its divine Creator, to exist in a perpetual state of 
solitary contemplation, or amid dreams and phantoms of its own 
creating, but to act and be acted on, to influence and be influenced by 
the scenes and beings amidst which it is placed. 

144. In the threefold nature of man, spiritual, intellectual, and 
corporeal, the laws which regulate conceptions, and give them their 
appropriate forms, belong to the intellectual power, which we com- 
monly call reason ; but those laws and forms may be applied to 
objects as w r ell spiritual or corporeal, as intellectual. In those of 
mere intellect, indeed, their nature is most' obvious, and particularly 
in mathematical conceptions. Every one, who knows anything of 
Geometry, must at once perceive that the pure idea of a circle, can 
only exist in the mind, that it is true, necessary, absolute, universal, 
and entirely independent of the question of fact, whether any man 
ever did, or ever can receive the sensible impression of a perfect 
circle. And the more we dwell on this idea, the more plainly we 
perceive, that it not only is not furnished to the mind by the senses, 
but is directly opposed to what is commonly regarded as the evidence 
of the senses, for both the radius and the periphery are lines which 
have length without breadth ; the centre is a point which has neither 
parts nor magnitude, which terminates innumerable radii without 
being a part of any one of them, and which must remain at absolute 
rest, though the other extremity of a radius proceeding from it should 
move with incalculable rapidity round the whole circumference. 
Nevertheless it has been by applying these and similar ideas to 
sensible objects, that a great proportion of the physical sciences 
and arts have reached that high degree of perfection to which they 
have at present attained. 

145. Universal conceptions of the highest order have been termed 
transcendental. This designation was confined by the old logicians 
to six conceptions, Ens, Res, aliquid, unum, verum, bonum ; but it is 
extended by other writers to all conceptions, understood to exist 
a priori, that is prior to their application to sensible impressions. 
That the human mind has a power of forming such conceptions, by 
its very nature, has been admitted to a greater or less extent, and 
expressed in various terms, by philosophers of all ages, countries, 
and sects. I have mentioned Plato and the Stoics. St. Augustin 
called them "innate notions;" Cardinal Cusanus, " concreated 
judgments;" Ficinus, "notions of the divine mind;" Melanc- 
thon, " innate fixed points," and " principles of knowledge ; " Lord 
Bacon, "essential forms," and "ideas of the divine mind;" Sir 
K. Digby, " universal notions ; " Spinosa, "modes of thinking;" 
Leibnitz, "necessary truths;" Kant, "Notions of the Eeason," 
" Transcendentes," and " Noumena ;" Dugald Stewart, "intuitive 
truths ; " AbercPvOMBIE, " First Truths," and " intuitive articles of 



CHAP. V.] OF NOUNS SUBSTANTIVE. 63 

belief;" Coleridge "necessities of the mind" and "forms of 
thinking, which though first revealed to us by experience, must yet 
have pre-existed in order to make experience itself possible ;" and 
Whewell " fundamental ideas," from which he considers "ideal 
conceptions " to be derived. Nor among the ingenious physiologists 
of the present day are there wanting authorities for the same doctrine. 
Professor Muller says, " that innate Ideas may exist, cannot, in the 
slightest degree, be denied." Mr. Mayo says, " certain Truths may 
be called intuitive" And Mr. Green, in his Hunterian Oration of 
1840, describes Ideas, as "principles, which give to the results of 
sensuous experience their connexion and intelligibility" — "powers 
predetermining and constructive" — " intelligential acts." 

146. The doctrine of Ideas, as first taught by Plato, and after- §£*££ 
wards (though less clearly) by his scholar Aristotle, continued to 
prevail with the great majority of philosophers throughout Europe, 

till within less than two centuries ago. The successive theories, by 
which it was to a great degree superseded, were these : — 

1. That Ideas are not acts of the mind, but separate and 

distinct objects which it perceives. 

2. That Ideas comprise all our thoughts. 

3. That Ideas (i. e. all our thoughts) are derived partly from 

sensation, and partly from reflection. 

4. That Ideas of reflection are mere transcripts or combina- 

tions of sensations. 

5. That both sensations and reflections are mere bodily acts. 

147. The first and apparently most simple notion of thoughts, pro- ^ou$hteand 
posed as a philosophical theory, was that they were a kind of airy the same, 
shapes detached from external bodies, and conveyed through the 

senses to the mind, as Lucretius assures us — 



And again- 



quaa rerum simulacra yocanras, 

Quae quasi membranse surnmo de corpore rerum 
Dereptae volitant. 

Quippe etiam multo magis hsec sunt tenuia textu, 
Quam quae percutiunt oculos visumque lacessant ; 
Corporis hasc quoniam penetrant per rara, cientque 
Tenuem animi naturam intus. 



But this was directly contrary to the doctrine both of Plato and 
Aristotle, the latter of whom says, 'E7rt per yap rdv avev vXt]g, to 
clvto kgi to rosy kcli votjfievop, ' in incorporeal existences, the thinking 
faculty and the thought are the same thing." Descartes and others, 
who rejected the gross fiction of forms emanating from external 
bodies, held, nevertheless, an opinion equally irreconcilable with the 
doctrines of Plato and Aristotle, viz., that an idea is a substance 
separate from the mind ; that the mind can only receive it passively, 
contemplate it as the eye contemplates a picture, or work after it as 
the hand works after a model. " In every exercise of the mind" 
(says Tucker) " that which discerns is numerically and substantially 



64 OF NOUNS SUBSTANTIVE. [CHAP. V* 

?J\ eories of different from that which is discerned." Whether this proposition be 
true or false, is a plain question of fact, which every human being 
can determine, if, without being led away by prevalent expressions, 
such as " abstract ideas," " association of ideas," or the like, he will 
calmly and quietly appeal to his own internal experience. Are my 
thoughts different from myself? or are they my own acts? And if 
they are my own acts (which was the doctrine of Plato and Aristotle), 
then are they wholly capricious and accidental, or are there any laws 
by which they must be more or less strictly governed ? any forms, 
which they must more or less exactly assume ? If there be such laws 
and forms of the mind, as all admit that there are of objects in the 
external world ; if we can no more believe that a square is a circle, 
or a triangle a parallelogram, than we can that the sound of a flute 
is the pain of the gout, or that a grain of wheat sown in the earth 
will grow up an elephant ; then those laws are ideas, by which every 
one must be consciously or unconsciously governed in the exercise of 
his mental powers ; and which are universally, necessarily, and ab- 
solutely true, whether or not the circumstances, in which an indi- 
vidual is placed, require him to call them into action. 

Locke's 148. Nothing; however contributed so effectuallv to pervert the 

■pprvftrsion 

otthe knowledge of this most important part of our mental constitution, as 
the very vague use made of the term idea in Mr. Locke's work on 
the Human Understanding. By employing it for all modes and forms 
of thought without distinction, he introduced into the philosophy of 
the human mind much the same sort of confusion as a mathematician 
would into geometry, who should inform his pupils that all figures 
are circles; and that though Euclid had given that name only to 
figures possessing certain well-defined properties, no regard should be 
paid to his doctrines, nor any distinction made between curvilinear 
and rectilinear figures. Unfortunately for us in England certain ex- 
traneous circumstances procured for Mr. Locke's book, at its first 
appearance, a popularity certainly not due either to its style or 
matter : and the consequences have been, first, that the original 
meaning of the term idea has been totally mistaken ; and secondly, 
that the word has obtained the most vague acceptation of any word 
in our language. It has been supposed that Plato meant by it an 
image, something like the simulacra of Lucretius. On this assump- 
tion, Dr. Johnson, as we are told by Boswell, " was particularly 
indignant at the use of the word Idea, in the sense of Notion or 
Opinion, thinking it clear, that idea could only signify something of 
which an Image can be formed in the mind." So, Abraham 
Tucker says, " an idea is with respect to things in general, what an 
Image is with respect to objects of sight." And David Hume says, 
" nothing can be present to the mind but an Image or perception ; 
and the senses are the only channels destined to receive (and convey) 
such images." These supposed mental images answer much more 
nearly to the (payraajjiaTa of Plato, and are totally different from 



CHAP, V.J OF XOUXS SUBSTANTIVE. 65 

ideas, which belong to the class of No^ara ; the former being 
particular creations of the fancy, the latter universal laws of the in- 
tellect. As to the popular use of Idea, for thought, notion, belief, 
conjecture, and, in short, for almost any vague conception, subjective 
or objective, if it can be assimilated to any Platonic term, it must be 
to Sofa, opinion, which, as Plato says, is at best only a medium 
between knowledge and ignorance — ?/ 6p$r) ^o^afxera^v <f>povr](T£ii)Q 
kcil afiaQiac. 

149. Mr. Locke certainly did not intend to expunge the notion of Locke's 
mind from all philosophy. By distributing ideas, as to their origin, materialism. 
between sensation and reflection, he no doubt meant to imply that 

there was, in the nature of man, an immaterial mind which reflected, 
as well as a material body which felt ; but the inevitable consequence 
of his own vague conceptions on the subject was to employ ex- 
pressions which might be taken in different senses ; and accordingly 
the materialists, not without a plausible appearance of reason, cited 
him as a conclusive authority in their favour. Thus Condorcet says, 
" Locke fat le premier qui prouva que toutes nos idees etaient com- 
posees de sensations." Locke, at all events, was not the first who main- 
tained such an opinion. It was clearly that of Epicurus, as set forth 
by Lucretius, in the introduction to the passage before quoted, — 

Nunc age, qua? moveant anirnum res accipe, et unde 

Qua? veniunt verdant in mentem percipe paucis. 

Montaigne repeats the maxim which he had heard and seems to have 
approved : — " All knowledge is conveyed to us by the senses ; they 
are our masters: Science begins by them and is resolved into 
them."* Hobbes in England and Gassendi in France had held the 
same vague opinion before Locke's book appeared ; and since Locke's 
time it has become the distmguishing characteristic of modern 
mental philosophy, as professed in England by Hartley, Priestley, 
Darwin, Beddoes, &c, and in France by D'Alembert, Diderot, Con- 
dillac, Condorcet, &c, until it at length attained its climax in the public 
atheistical lectures of M. Comte. Happily this extreme proof of the 
insanity, to which false principles of philosophy eventually lead, has pro- 
duced in France a reaction in favour of M. Cousin's powerful exertions 
to restore the writings of Plato to their true place in public estimation. 

150. Universal conceptions, that is to say, ideas, though subjectively classes of 
existing in, or rather forming the basis of the human mind, are ob- ideas - 
jectively applicable to spiritual, mental, and corporeal substances ; for 

none of these can be comprehended by the mind otherwise than 
according to certain laws imposed on them by the Creator, which laws, 
as felt by the mind, are ideas. Those applicable to spiritual objects 
are, to us, by far the most interesting and the most important ; but 
in each class the more profoundly an idea penetrates into the first 
principles of existence, the more difficult is it for unassisted human 
faculties to comprehend it, in all its clear and comprehensive certainty ; 

* Montaigne, by Hazlitt, p. 275. 
2. . F 



66 OF NOUNS SUBSTANTIVE. [CHAP. V. 

whilst on the other hand, some faint glimmerings of it are to be per- 
ceived in the weakest minds ; and there is no human being so con- 
stituted as clearly to conceive its direct contrary. 
Transcen- 151. J have said, that in the mind of man the consciousness of 

dental idea ' 

of God. simple existence is the source and necessary condition of all other 
powers ; and accordingly we find that at the head of the six trans- 
cendental above mentioned, is placed Ens, " Being." This applies 
to all objects, spiritual, mental, and corporeal ; but, above all, it 
applies to the great Ens Entium, the Being of Beings, the Spirit of 
Spirits, in whom " we live, and move, and have our being." Of all 
intellectual energies, therefore, that we possess, the most transcendent 
is that which offers to our finite conception, however imperfectly, the 
idea of an infinite, spiritual Ruler of the Universe. It has been said 
by very worthy and pious writers, that " the belief of one Almighty 
Governor of all things is not an instinctive and universal principle of 
our nature." Certainly not, if we speak of such an instinct as teaches 
an insect to fly as soon as its wings are unfolded from their sheath, or 
such universality as makes human beings of all ages feel the necessity 
of food and sleep. But this statement is wholly inconclusive, as to 
the gradual development of ideas in the human mind. It is like 
saying, that there is no pure idea of a circle ; because a child, in his 
early notion of roundness, does not reflect on the position of a central 
point, on the equality of radii, or on that combination of centripetal 
and centrifugal forces, which produces a circular movement ; or it is 
like denying that a particular plant has within it a principle of fruc- 
tification, because it has as yet put forth only leaves, or perhaps is 
just raising its young stem from the earth. There is not, there can- 
not be, such a thing as a pure atheist ; but the idea of Deity developes 
itself in the human mind slowly : it is easily overlaid and perverted by 
the phantoms of imagination ; and the intellect can make but gradual 
approaches toward that which, in its brightness, " dark with excess 
of light," defies human comprehension. The word God, our Teutonic 
name for this adorable Being, is in its origin synonymous with Good, 
the idea of which, Plato, in the 6th book of the Republic, makes 
Socrates declare to be " the -most sublime of all intellectual concep- 
tions;"* adding moreover to this assertion, the following remarkable 
words: — " We do not sufficiently know it; but if we were wholly 
ignorant of it, then although we possessed all other know ledge in the 
highest degree, it would, without this,, profit us nothing. "f This 
passage cannot but forcibly bring to mind the expressions of St. Paul, 
" though I speak with the tongues of men and of angels, and have not 
charity, I am become as sounding brass, or a tinkling cymbal." Yet 
though goodness (which in human nature the Apostle calls charity,) 
be in its infinite purity one element of the ineffable idea of the Divinity, 

* 'H <rov dyaSvv 'lltti (j/Xytirrov fAu.§nf£(*. 

J o.utyiv ou% ixavag "iTf/Av, U ii fjb9) tff/itv, ri-viv o\ T-aur'/j: ho ti f/.a.XiffTa tolXXx \<TiffT r Ai' 



CHAP. V.] OF NOUNS SUBSTANTIVE. G7 

two other elements are essential to the mental conception of that idea, 
namely, the elements of infinite Power and infinite Wisdom. And 
though this be not the place for theological discussion, yet I cannot 
omit to observe, that many eminent divines have considered these 
elements of our finite idea of God to indicate respectively the creative 
Power of the Father, the enlightening Wisdom of the Son, and the 
enlivening Love of the Holy Spirit. 

152. From that combination of Power, Wisdom, and Goodness, Spiritual idea 
which, in its perfection, belongs to God alone, flows the spiritual idea otlavv ' 

of Law; which, in its application, comprehends as well " that which 
God has eternally purposed in all His outward works to observe," as 
" that which He has set down as expedient to be observed by all His 
creatures," spiritual, intellectual, and material; and from which all 
human laws are or ought to be derived. The development of this 
idea has never been treated with so much depth of thought, or power 
of language, by any author, ancient or modern, as by our own Eichard 
Hooker, in his invaluable production, the Ecclesiastical Polity; 
the first book of which, with equal truth and beauty, thus concludes : 
" Of Law there can be no less acknowledged, than that her seat is 
the bosom of God, her voice the harmony of the world. All things 
in heaven and earth do her homage, the very least as feeling her care, 
and the greatest as not exempted from her power ; both angels and 
men, and creatures of what condition soever, though each in different 
sort and manner, yet all with uniform consent admiring her, as the 
mother o£*their peace and joy." Thus may we see, that the more 
profoundly we meditate on an idea, the more prolific we shall find it 
to be of new and subordinate ideas, each becoming gradually more 
luminous and comprehensive, as the parent idea is more distinctly 
seen and felt ; for while we dwell in awe and admiration on the idea of 
an Almighty Lawgiver, not only do we obtain more elevated and 
philosophic views of Law, but new and clearer ideas present them- 
selves to us of right and wrong, justice and injustice, virtue and vice, 
order and disorder, with their attendant trains of thought. 

153. The ideas applicable to intellectual objects have been differently ideas of 
arranged, in the systems of different philosophers ; for instance, in the objects? 
" Categories " of Aristotle, the " Verstandes-begriffien" of Kant, and 

the " Fundamental Ideas " and " Ideal Conceptions " of Dr. Whewell. 
Aristotle mixes together those which relate to Space and Time, with 
others which are more clearly intellectual. Kant, properly as it seems 
to me, separates the former from the latter, inasmuch as space and 
time imply the existence of an external world, whereas the ideas of 
limit and infinity, unity and number, substance and attribute, cause 
and effect, and the like, might be applied to intellectual conceptions 
-without reference to anything beyond the mind itself. It does not 
seem that the ancient, or at least the heathen philosophers, distin- 
guished spiritual from intellectual ideas. Indeed Socrates, in the 
Phsedon, places the spiritual ideas of goodness and justice on the 



GS OF NOUNS SUBSTANTIVE. [CHAT. V. 

same footing, in point of reasoning, as the intellectual idea of equality. 
" We must necessarily have known equality" (says he), " before we 
first saw equal things, and became aware that they desired (as it were) 
to partake of the nature of perfect equality, but fell short of that per- 
fection."* " And this reasoning " (he adds) " is not more applicable to 
equality, than it is to beauty, goodness, justice, and the like." j On 
the other hand, however, it will be remembered that in the passage 
above cited from Plato's Republic, the same Socrates is represented 
as attaching to the spiritual knowledge of goodness a value incom- 
parably higher than that of any mental acquisition, 
ideas of 154. The remaining class of ideas consists of those which are 

objlcts!' 1 applicable to corporeal objects. Space and time (purely and simply 
considered) do not necessarily imply the existence of any corporeal 
object corresponding to them ; for space may be contemplated as one 
infinite vacuum, and even if portioned out and limited by lines and 
figures, there might be no material forms corresponding to these ; and 
the same might be said of ever-flowing time, if there were no courses 
of the stars, or revolutions of the planets, by which it could be 
measured. But when a new idea intervenes — when we suppose 
matter to exist — this idea, like all others, becomes prolific of a vast 
train of subordinate ideas, according as we apply to it the higher ideas 
of space, time, substance, attribute, cause, effect, &c. We conceive 
of matter as occupying space ; as enduring for a greater or less time ; 
as the effect of a cause ; and as a substance holding together various 
corporeal attributes, as the mind is a substance holding together various 
mental attributes. From the idea of matter flows that of motion, 
which combines the idea of force with those of time and space, inas- 
much as it supposes a portion of matter to occupy at one time one 
part of space, and at another time another, and to be caused so to do 
by some force, whether the force be such as urges the planets to move 
round the sun, or such as makes the smallest conceivable atoms attract 
or repel each other. All matter, organized and unorganized, and all 
motion, voluntary and involuntary, have their laws, which become dis- 
tinctly or indistinctly known to us by sensation and reflection, and 
may be contemplated either substantively in themselves, or adjectively 
as attributes of other substances. 
Substantias, 155. Words which express ideas substantively, whether referable 
abstract, to spiritual, mental, or corporeal objects, are for the most part com- 
prehended by Harris and others among " abstract substantives," or 
words expressing " abstract substances :" and the way in which they 
are explained is, that " by a refined operation of the mind alone, we 
abstract any attribute from its necessary subject, and consider it apart, 

* ' Ava.yxa.~ov ago. ri/u.el$ tfeotttivxi to "lffov vrpo txiivov tov %govou, on to wqutov 
idovrts rot, "\aa. \vivon<rupiv on ogiyiru-i fx.iv <xa,vra. toZt uvai o'tov to Itrov, £;££/ o^i 
ivbuo-Tiftus — 

f 'Ou yu,(> Via) tov "irov vvv o Xoyns v/juv fzciWov ti ?, xa.) m.£i olvtov tov Kakov, xai 
eci/Tou tov 'Aya,6ov, xa,) Aixa'iov — x. t. X. 



CHAP. V.J OF NOUS'S SUBSTANTIVE. 69 

devoid of its dependence ;" " for instance " (says Harris), " from body 
we abstract to fly, from surface the being white, and from soul the 
being temperate ;" and thus are formed the words " Flight" " White- 
ness" " Temperance." That such an operation of the mind is possible 
(as I have before said), I do not deny ; but that it is often exercised 
I doubt ; and that it accurately explains all the conceptions of which 
it is supposed to be the origin, and consequently all substantives 
naming those conceptions, appears to me more than doubtful. 

156. The term "Abstraction" is the Latin abstraction and the %*&££* 
Greek cKpaipeatQ ; but I can find no classical authority for the tion - 
use of either of the two latter terms, in the sense of the mental 
operation alluded to. Aristotle appears to have incidentally spoken 
of geometrical magnitudes as tcl t£ cKfyaipiaawg, " things abstract ;" 
but this was merely to distinguish the reasoning part of geometry 
from the diagrams, or visible points, or lines, which Themistius calls 
vXrj rfjg yeio/JLETpiag, "the matter of geometry," in opposition to 
its intellectual form. The schoolmen seem first to have used the 
term " abstract," as opposed to " concrete." The former they defined, 
" quod significat formam aliquam cum exclusione subjecti ut albedo;" 
" that which signifies any form, with exclusion of its subject, as white- 
ness ;" the latter, "quod significat eandem formam cum hserentibus 
subjecti, ut albus ;" " that which signifies the same form with the 
accompaniments of the subject, as white" Still this decides nothing 
as to the mental operation by which the conceptions in question are 
formed, or the manner in which they arise in the mind : I therefore 
venture to suggest the following explanation, in conformity with the 
views which I have hitherto taken of the constitution of the human 
mind. 

157. The idea of Substance is enumerated above among those Corporeal 
which are applicable to intellectual objects ; but it has pleased the 
Almighty that man should possess not only a spirit and a mind, but 

also a body, which Plato (or whosoever composed the First Alci- 
biades) has compared to an instrument of the mind. It may also be 
compared to the soil, in which the spiritual and mental seeds are im- 
planted, and the elements by which they are surrounded, and 
without which, as seed sown on a rock, they could never put forth 
their vegetative powers. Hence the idea of an intellectual substance, 
as an individualising principle, not limited by space, but holding toge- 
ther, as attributes, various mental faculties, has its contra-type in the 
idea of a corporeal substance, namely, matter, which, as an individualising 
principle limited by space, holds together, as attributes, various sensa- 
tions, and organic, and elementary powers of action. These ideas of 
matter, at first vague and obscure, become by experience and obser- 
vation more and more distinct conceptions, so that we can reason on 
them, on their parts, constitution, and elements, and hereon is founded 
the whole of Natural Philosophy. 

158. Further, the corporeal conceptions do not at first come to us Corporeal 

A L attributes. 



70 



OF NOUNS SUBSTANTIVE. 



Corporeal 
actions. 



Etymology 
not here in 
question. 



[chap. v. 

in the shape of substances, but of sensations, as of heat and cold, light 
and darkness, &c, all which the mind even of an infant can soon dis- 
tinguish ; and it can form conceptions of them before it can refer 
them, as attributes, to any particular substance. Nay, even in after 
life, sensations often occur, such as those of faintness, languor, ennui, 
or tcedium vitas, of which we know neither the seat nor the cause ; and 
yet we can easily reason on them as independent conceptions. In the 
early stages of reason, when men first look on external objects as 
causes of their sensations, they usually suppose the attributes of those 
objects to be similar to the sensations which they experience ; and 
hence they ascribe heat to fire, light -to the sun, cold to ice, &c. 
Still the conceptions of heat, light, cold, &c, remain the same : they 
may be viewed in concreto or in abstracto, as the logicians say, that is, 
as attributes, or as substantive conceptions. 

159. What has been said of the attributes of corporeal substance 
may be understood of its actions; which, indeed, are commonly 
reckoned among its attributes ; as Harris, speaking of abstraction, 
says, " from body we abstract to fly" And so Falstaff humorously 
ascribes to his size an " alacrity in sinking." All corporeal action im- 
plies motion, and the conception of motion (as has been shown) is no 
less an idea than that of matter is. The conception of " flight," 
therefore, may be considered not merely as an attribute of the flying 
body, but as a substantive conception derived from the idea of 
motion. Moreover, there are certain things, as light, heat, elec- 
tricity, magnetism, &c, of which we form substantive conceptions, 
and express them by nouns substantive, though the learned are 
by no means agreed whether they ought to be included among 
corporeal substances themselves, or to be reckoned as attributes, 
forms, or modes of some unknown substance. The great discoverers 
in these, and, indeed, in all branches of physical science, have been 
men who traced our knowledge of the operations of Nature up to some 
bright idea, of which their predecessors had had obscure anticipations, 
but had never obtained 

That sober certainty of waking bliss — 
which ever accompanies the "Heureka " of a mighty truth. 

160. In what has been hitherto said, it must be observed that I 
wholly disregard the historical origin of the words expressing ideas. 
It may be, and it is true, that the English word Eight and the French 
word Droit are of the same origin as the Latin word Rego, " I rule, 
govern, or command;" but long before any of these words were 
employed in their present signification, there existed in the human mind 
an idea of Right (still, alas ! too imperfectly understood, and too little 
desired to be understood, by the great mass of men) which is correla- 
tive with the idea of Duty, and, together with it, flows from a 
development of the higher idea of Law. So the word Heaven may be 
etymologically connected with our common verb " to heave," or with 
the Anglo-Saxon heqfod, " the head ;" but that there is a state of 



CHAP. V.] OF NOUNS SUBSTANTIVE. 71 

greater purity and happiness than can be attained in this mortal life — ■ 
that there is, indeed, "another and a better world," such as we 
believe Heaven to be — is an idea wholly independent of these etymo- 
logies, and which even the most barbarous nations have in all ages 
been found to cherish. 

161. I have dwelt at some length on the doctrine of Ideas, not General and 
only because the gross misuse of the word Idea has become so in- noTtobe 
veterate, since the time of Mr. Locke, in our literature, but because a confoimded - 
clear understanding of it will correct a confusion very injurious to 
grammatical science between the terms general and universal. By the 

former we imply that which is equally common to many individuals, 
and which therefore may be particularised, as " a man," "a slave;" 
by the latter, that which is absolutely and simply true, whether it can 
be applied or not to any existing individual, as " manliness, " slavery." 
These two classes of words are not always distinguishable by their 
form, but always by their meaning in the sentence in which they are 
employed. Thus " man " is a general word, when King Henry 
says — 

Wish not a man from England. 

God's peace ! I would not lose so great an honour, 

As one man more methinks would share from me, 

For the best hope I have. 

But Isabella employs it as an universal in her passionate exclamation — 

Man, proud Man, 

Drest in a little brief authority, 

Plays such fantastic tricks before high Heav'n 

As make the angels weep ! 

And, on the other hand, the word "Right " is an universal in the bold, 
false, and wicked, but too prevalent assertion — 

That what makes the right and wrong, 

Is a short sword and a long, 

Or a weak arm and a strong. 

But it becomes merely a general word in the Bill of Rights, where 
the Lords and Commons of England, after setting forth thirteen 
specific declarations, " claim, demand, and insist upon all and singular 
the premises as their undoubted rights and liberties." How far the 
distinction between general and universal words may be grammatically 
indicated by the construction of a sentence, will be noticed hereafter. 
Logicians term the words indiscriminately " common," which I have 
distinguished as general and universal ; and a proposition in which 
either is predicated may be the major of a syllogism. Formally, 
therefore, the two classes agree, but materially they differ ; for to 
general words, strictly speaking, belong only probable arguments, 
whereas demonstration requires universals. 

162. Thus have I considered the first essential distinction of Gradation, 
substantives, that of kind. I come now to the other essential distinc- 
tion, that of gradation, by which I mean that order or arrangement of 



72 OF NOUNS SUBSTANTIVE. [CHAP. V. 

conceptions, and consequently of the words naming them, to which 
Harris refers when he says, " those several (kinds of) substances have 
their genus, their species, and their individuals ; for example, in natural 
substances, animal is a genus, man a species, Alexander an indi- 
vidual." Of these three distinctions, logicians rank the two first 
among the five predicables, genus, species, differentia, proprium, and 
accidens : that is to say, they hold that whatever is predicated (or 
asserted) of anything must be predicated of it as falling under one of 
these five distinctions. Omitting for the present to notice the three 
last predicables, I may observe, that an individual, which, strictly 
speaking, is only an object designated by a proper name, as Alexander, 
Vatican, Etna, may be classed under a species by possessing some one 
or more qualities common to it, with all other individuals of the 
same species, as Alexander agrees with John and others in the quali- 
ties of a man ; the Vatican with the Tuileries and others in those of a 
palace ; and Etna with Vesuvius and others in those of a volcano. 
And again, that a species may be classed under a genus by possessing 
some one or more qualities common to it with all others of the same 
genus, as the species man falls under the genus animal by possessing 
sensibility ; the species palace under the genus edifice by possessing 
construction ; and the species volcano under the genus mountain by 
possessing height. But as there is no one external object which solely 
and exclusively answers to the terms man or animal, palace or edifice, 
volcano or mountain, it is clear that these are conceptions of the 
mind, and that the nouns substantive naming them must be not proper 
but common,* that is, either general or universal. 
Genus and 163. Harris and others speak only of the three gradations above 

subordina- mentioned, genus, species, and individual ; but it is easy to see that 
the intermediate gradation may be practically multiplied to any extent. 
Thus by an operation of the mind we may divide the species man into 
white and black, free and slave, Greek and barbarian, governors and 
governed ; or we may make being the genus, created being the first 
species, organised being the second, animal the third, and so down- 
wards, in regular subordination. " Every genus," says Harris, " may 
be found whole and entire in each one of its species ; for thus man, 
horse, and dog are each of them distinctly a complete animal." And 
again, " every species may be found whole and entire in each one of 
its individuals ; for thus Socrates, Plato, and Xenophon are each of 
them completely and distinctly a man." " This," he adds, " is what 
Plato seems to have expressed, in a manner somewhat mysterious, 
when he talks (in the Sophist) of \iiav 'Idiav cka ttoWojv, evbg e/caora 

* Hence the predicate of every proposition must be in effect a common word. 
In affirmative propositions, to say John is William is merely to say that two names 
are, by mistake or otherwise, given to the same individual. In negative propo- 
sitions, such as " John is -not William," the predicate, though formally a proper 
name, is in effect common ; for the assertion amounts to no more than declaring 
that John is not Daniel, or Philip, or any other person ; and in this manner it may 
be said that an individual word may be generalised. 



CHAP. V.J OF NOUNS SUBSTANTIVE. 73 

KEifiivv %b)pi-Q 7ravrr} BiareTafxivrjv — teal 7ro\\ag, kripag aXX^Xwr, 
v7ro /jliclq efaOev 7r£pt£^o/xcVac. Now there is really no mystery in 
these expressions to any one who has well studied the use of the 
word idea by Plato ; for he is speaking of an accurate reasoner, 
one who understands the proper method " of dividing by genera, 
and neither supposes one species to be another, nor the latter to be 
the former."* " Such a person," Plato says, *' will clearly discern 
one idea spreading through many things widely separated from each 
other, and will perceive that those many separate things are held 
together under one." 

164. The philosopher's remark maybe thus illustrated: — If any illustrated. 
person should profoundly meditate (as Hooker did) on the generic 

idea of law, and should know how to divide its species with perfect 
accuracy into the law divine, revealed and rational, the laws of nature, 
of nations, and of separate polities, civil and ecclesiastical, assigning 
to each its due limits, he would clearly perceive that this generic idea 
pervades all its species, and that all the works of the Creator and of 
man must alike conform to it, or perish. For want of this animating 
principle in human laws it is — 

That mighty States characterless are grated 

To dusty nothing. 

And what must happen, if we could suppose a like defection from 
the laws of nature, has been admirably described by the great authoi 
of the Ecclesiastical Polity himself — " If those principal and mothei 
elements," says he, " whereof all things in this lower world are made, 
should lose the qualities which now they have ; if the frame of that 
heavenly arch erected over our heads should loosen and dissolve itself; 
if celestial spheres should forget their wonted motions, and by irre- 
gular volubility turn themselves any way as it might happen ; if the 
prince of the lights of heaven, which now as a giant doth run his un- 
wearied course, should, as it were through a languishing faintness, 
begin to stand and to rest himself; if the moon should wander from 
her beaten way ; the times and seasons of the year blend themselves 
by disordered and confused mixture ; the winds breathe out their last 
gasp ; the clouds yield no rain ; the earth be defeated of heavenly 
influence; the fruits of the earth pine away, as children at the 
withered breasts of their mothers no longer able to yield them relief, 
what would become of man himself? See we not plainly that 
obedience of creatures unto the law of nature is the stay of the whole 
world?" 

165. There are two modes then of acquiring knowledge, with refer- Proceeding 
ence to the distinction of genus, species, and individual, the ascending to^ecfe™ 8 
and the descending mode ; and these have been explained or typi- ^|, !ce 
tied in various ways, as by the Arbor Porphyriana of logicians, the 

2eiprj ygvoia) of the poet, and the Ladder of the patriarch's dream. 

To Ku.ru yzvvi diaigittrdai, xa) fw<rt ruurov slbos iri^ov, r,y/itraa-Sc<.t, f/Jiri tn^ov ov 



raurcv. 



74 OF NOUNS SUBSTANTIVE. [CHAP. V. 

Porphyry, an eminent philosopher of the third century, in his Isagoge, 
or introduction to the five predicables above enumerated, thus forms 
a scale (usually figured as a tree), viz., Socrates, Homo, rationale, 
animal, vivens, Corpus, Substantia; according to which we may 
ascend from the individual, Socrates, to the genus, substance; or 
descend, vice versa. Homer, in Chapman's spirited translation, thus 
describes the golden chain by which Jove holds all things suspended— 

Let down our Golden Chain, 

And at it let all Deities their utmost strengths constrain 

To draw me to the Earth from Heav'n ; you never shall prevail, 

Though with your most contention ye dare my state assail. 

But when my will shall be dispos'd to draw you all to me, 

Ev'n with the Earth itself and Seas, ye shall enforced be. 

Then will I to Olympus' top oiir virtuous engine bind, 

And by it ev'ry thing shall hang, by my command inclin'd. 

The patriarch Jacob, in his dream at Luz (afterwards called Bethel), 
" beheld a ladder set up on the earth, and the top of it reached to 
heaven ; he saw the angels of the Lord ascending and descending on 
it; and the Lord stood above it." (Genes, xxviii. 12, 13.) Every 
branch of the tree, every link of the chain, every step of the ladder, 
beginning at the lowest, brings us nearer to the source of all know- 
ledge, until we reach 

Things not reveal'd, which the Invisible King, 

Only Omniscient, hath supprest in Night. 

In which belief of a wisdom beyond human attainment our great 
poet agrees with Plato, who intimates that as the bodily eyes of 
the generality of men are unable to look steadily at the clear meri- 
dian sun, so their mental eyes, contemplating the divine light, are 
unable to sustain its splendour.* On the other hand, the knowledge 
which begins from the highest intelligible genus, and descends in fit 
gradation through subordinate species (as has been above exemplified 
in the idea of law) is also of inestimable value to mankind. To the 
former belongs inductive science, to the latter demonstrative ; these 
are the two wings of the human mind, and he who attempts to fly 
with either alone will effect but an imperfect and limited flight. 
Practical 166. The practical utility of a- well-formed gradation from an indi- 

gradation. vidual through successive species to a genus, or the contrary, may be 
thus briefly explained. The general aim and object of the process is 
to acquire some knowledge that may be useful, not only on one occa- 
sion but on all similar occasions ; to know some truth which may not 
only apply to Peter or John, but to all persons who resemble Peter 
or John ; but this camiot be done unless we have a common word 
which implies that resemblance, and the persons in question cannot 
resemble each other but by relation to some common conception, 
which does not necessarily belong to any one of them more than to 
any other. That common conception therefore supplies the class- 

* Ta yu,^ tJJj rav rfoXXuiv tyv%ijs oftpara Kx^re^zTv vr^os to ®i~ov atyo^uvra aou- 

uecra. (Sophist, p. 177. Ed. Ficin.) 



CHAP. V.] OF NOUNS SUBSTANTIVE. 75 

word, which renders the truth common. Thus Peter, James, and 
Andrew may be slaves ; the conception of slavery therefore is common 
to them all, and whatever is universally true of it is true not only with 
relation to Peter, James, and Andrew, but to all others who are, or 
have been, or may be, in the state of life expressed by the word slave. 
Again, a slave and a free citizen agree in this, that they are subjects ; 
a subject and a sovereign in this, that they are men ; a man and a 
beast in this, that they are animals. Now all these conceptions, to 
wit, slavery, subjection, human nature, and animal nature, are so many 
mental conceptions or ideas, and they are regularly subordinated, one 
to another, in a certain gradation, according as they are viewed by the 
mind ; which view is determined, not by any accidental impression 
received from the senses, but, on the contrary, by the general truth of 
which the understanding is in search. Thus, if I am in search of 
some truth relative to the state of slavery, I may consider the concep- 
tion of slave as a genus, and divide it into the species of domestic, 
political, absolute, limited, and the like ; or if I wish to reason on 
animal nature, I may regard animal as the genus, and man, beast, 
bud, fish, &c. as species. In like maimer I may consider an angle as 
a genus, and right, acute, and obtuse angles as species. 

167. They who think that we can have no conceptions but those Certainty, 
of bodily impression, that there is no substance but matter, and that 
sensation and reflection are alike bodily acts, will of course contend 

that there can be no truth or certainty in the mental conceptions which 
we call genera and species, and consequently no precise meaning in 
the words by which they are signified, inasmuch as there is no ex- 
ternal standard to which they can be referred. But an external 
standard, to which there are no means of referring, is in fact no standard 
at all. Now this must happen, in the great majority of cases, with 
regard to corporeal conceptions. No sooner have I seen " Peter " or 
" John," than he may take his departure. Shall I then say he is a 
nonentity ? And what has truth or certainty to do with external 
existence, more than with internal ? We do, in fact, attain greater 
certainty, and are more confidently persuaded of truth, in regard 
to some mental, than we possibly can in regard to any corporeal con- 
ceptions. Mathematical demonstration is proverbially clear and un- 
questionable ; but mathematical demonstration is carried on solely by 
means of ideal conceptions. If men were to trust to physical mea- 
surement, aided by the very nicest instruments, they might be em- 
ployed for ages before they could satisfy themselves that the three 
angles of a right-lined triangle were universally equal to two right 
angles. 

168. The species is to the genus as the individual is to the species. Species 
Hence it is, that though (as I have said) an individual, strictly individual, 
speaking, is an object designated by a proper name, yet a species, 
though necessarily designated as such by a common noun, may be 
contemplated as an individual, with reference to the genus to which 



76 OF NOUNS SUBSTANTIVE. [CHAP. V. 

it belongs. The conceptions of virtue and modesty, separately con- 
sidered, may be regarded as genera ; but if the latter be contemplated 
only as a species of the former, it may be individualised. When 
Hamlet says to his guilty mother, 

Assume a virtue, if you have it not, 
he alludes to modesty as one of several species of the genus virtue. 
Again, when we say, 4 * Virtue is its own reward," we speak of virtue 
as one of the several species of the genus reward. On this principle 
we may correct what seems to be an error of the learned grammarians 
of Port Royal, and of M. Dumarsais. " There are nouns," say Messrs. 
de Port Royal, " which pass for substantives* but are really adjectives, 
as * King,' ' Philosopher,' ' Physician ; ' " and M. Dumarsais says, in 
the phrase " Louis is king," king is an adjective. Now it surely 
would be more correct to say that the words alluded to are substan- 
tives common, signifying species or genera, of which the person indi- 
cated is an individual. Louis was an individual of the species king, 
and genus ruler. Davy was an individual of the species chemist, and 
genus natural philosopher, and so forth. Condillac says that when a 
substantive is the attribute (he means the predicate), it is the more 
general of the two terms. Now, this is true with reference to the 
particular view taken at the time of speaking. When we say " Time 
is money," we do not mean to use the words time and money both 
as universals, implying genera, so as to make the proposition merely 
an identical one ; but we suppose the word money to be employed 
symbolically as a genus, including all the means of acquiring what- 
soever men deem valuable ; we regard time as a species of that genus, 
and we might continue the gradations thus, Time is money, Money is 
power, Power is happiness. So when we say " Gratitude is justice," 
we mean, that gratitude is a species of the genus justice : it is one of 
the many forms of rendering suum cuique, such as punishing crime, 
rewarding merit, paying a debt, returning a kindness, &c. 
Partition and 169. From what has been said it will be manifest that a genus is 
an idea including various species, not as a day includes an hour, or as 
a mile includes an inch ; that is to say, as a given measurable portion 
of time or space, matter or motion, but as involving conceptions of a 
lower order and less comprehensive nature. This distinction Cicero 
expresses by the words Partitio and Divisio. " In partitioned ' says he, 
" quasi membra sunt, ut corporis, caput, humeri, manus, latera, crura, 
pedes, caetera. In divisione formae sunt, quas nostri species appellant. 
Formae sunt hae in quas genus, sine ullius praetermissione, dividitur ; 
ut si quis jus, in legem, morem, aequitatem, dividat." (Topic, 6, 7.) 
To partition, rather than to division, belongs the class of nouns called 
nouns of multitude, each of which, though it represents a number of 
beings definite or indefinite, still represents them as one thing ; of this 
kind are the words " an army," " a regiment," " a troop," " a nation," 
" a crowd," " a flock." Those writers who have not well compre- 
hended the distinction of genus and species, have sometimes explained 



Division. 



CHAP. V.] OF NOUNS SUBSTANTIVE. 77 

the words representing them as mere nouns of multitude ; that is to 
say, " as representatives of many particular things," instead of being 
representatives of an idea common to those particular things. 

170. Having thus considered the essential distinctions of nouns Number, 
substantive, viz., kind and gradation, I have next to speak of the 
accidental distinctions, viz,, number, gender, and relation or case. 
Whatever is accidental may, or may not, be viewed in connection with 

that which is essential. Thus the conception of ideas of number may 
or may not be viewed in connection with other conceptions, as that of 
" man," or " whiteness," or "sun," or "star;" and if viewed in 
connection with any one of these, the complex conception may be 
expressed by a single word, or by two words, as happens in regard to 
other combinations of ideas ; thus as " saint " is a single word, 
including the conceptions expressed by the two words, " holy " and 
" man," so the word " horses " includes the conceptions expressed by 
the words "horse" and " number." 

171. In order to understand when the conceptions of number can, whence 
and when they cannot, be added to other conceptions, we must con- env ' ' 
sider what the former are. For this purpose I cannot refer to a more 
satisfactory or better authority than Plato's Ephwmis, sometimes called 

the Thirteenth Book on Laws ; but the whole passage is too long to 
be extracted, and I should do it injustice were I to exhibit it in an 
imperfect state. Suffice it to say that Plato agrees with Mr. Locke 
in asserting that " number is the simplest and most universal idea," 
for unity itself is in this sense the origin of all our ideas of number. 
But the latter philosopher is by no means correct in saying that " its 
modes are made by addition ; " for we might as well say that they 
were made by division, or by subtraction, or by multiplication ; since 
addition is, equally with each of the others, one of the powers of 
numbers, and presupposes the idea w T hich Mr. Locke imagines it to 
produce. He says, " by repeating this idea (viz., of unity) in our 
minds, and adding the repetitions together, we come by the complex 
ideas of the modes of it. Thus by adding one to one we have the 
complex idea of a couple." Very true, by adding ; but not by simply 
repeating, which is a totally different operation. John is one, and 
Peter is one, and Henry is one ; but one is not two, or three. What 
makes me then acquire the ideas of two or three ? Certainly not the 
bare act of repeating one, one, one ; for children and idiots who cannot 
reckon three, can do this : and M. de la Condamine mentions whole tribes 
of savages who cannot reckon beyond three, though certainly they could 
repeat one, two, three, all the day long. There must, then, be some- 
thing in the nature of the ideas of number without which it would be 
impossible for us to "add one to one," and thence to obtain "the 
complex idea of number." Now, this consists in the still more general 
nature of all ideas, and in that power, which they have, to grow and 
multiply by contemplation. Thus, if we enumerate John, and Richard, 
and Henry, and William, and James, and Edward, and so forth, the 



78 OF NOUNS SUBSTANTIVE. [CHAP. V. 

very slightest attention will show us that there is not merely unity, 
but multitude, or the idea of number in its most indistinct form ; but 
in order to distinguish this multitude into given numbers, as twos, 
threes, or fours, it will be necessary to refer each conception to some 
other. Thus these two, John and Richard, are tall ; these three, 
Henry, William, and James, are short; Or these three, John, and 
Richard, and Henry, stand in the first line ; these two, William and 
James, stand in the second; or the first, John, is counted on the 
thumb ; the second, Richard, on the fore finger ; the third, Henry, on 
the middle finger ; the fourth, William, on the finger next beyond the 
middle ; and the fifth, James, on the little- finger. This last mode of 
sorting and classing conceptions has been very generally adopted by 
mankind, whence the Greek word irz\x-Kaluv, u to reckon by fives," 
was used for " to number." Some barbarous tribes never went beyond 
the use of one hand for this purpose ; whereas the more cultivated 
nations employed both hands ; and this latter mode is the origin of 
our decimal system of arithmetic, and explains why the numeral figures 
are still called digits, that is, fingers. 

Plural 172. I have observed that the first conception of number is simply, 

that it is something beyond, and different from, unity ; that it is unity 
repeated, or multitude. Thus far most nations have gone, in expressing, 
by one word, the combination of number with any given conception ; 
and this variation in the noun is called, by grammarians, the plural 
number. The plural number usually differs from the singular in form, 
either by the use of a word altogether different, as "pig and swine; " 
or by a change in articulation, as "man and men;" or by a syllable 
added, as " horse and horses," " ox and oxen ;" but as the variety of 
these forms proves that no one of them is essentially necessary ; so 
both experience and reflection will show that no change whatever is 
necessary in the noun itself, provided that some other word serves to 
show us that the noun is used with reference to plurality ; thus in 
English we say " fifty sheep" and " fifty head of cattle ;" and so in 
Latin the genitive and dative cases singular, and nominative and 
vocative plural of the first declension, are identical. 

jPumler 17$. ^e ^ orm * n w ^ cn tne n o un expresses unity of conception, 

is called the singular number ; but it would not be possible for nouns to 
have a separate inflection for every separate conception of number, that 
could be combined with them by the mind. Therefore, they cannot 
have separate forms for the dual, ternal, quaternal numbers, and so on, 
ad infinitum ; but for some of these numbers they may. Experience, 
indeed, has not shown us that they have ever gone beyond the dual 
number ; and that has been done by very few nations. Certain writers 
argue on this and other matters concerning language, as if the formation 
of different dialects were a matter of premeditation and study ; 
whereas it is certain that all languages, in their early state, grow up 
without meditation or reflection, and that the cultivation and polishing 
of its language is one of the last results of a nation's civilization. Nor 



CHAP. V.] OF NOUNS SUBSTANTIVE. 79 

can this be otherwise ; for ideas, which are the laws of mind, develop 
themselves in practice, and guide our mental operations, just as animal 
laws direct our bodily actions, long before we suspect either of them 
to exist. We walk, and dance, and ride, according to the laws of 
gravitation ; we swim by the principles of hydrostatics ; we form and 
express thoughts by the laws of conception, assertion, and conclusion ; 
but it is not until long after we have submitted to those laws, that we 
begin to take cognizance of them as distinct objects of thought ; 
for the last operation of the human intellect is that by which it 
separates itself from outward things, and discovers within its own 
nature a world of beauty and order, which even more than this won- 
drous body of man with all its curious apparatus, chemical and 
mechanical, more than this terraqueous globe with its animal and 
vegetable and mineral riches, more than the sun " looking from his 
sole dominion," or even than the countless numbers of the heavenly 
host peopling interminable space, discovers to our finite comprehension 
the traces of that Deity, who cannot be more fully revealed but by his 
own divine word. 

174, Thus it is, that in intellectual, as in moral speculation, our Absolute 
simplest conceptions are most closely connected with that absolute trut ' 
truth, of which Mr. Tooke altogether denies the existence. " Truth," 

says he, " supposes mankind for whom, and by whom alone, the 
word is formed. If no man, no truth. There is, therefore, no such 
thing as eternal, immutable, everlasting Truth ; unless mankind, such 
as they are at present, be also eternal, immutable, and everlasting. 
Two persons may contradict each other, and yet both speak truth." 
This is not only not common sense, but it is very bad logic. The argu- 
ment runs thus : A man trowed or believed something to exist ; he 
used the word " troweth, troth, or truth," to express this belief; 
therefore no such thing existed. Again, two men believed that two 
different things existed ; they both used the same word to express the 
same belief : therefore the belief of both was equally well founded. 
Turn Mr. Tooke's sentences how we will, they come to this sort of 
reasoning, and can only be accounted for by his loose and hasty con- 
ception of the word thing ; which as he uses it, corresponds exactly to 
Mons. Condillac's object, and to Mr. Locke's idea ; and really means 
nothing ; that is to say, nothing certain, definite, or intelligible. 

175. That the human mind can embrace Eternal Truth, in the Truth of 
widest sense of these terms, it would be folly and madness to assert ; mm ers " 
but that none of the truths which it is formed to comprehend are 
eternal, is a proposition, to say the least of it, extremely bold. At all 
events, the circumstance that men, " such as they are at present," 

may not be able clearly to comprehend a given truth, is certainly no 
proof of its falsehood. Suppose a child does not well comprehend 
that two and two are four, are they the less so ? Now, this is the 
case with all conceptions of number. We begin with unity, we 
proceed to multitude, we advance to numeration ; but the elementary 



80 OF NOUNS SUBSTANTIVE. |~ CIIAp . V. 

books of arithmetic will teach us that this last is the introduction to 
that science by which Newton brought down the old divinities from 
their starry thrones, and converted lovely Venus and potent Jove into 
silent monitors of the lapse of time, or friendly guides of the adventu- 
rous navigator on a lonely ocean; that science, by which judicial 
astrology was for ever confuted, and men learnt to gaze unmoved on 
the comet, which, as they had once thought, 

from his horrid hair 

Shook pestilence and war. 

How 176. Such being the nature and power of the conceptions of number, 

withSer l et us inquire how, and on what principles it is that they are connected 
truths. w i t h ther conceptions : and here it will be seen that these principles 

are founded in the essential distinctions of the noun, as already 
described ; for the principal office of numbers is to apply science to 
fact, by distributing the genus into its species, and the species into its 
individuals ; number, therefore, is the bond uniting the universal with 
the particular, the highest genus with the lowest individual, Eternal 
Truth with momentary sensation. Therefore it is, that Plato says, 
ItVep apt^^bv ek rfjg av$pu)7rivr]Q <j)vcreojg e^iXoifxrjv 6v\c av ttote ri 
(ppopifxot yevoifieSa. " If we were to take out number from human 
nature, we should become void of thought on every subject ;" which 
he again illustrates by observing, that an animal which has not the 
distinct conceptions of two or three, or of even and odd, and, conse- 
quently, is quite ignorant of numeration, can never give any account 
of those things which he perceives by sense and memory. 
How applied 177. "The genus," as has been observed, " is found whole and 
spe g cles! s and entire in each one of its species." Thus the genus animal is found in 
the different species, man, horse, and dog ; that is to say, a man is 
an animal, a horse is an animal, and a dog is an animal. By num- 
bering the species, we find that the genus though one, is capable of 
being conceived in them as many, and therefore we can speak of many 
animals. Again, " the species is found whole and entire in the 
individual." Thus Socrates is a man, Plato is a man, Xenophon is a 
man ; and by applying the conception of number to the species of 
man, we call them three men. The plural number, therefore, be- 
longs to genera and species : and accordingly we find all languages 
apply the plural number to words expressing genera and species, that 
is to say, to the words, called common, or appellative. 
Proper names 178. But the case is totally different with proper names, when 
singular. strictly used as such ; for in that case they are applied to individuals, . 
and the individual is not found whole and entire in the genus or 
species. The conception of Ccesar is not found whole and entire in 
the genus animal, or in the species man, or in the class of Romans, or 
of conquerors, or of generals, or of soldiers, or of scholars. The word 
Caesar, therefore, when used to express the very individual who passed 
the Rubicon, and who spoke with so much affected liberality in 
behalf of the traitors engaged in the Catilinarian conspiracy, and who 



CHAP. V.] OF NOUNS SUBSTANTIVE. 81 

doubted of a future state, and who associated with the debauched and 
profligate Antony, and who at once nattered and subjugated the 
Roman people, cannot receive a plural termination; and for this 
reason, because the particular conception which it expresses cannot be 
associated with number ; since there never was nor ever will be more 
than one such man ; who therefore spoke philosophically and truly, 
when he said — 

For always I am Csesar. 

But if the word Caesar be used to express a different conception ; if 
it mean something which is also found whole and entire in Alexander, 
and Attila, and Jenghiz Khan, and Napoleon Buonaparte, then indeed 
"the Caesars "'is a proper grammatical form of speech; because the 
noun is no longer a proper name, but an appellative : then we may 
reason on the Caesars, as on a class or species, and what we say of one 
will be equally true of another ; but then the word, though the same 
in sound, will be very different in signification ; and the reason which 
before prevented our adding to it the plural termination will no 
longer exist. 

179. Mr. Harris has mentioned various ways in which a proper How they 
name may come to be used as an appellative. The persons indicated p furd. e 
by it may, as members of the same family, or from other accidental 
causes, happen to bear the same name. Hence the expression of 

" the twelve Caesars," to designate twelve Roman emperors who suc- 
cessively bore that name. Hence too the Howards, Pelhams, and 
Montagues, "because a race or family is like a smaller sort of 
species ;" so that the family name extends to the kindred, as the 
specific name extends to the individuals. Again, another cause which 
contributes to make proper names plural, is the marked character of 
some individual who bears it, whether for eminent virtue, or for 
notorious vice, or simply for anything extraordinary and singular in 
his conduct or opinions. It is thus that in speaking on the subject of 
Grammar, we might not improperly say, " these are the opinions of a 
Condillac ! " referring to an author of some celebrity (though, as I 
think, of remarkable inaccuracy) in his views of that subject. So the 
liberality of Horace's patron and friend has made every patron of lite- 
rature be called a Maecenas ; the odious cruelties of Nero have made 
his name a synonym with the word tyrant : and on the same prin- 
ciple Shylock, when he would express the integrity and acuteness of 
the supposed young lawyer, exclaims, 

A Daniel come to judgment ! Yea, a Daniel! 

180. Gender, as an accidental distinction of nouns, has given rise to Gender. 
much litigation among grammarians. " Gender," says Vossius, " is 
properly a distinction of sex ; but it is improperly attributed to those 
things which have not sex, and only follow the nature of things hav- 
ing sex, in so far as regards the agreement of substantive with adjec- 
tive. Sex is proper] v expressed in reference to male and female, as 

2. G 



82 OF NOUNS SUBSTANTIVE. [CHAP. V. 

Pythagoras and Theano ; ager, a field, therefore, is improperly called 
masculine ; and herba, an herb, is improperly called feminine. But 
animal is neuter, because it is construed neither way." Scaliger 
says, that the ancients improperly attributed sex to words ; and that 
with respect to the neuter gender, it is absurd to attribute that to 
gender which is the negation of gender. Neither is it to be borne, 
says he, that words should be called of the doubtful gender, from the 
circumstance of their being sometimes used with a masculine and 
sometimes with a feminine construction. Mr. Harris, however, has, 
with some ingenuity, endeavoured to assign reasons for the generic 
distinction of nouns. " Every substance," says he, " is male or 
female, or both male and female, or neither one nor the other. So 
that with respect to sexes and their negation, all substances con- 
ceivable are comprehended under this fourfold consideration." Hence 
he proceeds to consider language as if it had been really and inten- 
tionally formed with a view to this classification of substances. As 
to the first and second class, they are manifestly such as must on 
many occasions require some mode of expression. The third is rare, 
and its expression would in general be shunned. But as to the fourth, 
it must necessarily include by far the greater portion of the objects of 
thought. In languages which express the natural sexes alone by 
terms corresponding to them, very little difficulty occurs in this part 
of Grammar. In general, every noun denoting a male animal is mas- 
culine ; every noun denoting a female animal is feminine ; and every 
noun denoting neither the one nor the other is neuter. The only 
exception to this general rule, is an exception which is founded in the 
poetical part of our nature ; and it happily serves to distinguish the 
language of imagination from that of reality. The instances to which 
I allude are those in which the conception of a thing is raised to the 
dignity of a person, or where we dwell with such fondness on our 
thoughts as to invest them, as it were, with life and action. Virtue 
stands before us in the enchanting form of a lovely female. Patience 
appears " gazing on kings' graves, and smiling extremity out of act." 
— So Shakspeare says, — 

The mortal Moon hath her eclipse endured. 
And perhaps a finer instance of this figurative use of gender cannot be 
cited than its application to the Idea of Form, in Milton's noble de- 
scription of Satan — 

His form had yet not lost 

All her original brightness, nor appear'd 

Less than archangel ruin'd. 

But in languages where the mere terminations of words imply, or are 
supposed to imply, any or all of these distinctions, it is no wonder 
that much confusion arises in the various modes of explaining a cir- 
cumstance so foreign to the general laws of thought. "The Greek, 
Latin, and many of the modern tongues," says Mr. Harris, "have 
words, some masculine, some feminine (and those too in great multi- 



CHAP. V.] OF NOUNS SUBSTANTIVE. 83 

tudes), which have reference to substantives where sex never had 
existence. To give one instance for many, mind is surely neither male 
nor female ; yet is vovq, in Greek, masculine ; and mens in Latin, 
feminine." This learned grammarian could not but perceive that ' ' in 
some words these distinctions seemed owing to nothing else than to 
the mere casual structure of the word itself;" but he was of opinion 
that in other instances there might be detected " a more subtle kind 
of reasoning, which discerned even in things without sex a distant 
analogy to that great distinction which, according to Milton, animates 
the world!" 

181. I am far from asserting that in particular instances some such Mr. Harris's 
analogy may not have operated. Indeed it appears to be of the 
nature of that imagination to which we owe the figurative language 
above mentioned ; but it could only have been a rare accident, by no 
means capable of carrying us far toward the explanation of the princi- 
ples on which language in general was constructed. Harris, it must 
be owned, expresses himself modestly enough, observing, " that all 
such speculations are at best but conjectures, and should therefore be 
received with candour rather than scrutinised with rigour." " Varro's 
words, on a subject near akin," says he, "are for their aptness and 
elegance well worth attending : Non mediocres enim tenebrce in silvd ubi 
Tuec captanda, neque eb, quo pervenire volumus semitai tritce, neque non in 
tramitibus qucedam objecta, quce euntem retinere possunt." With this 
allowance, we may therefore notice the general principle for which 
Han-is contends, namely, that " we may conceive such subjects to 
have been considered as masculine, which were conspicuous for the 
attributes of imparting or communicating ; or which were, by nature, 
active, strong, and efficacious, and that indiscriminately, whether to 
good or to bad ; or which had claim to eminence either laudable or 
otherwise ;" and again, that " the feminine were such as were con- 
spicuous for the attributes either of receiving, of containing, of pro- 
ducing, or of bringing forth, or which had more of the passive in their 
nature than of the active ; or which were peculiarly beautiful and 
amiable, or which had respect to such excesses as were rather femi- 
nine than masculine." Hence he thinks it would be reasonable to 
consider as masculine nouns, the "sun," the "sky," the "ocean," 
"time," "death," "sleep," and "God;" and as feminines, the 
"moon," the "earth," a "ship," a "city," a "country," and 
" virtue." But the question, as respects the science of Grammar, is 
not whether any or all of these may not occasionally and accidentally 
be so considered ; but whether there be any necessary cause connect- 
ing in our minds the conception of sex with any of them. Now r , 
there can be no other such cause than personification, because sex is a 
personal distinction ; but even that cause does not universally apply to 
any of these conceptions. God, indeed, our creator and preserver, 
we usually and properly regard as a person ; and then the reasoning 
of Mr. Harris is so far just, that we cannot easily view the Supreme 

g2 



84 OF NOUNS SUBSTANTIVE. [cHAP. V. 

Being as a female; for even in those heathen mythologies which 
abound with female divinities, the chief and sovereign Deity is always 
represented as masculine. But Hams himself admits, what indeed 
the common experience of every day sufficiently proves, that we often 
contemplate this ineffable conception without any reference to sex, or 
even to person, calling it " Deity," " Numen," " to Seiov." It must 
be remembered, that personification was more common among the 
ancients than among the moderns. The Greeks actually worshipped 
Sleep and Death in the form of men : Virtue was portrayed before 
their eyes by the statue of a female. Nor must we forget that many 
of these personifications have been handed down to us from them by 
mere tradition and the language of the poets. Thus it is difficult for 
us, who have seen Fame and Victory so often delineated as females, 
on ancient medals, and in sculpture, who read of them as such in 
poetry, and know that Fama and Victoria are nouns of feminine ter- 
mination; it is difficult for us, when we do personify these airy 
beings, to figure them to ourselves as men, in a different habit and 
form, with different accompaniments, and expressed by words and 
sentences of a different character and construction. But there are 
comparatively few things which we personify in our common prose : 
and when we do so, the change of the form of words from neuter to 
masculine or feminine, at once and powerfully marks the transition of 
the mind from cold matter of fact to ardent imagination. This, how- 
ever, is again an accidental circumstance appertaining to the particular 
history of the English language, and not to the philosophy of language 
in general. 
Gender of 182. There is a curious difference of opinion between Sanctius 

and Harris. The former writer asserts " that proper names of men, 
cities, rivers, mountains, and the like do not admit of grammatical 
gender;" " Nomina propria hominum, urbium, fluviorum, montium, et 
ccetera hujusmodi, genus grammaticum habere non posse ;" whereas the 
latter author says "both number and gender appertain to words. — 
Number, in strictness, descends no lower than to the last rank of 
species : gender, on the contrary, stops not here, but descends to every 
individual, however diversified." ' This apparent contradiction between 
two eminent writers is nevertheless easily reconciled. Harris attri- 
butes gender to words as significant of the conceptions of the mind. 
Sanctius, on the other hand, following the authority of Varro and 
Diomedes, considers grammatical gender as relating only to the termi- 
nation or construction of words. " Thus," says Varro, "we do not 
call those words masculine which signify male beings, but those before 
which are properly placed hie and hi, and those ieminine with which 
we can say hcec and hce." " Sic itaque ea virilia dicimus, non quce virum 
significant, sed quibus prceponimus hie et hi; et sic muliebria in quibus 
dicere possumus hose et hee" The reason which this author assigns for 
his doctrine is suitable enough to Grammar as an art, but not as a 
science. Grammatics propositum non est singularum vocum signijtcationes 



proper 



CHAP. V.J OF NOUNS SUBSTANTIVE. 85 

explicare, sed usum. " The object of Grammar is not to explain the 
significations of particular words, but their use." Now, though the 
mere signification of words is not the object of Grammar, the mode of 
signification is so far from being an immaterial part of that science, 
that it is its sole foundation. There is no doubt but that the expres- 
sion or non-expression of the distinction of sex in connection with other 
conceptions, must affect the relations of language considered as signi- 
ficant, and consequently must fall under the science of Grammar, 
according to the definition of it above adopted. This expression is 
not essential to all nouns, but it is an accident universally affecting 
whole classes of nouns, and therefore demanding for its application 
some rules of Universal Grammar. 

183. Now those rules not only do not depend on the termination Termina- 
or other peculiarity in the sound of words, but even in the Latin lan- 
guage, as Wall is has observed, sex is not so distinguished; for 
though the termination um is neuter, yet the words scortum, mancipium, 
amasium, &c, are applied both to the male and female sex : and so 

we find it even in proper names, as Glycerium mea, which Priscian 
notes as figurative. 

184. Regarding only the science of Grammar, as dependent on the Union of 
nature of thought, it is manifest, that those conceptions which are of 

a nature to coalesce, in reason or fancy, may be considered either dis- 
tinctly or in absolute union. Thus the conception of " number " and 
that of " soldier" are absolutely united in the conception of " army" 
or " regiment," or " troop ; " the conception of " royalty " and that of 
" man" are absolutely united in that of " king ;" and so the concep- 
tion of " sex" and that of " child" are absolutely united in the words 
** boy " and " girl." This sort of union gives occasion to many 
classes of words in most languages, as " horse " and " mare," "ram" 
and "ewe;" "bull" and "cow;" but there is a second class in 
which the same distinction is expressed by the compound form of the 
word, as "shepherd" and " shepherdess," "milliner" and "man- 
milliner ; " and lastly, the sexual quality is often expressed by its 
proper adjective, as the " male and female elephant," the " male and 
female rhinoceros." 

185. There are some conceptions in which that of sex is tacitly Con } mon 

i j gender. 

included, but may not be absolutely determinable, or may not require 
to be determined for the purpose of communicating thought. Thus a 
" child " is either a " boy " or a " girl ; " but if we are reasoning on 
the education of children generally, many thoughts may occur to us 
which indifferently and equally relate to boys and girls, and in express- 
ing which we may therefore use the neuter word " child." And per- 
haps this consideration alone would afford a sufficient answer to those 
persons who contend, like Hobbes, that the general word "man" is 
no more than the representation of some one particular man in my 
memory or imagination : for if the word child in my thoughts repre- 
sented a boy, it could not represent a girl, and vice versa; whereas 



Accidental 

ajisociations. 



Animated 
style. 



86 OF NOUNS SUBSTANTIVE. [CHAP. V. 

we see in practice that it represents the two opposite sexes at the 
same time, without the least difficulty, and serves the purposes of rea- 
soning quite as well, and oftentimes better than if we had employed 
different words for the two sexes. 

186. Lastly, there are conceptions, which in reality have nothing 
to do with sex, but which, from various causes, principally depending 
on imagination or habit, we are apt to consider in connection with 
notions of sex. Thus the English sailor, who has contracted a sort 
of affection for the tight vessel in which he has braved the winds and 
waves, and who sees in her neat trim and gallant tackling the elegance 
of female apparel, is habitually led to speak of her as a female. Who 
has not been electrified with the feeling expressed in the old sea- 
song — 

She rights, she rights,, boys — we're off shore ! 
To a similar cause it is to be attributed that we can hardly think 
of Britannia as a mailed warrior, " an arm'd man for the battle," or 
as a sea-god wielding his trident over the subject waves ; but we see 
her, like another Minerva, great in arts and arms > circling her brows 
at once with the olive and the laurel, covering the nations Avith her 
aegis, and stretching out her spear for their protection. If we speak 
of her domestic greatness, it is as 

The nurse, the teeming womb of royal kings ; 
if we lament her errors, and her failings, we 

Feel for her, as a lover, or a child. 

187. This is the language, not of mere plain unadorned reason, but 
of reason elevated and sublimed by passion ; yet does not this circum- 
stance take it entirely out of the domain of Grammar, viewed as 
teaching the necessary modes of communicating thought ; for passion 
is a necessary part of our nature, and it unavoidably gives a hue and 
tinge to our conceptions, and forces us to modify accordingly the 
forms of expression in language. Unhappy is the critic who knows 
nothing of this part of Grammar; he will not only miss some of the 
finest beauties in the poets, but if he attempt to correct what he 
thinks faulty, he will display, in the most ridiculous light, his own 
want of taste. Mr. Harris has finely exemplified this remark,, by a 
quotation from Milton — 

At his command th' uprooted hills retired 
Each to his place : they heard his voice and went 
Obsequious : Heav'n his wonted face renew'd, 
And with fresh flow'rets hill and valley smil'd. 

" Here," says Hairis, " all things are personified: the hills hear, 
the valleys smile, and the face of heaven is renewed. Suppose, then, 
the poet had been necessitated by the laws of his language (or we 
may add by the correction of the critic) to have said, Each hill retired 
to its place ; Heaven renewed its wonted face — how prosaic and life- 
less would these neuters have appeared ; how detrimental to the pro- 



CHAP. V.] OF NOUNS SUBSTANTIVE. 87 

sopopeia which he was aiming to establish ! In this, therefore, he 
was happy, that the language in which he wrote imposed no such 
necessity, and he was too wise a writer to impose it on himself. 
'Twere to be wished his correctors had been as wise on their parts." 
That they were not always so wise we have a striking instance in the 
celebrated Bentley, who has taken upon himself to make a vast 
number of alterations of this kind in Milton's text. Thus the great 
poet, in his picturesque description of creation, had written — 

. The swan, with arched neck, 

Between her white wings mantling proudly, rows 

Her state with oary feet. 

On which Dr. Bentley has the following note : " The swan, her 
white wings ! and her state ! I wonder he should make the swan of 
the feminine gender, contrary to both Greek and Latin; always 
Kvkvoq, cygnus. Rather, therefore, his wings, his state." This comes 
of having learnt only the Greek and Latin Grammars, and not know- 
ing, even of these, the true foundations ! 

188. I come now to the expression of the relations of nouns to Relation, 
each other, which is effected by declension, or case, if the relation 

and the conception coalesce in one word, and by a preposition, if in 
different words. By this short statement many disputes of gram- 
marians relative to the cases of nouns will be easily settled. Declen- 
sion is the term commonly used to signify the variation of case ; but 
Varro considers case as only one mode of declension. His expres- 
sions are these : " Of words, as man and horse, there are four kinds 
of declension ; first nominal, as from equus comes equile ; secondly 
casual, as from equus comes equum ; thirdly augmentative, as from 
albus comes albius ; and fourthly diminuent, as from cista comes 
cistula." I have, however, at present only to do with the second of 
these modes. 

189. It was long disputed what number of cases existed in the Number of 
Latin language. These are thus enumerated and explained by Ciwe3 ' 
Priscian : " The first case is called the right, or nominative case; for 

by this case naming is effected ; as this man is called Homer, and 
that man Virgil. The reason that it is sometimes called the right or 
straight case is, that it is first formed naturally by merely laying down 
the word, and then the other cases formed by flexion from this are 
called oblique. The next is the genitive, which is also called by some 
the possessive or paternal. The word genitive is either derived from 
genus, a race, because we signify by it the race to which any one 
belongs, as ' he is of Priam's race,' or from genero to generate, be- 
cause from this case are generated many other words and parts of 
speech ; at least it is so in the Greek language. Again it is called 
possessive, because we signify possession by this case, as ' Priam's 
kingdom,' or the kingdom possessed by Priam : whence possessive 
adjectives may also be construed by this case ; for what is * the 
Priameian kingdom ' but ' the kingdom of Priam,' or ' Priam's 



88 OF NOUNS SUBSTANTIVE. [CHAP. V. 

kingdom ?' It is called paternal for a similar reason, because the 
father's name is thus expressed, as ' Priam's son ;' and hence patro- 
nymic names may be resolved into this case, as ' Pelidan Achilles ' is 
the same as Achilles the son of Peleus. The following case is the 
dative, which some term the commendative. I give a thing ' to a 
man,' or I recommend a person ' to a man.' Fourthly comes the 
accusative or causative : I accuse a man, or I (as a cause) make a 
thing. The fifth case is the vocative or salutatory, as ' O Eneas !' or 
* Hail Eneas !' The ablative is also called the comparative ; as 'I 
take from Hector,' or * I am stronger than Hector.' Each of these 
cases, moreover, has many other different uses ; but they have re- 
ceived their names from their most general and familiar use, as we see 
happen in many other things." 
theworS of *90. ^ rom tm s enumeration, it is observable that the sort of 
case. declension which the ancients called case, not only expressed the 

relation of nouns to each other, but also that which they bore to 
verbs, as agent or object; and lastly, their use in the expression of 
passion, without reference either to another noun or to a verb : in 
order to explain the reasons of which it will be necessary to observe, 
that the meaning of the word casus, which we render case, is, pro- 
perly, the falling or declining from a perpendicular line. Thus, if the 
simple notion of the noun be supposed to be expressed by an upright 
straight line, as in the letter I , the other cases may be supposed to 
be expressed by lines obliquely declining one way or the other, as in 
the letter V. 
Nominative. 191. It was long disputed among the ancient grammarians, whether 
the nominative should, or should not, be called a case. On the one 
hand it was urged, that conceptions are only expressed by speech, in 
some one of the forms called cases, including the nominative ; and 
that of these forms, the nominative expressing the agent of the verb 
active was the simplest, and was, therefore, used whenever there was 
occasion simply to name a thing or person. Thus we should not say, 
that the name of the person slain by Marcus Brutus was Ccesaris, or 
Ccesari, but C&sar. Those, on the contrary, who called it a case, 
contended that every expression of a conception in speech was a 
declension, or falling away from the simple conception in the mind, 
which, taken by itself, does not imply either action, or passion, or 
relation. Thus, before I can assert anything whatsoever of Caesar, I 
must form the conception or thought of " Csesar" as a person ; but 
when I put that thought to another, when I mention the wife " of 
Caesar," or the friends who were faithful " to Caesar," or those who 
revolted "from Caesar;" or assert that " Caesar conquered," or that 
" Caesar was killed;" or express a feeling of any sort by the excla- 
mation " Caesar " — on these and all such occasions my conception 
declines from its original simplicity, and consequently my expression 
should be said to decline, or fall away from the pure noun. They 
added, moreover, that it was not always the simplest form of the 



CHAP. V.] OF NOUNS SUBSTANTIVE. 89 

noun, but was sometimes more distant from the radical, and therefore 
more deserving of the appellation of oblique than some other cases ; 
as, for instance, the vocative or ablative, which latter some writers 
have considered as the primary and original case of the noun. 

192. Since the notion of action implies the notion of an agent, there Agent or 
must be a form of the noun which denotes the agent to every verb in Ject " 
a simple sentence. The action, however, may be represented as pro- 
ceeding from the agent, or as received by the object. On the former 
supposition, it becomes a verb active, and the nominative case is the 

form of the noun which denotes the agent. On the latter suppo- 
sition, it becomes a verb passive ; and the nominative case is the 
form of the noun which denotes the object. Thus, " Caesar fights," 
" Caesar is killed," are two simple sentences, in both of which Caesar 
is the nominative case. In the former, the word Caesar signifies the 
agent that fights ; in the latter, the same word Caesar signifies the 
object that is killed. In both instances the nominative is essential to 
the completion of the sentence ; for when we speak of fighting, as 
proceeding from an agent, we must necessarily express that agent ; 
and when we speak of being killed, as received by an object, we must 
express the object. Hence the trivial rule, that the nominative 
answers to the question who, or what ; as " Caesar fights." Who 
fights? — Caesar. "Caesar is killed." Who is killed? — Caesar. It 
is justly observed by Harris, that the character of the nominative may 
be learnt from its verb. The action implied in the verb " fights," shows 
the nominative " Caesar" to be an active efficient cause. The suffer- 
ing implied in the words " is killed," shows the nominative " Caesar " 
to be a passive subjcet. Persons may be considered in both these 
lights ; as Caesar is active in the one instance, and passive in the 
other. But Things cannot, except figuratively, be considered other- 
wise than as passive, and, consequently, can only become nominatives 
to passive verbs; as we may say, "the house is built;" but we 
cannot say, " the house builds." 

193. The nominative is the most essentially necessary of all cases ; Nominatives 
and it has therefore been described as " that case without which 

there can be no regular and perfect sentence." The sentences 
in which we make the positive it serve for a nominative, and 
which the Latins used without any nominative at all, as pluit t 
"it rains;" tcedet me, "it wearies me," or " I am wearied;" are 
imperfect sentences, which I shall hereafter consider separately. In 
all other instances, although it may not be necessary to express the 
object to which an action is directed, or the agent from which a suf- 
fering proceeds, yet the converse is absolutely necessary : thus, when 
we say, " William builds," it is not necessary to add " a house," or 
" a palace ;" but if we say " builds a house," or " builds a palace," 
it is necessary to prefix the name of the builder. 

194. In order, however, to extend and enlarpe a sentence, it often Accusative 

" and Ablative. 



Primary and 
Secondary. 



Dative, &c. 



90 OF NOUNS SUBSTANTIVE. [CHAP, V. 

becomes necessary to state the object of a verb active, or the agent of 
a verb passive. Hence arises the necessity for two other cases, which 
have been called the accusative and the ablative. When I say there 
is a necessity for such cases, it will be understood, from what I have 
before observed, that I do not contend for the necessity of any par- 
ticular terminations, or inflections, or prepositions, or arrangement 
of words, to mark these varieties of case ; I only mean, that it is 
necessary, that by some means or other the noun, which indicates 
the conception, should be placed in such or such a relation to the 
verb which constitutes the assertion. It may happen, and, in point 
of fact, it does happen in some languages, that there are no inflec- 
tions of case ; but there are means in all languages of determining 
when a noun is the object of an active, or the agent of a passive verb. 
It has, indeed, been disputed, whether the cases of nouns should be 
reckoned according to the relation in which they stand to other words, 
or according to the diversity of their inflections ; nor are there wanting 
names of high repute on either side of this question. Sanctius con- 
tends, that there is a natural partition of cases, according to the 
relations which they imply, and, consequently, that there must neces- 
sarily be the same number of cases, which he estimates to be six, in 
all languages. Vossius objects to this reasoning, and alleges, that if 
the cases of nouns were to be reckoned by the relations which they 
bear to other words, they must be endless. This contest, like many 
others, has arisen from confounding Universal Grammar with Par- 
ticular. The difference of inflection, or position, belongs to the latter ; 
that of signification to the former. True it is, that the relations of 
nouns to other nouns and to verbs are infinite ; but yet they are dis- 
tinguishable into certain great classes ; and whether these classes 
ought or ought not to be called cases is a mere verbal dispute. I 
shall so designate them, for the sake of convenience ; at the same 
time it must be understood that this arrangement is not intended to 
interfere with the Grammar of any particular language, in which the 
cases are arranged according to their inflections. 

195. In my sense of the word case, then, the nominative, that is, 
the agent of the active, or object of the passive verb, may be called 
the primary case; and the secondary cases are the accusative and the 
ablative, in so far as they perform the functions above noticed. These 
two cases, it is to be observed, are respectively convertible with the 
nominative, by a change of the verb from active to passive ; for 
" James loves John" is convertible with " John is loved by James;" 
the accusative of the first being the nominative of the second, and the 
nominative of the first being the ablative of the second. 

196. So the matter stands in the simpler combinations of thought; 
but let us consider what is to be done, if in one and the same sen 
tence we wish to express not only the agent and object of any action, 
but also the end to which the action is directed : the cause on account 



CHAP. V.] OF NOUNS SUBSTANTIVE. 91 

of which it happens, or the instrument, mode, and circumstances of 
its performance. For these purposes it is necessary that the concep- 
tion of such end, or cause, or instrument, &c, should be expressed by 
a noun ; and that some means should be adopted to show whether 
the noun was meant to stand in the relation of end, cause, or instru- 
ment, or in any other relation to the verb. It is, as Vossius justly 
observes, quite impossible that any language should have separate 
inflections for all these relations, and therefore some of them are, in 
most languages, represented by separate words, or particles, com- 
monly called prepositions ; but others are often expressed by inflec- 
tions, the number and diversity of which vary exceedingly in different 
languages, as will be shown hereafter. 

197. Thus have I noticed three classes or degrees of relation in Genitive, 
which the noun may stand to the verb ; but it may also be related to 
another noun, as depending on, or belonging to it. Thus the words 

" Priam's kingdom," " the son of William," mark a dependence of 
"son" on "William," and of " kingdom" on " Priam." This rela- 
nion is expressed by a separate inflection in Greek, Latin, English, 
and many other languages ; and it is commonly called the genitive 
case. Now the use of the genitive case in nouns substantive differs 
but little from the use of an adjective. It expresses one conception, 
as dependent on another, and the expression of the latter serves to 
individualise and specify the former. The dependent conception is 
therefore, in fact, a mere attribute of the other, and consequently the 
genitive is easily convertible into an adjective. Thus the words 
BaaiXeoQ ^Kfj-n-rpor, regis sceptrum, the king's sceptre, are easily con- 
verted into ^.Ki]Trrpov BaciAe/cov, sceptrum regium, the kingly sceptre. 
For the same reason, we find that in some languages, the Chinese, 
for example, the adjective is in no manner distinguished from the 
genitive or possessive case of a substantive ; for it is said that 
the word had signifies goodness, and gin signifies man ; but hao gin 
is a good man, or man of goodness ; and gin hao is human good- 
ness, or the goodness of man. Hence, too, we see why Wallis con- 
siders the English genitive case as a possessive adjective ; e.g., " the 
king's court," aula regia, where he differs from all other English 
grammarians, in calling the word "king's" an adjective. On the 
other hand, Lowth reckons the words mine and thine, which are 
usually called adjectives, as the possessive cases of me and thee. It is, 
perhaps, from a similar cause that Dr. Jonathan Edwards asserts the 
Muhhekaneew or Mohegan Indians to have no adjectives at all in 
their language ; a fact on which Mr. Home Tooke lays great stress, 
but which, in reality, proves nothing as to the signification of language, 
whatever it may do as to its forms or inflections. 

198. It seems hardly necessary to distinguish the vocative case by Vocative, 
any particular inflection. Indeed, we find the terminations of the 
nominative and accusative equally employed in Latin as exclamatory : 



92 OF NOUNS SUBSTANTIVE. [CHAP. V. 

and it is said that the Sanscrit grammarians do not allow the vocative 
to be a case. Yet, when we are speaking of the different relations 
which a noun may bear to other words in a sentence, it is impossible 
to overlook its use in those sentences where it stands forth promi- 
nently as the object addressed or invoked. Thus, in the first ode of 
Horace, we find two verses almost wholly occupied with vocatives : — 

Maecenas, atavis edite regibus, 

et presidium, et dulce decus meum ! 

So Plautus uses it as an interjection, "Io! Hymen! Hymensee !"* 
From which, and many similar instances, it might be called the inter- 
jectional case. 

* Casna, a. 4, sc. 3, v. 3. 



( 93 ) 



CHAPTER VI. 

OF NOUNS ADJECTIVE. 

199. I have said that the noun adjective is the name of a concep- Definition, 
tion or thought, considered as a quality or attribute of another con- 
ception. In more popular language, it is a word added to a 
substantive to designate a quality, which distinguishes it from some 
other substantive of the same class, as a red house, a lovely lady, the 
moneyed interest, the fiftieth regiment ; where red, lovely, moneyed, 
and fiftieth are all adjectives. In order fully to uuderstand this defi- 
nition, it will be proper to advert once more to the nature of a simple 
enunciative sentence or logical proposition. The subject, or that con- 
cerning which something is asserted, is always a noun substantive ; 
the predicate may be a noun adjective. Thus, in the sentence " John 
is tall," the subject is " John," which is a noun substantive ; the pre- 
dicate is "tall," which is a noun adjective. Complex sentences are 
resolvable into more simple ones : and where adjectives are used, so 
as to render a sentence complex, they are always resolvable into the 
predicate of a logical proposition. Thus, if it be said that " a wise 
man is cautious," this sentence is resolvable into the two simple 
sentences " a man is cautious," and " that man is wise," and in each 
of these the adjective is the predicate of the proposition. Adjective. 

200. The inferences to be drawn from this statement are several. Not the 
In the first place, whenever the name of a conception is employed as proposition^ 
the subject of a proposition, it is not an adjective. Thus, the con- 
ception expressed by the words "good" and " goodness" is the 

same ; but if we predicate anything of this conception ; if, for in- 
stance, we say " goodness is amiable," the word goodness must 
necessarily be a substantive. And this does not depend on the form 
of the word ; for if the idiom of our language allowed us to say 
"good is amiable," or "the good is amiable," the word "good" 
would be as much a substantive as " goodness." 

201. Hence it follows, that the distinction between a substantive Mode of _ 
and an adjective does not necessarily depend on any difference between viewlng 
the conceptions which they express, but between the different modes 

in which those conceptions are contemplated by the mind. If we 
contemplate goodness as a separate idea, if we assert anything of that 
idea, if we make it the subject of any proposition, then it is a sub- 
stantive ; but if we predicate it of anything else, if we consider it 
only as a quality of that thing, then it is an adjective. 

202. Hence, again, it follows, that an adjective and a substantive Notcon- 
cannot be convertible, without wholly changing the meaning of the 
proposition in which they are employed. Thus, to say that " envy 



94 OF NOUNS ADJECTIVE. [CHAP. VI. 

is criminal," and that *' criminality is envious," are two propositions 
entirely different. 
Cannot stand 203. It is equally a rule of Universal and of Particular Grammar, 
that an adjective cannot stand alone, but must be joined with its sub- 
stantive; which is, in truth, no more than saying, that a predicate 
must necessarily refer to some subject. Mr. Tooke, however, con- 
troverts this rule, though it is certainly as old as the words adjective 
and substantive. He objects, that the rule equally applies to the 
oblique cases of nouns substantive, and that therefore " the inability 
to stand alone in a sentence is not the distinguishing mark of an 
adjective ;" but, though it were not a distinguishing mark, it might 
yet be a rule common to all adjectives. However, the real intent of 
the rule is to distinguish adjectives from the substantives with which 
they are used, and that in the most simple sentences ; and with re- 
ference not to their form or inflection, but to their signification. Thus, 
if we say " a golden is valuable," the sense is incomplete, and the 
adjective "golden" requires the addition of a substantive, as, for 
instance, " ring," to render it intelligible. On the contrary, if we 
say "gold is valuable," the sentence is perfect. 
Have not 204. Mr. Tooke contends that " the adjectives golden, brazen, silken, 

meaning. uttered by themselves, convey to the hearer's mind, and denote the 
same things as gold, brass, and silky The short answer to this is, 
that it is contrary to common sense and experience to confound these 
terms together; and nobody ever does so, who understands the 
English language in the slightest degree. But if we wish to trace the 
source of Mr. Tooke's error, we must examine more particularly his 
expressions. First, what does he mean by " uttered by themselves ?" 
Words uttered by themselves are like syllables or letters uttered by 
themselves. They are the mere elements of discourse. Their proper 
force and effect in rational speech must depend on their connection 
with each other. Again, what is meant by " denoting the same 
things?" In so far as they are both of the same origin, there is 
doubtless a common conception to which they both bear relation ; 
but it does not follow that they both bear the same relation to it. A 
numerous tribe of words derived from, or connected with, this term, 
gold, is to be found in the different European languages. Is it to be 
said that they all " convey to the hearer's mind and denote the same 
things ?" Let us see how this can possibly be made out. From (1) 
the splendour of the rising or setting sun, was denominated (2) the 
yellow colour resembling that splendour. From the name of that 
colour, was derived (3) that of the jaundice, which rendered the 
whole body yellow, and (4) that of the gall, which produced the 
jaundice. From yellow also came (5) the name given to the yolk ot 
an egg. And again, from this colour came (6) the name of gold. 
Gold, being the most precious of metals, gave its name (7) to riches 
in general ; and particularly (8) to money. Hence were denominated 
all kinds of payments, whether (9) voluntary gifts, or (10) offerings, 



CHAP. VI.] OF NOUNS ADJECTIVE. 95 

or (11) tribute, or (12) rent, or (13) fines; as well as (14) debts 
due on any of these accounts. In process of time, certain societies 
were formed and maintained by regular payments from each member, 
and these societies received their name (15) from this circum- 
stance. The name was afterwards extended to societies (16) or 
fellowships in general ; and it occasioned the peculiar designation of a 
building (17) in London, where they assembled. Fines in ancient 
times were applied, in the nature of punishment, to almost all 
crimes ; and hence their name came to signify (18) punishment in 
general; and particularly a barbarous mutilation (19) often used as a 
punishment. Lastly, the general term for punishment was naturally 
applied to the criminality (20) by which the punishment was occa- 
sioned. In a future part of this work I shall trace these progressive 
changes of signification, as they are to be found in the Maeso-Gothic ; 
Anglo-Saxon ; Alamannic ; Lombardian ; Precopian ; Greek ; Latin, 
old, middle, and barbarous ; Suevian ; Swedish ; Icelandic ; Russian ; 
German ; Dutch ; Welsh ; Italian ; old and modern French, and old 
and modem English. Every change of application is occasioned by a 
new operation of the mind. The sound of the word conveys a new 
thought, similar indeed to the preceding, and having reference to the 
same conception, but placing it in a new light. It would be absurd 
to say that the thought remained the same through all these different 
uses ; and it is equally incorrect to say, that it remains the same after 
any one step. There is as real, though not the same difference be- 
tween " gold" and " golden," as there is between "a guilder" and 
" Guild-hall." If Mr. Tooke were right, to gild a thing would be to 
convert it into gold : whereas these words, though of the same origin, 
are so far from denoting the same conceptions, that they are often 
used in direct opposition to each other. " Is this gold? — No, it is 
only gilt." So gold and golden are not the same. They both, 
indeed, refer to the same conception ; but they refer to it in different 
ways. In the one instance, the conception (namely gold) is the very 
thing of w 7 hich we are speaking ; it is the logical subject of the pro- 
position ; the mind looks at it, as it were, directly ; as when Bassanio 
says, 

Thou gaudy gold, 

Hard food for Midas — I will none of thee. 

Whereas, in the other case, it is noticed but incidentally, as a 
thought passing over, and giving a momentary tinge to another 
thought, but differing from it as the light in which we view a sub- 
stance differs from the substance itself. So the same Bassanio, in 
the same scene, speaking of his mistress's portrait, says, 

here in her hair, 

The painter plays the spider, and hath woven 

A golden mesh to entrap the hearts of men. 

205. From what has been already said, it will easily be under- How treated 
stood that these secondary thoughts, which are expressed by adjectives, tfvel. bstan " 



Necessary to 
language. 



Agreeing- 
with sub- 
stantive. 



96 OF NOUNS ADJECTIVE. [CHAP. VI. 

may be brought more distinctly before the mind, and treated as sub- 
stantives in connection with other substantives. It is thus that 
instead of " a virtuous man," we may say "a man of virtue;" but 
though there appears, in this instance, very little difference of mean- 
ing, yet, on analysing the two expressions, we shall find that a new 
and distinct operation of the mind is performed, which operation is 
here expressed by the word " of." We do not merely, as in the case 
of the words " virtuous man," contemplate the conception of " man " 
as a substance, and that of " virtue " as a quality belonging to the 
individual in question ; but we contemplate " man " as having a sub- 
stantial existence, and " virtue " as having an existence capable of 
coalescing with man ; and further, we contemplate the actual union of 
these two thoughts, as expressed by the word " of." Slight, there- 
fore, as the difference of meaning is between the words " a man of 
virtue " and " a virtuous man," yet the grammatical difference is not to 
be overlooked : and the best proof of this will be to consider how 
totally the style of any author would be altered if we were always to 
change the genitive case of the substantive into an adjective, and vice 
versa. Suppose that, instead of the line, 

The quality of mercy is not strained, 
we were to say, " the merciful quality is not a quality of compul- 
sion," we should certainly not augment the force and beauty of the 
language ; and we should as certainly change the flow and current of 
the thought ; we should alter the Grammar, and annihilate the poetry. 

206. The preceding remarks, too, show the absurdity of asserting 
that " adjectives, though convenient abbreviations, are not necessary 
to language," and that " the Mohegans have no adjectives in their 
language ;" for though this latter fact is vouched by " Dr. Jonathan 
Edwards, D.D., pastor of a church in Newhaven, and communicated 
to the Connecticut Society of Arts and Sciences, and published by 
Josiah Meigs," it amounts really to this, that the Mohegans cannot 
distinguish subject from predicate, or substance from quality ; and if 
so, they must be utterly destitute of the faculty of reason, which 
probably neither Dr. Edwards, nor Mr. Meigs, nor Mr. Tooke in- 
tended to assert. The only conceivable ground for the Keverend 
Doctor's assertion is, that the Mohegans employ the same word in a 
substantive and adjective sense, as we say " there is a calm,'"' and 
"the day is calm'' the weather "is cold" and I have " a cold;" or 
figuratively, as " silver locks," the " honey-moon" " angel visits," 
" serpent error," " infans pud or," and the like. 

207. It is a common rule, that the adjective should agree with its 
substantive in gender, number, and case, whence perhaps, it might 
at first sight be inferred, that gender, number, and case properly 
belong as well to the adjective as to the substantive. This, however, 
is not the fact : the adjective simply expresses a quality ; but it must 
of necessity be connected in language with its substantive, and that 
connection is effected in many languages by a similarity of inflection ; 



CHAP. VI.] OF NOUNS ADJECTIVE, 97 

and when the inflections of the substantive express gender, or number, 
or case, those of the adjective often follow a similar rule of construc- 
tion. This construction, it is obvious, is a matter belonging only to 
Particular, and not to Universal Grammar. It may exist in one 
language and not in another ; and, in fact, there are languages (our 
own, for example) in which all these variations in adjectives are 
unknown. 

208. On the other hand, a variation of degree belongs, in an Degree, 
especial manner, to certain adjectives, but not at all to substantives ; 

and where there are variations of degree, they may be compared to- 
gether, whence arise, what are technically called by grammarians, the 
degrees of comparison. 

209. Substantives cannot be compared, as such, in point of degree ; Notappii- 
for that would be to suppose that the nature of substantial existence substantives, 
was variable ; and that one existing thing was more truly existing 

than another, which is absurd. " A mountain," says Harris, " cannot 
be said more to be, or to exist, than a molehill ; but the more and less 
must be sought for in their quantities. In like manner, when we 
refer many individuals to one species, the lion A cannot be called more 
a lion than the lion B ; but, if more anything, he is more fierce, more 
speedy, or exceeding in some such attribute. So again, in referring 
many species to one genus, a crocodile is not more an animal than a 
lizard is, nor a tiger more than a cat ; but, if anything, they are more 
bulky, more strong, &c. ; the excess, as before, being derived from their 
attributes. So true is that saying of the acute Stagyrite, ovk av em- 
leyotTo i) ovala to jxaXKov kcli to t)ttov ; substance is not susceptible of 
more and less." Sanctius, referring to this same passage of Aristotle, 
observes, that we may hence infer that comparatives cannot be drawn 
from nouns substantive. " Therefore," adds he, " they are deceived, 
who reckon the words senex, juvenis, adolescens, infans, &c, as sub- 
stantives, for they are altogether adjectives. Nor is it to be objected, 
that Plautus has made from Pamus the comparative pamior ; for he 
does not there mean to express the substantial existence of the Car- 
thaginian, but his craftiness, as if he had said callidior ; for the Car- 
thaginians were reputed to be a very crafty people. So the writer 
who used the word Neronior, from Nero, meant only to signify an 
excess of cruelty." 

210. As substantives in general admit not of degree, so there are Nor to some 
some adjectives which equally exclude either intension or remission. ad - iectlves - 
Thus Scaliger justly observes, that the word " medius" can neither be 
heightened nor lowered in degree ; and that the same may be said of 

" hodiernus," and of many other adjectives. On this topic Mr. Harris 
thus expresses himself: "As there are some attributes which admit 
of comparison, so there are others which admit of none. Such, for 
example, are those which denote that quality of bodies arising from 
their figure ; as when we say a circular table, a quadrangular court, 
a conical piece of metal, &c. The reason is, that a million of things 
2. H 



98 OF NOUNS ADJECTIVE. [CHAP. VI. 

participating the same figure, participate it equally. To say, there- 
fore, that while A and B are both quadrangular, A is more or less 
quadrangular than B, is absurd. The same holds true in all attribu- 
tives denoting definite qualities, whether contiguous or discrete, whe- 
ther absolute or relative. Thus the two-foot rule A, cannot be more 
a two-foot rule than any other of the same length. Twenty lions 
cannot be more twenty than twenty flies. If A and B be both triple 
or quadruple of C, they cannot be more triple or more quadruple one 
than the other. The reason of all this is, that there can be no com- 
parison without intension and remission ; there can be no intension 
and remission in things always definite : and such are the attributes 
which we have last mentioned." This reasoning, which, as far as it 
goes, is very just, seems nevertheless to require some further deve- 
lopment. What is here meant by ' ' things always definite ?" Plainly, 
what we have already called ideas, and those clearly conceived. The 
idea of a circle, when clearly conceived, is a thing always definite. 
By mathematicians it is clearly conceived; and consequently they 
would think it absurd to say, that one table was more circular than 
another ; but persons who have not a distinct idea of a circle would 
not perceive the absurdity of the expression. To them, circularity 
would appear capable of intension and remission ; and therefore they 
would conclude, that this quality admitted of comparison as much as 
sweetness or sourness, hardness or softness, heat or cold. Hence we 
find in language such words as round, which expresses the idea of cir- 
cularity in a vague and indistinct manner ; and these words are com- 
monly used in the comparative and superlative, as well as in the posi- 
tive degree. For the same reason, all words signifying bodily sensa- 
tion are capable of comparison ; for though we agree generally in the 
meaning which we attribute to them, yet there is no definite idea to 
which any one of them can be distinctly referred. Men employ the 
terms "hot, cold, white, black, green," &c, so as to convey to each 
other's mind certain general notions, but not to communicate precise 
and distinct ideas, like those expressed by the words, " square," or 
" triangle." Again, in moral qualities there is usually the same indis- 
tinctness. We say, one man is braver or wiser than another; 
because we possess no absolute standard of bravery or wisdom. If 
we possessed such a standard, that is to say, if we had a clear idea of 
bravery, or of wisdom, we should simply say, that each of the two 
was either brave or not brave, wise or unwise. There is no more 
common comparison in all language than between that w~hich is good 
and that which is better ; yet the pure idea of goodness presented to 
us by the Christian religion excludes all comparison — "There is none 
good but one, that is God." 
Three 211. I have observed, that where there are variations of degree, 

these variations may be compared together. Grammarians have fixed 
three degrees of comparison — the positive, the comparative, and the 
superlative ; and it seems material to observe, that the comparison 



dekTees. 



CHAP. VI.] OF NOUNS ADJECTIVE. 09 

here referred to is of two kinds. We may either compare a quality, 
as existing in any given substance, with the same quality as existing 
in other substances, or we may compare it with some assumed notion 
of the quality in general. 

212. The positive is the simple expression of the quality : and Positive. 
Harris says, it is improperly called a degree of comparison ; but in 

this he seems to be wrong ; for it is that form in which the compa- 
rison of equal degrees of the same quality is expressed, either affirma- 
tively or negatively. Thus we say, in the positive degree, " Scipio 
was as brave as Cassar ;" " Cicero was not so eloquent as Demo- 
sthenes." 

213. The comparative expresses the intension or remission of any Comparative, 
quality in one substance, compared with the same quality in some 

one other substance, as " Cicero was more eloquent than Brutus ;" 
" Antony was less virtuous than Cicero." Hence it is manifest, that 
there are, properly speaking, two kinds of the comparative degree, one 
expressing the more, and the other the less of the quality compared. 
Languages in general have employed a peculiar inflection only to 
express the former ; but the latter is in its nature no less capable of 
expression : and both belong to those distinctions which constitute 
Universal Grammar. It is to be remarked, that the comparative, 
though it excludes the relative positive, does not necessarily include 
the absolute positive. If we say " John is wiser than James," we 
exclude the assertion, that " James is as wise as John ;" but we do 
not necessarily include the assertion either that " John is wise," or that 
'* James is wise." All that may really be intended by the affirmative, 
is a negation of the negative. It may only be meant to assert that 
" John is less unwise than James." 

214. The superlative expresses the intension or remission of a quality Superlative, 
in one thing or person, compared with all the others that are contem- 
plated at the same time. There must be more than two objects com- 
pared, but the number compared may be indefinite : we may say, 
Octavius was the most prudent of the triumvirate ; Homer was the 

most admirable of poets ; Solomon was the wisest of men. In other 
respects, what I have observed of the comparative, applies equally to 
the superlative, which may properly be considered as expressing the 
most or the least of the quality in question, but which does not, any 
more than the comparative, necessarily include the absolute positive. 
Of this remark, the common proverb, " Bad is the best," affords a 
sufficient illustration. 

215. Hitherto I have only spoken of the comparison of qualities Comparison 
existing in one subject with those existing in another or others ; but the genera " 
comparison may be made with a general conception of the quality : and 

here also may be three similar degrees. Where the quality is sup- 
posed to be of the general or average standard, we use the positive ; 
where we mean to imply simply an excess beyond that standard, we 
use the comparative, which in English is commonly expressed by the 
adverb too, as when Hamlet says, " Why mav not imagination trace 

h2 



Names of the 
degrees. 



1 00 OF NOUNS ADJECTIVE. [CHAP. VI. 

the noble dust of Alexander, till he find it stopping a bunghole ?" 
Horatio answers " 'Twere to consider too curiously, to consider so ;" 
that is, more curiously than is usual or needful. Lastly, where we 
mean to express a high degree of eminence in the quality of which we 
speak, we use the superlative, as vir doctissimus, vir fortissimus, a 
most learned man, a very brave man ; that is to say, not, perhaps, the 
bravest or most learned of all men that ever existed, or of any given 
number of men; but a man possessing the quality of learning or 
bravery in a degree far beyond the common standard. 

216. It is of small consequence to inquire whether all these forms 
of speech together are properly named degrees of comparison, and 
equally immaterial whether the particular names, positive, comparative, 
and superlative, are well chosen to designate each degree. Many 
eminent grammarians have contended on these points. Vossius 
objects to the name positive, because the two other degrees are 
equally positive, that is, equally lay down their respective significa- 
tions, whence the Greeks called the superlative hyperthetic, from 
TiSivai, to lay down. Not more appropriate, says he, is the name 
of the comparative degree, since comparison is applied to many words, 
both nouns and adverbs, which are not of this degree, as the adjec- 
tives, like, unlike, double; and among adverbs, equally, similiter, &c. 
Moreover, comparison is effected no less by the superlative than by 
the comparative : for it would be equally a comparison if I were to 
say, speaking of Varro, Nigidius, and Cicero, " Varro is the most 
learned of the three ;" as if I were to say, speaking of Varro and 
Nigidius only, Varro is the more learned of the two." Lastly, the word 
superlative is not well chosen, since it merely signifies preference, or the 
raising one thing above another ; and in this sense the comparative itself 
is a superlative ; for in saying, " Varro is more learned than Nigidius," 
I prefer, or raise Varro above Nigidius in regard to learning. For 
similar reasons, Scaliger proposed new names for the three degrees. 
The first he called the aorist, or indefinite ; the second, the hyperthetic, 
or exceeding ; and the third, the acrothetic, or highest degree. Quin- 
tilian and others call the positive the absolute degree; others call 
it the simple, and so forth ; but none of these names having come into 
general use, I think it more convenient to hold to those which are 
commonly received ; not considering the choice of a name as very 
important, compared with the accuracy of a distinction ; and that 
the three variations of adjectives in degree are essential to Gram- 
mar, has been already sufficiently proved. 
Comparison 217. It is of more consequence to note, that intension and remis- 
butives". sion not being confined to adjectives, the degrees of comparison are 
likewise not confined to them, but are common also to certain verbs, 
participles, and adverbs ; in short, to the whole class of attributives 
(as they are called by Harris), provided that, in signification, they 
import qualities which may be increased or diminished. Thus, as 
the adjective " amiable " admits of the comparative and superlative 
" more amiable," and " most amiable ;" so we may use the ex- 



CHAP. VI.] OF NOUNS ADJECTIVE. 101 

pressions " more loving," " most loving ;" " to love well," " to 
love better," " to love more," " to love most of all." These indica- 
tions of degree, however, have been rarely expressed by inflection, 
except in adjectives ; and this seems to be the true reason why the 
degrees of comparison have often, but inaccurately, been considered 
by grammarians as belonging to adjectives alone. It is scarcely worth 
while to occupy attention with such words as avrorarog, used by 
Aristophanes ; or ipsissimits, employed by Plautus. Some critics, in- 
deed, have seriously adduced these as examples of comparison in pro- 
nouns, as if I could be more I, or he more he in reality ; whereas it is 
plainly seen, that the comic writer, by a natural boldness in the use of 
language, employs these pronouns in a secondary sense, as if they ex- 
pressed a quality instead of a substance ; but not as if a man could be 
more or less himself without losing his personal identity. 

218. I come now to consider the two great classes into which ad- Kinds of 
jectives may be divided ; and these, as I have before observed, depend a jec nes 
on their expressing, or not expressing action. Thus, if we say " a 

four-footed animal," although the quality of being four-footed has re- 
ference, in this instance, to action, as its final end ; yet as it does not 
express action (for a table or a chair may also be four-footed), this is 
an adjective of the first-mentioned kind. On the other hand, if we 
say " an animal moving" we clearly express that action is really taking 
place : this, therefore, is an adjective of the second kind. Now, of 
these two kinds, the former are exclusively called adjectives by the 
majority of grammarians, and the latter are as commonly called par- 
ticiples. I adopt these distinctive terms from an unwillingness to 
alter the received nomenclature of grammatical science ; but at the 
same time, I wish it to be clearly understood, that both the adjective 
and participle of the common grammarians fall under the definition 
which I have above given of the word adjective in its largest sense. 

219. Of the adjective simple, or unmixed with any idea of action, Verbal 
little remains to be observed ; but before I proceed to the considera- a •> ectlves - 
tion of the participle, it may be proper to notice a large class of ad- 
jectives, which, though they do not express action, yet bear reference 

to it. Such are those words expressive of the capability or habit of 
action, which Mr. Tooke has classed among the participles. There is 
great hazard, when a writer chooses to treat all his predecessors 
with contempt, that he may fall into gross errors himself. Mr. Tooke 
has confounded, in his new scheme of participles, the verbal adjectives, 
gerunds, and participles of former writers ; and, at the same time, has 
laid down no clear definition of his own to guide us out of the 
labyrinth. What is more, he has adopted as participles the verbal 
adjectives in bilis, ivus, and icus, and excluded those in asc, arius, 
bundus, icius, &c, which seem quite as much entitled to the same 
distinction. 

220. Upon a full consideration of all these different kinds of adjec- are simply 
fives, there seems to be no reason for classing them apart from the simple a jec lveb ' 
adjective, and as little for confounding them with the participle. They 



102 OF NOUNS ADJECTIVE. [cHAF. VI. 

ought not to be separated from the simple adjective, because they do, 
in fact, express only a simple quality ; and it is difficult, if not impos- 
sible, to draw a line between qualities which are originally derived 
from action, and qualities not so derived. Let us take, for instance, 
the word falsus, false. No doubt this is derived from /alio, which 
expresses the act of failing or deceiving ; yet, by a transition of mean- 
ing, it comes to signify simply that which is not true. In like manner, 
many of the words which Mr. Tooke treats as participles have been 
really introduced into the English language as simple adjectives, with- 
out the least reference to the action, which their radicals expressed in 
other languages. Such is the word " palpable." We commonly say 
" it is palpably false," *' the truth is palpable," &c. ; yet, perhaps, 
few persons, when they use these phrases, entertain any notion of 
feeling and handling the truth or falsehood in question, though palpare, 
to feel or handle, is the undoubted origin of this word. The same 
maybe said of "ductile," "frail," "sensible," "noble," and many 
other English adjectives, which have not the slightest pretence to be 
considered as participles. If the mere derivation from a verb is to 
entitle a word to be called a participle, we should have numerous 
classes both of substantives and adjectives so distinguished : for if 
ductilis be a participle, because it is derived from duco, so is audax, 
because it is derived from audeo ; ridiculus, because it is derived from 
video ; and a thousand other adjectives. Nay, we may add to this list 
the substantives derived from verbs, if the mere derivation is to be a 
test of the grammatical use. Thus, we may say, that pistrinum, a 
bakehouse, is a participle of pinso, to bake ; juramentum, an oath, of 
juro, to swear ; judicium, a judgment, of judico, to judge, &c. In this, 
as in numberless other instances, Mr. Tooke supposed the history of 
words to be the science of language. Because noble is derived from 
nosco, to know, therefore he called it a participle of that verb ! At 
this rate, all the parts of speech must become an inextricable mass of 
confusion ; for, historically speaking, each is derived from the other, 
and there can be no rule which gives any one the precedence. If we 
look to the signification, all is clear. Either a given adjective ex- 
presses action or it does not. If it does not, it is a simple adjective ; 
and the circumstance of its referring to the habit or capacity for action 
cannot alter its character. The words " forcible " and " culpable" 
relate originally to the actions of forcing and blaming ; but they relate 
to them only as the ground-work of an existing quality, and not as 
being really in action, or as having been so, or to be so, at any given 
time. These considerations will probably suffice to clear away all the 
difficulties which Mr. Tooke raised respecting what he called the 
participles of the potential mood active, the potential mood passive, 
the official mood passive, and the future active. They are all, as 
used J n the English language, simple substantives, or simple adjectives : 
and to rank them among participles, would not only be to oppose the 
great majority of writers who have treated of these subjects, but to 
confound all reasonable principles relating to this part of Grammar. 



( 103 ) 



CHAPTER VIL 

OF PAKTICIPLES. 

221. Although, in accordance with the generality of the gram- Definition, 
marians, I have enumerated the Participle as a distinct part of speech, 
yet it is in truth (as may be seen by the Table in Chapter III.) a 
subdivision of the noun agreeing with the adjective in expressing an 
attribute or quality ; but differing from the adjective in expressing a 
quality not simply, but as being, or having been, in action. Inasmuch, 
therefore, as action implies time, the participle partakes, in this 
respect, of the nature of the verb ; and hence it received the designa- 
tion Participium, a parte capiendo, ; for, as was said, partem capit a 
nomine, partem a verbo. The definitions given by many ancient gram- 
marians of this part of speech were founded on its characteristics in 
the learned languages. Thus Yossius says } " Participium est vox 
variabilis per casus, significans rem cum tempore." But here the variation 
per casus is a mere accident of the Greek and Latin tongues ; and the 
word rem must not be taken as expressing a substance, but a quality. 
The words cum tempore, indeed, apply to a principle of Universal 
Grammar ; and, so far, the definition is correct. Upon the whole, 
however, Spinosa's definition in his Hebrew Grammar is more worthy 
of attention. He says, " Participia sunt Adjectiva, quo? actionem vel 
omne quod Verbo significari solet tanquam Rei affectionem vel modum, cum 
relatione ad tempus exprimunt." 

222. The participle differs essentially from the verb in this, that The Participle 
it simply names a conception, but does not assert anything concerning assert 1 . 

it. The words, " loving, moving, reading, thinking," &c, assert 
nothing respecting these acts ; they merely name the acts, or rather 
they name the conceptions, as in action. It is said that the participle 
should be ranked among nouns when it constitutes the subject of a 
logical proposition, and among verbs when it forms the predicate ; 
but this is not accurate : a participle, as such, can never form the 
subject of a proposition. The example given is, Militat omnis amans, 
Ildc 6 epiov TroXefxii ; but in this instance amans has an adjectival force, 
agreeing with homo understood ; and it is the same in the Greek. 
Again, when the participle is a predicate, as Socrates est loquens, it 
equally fills the office of an adjective, and is not to be treated as a 
verb, at least in the sense which I have attached to the latter term. 

223. The adsignification of time is proper to the participle. This Adsignifica- 
point, however, Mr. Tooke contests, upon the ground that the Latin 
participles, present, past, and future, are not confined to the times 

from which they respectively receive their designations. Proficiscens 
is a participle of the present tense ; yet Cicero says, dbfui proficiscens, 



104 OF PARTICIPLES. [CHAP. VII. 

thus connecting time present with time past. So profecturo tibi dedi 
litems, connecting the past with the future : and again, quos spero 
societate victories tecum copulatos fore ; where spero is present, copulatos 
past, and fore future. None of these examples, however, prove any- 
thing against the expression of time by the participles, but merely 
that time is contemplated in various lights by the mind in one and 
the same sentence. Thus, in the phrase abfui profciscens, the first 
word relates to the time of speaking, and the second to the time of 
acting. The going was present, when the absence (which is now 
past) was present. Again, dedi refers to a time past ; but when 
that time was present, the departure (expressed in profecturo') was 
future. A thousand such cases as these would lead to no inference 
whatsoever against the expression of time by the participle. It is 
necessary to observe, however, that words which express time express 
it in two ways, either as simple existence or as relative to the different 
portions of duration. Thus, when we say " justice is at all times 
mercy," the present is a mere expression of existence, a present con- 
tinuous. So when we say, " the sun rises every day," we speak of 
an act habitually present. It is the nature of the human mind to be 
able thus to contemplate duration ; but this in no degree interfere^ 
with, still less contradicts, the view which we take of different portions 
of time, as past, present, and future, with relation to each other. The 
assertion, for instance, that the sun rises every day, does not at all 
clash with the assertion that the sun is rising at this moment. In 
both cases time is referred to : a certain portion of time is designated 
in the one case which coincides with the general assertion in the 
other ; and, in fact, the difference between the two assertions does 
not depend on the verb itself, but on the accompanying words 
" every day" and " this moment." In these respects the verb and 
participle agree. The participle is an adjective so far participating 
the nature of the verb as to signify action, and it cannot signify action 
without the capability of adsignifying time. 
V a a r r tte?ies 224. Particular languages may or may not have separate words 

adapted by inflection to signify the different portions of time in a 
participial form. In truth, the notion of time is in all such cases a 
new element in the compound conception, which compound con- 
ception may be expressed by one word or by several. The com- 
plexity of conception may go still further : it may include the 
distinctions of active and . passive, of absolute and conditional ; and, 
in short, all those which I shall have to consider when I come to 
treat of the verb. Hence we see, that languages may have as great a 
variety of participles, as they may of moods and tenses : and it does 
not seem of the nature of language altogether to exclude participles 
from the parts of speech ; for Mr. Harris is perfectly right in saying, 
that if we take away the assertion from a verb there will remain a 
participle. He is speaking of the signification, and not of the sound ; 
and therefore Mr. Tooke's ridicule of this passage is entirely mis- 



CHAP. VII.] OF PARTICIPLES. 105 

placed. It is an observation, as old as Aristotle, that the words 
" Socrates speaks " are equal in signification to the words " Socrates 
is speaking ;" but it is evident that the assertive part of this sentence 
consists entirely in the word " is," which word being taken away, the 
word " speaking " still expresses a quality of Socrates, and expresses 
that quality in action, and is therefore a participle. And so it will 
happen with every verb, as is instanced by Harris in the verbs, ypatyei, 
ypcKpwv, "writeth," "writing." Tooke misrepresents Harris as 
saying, that, by removing ei and eth, he takes away the assertion ; 
whence he concludes, that Harris supposed the assertion to be im- 
plied in those syllables ; but Harris says nothing about taking away 
si and eth. He says what is very true, that the words ypacpei and 
writeth imply assertions, and that in the words ypa0wv and writing, 
the assertion is taken away ; and yet there remains the same time, and 
the same attribute ; which expressions of time and attribute, without 
assertion, constitute a participle. 

225. It has been laid down as a rule by some writers, that there where no 
can be no participles but what are derived from verbs ; and hence ing^erb!" 
they deny that such words as togatus, galeatus, &c, are to be called 
participles. Augustinus Saturnius, who treats particularly of this 
point, calls them, by way of distinction, participials. It is manifest, 
however, that this is a distinction altogether nugatory, in regard to 
Universal Grammar. When Othello says 

My demerits may speak unbonneted, 

he uses exactly the same form of speech as if he had said uncovered, 
and the one word is as truly a participle as the other ; for although 
there may be no authority for the use of the verb " to bonnet," or 
" to unbonnet," such verbs would be perfectly consistent with the 
principles of Universal Grammar ; and, indeed, as much so with the 
English idiom, as the verbs " to veil," and " to unveil," both which 
are used by Milton. Uncovered, unveiled, and unbonneted equally 
express an action of past time, viz., the removing the cover, veil, or 
bonnet from the head ; and it is by this signification, and not by their 
etymology, that the part of speech to which they belong is to be 
determined. 

226. We must not be surprised to find, that participles of different Passintoeach 
classes pass into each other. Many active participles come to have a ot ier ' 
passive signification. The word evidens, which was originally active, 
is found with a passive meaning, from whence our common adjective, 
evident, is derived. This is a circumstance not peculiar to participles ; 
for when I come to treat more at large of those transitions of meaning, 
which are the groundwork of sound Etymology, it will be found that 
they apply to every part of speech indifferently. Men cannot always 
find a separate term to express each distinct shade of thought, and 
they naturally avail themselves of those expressions which come the 
nearest to their meaning. 



Admit of 
comparison. 



Used sub- 
stantively. 



106 OF PARTICIPLES. [CHAP. VII. 

227. From what has before been said on the subject of comparison, 
it is clear that participles, as well as adjectives, when they express 
qualities capable of intension and remission, may admit the three 
degrees of comparison : thus we may say amantior as well as durior, 
amantissimus as well as durissimus. It matters not, that in some 
languages the idiom will not allow of expressing the degrees of com- 
parison by inflection ; that, for example, in English we cannot say 
lounger, or lovingest ; this is a mere accident of the particular lan- 
guage, depending principally on circumstances connected with its 
sound ; and it is to be observed, that however barbarous such words 
as hunger or lovingest might sound to the ear, yet they would be 
perfectly intelligible to the mind : there would be nothing absurd or 
contradictory in the combination of the thoughts ; for the same com- 
bination is effected by the words " more loving," and " most loving ; " 
and in all languages there must be means more or less concise, or cir- 
cuitous, to express such combinations. 

228. We have seen how the conception of a quality considered 
alone, and rendered the subject of assertion, becomes a noun sub- 
stantive ; and this applies, in principle, as well to those qualities which 
are expressed by participles as to those which are expressed by ad- 
jectives. Whether the same or a different word shall be employed 
for this purpose is, again, a matter of particular idiom. In English, 
we use the very same word for both purposes. Thus, " singing," 
" dancing," &c, may be used in construction as adjectives, or as 
substantives of the sort commonly called abstract. We may say 
" a singing man," " a dancing woman ;" or we may say, " singing is 
an accomplishment," " dancing is a recreation," &c. In Latin, the 
idiom is different : cantans, saltans, &c, can only be used in the 
former of these two ways ; but, nevertheless, a similar principle is 
observable in the use of what are called gerunds and supines. 

Gerunds. 229. Scaliger gives the following account of the Gerund: "From 

these (participles) our ancestors chose certain tenses, by means of 
which they might imitate those Greek terms \ekteov, /xa^T/rcov, &c, 
but with a more ample and extensive use. These they called gerunds, 
assigning them to three cases, pugnandi, pugnando, pugnandum ; of 
which the second preserved the power of a participle, but so much 
the more aptly as the verbs were excelled by the participles. For, 
as the cause of action is more plainly shown by saying ' ccedens 
vulneravi,' than by saying cecidi, and better still by saying * quia 
coederem vulneravi,' the whole of this is expressed by the gerund 
* coedendo vulneravi.' Moreover, in many things the form and the 
end are the same; but the end is partly out of us, as the ship is a 
thing out of the ship-builder ; and partly within us, in our minds, as 
is that which is called an idea, by which we are impelled to the 
external end. Now both of these they very skilfully expressed ; for 
both pugnandi and pugnandum signify the end. Thus I may say, 
pugnandi causa equum ascendi, I mounted my horse for the purpose of 



CHAP. VII.] OF PARTICIPLES. 107 

lighting ; or pugnandum est ex equo, I must fight (or the fighting must 
be) on horseback." " Hence it appears that these (gerunds) are 
participles, differing little from other participles, either in nature, or 
use, or even in form." Again he observes : " Some writers have 
called these gerunds from their use participial nouns ; for they are 
neither pure nouns, since they govern a case, nor are they pure 
participles, since, with a passive voice, they bear an active signi- 
fication." 

230. The same author thus speaks of the Supine : " Nearly similar Supir 
is the explanation to be given of the Supines ; but these latter express 
the same meaning more forcibly. Thus, eo ad pugnandum signifies a 
future action ; eo pugnatum expresses the future so as to be quite 
absolute." " Hence it signifies activity with actives, and passiveness 
with passives : eo factum injunam, or injuria mihi factum itur ; but 
indeed it always savours, in some degree, of passiveness ; for it does 
not so much mean eo<ut faciam, as it means eo ut hoc fiat ; as if one 
were to say, I am going indeed for the purpose of doing so and so, 
but I hope it is already done ; and like Sosia's speech, Dictum puta, 
" suppose it said." " Since, therefore, the end (or aim) of an action 
was to be thus signified, the other extreme was not improperly ex- 
pressed by a different word." Hence Scaliger explains the different 
use of the supines in um and w, the latter of which he regards as a 
sort of ablative case. " There is equally a movement," says he, 
" from and to an object ; and therefore we rightly say venatu venio, as 
we do venatum vado." He goes at length into these considerations, 
opposing in some measure what other grammarians had said of the 
supine in u ; but these questions are beside my present object : and 
all that is necessary here to be shown is the chain of connection which 
unites the participle, as an adjective, on the one hand with the noun 
substantive, and on the other with the gerunds and supines. 



( 108 ) 



CHAPTER VIII. 

OF PRONOUNS. 

Definition. 231. A Pronoun is a part of speech so called from the Latin Pro- 
nomen, and the Greek Avrioyvjiia ; and agreeably to this derivation, it 
is defined by the generality of grammarians, " a sign or representative 
of a noun ;" for things (and persons), as Vossius observes, are con- 
sidered in grammar as named by nouns. When, therefore, a pronoun, 
such as he or it, is used to signify a person, for instance " Caesar," or a 
thing, for instance, " a crown," the pronoun he is a sign or repre- 
sentative of the noun " Caesar ;" and the pronoun it is a sign or repre- 
sentative of the noun "crown;" and so forth. Aristotle, indeed, in 
his treatise wepl 'Ep^nveiag comprehends the pronoun under the title 
Noun. By subsequent writers, the term pronoun has been applied to 
several classes of words, very distinguishable from each other ; and it 
may be doubted, whether it would not originally have been better to 
restrict its signification within narrower limits than those which were 
adopted. Upon the whole, however, as the meaning has been so long 
settled, I deem it advisable to follow the established usage. 

Distinctions. 232. Of the many distinctions which have been made in this part 
of speech, that which first demands attention, as essential, is into sub- 
stantive and adjective, answering to the like division of primary nouns, 
which has been already explained. Thus he is a substantive pronoun, 
which may, standing alone, represent the primary noun substantive, 
Socrates understood, and they is a substantive pronoun, which, standing 
alone, may represent the primary noun substantive, Men, or Skips, 
understood; whereas, in the expressions every person, any nation, 
every and any are pronouns adjective, which cannot stand alone, but 
agree, as adjectives, with the substantives "person," and "nation," 
expressed. Some of the adjective pronouns, however, may be used 
substantively, by a sort of ellipsis, which will presently be explained. 
Pronouns 233. I consider as pronouns substantive all those which are com- 

monly called personal, and distinguished as of the first, second, and 
third person. Of this distinction the common account is, that the first 
person is the speaker, the second the person spoken to, and the third 
the person or thing spoken of. But this is not quite correct ; for 
though the first person be in fact the speaker, and the second, the 
person spoken to, yet, unless they are also spoken of, they do not 
enter into the grammatical construction of a sentence. And again, as 
to the third person's being spoken of, this is a character which it shares 
in common with both the other persons, and which can never, there- 
fore, be called a peculiarity of its own. To explain by an instance 



personal. 



€HAP. VIII.] OF PRONOUNS. 109 

or two. When iEneas begins the narrative of his adventures, the 
second person immediately appears ; because he at once makes Dido, 
whom he addresses the subject of his discourse. 

Infandum, Begina, jubes renorare dolorem. 

From henceforward for 1500 verses, (though she is all that time 
the person spoken to) we hear nothing further of this second person, 
a variety of other subjects filling up the narrative. In the meantime, 
the first person may be seen everywhere ; because the speaker is 
everywhere himself the subject : the events were, indeed, as he says, 
those — ■ 

Quae ipse miserrima vidi, 

Et quorum pars magna fui. 

Not that the second person does not often occur in the course of 
this narrative ; but then it is always by a figure of speech, when those 
who, by their absence, constitute, in fact, so many third persons, are 
converted into second persons, by being introduced as present. On the 
other hand, when we read Euclid, we find neither first person nor 
second in any part of the whole work. The reason is, that neither 
the speaker nor the party addressed (in which light we may always 
view the writer and his reader) can possibly become the subject of 
pure mathematics. 

234. The clearest explanation of the different persons is that given by Priscian's 
Priscian, who took it from Apollonius: Persona? pronominum sunt expar 
tres, prima, secunda, tertia. Prima est cum ipsa, quae loquitur, de se 
pronuntiat ; secunda, cum de ea pronuntiat ad quam directo sermone 
loquitur ; tertia, cum de ea quae nee loquitur, nee ad se directum accipit 
sermonem, 1. xii. p. 940. Theodore Gaza gives the same dis- 
tinctions : TlpwTov (jip6au)7rov, sc.) u> 7rep\ kavrov <ppa£ei 6 \iywv' 
ZivTEpov^ to 7repl rov, irpoc ov 6 \6yog. rpirov w Trap) eripov. Gaz. Gram. 

1. iv. p. 152 : and this explanation is stated more at large by Harris, 
whose words therefore, I shall, with a slight correction, adopt. 

235. " Suppose the parties conversing," says he, "to be wholly First person, 
unacquainted, neither name nor countenance on either side known ; 

and the subject of the conversation to be the speaker himself. Here, 
to supply the place of pointing, by a word of equal power, the 
speaker uses the pronoun I. ' I write, I say, I desire,' &c. : and as 
the speaker is always principal with respect to his own discourse, 
this is called, for that reason, the pronoun of the/r.s£ person. 

236. "Again, suppose the subject of the conversation to be the Second 
party addressed. Here, for similar reasons, the pronoun thou is em- 
ployed. ' Thou writest,' ' thou walkest,' &c. ; and as the party ad- 
dressed is next in dignity to the speaker, or at least comes next to 
him, with reference to the discourse, this pronoun is therefore called 

the pronoun of the second person. 

237. " Lastly, suppose the subject of the conversation neither the Thh-dperson. 
speaker, nor the party addressed, but some third object, different from 



110 OF PRONOUNS. [CHAP. VIII. 

both ; here another pronoun is provided, viz. : he, she, or it, which, in 
distinction from the two former, is called the pronoun of the third 
person." " And thus it is that pronouns come to be distinguished by 
their respective persons." But plain and intelligible, as this explana- 
tion is, of the grammatical distinction of persons, it must not be under- 
stood to imply that the actual conception of a person is subsequent, 
in the human mind, to that of the noun which the pronoun represents ; 
for, as has been observed, the notion of our own personal identity, 
which is expressed by the pronoun, " I," is essentially necessary to 
all consciousness ; and by an innate sympathy, we cannot but believe 
other Persons to possess, like ourselves, each his own identity ; which 
notion of identity we even transfer to 'Things, if they appear to us 
under all circumstances to retain the same qualities. 
£ the e wo g 238 * * fc wil1 not fail > nowever , to be observed, that there is a marked 
former. difference between the third person, and the two former. The first 
and second are strictly personal, the speaker must be a person, and the 
party addressed must be at least personified, as when Satan addresses 
the sun, — 

thou, that with surpassing beauty crown'd, 
Look'st from thy sole dominion ! 

But the pronoun of the third person may represent either a person, 
or a thing ; and that by the same word or a different one, according to 
the idiom of the language employed. Hence, some grammarians dis- 
tinguish pronouns in general into personal and demonstrative, including 
in the former class only those of the first and second person, and re- 
ferring those of the third person, together with all other pronouns, to 
the latter class. This arrangement, in so far as it confounds sub- 
stantive pronouns with adjective, I cannot approve. He or she may 
stand as much alone in a sentence, as Peter or Jane, and may regu- 
larly be made the subject of a proposition, and connected with an ad- 
jective as its predicate. We may say indifferently "he is wise," or 
"Peter is wise," "she is handsome," or "Jane is handsome." Nor 
does the pronoun of the third person necessarily represent a noun un- 
known, or a person or thing absent, any more than a pronoun of the 
first or second person does. The name of the speaker (that is the 
noun represented by the pronoun I) may be as little or less known to 
tiie person addressed, as the name of the person or thing spoken of; 
and, in point of fact, the speaker, the person spoken to, and the person 
or thing spoken of, may be all present, and may as little need to be 
demonstrated or pointed out, one as the other. Therefore, though a 
pronoun substantive relating to a thing cannot in strictness be called 
personal ; yet the grammarian will do right, who includes it under a 
common head with pronouns of the first and second persons. 
How coaiesc- 239. The characteristics of the three persons are not so entirely 
separate, as to preclude a possible coalescence of the pronouns of dif- 
ferent persons ; but this is subject to certain restrictions. The pro- 
noun of the first or second person may easily coalesce with the third ; 



CHAP. VIII.] OF PRONOUNS. 1 1 1 

but the first and second cannot coalesce with each other. For exam- 
ple, we may say (and the difference of idiom in different languages 
does not affect these expressions), "lam he," or, " thou art he ;" or, 
as in the text, " art thou he that should come, or do we look for 
another ?" But we cannot say, '* I am thou," nor " thou art I ;" the 
reason is, that there is no absurdity in the speaker's being the subject 
also of the discourse ; as when we say, " I am he ;" or in the person 
addressed being so, as when we say, " thou art he ;" but that the 
same person, in the same circumstances, should be at once the speaker 
and the party addressed would be absurd; and, consequently, so 
would the coalescence be of the first and second person. Some gram- 
marians seem to have inaccurately supposed, that all but the personal 
pronouns of the first and second person were to be considered as be- 
longing to the third person. This, however, is inaccurate, at least 
with respect to the relatives, who, which, that, as may be observed in 
those lines of the old song : — 

What ! you, that loved ! 

And I, that loved ! 

Shall we begin to wrangle ? 

Where the relative that is of the second person in the first line, and of 
the first person in the second line : and if translated into Latin, it must 
be rendered, not tu quoe amabat, and ego qui amabat, but tu quo? 
amabas, and ego qui amabam. 

240. The pronoun adjective is distinguished from the pronoun sub- Pronoun 
stantive, in the same manner as the noun adjective is from the noun 
substantive, namely, by its inability to stand alone ; because it implies 
some attribute or quality of a noun or pronoun substantive. It must 

be admitted, that to determine whether a particular word, which 
occurs in a speech or literary composition, should be considered as a 
pronoun adjective, or a noun adjective, is not always very easy ; but 
this, is rather a difficulty of idiom than of grammatical principle. 
Without dwelling on this point, therefore, I proceed to notice the 
most obvious distinctions of the pronoun adjective. 

241. First, I consider that they are either positive or relative. By Possessive, 
positive I mean those distinctions which regard the word as a member 

of a single sentence ; and by relative, those which relate to another 
sentence preceding or subsequent. The positive either depend on the 
personal pronoun, and are commonly called possessive, or else serve to 
limit general nouns, and may be called definitive. Some possessive 
pronouns must be necessarily expressed or understood in all languages ; 
for if it be necessary to have a pronoun personal, which is a word 
representing a whole class of nouns substantive, it is equally necessary 
to indicate (in some manner or other), the quality which consists in 
belonging to that class. If every speaker must indicate himself by the 
word /, or me, he must indicate what belongs to himself by some such 
expression as mine or of me. Whether this be done by the former of 
these two modes of expression, or the latter, is immaterial to the sense, 



112 OF PRONOUNS. [CHAP. VIII. 

and must depend on the construction permitted by the idiom of the 
particular language ; but if such a word as mine or my be employed, 
it must be regarded as a pronoun adjective, and indeed is treated in 
many languages exactly as any other adjective is, at least in the positive 
degree. For instance, meus, mea, meum, is declined in Latin exactly 
as bonus, bona, bonum, is. Under the head of possessive pronouns may 
be classed those which Vossius calls gentilia, such as nostrates, meaning 
individuals of our race, family, or party ; as military officers in this 
country often mention a comrade, as "of ours," meaning, " of our 
regiment." 

Definitive. 242. The definitive pronouns serve to limit general nouns, with re- 

ference either to an individual simply, as when I say " this man," or 
" that man ;" or else with reference to other individuals of the same 
class, as when I say, " the other man," " every man." How far such 
distinctions may be carried in practice, depends on the degree of cul- 
tivation which particular languages may receive ; but some degree of 
definition seems necessary to the formation of every language : and 
from pronouns of this class is derived the definite Article, which will 
be considered hereafter. The pronouns which limit with reference to 
an individual simply may be called demonstrative, as they show the 
individual intended, by reference to his own particular position, 
situation, or the like. Thus, the words "this man" usually indicate 
a person near, or present ; the words ' ' that man," a person more 
distant, or perhaps absent. The pronouns which limit a conception 
with reference to several individuals of a like class are distinguished 
by Vossius into partitives, such as " either," " neither," " other;" and 
distributives, such as " any," " some," " every." The distributives again 
might be distinguished into general and numeral ; but these latter 
form an important class, which I shall have occasion to consider 
apart. 

Subjunctive. 243. Of the relative pronouns adjective, those which relate to a 
preceding sentence are commonly called subjunctive ; those which relate 
to a future sentence are called interrogative. I say those which relate 
to a sentence, and not those which relate to a person or thing ; because 
in truth all but the pronouns of the first and second person must refer 
to some person or thing previously indicated. When we say, ** he 
reigned," or " she lived," we presume that the persons included by he 
and she are previously known. These pronouns, however, may intro- 
duce or lead sentences which do not depend on any previous sentence 
in point of construction. But it is not so with the subjunctives. 
They cannot introduce an original sentence, but only serve to subjoin one 
to some other which has preceded it. The principal subjunctive pro- 
nouns in English are who and which, and sometimes that. It does not seem 
essential to the constitution of a language, however convenient, that 
there should be such pronouns as these ; for they may be resolved into 
another pronoun and a conjunction ; and consequently by such other 
pronoun and conjunction their place may always be supplied. Let us 



CHAP. VIII.] OF PRONOUNS. 113 

take the example given by Harris. I will suppose that it is desired to 
combine into one sentence the two following propositions : — 

1. "Light is a body." 

2. " Light moves rapidly." 

Here it is obvious that the use of the noun light, in the second pro- 
position, may be supplied by the pronoun it, as thus : — 

" Light is a body : 

It moves rapidly.'* 
This slight change, however, leaves the two propositions still distinct ; 
let us then connect them by the conjunction and ; thus : — 

"Light is a body; 

And it moves rapidly." 

Here is a connection of the two propositions, yet still not so much 
dependence of the latter on the former, (not so intimate a union of 
the parts,) as if, for the words u and it," we substitute the subjunctive 
pronoun which ; thus : — 

" Light is a body, which moves rapidly." 

Accordingly, w T e see that in the punctuation, which most accurately repre- 
sents the proper mode of reading the passage, we gradually diminish 
the interval between the two propositions, from a period to a comma. 

244. Of the nature of the subjunctive pronoun is the interrogative : interrogati 
and therefore we very commonly find the same word performing these 
two functions. Thus, in English, the subjunctives who and which, are 
used as interrogatives, though with a remarkable difference in then 
application. As subjunctives, in modern use at least, who is applied 
to persons, and which to things. As interrogatives, they are both 
applied to persons, but who indefinitely, and which definitely. Thus, 
the question, " Who will go up with me to Ramoth-gilead ?" is indefi- 
nitely proposed to all who may hear the question: but when our 
Saviour says, ' ' Which of you, with taking thought, can add to his 
stature one cubit ?" the interrogation is individual, as appears from 
the partitive form of the words " which of you;" that is to say, "what 
one among you all." These applications of particular words are 
indeed matters of peculiar idiom ; but the distinctions of signification 
to w T hich they relate properly belong to the science of which we are 
treating. Interrogative pronouns are necessarily of a relative nature, 
and on that account were ranked by the Stoics under the head of the 
article ; but as they do in fact stand for, and represent nouns, they 
are properly called pronouns. On interrogatives in general, Vossius 
has the following just observation: — "It appears to me, that the 
matter stands thus : there are two principal classes of words, the noun 
and the verb ; and, therefore, to one or other of these every interro- 
gation must refer. For, if I ask who, which, what, how many, I 
inquire concerning some noun ; but if I ask where, whence, whither, 
when, hoio often, I inquire concerning some verb. As, therefore, the 
2. I 



114 OF PRONOUNS. [CHAP. VIII. 

words which are subsidiary to the verbs are called adverbs, so the 
words which refer to the noun should be called pronouns." 

Transition. 245. The number and variety of classes into which pronouns may 
be distributed in any one language must, in a great measure, depend 
on the classification of conceptions, which had become habitual among 
the early formers of that particular language. Thus we cannot in 
English express, without periphrasis, the Latin pronouns qualis, 
quantus, &c, any more than we can the adverbs quoties, qualiter, &c. 
Nor must it be forgotten, that many of these pronouns pass into 
different classes, according as they are used in particular passages. 
" Sunt ex istis," says Vossius, " quce pro diverso, vel usu vel respectu, 
ad diversas pertineant classes" 

Of Numerals. 246. This remark applies with peculiar force to the Numerals , 
which, according to the different modes in which they are employed, 
may be regarded either as nouns substantive, or else as pronouns 
substantive or adjective, as the case may be. I have heretofore shown 
the fundamental importance of the conceptions of number. These 
conceptions must have names, and when the names are used to 
express the mere ideas of number, as when we say, "one and one are 
two" they may be considered as nouns substantive ; in the same 
manner as the words line, point, angle, which are also names of ideas, 
are considered. But when these nouns are used with an express or 
tacit reference to some other noun, they become pronouns, either sub- 
stantive or adjective. When we say, " two men are wiser than one," 
or " many men are wiser than one," the numeral " two " is as much a 
pronoun adjective as the word " many " is a noun adjective. But if 
we say, generally, " two are more than one," the word two is a pro- 
noun substantive. Numerals are commonly divided into cardinal and 
ordinal ; I have hitherto spoken of the former, that is to say, of the 
names given to our distinct ideas of number, simply as distinguishing 
them from each other, as one, two, three, &c. ; but these same con- 
ceptions, viewed with reference to order, form in the mind a class of 
secondary conceptions, which are treated as qualities of the substances 
to which they belong. Hence originate such words as first, second, 
third, fourth, &c. These may be called pronominal adjectives. The 
ordinal numbers are in general ■ derived from the cardinal numbers, 
but not necessarily so ; for in many, perhaps in most languages, the 
words first and second have no similarity to the words one and two. 
Professor Bopp has observed " that whilst in the Indo-European class 
of languages the greatest variety obtains in designating the cardinal 
number one, they are almost unanimous in their designation of the 
ordinal first, which none of those languages derives from the corre- 
sponding cardinal."* Thus from the Sancrit prd comes prathama (first), 
and from the Greek jrpo comes Trputrog. So from the Saxon fore comes 
fore-est, first ; from, the Latin sequor comes secundus, second, &c. 

* Bopp, Comp. Gram, i., 321. 



CHAP. VIII. 



OF PRONOUNS. 115 



247. Almost all pronouns, except tne first and second personals, Other , 
are adjectives in origin ; but they do not continue to be such when 
they stand by themselves, or as Lowth rather singularly expresses it, 
" seem to stand by themselves." It is true, that in such cases, they 
often have " some substantive belonging to them, either referred to or 
understood;" but this only proves that they are pronouns. Whether 
we say " this is good," " it is good," or " he is good," there is always 
some noun referred to, or understood : and the words it and he " seem 
to stand by themselves," just as much as the word " this " does. So 
in the phrases " one is apt to think," and " /am apt to think," the 
words one and i" equally " seem to stand alone," that is to say, they 
equally do stand alone. They perform the function of naming an 
object, so far as it is necessary to be named ; and they name it not as 
a quality of another object, but as possessing a substantive existence. 
The words this, that, who, which, all, none, and many of a similar kind, 
are (in this view of them) substantive pronouns when they stand 
alone, but adjective pronouns when they are joined to a noun sub- 
stantive. When Antony says — 

This — this was the unkindest cut of all, 

I consider the word this to be a substantive pronoun. It may, 
indeed, be explained by transposition, as if it were, " this cut was the 
unkindest of all ;" but such is not the order of the thoughts : and, in 
fact, the particular wound inflicted by Brutus had been before 
described at some length, but the noun cut had not been used : and 
supposing that, for dramatic effect, the line had been broken off at the 
word " was," it would have been impossible to say that the pronoun 
this had any specific reference to this particular noun cut, as we may 
easily perceive by so reading the passage : — 

See, what a rent the envious Casca made ! 
Through this the well-beloved Brutus stabb'd ; 
And as he pluck'd his cursed steel away, 
Mark how the blood of Caesar followed it, 
As rushing out of doors, to be resolv'd 
If Brutus so unkindly knock'd, or no : 
For Brutus, as you know, was Caesar's angel. 
Judge, ye gods, how dearly Caesar lov'd him ! 
This — this was 

If the passage had thus broken off, the pronoun this would have 
rather seemed to refer to the whole narrative of the share which Brutus 
had taken in the transaction ; that narrative presenting to the mind 
one complete and definite conception. 

A passage in Othello will further illustrate my meaning. lago 
pretends to caution Othello against suffering his mind to encourage 
any suspicion against his wife's honour : — 



0, beware, my lord, of jealousy ! 

It is a green-eyed monster which doth make 
The meat it feeds on. 



Idioms. 



116 OF PRONOUNS. [CHAP. VIII. 

After he has pursued this strain of reasoning for some time, Othello, 
interrupting him, exclaims with surprise — ■ 

Why, why is this ? 

Evidently meaning, Why do you act thus ? Why do you talk of 
jealousy to me, who am not at all disposed to be jealous ? The word 
this cannot here be said to refer to any one noun that precedes, or to 
any one noun that follows it ; and it is therefore most manifestly used 
with the force and effect of a substantive. On the contrary, it is 
clearly used as an adjective, in a subsequent passage, where Othello, 
speaking of Iago, says : — 

This honest creature, doubtless, 

Sees and knows more, much more than he unfolds. 

248. Whether the same or different words shall be employed to 
express the substantival and adjectival form of pronouns is matter of 
idiom. Thus, a language may, or may not, have different forms for 
the personal and possessive pronouns. Lowth considers the word 
mine as the possessive case of the personal I ; but the English word 
mine answers to the Latin mens, which is certainly an adjective. On 
the other hand, the Latin mi, which is commonly called the vocative 
singular of mens, seems to be the same word with mihi, the dative 
case of Ego ; for it is used in connection with plurals as well as sin- 
gulars, and with masculines, feminines, and neuters indiscriminately. 
Thus we have in Plautus, mi homines ; and in Petronius, mi hospites ; 
and in Apuleius, mi sidus, mi parens, mi herilis (sc. film), mi conjux, 
&c. ; and in a passage of Tibullus, the different manuscripts have, 
some mi dulcis anus, and some mihi dulcis anus ; in all which instances, 
the dative mihi seems to be intended to be used in that manner which 
grammarians often, though incorrectly, call redundant ; and describe, 
as adopted, nulla necessitatis, sed potius festivitatis causa. There are, 
many other idioms relative to the use of pronouns which it is not here 
necessary to consider, such as the combination of the adjective own 
and the substantive self with the pronouns my, thy, &c, in English ; 
and the subjoining the syllables met, cunque, &c, to certain pronouns 
in Latin, as ipsemet, quicunque, &c, which are usually accompanied 
with some corresponding change in the force of the original pronouns. 

249. To the essential distinction of pronouns as substantive and 
adjective, must be added the accidental distinctions to which, like the 
nouns which they represent, they are liable, of number, gender, and 
case. Since the pronoun stands in the place of a noun, and since 
number is a conception which may be combined in general with nouns, 
it follows that the pronoun may have the distinctions of number; nor, 
indeed, is it easy to conceive a language so constructed as to have 
pronouns without such a distinction. As to the first person, it is 
clear that there may be many speakers at once of the same sentiment, 
or, what comes to the same thing, one may deliver the common sen- 
timent of many, and in their name ; for the same reason, therefore, 



chap, vru.j 



OF PRONOUNS. 117 



that the pronoun I" is necessary, the pronoun we is so too. Again, 
the singular thou has the plural you, because a speech may be spoken 
to many, as well as to one : and the singular he has the plural they, 
because the subject of discourse often includes many things or persons 
at once. 

250. The pronoun is also susceptible of the distinction of Gender, Gender, 
because the noun which it represents is so. A difference, however, 
has been said to exist in this respect between the pronouns of different 
persons : and the reasoning thereon is plausible. It is certainly true 
that the pronouns of the first and second person, both in the dead and 
living languages, have no distinct inflection expressing their gender ; 
and the reason for this is alleged to be that the speaker and hearer 
being generally present to each other, it would have been superfluous 
to have marked a distinction by art, which from nature, and even 
dress, was commonly apparent on both sides. " Demonstiratio ipsa," 
says Priscian, " secum genus ostendit." However, it is by no means 
true that the pronouns of the first and second person have no gender. 
They have not, indeed, in any known language, inflections distin- 
guishing them in point of gender, but they always take, in construc- 
tion, the gender of the noun which they represent. Thus Dido — 

cui me moribundam deseris hospes ? 

And Mercurv addressing- ./Eneas — 



Til nunc Carthaginis altas 

Fundamenta locas, pulchramque uxorius urbem 
Exstruis ? 

It is agreed on all hands that the pronouns of the third person must 
almost of necessity receive the distinctions of gender in all languages. 
These pronouns are called in Arabic the pronoun of the absentee, and, 
in fact, they usually refer to persons or things which being absent 
require to be distinguished, as to gender, &c, by some expression in 
the discourse. It is further to be observed, that the pronouns of the 
first and second person each apply only to certain known and present 
individuals ; whereas, the pronouns of the third person may, in the 
course of one and the same speech, refer to a great diversity of 
objects, requiring to be distinguished by their respective genders. 
" The utility of this distinction," says Harris, "may be better found 
in supposing it away." Suppose, for example, we should read in 
history these words : he caused him to destroy him — and that we were 
to be informed that the he, which is here thrice repeated, stood each 
time for something different, that is to say, for a man, for a woman, 
and for a city, whose names were Alexander, Thais, and Persepolis. 
Taking the pronoun in this manner, divested of its gender, how 
would it appear which was destroyed, which was the destroyer, and 
which was the cause of the destruction? But there are no such 
doubts when we hear the genders distinguished ; when, instead of the 
ambiguous sentence, " He caused him to destroy him" we are told, 



118 OF PRONOUNS. TCHAP. VIII. 

with the proper distinction, that " She caused Mm to destroy it." 
Then we know with certainty what before we knew not, viz., that 
the promoter was a woman ; that her instrument was the hero ; and 
that the subject of their cruelty was the unfortunate city. 
Case. 251. Case is another distinction, not essential to the noun, but 

accidental. It is therefore to be ranked among the accidents of the 
pronoun ; yet, so frequent is the occasion to use pronouns, that many 
of them, especially those which are particularly denominated personal, 
have the variations of case, even in languages which vary their nouns 
in this respect very little or not at all. When a person speaks of 
himself as the performer of any action, he seems naturally led to 
adopt a different phraseology from that which he employs in speaking 
of the action as done toward him ; and hence the difference between 
/ and me, thou and thee, runs throughout far the greater number of 
known languages. After all, Universal Grammar only furnishes the 
reason for this difference when it exists, but does not prove its exis- 
tence to be necessary. There may be languages of which the pro- 
nouns have no cases ; but where they have cases, the same function is 
performed by each case in the pronoun as in the noun. 



( 119 ) 



CHAPTER IX. 

OF VEEBS. 

252. A Verb is a part of speech, so called from the Latin verbum, Aristotle's 
which seems to have been intended to correspond to the Greek 'Pfj/jta; 
though the latter word was used by different Grecian writers in very 
different senses. Aristotle defines 'Pri/xa, " a complex word, significant, 
with time, of which no part is significant by itself;"* but this defini- 
tion, which differs from that which he had before given of the noun, 
only in the words " with time," is manifestly referable to the Greek 
language, and not to Universal Grammar. Some philologists under- 
stand Aristotle in one instance to apply the designation 'Pijfxa to the 
adjective Xevkoq, white; but this seems to be a misapprehension. It 
however led Ammonius to maintain that every word which forms the 
predicate in a logical proposition is a 'Pijfia.^ . Some of the Stoics 
contended that the only genuine ( Prj/j.a was the infinitive mood of a 
verb. Others, again, disputed whether or not the copula, in a logical 
proposition, should be deemed a 'Pjjjoca. Words answering this pur- 
pose were called by most Greek writers 'Prifiara vwapKriKa, verbs of 
existence ; by Latin authors, verba svbstantiva ; and in English gram- 
mars, "verbs substantive:" but Aristotle seems, in his Poetics, to 
refuse to them the title of 'Pr^uara, considering them, perhaps, as 
mere ILvvlea^ioi, connectives. He defines the ^LvvleafioQ " a word 
not significant, which is fitted to make of several significant words one 
significant word" \ (or rather sentence). And further on he says, 
"not every sentence consists of 'Pfyuara and nouns ;"§ "but it is 
possible that there may be a sentence without a 'Pfjfia" || as an in- 
stance of which (it seems) he refers to "the definition of man." f 
The passage is rather obscure, but it would seem from the context 
that he means this : — If we say " man is an animal," the sentence is 
perfect, but there is no 'Pij/xa in it ; for the word "is" serves merely 
as a connective to make of two nouns, "man" and "animal," one 
significant sentence ; but in itself it signifies neither substance nor at- 

* Qjovri eruvhrh (r>i/^a.vriz%, [/.ira. %govou, ris olTiv fi'ioo; trnfidivii xatf koto. Poetic, 
s. 34. 

j n£<7«v <p«»7;v ■/ia.T7 i yooovfx,ivov oqov Iv TooTKtrsi Totov/ritv 'Vrif^oc, xccXsTtr^ai. Ad 
Arist., De Interp. 

| #&/v/j ci/rvpo;, lx vXuovwv /u.\v tyuvuv fiia,;, irrifia-vrixav Be, Toiuv irity via. y/iav 
fftifteivrixii* <p&»vsjv. Poetic, s. 34. 

§ Ob ycco a.7ra.% >Jyo$ \x or,uu.Tuv xki ovo/xcirwv trvyxurtxi. Ibid. 
AAX' ivbi^iTcci clviu pv)f/.a.Ta)v kivxi Xoyov. I Old. 
Oiov o tov uvfouvrou ooht/a'o;. Ibid. 



120 OF VERBS. [CHAP. IX. 

tribute, neither does it mark time, and for these reasons it is not to be 
deemed a 'Pij/jia. 
latements. ^53. If these explanations of the nature of a verb are not very- 
satisfactory, still less so is the manner in which this part of speech 
was treated by Mr. Tooke. So early as the year 1778, he published 
a letter to Mr. Dunning, in which he advanced some propositions con- 
cerning language, which were thought at the time rather paradoxical. 
These were amplified and extended in 1786, in the first volume of his 
" Diversions of Purley." He there laid it down that "in English, 
and in all languages, there are only two sorts of words which are neces- 
sary for the communication of our thoughts, viz., the noun and the 
verb." * He said, " he was inclined to allow the rank of parts of 
speech only to these necessary words ;" "j" that "a consideration of ideas, 
or of the mind, or of things, would lead us no farther than to nouns ;" \ 
and that "the other part of speech, the verb, must be accounted for 
from the necessary use of it in communication ; that it is in fact the 
communication itself, and therefore well denominated 'Prj/jia, dictum ; 
for the verb is QUOD loquimur, the noun De QUO."§ And with this 
mysterious hint the readers of the first volume were obliged, so far as 
regarded the verb, to be content. In that volume, and also in the 
second, which was published in 1805, he asserted many words to be 
moods, tenses, or participles of certain verbs (remarking, however, 
incidentally, that mood, tense, number, and person, are no parts of 
the verb), || but still the verb itself he neither defined nor explained, 
further than by saying that it was " the noun and something more."TT 
At the close of the second volume his supposed colloquial friend asks 
this very pertinent question, " What is the verb ? What is that pe- 
culiar differential circumstance, which, added to the definition of a 
noun, constitutes the verb ?" Is the verb — 

1. Dictio variabilis, quae significat actionem vel passionem? 

2. Or, dictio variabilis per modos ? 

3. Or, quod adsignat tempus sine casu ? 

4. Or, quod agere, pati, vel esse significat ? 

5. Or, nota rei sub tempore ? 

6. Or, pars orationis prsecipua sine casu ? 

7. Or, an assertion ? 

8. Or, nihil significans, et quasi nexus et copula, ut verba 

alia quasi animaret ? 

9. Or, un mot declinable indeterminatif ? 

10. Or, un mot, qui presente a l'esprit un etre indetermine, 
designe seulement par l'idee generale de l'existence sous 
une relation a une modification ?" 

To all this Mr. Tooke replies — ■" A truce ! a truce ! I know yon 
are not serious in laying this trash before me. — No, no, We will leave 

* Div. Pari., v. i. p. 65. f Ibid., p. 67. + Ibid -> P- 70 - 

§ Ibid., p. 71. || Ibid., y. ii, p. 473. \ Ibid., p. 514. 



CHAP. IX.] OF VEEBS. 121 

off here for the present ! " And so he did ; but never resumed the 
discussion. 

254. Surely, if the verb was one of the only two necessary parts inconclusive. 
of speech ; if it was one of the two main pillars supporting the whole 

edifice of language ; if Mr. Tooke himself had it constantly in view, 
and referred to it in his three successive publications ; he might have 
found time, between 1778 and his death in 1812, to have given the 
disciples of his new school, which was to sweep away all the old 
grammatical doctrines as " trash," a little more distinct information on 
the nature of the verb, than that it was a noun, "and something 
more," and that both it and the noun being equally necessary for the 
communication of thought, the verb was distinguished from the noun 
by the "necessity of its use in communication." A "something 
more," of which we know nothing, is to common capacities just equal 
to nothing : and to distinguish one of two necessary things from the 
other, by the common attribute of necessity, is a mode of division no 
less ungrammatical than illogical. 

255. The verb has been differently defined (as we have seen) by Analysis, 
different grammarians ; and indeed when we reflect on the variety of 
conceptions, which it' often combines in one word, we must allow, 

that this circumstance, " throws considerable difficulties in the way of 
any person who attempts to analyse the verb, and ascertain its 
nature."* The first step in such an analysis is to distinguish those 
properties of the verb, which are essential to it, and are therefore ne- 
cessarily to be found in all verbs, from those which are accidental, and 
form different combinations in different languages. I consider as 
essential properties of the verb, its power — 

1st. To signify an attribute of some substance. 

2ndly. To connect such attribute with its proper substance. 

3rdly. To assert, directly or indirectly, the existence or non- 
existence of the connection. 
I consider as accidental properties, those which grammarians have 
commonly designated by some such terms as kind, voice, mood, tense, 
person, number, gender, &c. 

256. The definition of a verb, so far as regards Universal Grammar, Attribute, 
should be confined to the essential properties of this part of speech. 
Before I attempt to define it, therefore, I shall examine those proper- 
ties : and first, as to signifying an attribute. Here the term " attri- 
bute " is to be taken largely, so as to include every conception, which 

can be predicated of another in a simple proposition. Therefore, the 
genus is to be deemed an attribute of the species, and the species of 
the individual. Existence, too, whether absolute or qualified, is to 
be deemed an attribute of the existing substance — absolute, as when 
we say, " God is," or when God says, "I am;" qualified, as when 
we say " God is almighty," " man is mortal ;" in both which cases, 

* Encycl. Bntan., art. Grammar. 



122 OF VERBS. [CHAP. IX. 

the word "is," forms a verb substantive. The attributes of qualified 
existence are numberless. We may, however, divide them into those 
which are qualified by conceptions of action, and those of which the 
qualifying conception does not relate to action. Conceptions of action 
are spiritual, as, to love ; mental, as, to know ; or corporeal, as, to 
touch ; and they may be of a positive or negative character, as, to live 
or die, to move or stop, to wake or sleep. Conceptions unconnected 
with action are such as to be wise or foolish, to be hot or cold, to be 
honest or dishonest, tall or short, beautiful or ugly. Now, the signi- 
fication of an attribute belongs to a verb in one of two ways : it is 
either added to the verb substantive as a necessary adjunct, or it is 
involved in the form of a different verb. Propositions, in which the 
attribute is a necessary adjunct to the vert;, are such as, " Socrates is 
wise," " Cicero is speaking." These necessarily contain three words, 
and have therefore been called, by some logicians, propositions tertii 
adjacentis. Propositions, in which the attribute is involved in the 
form of the verb itself, require but two words, as " Cicero speaks," 
" Victoria reigns," and have been said to be secundi adjacentis. In 
the former class, the attribute is absolutely necessary as an adjunct to 
the verb ; for if we stop at " Socrates is," or " Cicero is," the sen- 
tence is so imperfect as to be unintelligible. In the latter class, the 
attribute is involved in the form of the verb, as in "speaks" or 
" reigns." From what has been said, it is clear that the property 
of signifying an attribute belongs essentially to the verb. Nevertheless 
this property is not the peculiar and distinguishing characteristic of a 
verb, for it equally belongs to adjectives and participles. 
Connection. 257. The next essential property of the verb is that of connecting 
the conception of an attribute with the substance to which it belongs ; 
for it may have been observed in the instances above noticed, that 
when an attribute was signified, it was signified not alone, but in con- 
junction with the subject to which it belonged. If we say, " is " or 
" is almighty," or " is speaking," or " speaks," or "reigns," without 
showing to whom or to what these attributes belong, we utter no in- 
telligible sentence. And this is so obvious, that no one ever denied 
connection to be a property of the verb. Nay, some able philologists 
have gone so far as to maintain .that connection is the characteristic 
peculiarity of this part of speech.* From that opinion, however, I 
must dissent. The verb not only connects, but it does more ; it de- 
clares that the connected conceptions coexist as parts of one assertion. 
The conjunction also connects, but it does not predicate one thing of 
another, or make up one proposition of two distinct terms. Thus, 
if we say, " he is good," the conceptions expressed by the words he 
and good, that is to say, the conceptions of a particular man and of 
goodness, are not only connected, but the one is asserted to exist in 
the other, and to be a quality belonging to it. Otherwise is it in the 

* Rees, Cycl. Grammar. 



CHAP. IX.] OF VERBS. 123 

speech of the duke of Buckingham wishing happiness and honour to 
his sovereign Henry VIII. 

. May he live 

Longer than I have time to tell his years ! 

Ever belov'd, and loving may his rule be ! 

And when old Time shall lead him to his end, 

Goodness and he fill up one monument ! 

Here the same conceptions, viz., those of a particular man and 
goodness are connected, but the one is not asserted of the other, and 
they make up no intelligible meaning when taken together, without 
the further aid of a verb. We cannot assert without connecting our 
thoughts ; for to assert is to declare some one thing of some other 
thing, which cannot be done without connecting those things together 
in the mind ; and therefore it is that connection is always one charac- 
teristic of the verb ; but it is a secondary characteristic, being involved 
in the more important property of asserting, declaring, or manifesting 
real existence. 

258. This brings me to that property of the verb which is not only Assertion, 
essential to it, but is its peculiar and exclusive characteristic, and which, 
I agree with Messieurs de Port Royal and other eminent grammarians, 
is the power of signifying Assertion. It often happens in language, that 
the veiy same identical word, the same in orthography, in pronuncia- 
tion, and in accent, is both noun and verb. How then can we deter- 
mine when it is the one, and when it is the other ? Very simply, and 
very infallibly. When it directly or indirectly involves an assertion, 
it is a verb ; when it does not it is a noun. The word love, in English, 
is one of the words which I have just described. It is impossible to 
tell, a priori, whether it will be a noun or a verb in any particular 
discourse. We must wait to see how it is used, and then all doubt 
will vanish. Thus, it is a noun in these exquisite lines : — 

Love is not love, 

Which alters when it alteration finds, 
Or bends, with the remover to remove ; 
Oh no ! It is an ever-fixed mark, 
That looks on tempests and is never shaken. 

And again, it is a verb, in the speech of the crafty Richard, alluding to 
his unsuspecting brother : — 

I do love thee so, 

That I will shortly send thy soul to heaven. 

259. When I say, that assertion is involved in the verb, either di- pirwtor 
rectly or indirectly, I mean the word assertion to be taken largely, in 
contradistinction to nomination. The noun names a conception ; the 
verb implicitly or explicitly asserts its existence or non-existence ; and 
this it may do affirmatively or negatively, positively or hypothetically, 
by way of question, command, request, desire, or by any of the other 
indirect modes of implying existence, on which moods of verbs in dif- 
ferent languages depend. For instance, when the shepherd Claius, in 



indirect. 



124 OF VERBS. [CHAP. IX. 

Sir Philip Sidney's Arcadia, says of Urania " her breath is more sweet 
than a gentle south-west wind, which comes creeping over flowery 
fields, and shadowed waters in the extreme heat of summer," the as- 
sertion contained in the verb is (however figurative or poetical) is 
direct and positive. But when, a little afterwards, he asks, "hath not 
the only love of her made us, being silly ignorant shepherds, raise up 
our thoughts above the ordinary level of the world ?" the question 
negatively expressed in the words "hath not," indirectly asserts that 
the love of her has had that effect. So when the other shepherd, 
Strephon, exclaims, "O Urania! blessed be thou Urania! the fairest 
sweetness, and sweetest fairness !" There is an implied assertion in 
the verb " be," that she ought to be .blessed. Again, when the 
author thus relates the preservation of Musidorus from drowning — "so 
drew they up a young man of so goodly shape, and well-pleasing 
favour, that one would think Death had in him a lovely countenance," 
there is an assertion contained in the verb " had ;" but it is clearly 
hypothetical, and not positive. Other variations of the mode of asser- 
tion will be noticed when I come to speak more particularly of the 
moods of verbs. If it should be objected that to some of these modi-, 
fications the term "assertion" is, in strictness of speech, inapplicable, 
I might answer that I contend not for the fitness of the term, but only 
for the accuracy and importance of the distinction between the noun, 
which merely names a conception, and the verb, which by affirming, 
asking, commanding, or otherwise, gives to that conception life and 
animation, and so forms a sentence enunciative or passionate, 
objection. 260. It has been objected that assertion cannot be an essential 

property of verbs ; because we can assert without the express use of 
that part of speech. True, we can do so in certain languages ; for 
in such a case the assertion is an act of the mind, not expressed, but, 
as grammarians say, understood. The verb is wanting ; but its place 
is not supplied by any other part of speech, nor is it to be collected 
from a change of inflection, or accentuation, or from any other mode 
of express signification. Thus the verbs " is," " were," and " was," 
are intentionally omitted, in Milton's beautiful description of our 
first parents : — 

■ In their looks divine 

The image of their glorious Maker shone, 
Truth, wisdom, sanctitude severe and pure, 
Severe but in true filial freedom placed ; 
Whence true authority in men ; though both 
Not equal, as their sex not equal seem'd ; 
For contemplation he, and valour form'd ; 
For softness she, and sweet attractive grace. 

i. e. whence true authority is in men : both were not equal ; he was 
form'd for contemplation ; she was form'd for softness, &c. Now, in 
all these cases, the mind performs the act of asserting ; in the words 
of Plato, it manifests some action, and declares that something 
exists ; and this manifestation or declaration is not contained in the 



CHAr. IX.] OF VERBS. 125 

nouns themselves, which do nothing more than name the conception ; 
thus, when we say " nemo bonus," the assertion is neither included 
in nemo, nor in bonus, for these are mere names of conceptions. Nemo 
is the subject, bonus is the predicate ; but neither of them includes 
the copula. The two terms are not connected by anything which 
either of them contains, but their connection is inferred by the mind 
from their juxtaposition. But the question to be here considered, 
does not relate to verbs not expressed, but to verbs expressed ; and 
universally where the verb is expressed, it imports assertion, either 
simple or modified, direct or implied. 

261. From this view of its essential properties, the verb may be Definition, 
defined, a 'part of speech which signifies an attribute of some substance, 
connects the attribute and substance together, and asserts the existence or 
non-existence of the connection. To all verbs in all languages this 
definition is alike applicable ; but there are properties belonging in 
various modes and degrees to different verbs in different languages ; 

and these, which I have termed accidental properties, I shall con- 
sider, first in so far as they apply to a whole verb, and then as they 
apply to its separate parts. 

262. A verb, taken as a whole, may be distinguished from other Verbsnb- 

stantivtj. 

verbs, by certain properties which grammarians have generally con- 
sidered as marking its hind, either simply, or as modified by some 
other conception. The first and simplest distinction of kind (as 
stated by Messieurs de Port Royal) is into substantive and adjective. 
I have already alluded to the nature of the verb substantive, or verb 
of existence ; but the following remarks of Hams will place it in a 
clearer light : — " Previously to every other possible attribute, what- 
ever a thing may be, whether black or white, square or round, wise 
or eloquent, writing or thinking, it must first of necessity exist, before 
it can possibly be anything else ; for existence may be considered as 
an universal genus, to which all things are at all times to be referred. 
The verbs, therefore, which denote it, claim precedence of all others, 
as being essential to the very being of every proposition in which 
they may still be found either exprest or by implication ; exprest, as 
when we say ' the sun is bright ;' by implication, as when we say 
' the sun rises/ which means when resolved, ' the sun is rising.' 
Now, all existence is either absolute or qualified. The verb is can 
by itself express absolute existence, but never the qualified without 
subjoining the particular form ; because the forms of existence being 
in number infinite, if the particular form be not exprest, we cannot 
know which is intended. And hence it follows, that when is only 
serves to subjoin some such form, it has little more force than that of 
a mere assertion. 'Tis under the same character that it becomes a 
latent part in every other verb by expressing that assertion, which is 
one of their essentials."* So far Harris is right ; but when he men- 
tions the verbs is, groweth, becometh, est, fit, v-Kap^ei, igl, tteXei, 
* Hermes, i. 6. 



transitive. 



126 OF VERBS. [CHAP. IX. 

yiyverai, as equally verbs substantive, he does not advert to the 
fact, that several of these words combine in their signification other 
conceptions than that of mere existence ; for to grow, or to become, 
usually implies something more than merely to be. Still, if the 
idiom of a particular language allows it, any verb of this kind may 
occasionally be employed as a mere verb of existence. 
Verbs 263. All other verbs are comprehended by Messrs. de Port Royal 

under the designation of verbs adjective, a term which seems reason- 
able, as contradistinguishing them from the verb substantive. All 
verbs assert existence ; the verb substantive asserts nothing more ; but 
the verb adjective includes in one word the assertion and some attri- 
bute. Now those attributes are either of such a nature that we can 
be aware of their passing from one substance to another, and the 
verb expressing them is then said to be transitive ; or we only per- 
ceive the existence of the attribute, and the verb is then said to be 
intransitive. This distinction forms what some grammarians call the 
voice of a verb. As the conception of cause is one of the primary 
ideas of the human mind, and not a mere inference (as Hume and 
others absurdly fancied) from an observed similarity in the succession 
of events ; a verb transitive implies an agent as the cause of transi- 
tion, and a patient as receiving its effect. Generally the agent and 
patient are two different beings, and this gives occasion to the active 
voice, and the passive voice of a verb. Where the agent is first con- 
sidered, the verb is said to be in the active voice, as " John beats 
James;" where the patient is first considered, the verb is in the 
passive voice, as " James is beaten by John." But in some cases 
the same substance is both agent and patient, which in human beings 
arises from their double nature. Thus the Heautontimorumenos, of 
Terence, was a man in whom the attribute of suffering was caused by 
himself, and reflected back on himself. All languages have some 
mode, more or less direct or circuitous, of expressing this reflected 
action : in the Greek language it gave occasion to a form usually 
called the middle voice.* The Turkish language goes a step further. 
It expresses in one word an attribute in which the agent and patient 
are reciprocally cause and effect, as sevmek to love, sevichmek to love 
mutually.j" How far these distinctions are marked by peculiar forms 
in different languages will be considered in a future treatise ; but 
even where such forms exist, it often happens that in practice they 
are confounded : thus the Greek middle verb is often used with an 
active signification ; and in Latin there is a large class of verbs called 
Deponents, having a passive termination, with a sense in general 
active ; though some of these are also used passively, and therefore 
called by certain writers common — as adulari, which though in form 
a passive verb, is generally used actively, but sometimes passively. 
Thus Cicero says, in an active sense, " neque ita adulatus fortunam 

* Vide Kuster, De vero usu verborum mediorum. 
■f Davids, Gram. Turque, p. 34. 



CHAP. IX."] OF VERBS. 127 

sum alterius, ut me mese pseniteret.* But elsewhere, in a passive 
sense, " ne assentatonbus patefaciamus aures, nee adulari nos sina- 
mus."f 

264. Where the existence of the attribute is alone expressed by Verbs neuter, 
the verb, without reference to its transition from an agent to a 
patient, the verb involving such expression of existence and attri- 
bute, is called intransitive, or (with reference to action and passion) 

neuter ; and it may be either personal, as " he sings," " the tree 
blossoms," &c. ; or impersonal, as "it rains," "it lightens," it 
grieves me." Harris, following the authority of Priscian, Sanctius, 
Vossius, and others, rejects the doctrine of impersonal verbs, on the 
ground that " every energy respects an energizor or a passive sub- 
ject.":!: Thus he would explain the instances above given by supply- 
ing a nominative understood, as " the rain rains," the lightning 
lightens," " the event grieves me." These forms of speech are to 
a certain degree idiomatical ; but I would observe, that in the proper 
impersonate there is usually in the mind of the speaker some doubt 
at least as to the energizor ; and the fact is meant to be asserted 
simply, without reference to its cause ; or else the cause is to be 
otherwise collected from the context. Vossius explains pluit to mean 
aqua pluvia pluit ; but the Roman peasant, when he saidjoZmY, though 
he did not perhaps contemplate any distinct cause of the showers, 
would have been far from disputing the poet's animated description of 
that cause : — 

Turn Pater Omnipotens, foecundis imbribus, JEther 

Conjugis in gremium lsetae descendit. 

And again, when the same great poet says of the unhappy Dido, — 

Mortem orat, tcedet cceli convexa tueri. 
No nominative understood (such as res or eventus) can serve to imply 
the cause of the tedium ; but the context shows that to behold the 
very sky was the cause of tedium to the forsaken queen. The same 
confusion which I noticed between the middle and active voice of a 
verb, often occurs between its transitive or intransitive character ; or, 
to speak more correctly, the same word is used sometimes as an 
active verb and sometimes as a neuter. Thus in Greek we may say, 
Lq yrjy (nrip/jLara ttltttelv^ to fall seed into the earth, i. e. to drop 
it. So in Latin, auxit rempublicam, actively, or auccit morbus neu- 
trally. And so in English, " to beat the air," or " the pulse beats ;" 
but these are matters dependent on the idiom of each particular 
language. 

265. I have spoken of those distinctions of kind in verbs which are other kinds 
most simple; but there are others which result from modifying the ofverb3 - 
signification of a verb by some additional conception. In all languages, 

such modifications may be effected by separate words ; but in some 

* De Divinat., ii. 2. f De Offic, i. 26. 

X Hermes, i. 9. § Plato, Politic, c. 16. 



123 OF VERBS. [CHAP. IX. 

languages the same end is attained by the addition of certain par- 
ticles or letters. The modifications which it may suffice to notice are 
either of a positive or negative character; to the former are owing 
verbs desiderative, causative, inceptive, and frequentative ; to the 
latter, verbs implying either simple negation or impossibility. " There 
is a species of verbs " (says Harris) " called in Greek etyeriKa, in 
Latin desiderativa, the desideratives or meditatives; such are TroXeyuTjo-f/w, 
bellaturio, I have a desire to make war ; fipwaeiio, esurio, I long to 
eat. So prensare brachium, according to Turnebus, was not " to 
take by the arm frequently," but " to catch at the arm, to desire to 
take hold of it," as Horace did when he wished Aristius to rid him of 
his troublesome companion : — 



vellere caspi, 



Et prensare manu lentissima brachia, nutans, 
Distorquens oculos, ut me eriperet. 

The Turkish language, which is very rich in modifications of the 
verb, has a causative form, as aldatmak, to cause to deceive, from 
aldamak to deceive. In Latin the termination in sco usually marks an 
inceptive form, as 

Fhjctus uti primo csepit cum albescere vento, 

where dlbesco is to begin to be white, from albeo to be white ; but 
some of these verbs are rather thought to express continuation, as 
where Virgil says of Dido, dwelling on the contemplation of the 
beauty of the fictitious lulus, 

Expleri mentem nequit, ardescitque tuendo. 

The frequentative, or, as some call it, the iterative character, has 
several forms in Latin, as vendito, adjuto, pulso, facesso; though many 
of these have rather an augmentative, and some a diminuent force. 
The simply negative form is common in most languages, as in English, 
" will he mil he," i.e., " ne mil he;" so in Latin "nolo" i.e., " ne 
volo." We had also, in Old English, nuste for ne wist, I did not 
know : — 

In al this wurhliche won, 

A burde of blod and of bon, 

Never yete y nuste non, 

Lussomore in londe. 

M.S. Earl, 2253, a.d. 1200. 

The Turkish language has not only a form of simple negation in its 
verbs, but also a form of impossibility. In English we have a form 
expressive of counteraction, as to undo, which, in old Izaak Walton's 
amusing book on angling, gives occasion to a dispute among the 
gipsies on the difference between ripping a cloak and unripping it. 
Many other forms, expressing modifications of the signification of the 
verb, occur in different languages, and will be noticed in the second 
part of this treatise. 
Moods. 266. Having thus enumerated the accidental properties which 



CHAP. IX.] OF VEKBS. 129 

belong to a verb considered as a whole, I come to those which affect 
it as consisting of different parts. These I shall examine as they 
arise out of the essential properties of the verb ; for from the pro- 
• perty of assertion is derived the mood, from that of connection the 
tense, and from that of attribute the person, number, and (where it 
exists) the gender. First, tlb-aj, as assertion is not only an essential, 
but the peculiar property of th^ s part of speech, there must be certain 
portions of every verb showing how assertion may be directly or 
indirectly expressed. These portions we call, in English, the moods 
of a verb. Grammarians differ widely as to the number, and no less 
as to the names of the moods. Scaliger says that mood is not 
necessary to verbs ; and Sanctius contends that it does not relate to 
the nature of the verb, and therefore is not an attribute of verbs : non 
attingit verbi naturam, ideo verborum attributum non est ; on which 
passage Perizonius very justly observes, that great as the merit of 
Sanctius was in many parts of his work, yet he had in others, parti- 
cularly in what regarded the moods of verbs, been misled by an 
excessive desire of novelty and change. It is very true, as observed > 
by Sanctius, that the great mass of grammatical writers are so 
extremely discordant in their opinions respecting this part of the 
science of which they treat, that they have left us scarcely anything 
on it which can be said to be established by general consent. Some 
make only three moods, others four, five, six, and even eight. Again, 
some call these affections of the verb moods ; others call them divi- 
sions, qualities, states, species, &c. ; and as to the various appella- 
tions of each mood, we have the personative and impersonative, the 
indicative, declarative, definitive, modus finiendi, modus fatendi, the 
rogative, interrogative, requisitive, percontative, assertive, enunciative, 
vocative, precative, deprecative, responsive, concessive, permissive, 
promissive, adhortative, optative, dubitative, imperative, mandative, 
conjunctive, subjunctive, adjunctive, potential, participial, infinitive, 
and probably many others. In this confusion of terms and of notions, 
it is absolutely necessary to adopt some distinct principle which may 
guide us through the labyrinth ; and that principle, I apprehend, will 
be easily and intelligibly supplied by adverting to the peculiar function 
of the verb itself, namely, assertion. 

267. It must be remembered that I use the word assertion in its Four 
largest sense, to express declaring, affirming, or distinctly manifesting, KioodT^ 
any perception or volition. In this sense, assertion may be said to 
take place either in an enunciative or in a, passionate sentence. Thus, 
in the admirable scene between Brutus and his wife, Portia says — 



Dear, my lord, 



Make me acquainted with your cause of grief. 
And again, she says — 

Upon my knees 

/ charge you, by my once commended beauty, 
2. K 



1 30 OF VERBS. [CHAP. IX. 

By all your vows of love, and that great vow 
Which did incorporate and make us one, 
That you unfold to me, yourself, your half, 
Why you are heavy. 

In both these instances she asserts her earnest demand to be made ac- 
quainted with the secret cause of th^ e ,ick offence which she perceived 
to exist, not in her husband's healo, but in his mind. In the one 
instance the demand is directly and enunciatively expressed by the 
words " I charge you ;" in the other it is indirectly and passionately 
expressed by the words " make me acquainted." Again, an enun- 
ciative assertion may be expressed categorically (that is, positively), 
or else hypothetically. Thus Caesar, in describing Cassius, first asserts 
positively, by the word " has," what he 'had observed in his outward 
appearance, and then hypothetically, by the words " as if," what 
might be supposed to pass in his mind : — 

Yond Cassius has a lean and hungiy look ; 
Seldom he smiles, and smiles in such a sort 
As if he mocKd himself, and scorn'd his spirit, 
That could be mov'd to smile at any thing. 

And so, referring to Antony's expression, " fear him not," Caesar 
asserts positively, by the words " fear not," that he does not fear him, 
but puts a case hypothetically, by the word " if," in which he might 
do so : — 

I fear him not ; 

Yet if my name were liable to fear, 

I do not know the man I should avoid 

So much, as that spare Cassius. 

In like manner, a passionate assertion may be distinguished according 
as the object of the passion is within the power or influence of the 
speaker, or only within his desire or aversion. Thus, in Virgil's 
fifth Eclogue, Mopsus addresses his brother shepherds in the way of a 
command, " Spargite humum foliis ;" whereas Menelcas addressing 
the spirit of Daphnis, in the way of a prayer, says, "Sis bonus, O ! 
felixque tuis !" These two enunciative and two passionate modes of 
expressing assertion, here stated, supply us with four principal moods, 
the indicative, conjunctive, imperative, and optative. It has been sug- 
gested that these are only a few of the many modifications of signifi- 
cation which might be called moods of a verb ; that there might be 
for instance a potential mood expressed by " can," a permissive by 
" may" a compulsive by " must" and so forth ;* but to this it has been 
well replied, that " the possibility of providing separate forms for so 
many moods is, to say the least, doubtful ; and that, if possible, the 
additional complication introduced by so many minute distinctions 
into a part of speech already exceedingly complex, would render the 
import of the verb absolutely unintelligible to nine-tenths even of 
the learned."*|* Where any such possible moods exist in a particular 

* Dr. Gregory. f Encycl. Brit. 



CHAP. IX.J OF VERBS. 131 

language, they must of course be explained in the grammar of that 
language ; but they do not require notice in this part of the present 
treatise : I shall therefore proceed to examine the four moods above- 
mentioned. 

268. " If we simply declare or indicate something to be, or not to indicative, 
be, whether a perception or volition 'tis equally the same," says 
Harris ; " this constitutes that mood called the declarative or Indi- 
cative" Thus, " I love," " you walk," " he died," " we shall rejoice," 

are all simple, or, as logicians say, categorical assertions of fact, some 
of which do, and some do not, relate to passions of the mind, but 
which do not necessarily imply any passion in the enunciation. Some 
of them too may in reality be contingent, or doubtful, and may be 
dependent on the truth or falsehood of other assertions ; but as they 
are not so enunciated, but on the contrary are declared positively and 
simply, they belong to the indicative mood. It is to be observed 
that the indicative, from its very nature, is capable of being united 
with the conjunctive, as well as of standing alone. An assertion does 
not necessarily become the less positive for being coupled with 
another, although that other may be doubtful or contingent. Thus, 
when Milton says — 

The conquer'd also, and enslav'd by war, 

Shall, with their freedom lost, all virtue lose, 

it is matter of contingency whether any nation ever will be conquered 
and enslaved ; but yet the assertion that, supposing a nation to undergo 
that fate, it will lose all virtue, is properly expressed in the indicative 
mood by the word " shall." 

269. When a fact is asserted not as actual but merely as possible, Conjunctive, 
or contingent, the form of words by which such assertion is expressed 

in any particular language, may perhaps be the same as if the asser- 
tion were more positive ; yet the context will show that the verb is 
no longer in the indicative mood. The mood adapted to such con- 
tingent assertion has received various appellations, of which I consider 
the Conjunctive to be the most appropriate, inasmuch as the contin- 
gency is usually marked by a conjunction (such as if, though, that, 
except, until, &c.) which connects the dependent sentence with its 
principal. There are various methods of thus connecting sentences ; 
but they may be distinguished into two great classes. In the one class, 
an uncertain sentence is connected with a certain one ; in the other, 
both sentences are uncertain : in the former case a conjunctive is 
dependent on an indicative ; in the latter, both sentences are con- 
junctive. Some grammarians make this distinction the ground of 
a distinction of moods, calling the contingent assertion, in the first 
case, subjunctive, because it is subjoined to the indicative ; and in the 
other case potential, because it states a potential, and not an actual 
existence. It seems, however, unadvisable thus to multiply moods ; 
and if we were to proceed this length, there is no reason why we 
should not go much further, and call every possible variation of con- 

k2 



132 OF VERBS. [CHAP. IX. 

tingency a separate mood. Of these I shall here notice some instances 
easily distinguishable in point of principle. 

1. Ut jugulent homines surgunt de nocte latrones. 

Herejugulent is in the conjunctive, as indicating the end and object of 
the rising. 

2. Peter said unto him, though I should die with thee, 
yet will I not deny thee. 

Here " I should die " is mentioned as a motive to denial, but an insuf- 
ficient one. 

3. Si fractus illabatur orbis, 
Impavidum ferient ruinse. 

Here, in like manner, illabatur is in the_ conjunctive, as expressing a 
fact which might be the cause of fear to ordinary minds, but which is 
not so to the just and stedfast-minded man ; and the conjunction si in 
the one case is equivalent to though in the other, both of them having 
the proper force of our expression " even if." 

4. Except a man be born of water, and of the spirit, 
he cannot enter into the kingdom of God. 

Here the conjunctive be born, is placed in opposition to the indicative 
" cannot enter ;" so that if the one be in the negative, the other must 
be so too, and vice versa ; for the implication is, that if a man be born 
of water and of the spirit, he can enter into the kingdom of God. 
Accordingly, the Greek conjunctions in this and the preceding example 
would be directly opposed to each other : in No. 3, the word would 
be Kav, that is, Kal lav ; but in No. 4 it is lap p/. 

5. Csementis licet occupes 

Tyrrhenum omne tuis et mare Apulicum, 

non animum metu 

Non mortis laqueis expedies caput. 

Here the condition differs from that of No. 2, in being a fact of 
present time ; and on the other hand the indicative non expedies differs 
Horn the indicative ferient in No. 3, by being in the negative. 

6. The sceptre shall not depart from Judah, nor a law- 
giver from between his feet, until Shiloh come. 

Here both the facts are future, but the conditional one is the term or 
boundary of the other. 

7. tacitus pasci si posset Corvus, haberet 

Plus dapis." 

In all the preceding instances one assertion is absolute ; but here it is 
neither asserted that the crow can feed in silence, nor that it has more 
food ; both parts of the sentence, therefore, are contingent, and conse- 
quently, both are in the conjunctive mood. 

8. If it were done when 'tis done, then 'twere well 
It were done quickly. 

Here is also one contingent, namely, 'twere well, depending on another 



CHAP. IX. 



OF VERES- 13< 



contingent, if it were done ; and on each we see a further contingency 
also depends. 

These eight examples are sufficient to show that the varieties of 
contingent assertions are too various to be considered and treated as 
so many distinct moods of the verb. The six first are of the kind 
called, by some writers, subjunctive ; the two last are of the kind 
called, in contradistinction from the subjunctive, potential ; but as 
they are all equally conjunctive, it suffices to give them that name : 
and, indeed, it is a more correct and systematic distribution of the 
grammatical nomenclature so to do ; for the proper correlative to the 
term indicative is not subjunctive or potential, but some term which 
comprehends them both ; as, for instance, the term conjunctive. The 
indicative asserts simply : the conjunctive asserts with modification : 
if the one is a mood, so is the other ; but if the conjunctive is a mood, 
then its subdivisions cannot be properly so called ; but they should 
rather be called sub-moods, if it were necessary to give them any pecu- 
liar denomination. 

270. The effect of any degree of passion is pro tanto to interrupt i m ? er 
and modify the processes of reasoning. Reasoning is conducted by 
direct assertion, absolute or conditional. Passion goes at once to its 
object, assuming it as the consequence of an indirect assertion. Thus, 
if the fact be that I desire that a person should go to any place, it is 
not necessary for me to state my desire in the indicative mood, and 
his going in the infinitive or conjunctive, " I desire you to go," or 
"I desire that you should go;" but by the natural impulse of my 
feelings — feelings which language conveys as clearly as it does the 
more gradual processes of thought — I say, in a mood different from 
either the indicative, infinitive, or conjunctive — Go I Now, this mood, 
from its frequent use in giving commands to inferiors, has been called 
the Imperative, and that name, as being the most general, I shall 
adopt. Some writers have distinguished from the imperative, the 
piecative, the deprecative, the permissive, the adhortative, &c. ; but, 
so far as language is concerned, these are but different applications of 
the same mood : the operation is the same in communicating the 
object of the passion, and implying the assertion that such passion 
exists. A few examples may serve to explain my meaning : — 

1. Let there be light, said God; and forthwith light 
Ethereal, first of things, quintessence pure, 
Sprung from the deep, and from her native east 
To journey through the air)' gloom began. Milton 

2. Fear and piety, 

Religion to the gods, peace, justice, truth, 

Domestic awe, night-rest, and neighbourhood, 

Instruction, manners, mysteries, and trades, 

Degrees, observances, customs, and laws, 

Decline to your confounding contraries ! 

And let confusion live ! Shakspeare 



134 OF VERBS. [CHAP. IX. 

3. Help me, Lysander, help me ! Do thy hest 
To pluck this crawling serpent from my breast ! 

Ah me, for pity ! — what a dream was here ? Shakspeare. 

4. Go, hut be mod'rate in your food ! 

A chicken too might do me good. Gay. 

In the first of these examples we have an instance of the highest 
imperative, that which proceeds from the Almighty power, to whose 
command all things created and uncreated are subject ; and who, in 
Milton's fine paraphrase of the first chapter of Genesis, is described 
as calling into existence the hitherto uncreated essence of light. The 
second example is deprecative, or rather imprecative, in which Timon 
calls down on his worthless fellow-citizens the natural consequences 
of their profligacy. The third is precative, in which poor deserted 
Hermia, waking from a terrific dream, calls for help from her faithless 
lover Lysander. The last is permissive, in which the old dying fox, 
after a long harangue to dissuade the younger members of his com- 
munity from pursuing their usual trade of rapine, at length permits 
them to go out on a similar excursion. In all these varieties of the 
imperative mood, the grammatical process, both of thought and 
expression, is the same. In all of them the assertion of desire or 
aversion on the part of the speaker is clearly implied. The sense is, 
" I command that there be light" — " I wish that confusion may pre- 
vail" — " I pray you to help me" — " I permit you to go;" but it is 
unnecessary to express those various assertions, because they are all 
implied in the imperative moods, and without those moods they could 
not be so implied. The imperative animates the passionate sentence, 
as the indicative or conjunctive animates the enunciative sentence. It 
converts the name of an object of passion, or will, into a manifestation 
that such object exists ; just as the indicative or conjunctive converts 
the name of an object of perception or thought into an assertion that 
it is really existing. The original text, " God said let there be light, 
and there was light," affords a plain example of this operation in both 
ways. The conceptions in both are two ; namely, existence and light. 
Each of these, without the verb, would remain a mere noun. The 
word " light" does so remain; but " existence," by becoming a verb, 
exhibits itself first in the imperative as an object of volition, and then 
in the indicative as an object of perception. In the one case it implies 
an assertion of the Divine will that light should exist; in the other it 
expresses an assertion that light did exist. The authors of the " Port 
Royal Grammar" observe, that as the future tense is often taken for 
an imperative mood (which will be presently noticed), so the im- 
perative is frequently used for a future ; and this they ascribe to an 
imitation of the Hebrews. But in truth there must in all languages 
be a community of signification between these two portions of a verb ; 
because, as Apollonius remarks, " we can command only in regard to 
the time to come." " Steal not," and " thou shall not steal," have 
therefore the same signification. 



CHAP. IX. J OF VERBS. 135 

271. The Optative mood seems at first sight to imply only a minor optative, 
degree of the same passion, which is more energetically expressed by 
the imperative: and hence I was formerly inclined to agree with 
those grammarians who think it unnecessary to make the former a 
separate mood. But the Greek and some other languages distinguish 
it by a peculiar form ; and on reflection it appears to me, for the 
reasons above stated, that the distinction is well grounded. I cannot, 
indeed, adopt the language of Scaliger (lib. iv., c. 144), differunt, 
quod imperatives respicit personam inferiorem, optativus potentiorem: 
" they differ in this, that the imperative regards an inferior person, 
the optative a superior ;" for that difference is altogether accidental. 
Moreover, it makes no provision for the common case of wishes 
expressed between equals; and again, how are we to determine 
whether a request is addressed to a person in one character rather 
than another ? Or why should we not have moods to designate the 
different degrees of superiority and inferiority? The fact seems to 
be, that the more distant and indirect influence of the will on its 
object, has given rise, in some languages, to a peculiar form of the 
verb, generally called the optative mood. Yet even this distinction 
does not appear to be very accurately observed in practice, for we 
sometimes see the optative used, where the imperative might have 
been more naturally expected. Thus, in the Electra of Sophocles, 
when Orestes is forcing JEgisthus into the palace, to kill him in 
the apartment where he had murdered Agamemnon, he says to his 
reluctant victim : — 

X&»£o/j oiv zltrw ffvv to-x, 11 ' ^-°y MV yttg a 

Go in, without delay, for now the strife 
Is not for useless words, but for thy life : 

where the optative yupoiq undoubtedly expresses a strong volition 
that iEgisthus should do what he was unwilling to perform. The 
common distinction between the optative and the imperative is nearly 
expressed by the English use of the auxiliaries "may" and "let." 
Thus, the following passage in the hymn to Sabrina is an example of 
the optative, expressed by may : — 

Virgin daughter of Locrine, 
Sprung of old Anchises' line, 
May thy brimmed waves, for this, 
Their full tribute never miss, 
From a thousand petty rills 
That tumble down the snowy hills ! 
Summer drouth, or singed air, 
Never scorch thy tresses fair ! 
Nor wet October's torrent flood 
Thy molten crystal fill with mud ! 
May thy billows roll ashore 
The beryl, and the golden ore ! 
May thy lofty head be crown'd 
With many a tow'r and terras round V 



136 OF VERBS. [CHAP. IX* 

The tribute from the rills, the beryls rolled ashore, and the crown 
of towers and terraces were matters not within the power or control 
of the speaker, and which he, therefore, could only wish for. On the 
contrary, when the speaker can command the execution of his wishes, 
he uses the word let, as the king, in Hamlet : — 

Let all the battlements their ord'nance fire. 

Give me the cups, 

And let the kettle to the trumpet speak, 

The trumpet to the cannoneer without, 

The cannon to the heavens. 

It is observed by Vossius, that the Latin optative is no other than 
the conjunctive— and, indeed, the form is the same in both; for we 
say, utinam amem, or cum amem ; utinam amarem, or cum amarem ; 
utinam amaverim, or cum amaverim ; utinam amavissem, or cum ama- 
vissem. And so, in the passive voice, utinam amarer, or cum amarer ; 
utinam amer, or cum amer ; utinam amatus sim, or cum amatus sim, 
&c. The mood, however, is not to be determined by the form, but 
by the signification ; for it often happens that particular languages do 
not possess distinct forms for the different moods ; and where they 
do, the form of one mood is frequently used with the force of another. 
This even takes place in the Greek language, which possesses the 
richest abundance of inflections in its verbs. The Greek indicative is 
often used for the subjunctive and optative, and that through almost 
all its tenses, as Viger has shown at large in his celebrated treatise 
on Greek idioms : and in return, the optative, especially in the Attic 
dialect, is used for the indicative, 
interro 272. Besides the four moods which I have reckoned as principal, 

some grammarians hold that there are two others of equal importance, 
namely, the Interrogative and the Infinitive ; these therefore I shall 
proceed to examine. And first, as to the interrogative : Varro speaks 
of the mode of interrogating as different from that of answering. No 
doubt the state of the mind in these two acts is widely different ; but 
as both acts must, of course, relate to the same conception, and to 
the same direct assertion, categorical or hypothetical, it is not sur- 
prising that the grammatical forms expressive of those acts should 
nearly approach each other, or be sometimes the very same ; and 
hence that some grammarians should deny the necessity of an inter- 
rogative mood. " In written language" (says an able writer), " take 
away the mark of interrogation, and in spoken language the peculiar 
tone of voice, and the interrogative and indicative modes appear pre- 
cisely the same." * Of this there is a remarkable instance in the 
speech of Venus, in the 10th book of the iEneid : — 
Cernis, ut insultent Rutuli, Turnusque feratur 
Per medios insignis equis, tumidusque secundo 
Marte ruat,j- 

where, if read without the accent of interrogation, the word " cernis" 
* Encycl. Brit., art. Grammar. f Virg. ^En., 10, 20. 



gative. 



CHAP. IX.J OF VERBS. 137 

is in the indicative mood, " you see ;" but if read (as it certainly 
ought to be) with that accent, it is clearly in the interrogative, and 
should be translated " do you not see ?" In like manner, the beauty 
of the following lines of Catullus would be lost, if read without the 
interrogative accentuation, though the form is simply indicative : — 

Jam te nil miseret, dure, tui dulcis amiculi ? 

Jam me prodere ; jam non dubitas fallere perfide ?* 

Of a question put hi the form of an assertion (says the same learned 
person) we have a remarkable instance in the Gospel of St. Mat- 
thew. When Christ stood before Pilate, the governor asked him, 
saying, " 2u ei 6 ficKTiktvg tu)v Iaoaiwv." -\ Now this is literally 
" Thou art the king of the Jews ;" but pronounced in an interrogative 
tone, it must have signified, " Art thou the king of the Jews ?" And 
so it seems to have been understood. Indeed, in colloquial English, 
nothing is more common than to use the indicative form interroga- 
tively, and with the interrogative intonation, as " you took a ride this 
morning?" meaning " did you [or rather did you not] take a ride?" 
On these grounds the writer alluded to concludes, that " the [so 
called] interrogative mood is a useless distinction," and one which 
(he says) is " not found in any language." I confess that at one 
time these reasons appeared to me to have much weight ; but when 
I reflect that the mental energy exercised by an interrogator is alto- 
gether different from that exercised by a respondent or a narrator ; 
and that it is marked in all languages either by a change of the 
arrangement or accentuation of the words, or by some additional 
word or particle, or perhaps even by a peculiar inflection, I cannot but 
agree with those who add an interrogative mood to the four above- 
mentioned. 

273. This mood may be said to partake both of the enunciative its mixed 
and of the passionate character. On the one hand, it requires from nature - 
the party interrogated a direct assertion, affirmative or negative, either 
of the existence of some fact, the precise nature of which is pre- 
sumably unknown to the interrogator, or else of some unknown 
circumstance of person, place, time, or the like, relating to the fact in 
question ; and, on the other hand, it implies in the interrogator the 
indirect assertion of some sort of passion, varying from the simple desire 
of information, the height of pleasure, or to that tumult of painful 
feelings, which renders thought itself a chaos of doubt and confusion. 

Thus, Ismene, ignorant of the nature of the act, in which Antigone 
wishes her to take part, asks — 

What is the act ? What danger ? What intent ? % 
So Creon, ignorant of the person who had buried Polynices, asks — 
Who was the man, that dared to do this deed ?§ 

* Catull. 30. f Encycl. Brit., ut sup. 

J lloiov ; n Hiv^uvtu/y-a ; <rov yvcoftn; tot u. Soph. Antig., 42. 
§ t/j ocvhfuv 'hv, o ToX//.r,<ra,s Tao~z. Ibid., 248. 



138 OF VERBS. [CHAP. IX. 

So JEneas, ignorant of the place whence the ghost of Hector came 
! Hector, from vjhat coast, 



Long-wished for, dost thou come ?* 
So Lady Macbeth, when her husband says to her, " Duncan comes 
here to night," significantly asks, as if ignorant of the intended time of 
his departure — 

■■ And when goes hence ?f 

In all these instances, there is expressed on the part of the interro- 
gator a simple desire of information ; and the verb, though interrogative 
in effect, is in form indicative. But when Catullus would express 
perfect delight, he does it in the form of a question — 

What is more joyful or more happy than I ?J 
And again — 

! what is happier than to live free from cares ?§ 
On the other hand, so painful were the feelings of the unhappy 
queen of Carthage, when abandoned by her lover, that she scarcely 
knew what she said, or where she was, or what was the state of her 
own mind. Yet all this she expresses interrogatively, though the 
verbs retain the indicative form — 

What do I say ? Where am I ? And what rage 

Transforms my mind ? || 

complex " d ^4. The ancients (as Harris observes) distinguished two kinds of 
interrogations, the simple, called 'Epwrr/jua, interrogatio, and the com- 
plex, called ILvo-fia, percontatio.% The simple present a question, 
the answer to which may be given in the same words by converting 
them into a sentence affirmative or negative : ex. gr. Qu. " Are these 
verses of Homer ?" Answer. " These are verses of Homer," or " These 
are not verses of Homer," or, still more shortly, by the adverbs Yes 
or No. The complex interrogations are either definitely or indefinitely 
such. A definitely complex interrogation, such as, " Is this a verse of 
Horace or of Virgil ?" or, " Is this a verse of Horace, of Virgil, or of 
Ovid ?" admits of two possible answers to each separate interrogation 
which it involves, and also of one general negative ; as, " It is 
Horace's " — " It is not Horace's " (and so of Virgil and Ovid) ; or, 
"It is of neither." The indefinite may be answered by a whole sen- 
tence, or elliptically by a single essential word in such sentence : 
ex. gr. — " How many right angles equal the angles of a triangle ?" 
Answer. " Two right angles equal the angles of a triangle." But as 
this repetition of the eight last words of the question would be tedious, 

* Quibus, Hector, ab oris 

Exspectate venis ? Virg. Mn., 2, 282. 

+ Shaksp. Macbeth. 

I Quid me laetius est, beatiusve ? CatulL, 9. 
§ ! quid solutis est beatius curis ? CatulL, 31. 
|! Quid loquor ? Aut ubi sum? Quae mentem insania mutat? 
^f Hermes, b. i., c. 8. 



CHAP. IX.] OF VERBS. 139 

the question may be elliptically answered by the essential word 
" Two," corresponding to the interrogative " How many?" 

275. Of the so-called Infinitive Mood, the following is the account g} fin ii tive 
given by Harris : — " Through all the above modes (indicative, &c.) 

the verb, being considered as denoting an attribute, has always 
reference to some person or substance."* " But there is a mode or 
form, under which verbs sometimes appear, where they have no 
reference at all to persons or substances. For example, ' to eat is 
pleasant, but to fast is wholesome.' Here the verbs to eat and to fast 
stand alone by themselves, nor is it requisite, or even practicable, to 
prefix a person or substance. Hence the Latin and modern gramma- 
rians have called verbs under this mode, from this their indefinite 
nature, infinitives .""j" " These infinitives go farther : they not only lay 
aside the character of attributives, but they assume that of substan- 
tives. "J So far Harris. Now, as he had before said that " those 
attributives which have the complex power of denoting both an attri- 
bute and an assertion make that species of words which grammarians 
call verbs ;"§ and as he here denies that the infinitives retain the 
character of attributives, and nowhere pretends that they have the 
power of denoting an assertion, it would seem strange that he should 
still consider them as verbs, were it not that this inconsistency has 
been shared, as Vossius observed, not only by the semidoctum valgus, 
but even by some of the scientissimi. For my own part, far from 
ranking the infinitive among the moods of a verb, I agree entirely, 
for reasons which will presently appear, with those who call it a 
verbal noun substantive. 

276. Whether we call infinitives nouns or verbs, the propriety of win so 
the name infinitive is very evident from the observation of Vossius : °* e 
Utfinitum est nomen,tum philosophus, turn plurativus philosophi ; quippe 

iUo anus, hoc multi significantar : at contra infinitum est sui, quia utri- 
usque est numeri, item Grcecum deiva, quo et Me et Mi denotatur ; sic 
finitum verbum est audio, ac facio, ut quo certus numerus designatur ; 
infinita autem sunt audire, agere, ut quo? deficiant nvmeris ac personis, 
et undique sunt indefinita ac indeterminatur. " As the noun philoso- 
phus is finite, both in the singular and in the plural philosophi, since 
the former signifies one person, and the other many ; but on the other 
hand the word sui is infinitive, because it is both singular and plural ; 
and in like manner the Greek word htva is infinitive, because it 
denotes both him and them; so the verbs audio and facio are finite, 
as designating a certain number ; but audire and agere, which express 
no certain number or person, and are in every way indefinite and 
indeterminate, are called infinitives." 

277. That the class of words in question, however, are not verbs is a noun 
but nouns substantive, results from the following considerations : — 

1. There are, as I have often repeated, only two principal modes 
* Hermes, b. 1, c. S. f Ibid. % Ibid - § IWd. 



140 OF VERBS. [CHAP. IX. 

of enunciating thought by speech, that is to say, naming 
our conceptions, and asserting, or manifesting their exist- 
ence. Now the infinitives, " to love," aimer, amare, " to 
have loved," avoir aime, amavisse, assert nothing by them 
selves, either as to the conception of love, or as to the 
conception of time in which the action of loving took place . 
they express both only in the way of notation, or naming, 
and not in the way of declaration ; and therefore, in so far 
as either conception is concerned, the infinitive must remain 
in the class of nouns. 

2. Harris admits that if you take away the assertion from any 

mood of a verb, " there remains nothing more than the 
mere infinitive, which, as Priscian says, significat ipsam rem 
quam continet verbum."* And by the word remit is clear 
that nothing can be here meant but the noun involved in 
the verb. 

3. That this noun must be a substantive is manifest, smce it may 

be the subject of a proposition, of which the predicate is 
one of its attributes. Thus Cicero says, " Cum vivere ipsum 
turpe sit nobis,"t which might equally be rendered in 
English " to live is disgraceful to me," or, " life is dis- 
graceful to me." 

4. The infinitives (according to the idiom of most cultivated lan- 

guages) answer to the distinctions of case in other nouns 
substantive. Thus tempus dbire answers to the genitive, 
"time of departure ;" celer irasci, to the dative, " swift 
to anger ;" and dignus amari, to the ablative, dignus amore. 

5. Hence the latter of two verbs, which, when not connected 

with the preceding by a conjunction, must, according to 
the trite rule, be in the infinitive mood, is in effect the 
accusative case of a noun governed by the first verb : ex. gr. : 

God will not long defer 

To vindicate the glory of his name :$ 

where " defer to vindicate " is equivalent to " defer the 
vindication." 

is verba!. 278. These nouns, however, though not verbs, are properly desig- 

nated as verbal ; for though they do not possess the peculiar charac- 
teristic of verbs, namely assertion, they possess several of the proper- 
ties of verbs. They can express existence, action, passion, and 
consequently time. Esse expresses existence ; amare, action ; amari, 
passion ; and, again, amare expresses time indefinite or present ; 
amavisse, time past, fore, time future. " Scripsit Caesar nondum te 
sibi satis esse familiarem, sed certe foreP% Moreover, like verbs, 
they may govern nouns, with or without a preposition ; as " to excel 

* Hermes, b. i. c. 8. f Cicero, Attic, 13, 28. 

\ Milton, Sams. Agon., 474. § Cicero, Ep. Fam. 



CHAP. IX.] OF VERBS. 141 

in wisdom" " to acquire fame :" and like verbs they admit of modifi- 
cation by adverbs, as " to live well" " to die gloriously." As some 
of these incidents depend on the construction of different languages, 
they will be noticed more particularly hereafter ; but it may here be 
proper to observe that there are various classes of nouns, both sub- 
stantive and adjective, which are connected with verbs, that is to say, 
which express, with certain modifications, the same conception which 
is expressed as an attribute by the verb. These nouns may be thus 
classed: — 

1. Verbal adjectives (commonly so called), which express the 

conception in the form of an attribute, as the Latin verbals 
in bilis, &c, of which Mr. Tooke makes a class of participles, 
and which do not involve the notion of time. 

2. Participles (commonly so called), which agree with the former, 

except that they involve the notion of time, 

3. Abstract nouns (commonly so called), which express the con- 

ception in the form of a substantive, as the Latin nouns in 
io, &c, which do not involve the notion of time. 

4. Infinitives (commonly called infinitive moods), which agree 

with the former, except that they may involve the notion of 
time. 

It happens, indeed, in most languages, that distinct forms are 
wanting for some of these four classes of nouns, or that the forms are 
reciprocally used for each other. Thus, " he learns to sing" or "he 
learns singing" are used in English indifferently; and so " he learns 
singing," and " he is singing," are equally consistent with our idiom. 

279. I have thought it necessary to dwell the longer on the consi- Different 

, . ~ , . n P. , J . !-.. . & ! r , opinions. 

deration of the infinitive, because, m excluding it not only from the 
moods but from the verbs, I certainly deviate, more than I am gene- 
rally disposed to do, from the path pursued by the great majority of 
grammatical writers. Yet this deviation is justified by high authority ; 
for many of the ancients (and those, as Harris says, " the best gram- 
marians") have called the infinitive oro/na prifiariKov, or ovojia 
pjlfxarog : and with these agrees Priscian, in the following passage, 
" a constructions quoque vim rei verborum, id est, nominis, quod 
significat ipsam rem, habere infinitivum possumus dignoscere." " From 
the construction, too, we may perceive, that the infinitive has the 
force of the thing, of the verb, that is to say of the noun, which signi- 
fies the thing itself." What is here called the thing, of the verb, is 
what I have called the conception of an attribute, the mere name of 
which is a noun. Thus, "I die" expresses the conception of dying, 
but it not only names that conception, it asserts the thing to exist, 
with reference to a certain person ; whereas " to die " expresses the 
conception, that is to say, names the thing, and does nothing more : 
it does not manifest the existence of the thing as an object either of 
perception or volition ; it does not assert that any person is dying, or 



142 OF VERBS. [CHAP. IX. 

has died, or will die, or may die ; neither does it evince any desire 
that such an event should occur, or the contrary, either positively or 
conditionally. " Take away the assertion, the command, or what- 
ever else gives a character to any one of the other modes," says 
Harris, " and there remains nothing more than the infinitive." So, 
I say, take away from the other modes whatever gives them the 
verbal character, and there remains the noun. Whether we call this 
noun a verbal noun, or a participial noun, or simply an infinitive, is 
immaterial ; provided we clearly understand, that it belongs not to 
the class of verbs, but to that of nouns, and that its nature does not 
depend on its form ; since, in English, the words death, to die, and 
dying, may all be used as infinitives ; and, when so used, are gene- 
rally convertible into each other, with little or no change of meaning. 
Tense. 280. As I consider moods to arise out of the most essential pro- 

perty of the verb, namely assertion, so I consider Tenses to arise out 
of the next essential property of the verb, namely connection. The 
English word tense is merely a corrupt pronunciation of the old 
French temps, as that was of the Latin tempus, time. Now, if a 
word be meant expressly to assert the connection of a substance with 
its attribute, or of a species with its genus, that word must implicitly 
assert the existence of the things connected. In order, therefore, to 
understand the connection, we must begin, as Harris judiciously does, 
by considering existence according as it is mutable or immutable. 
I am well aware that certain self-styled philosophers hold that there 
is no such thing as immutable existence. They conceive that men's 
minds are made up, as their bodies are, of a sort of small dust, 
which is perpetually whirling about, and taking various forms and 
arrangements, some of which it may please a man to call true, and 
others false ; that this distinction, however, is a mere delusion of the 
individual's mind, mentis gratissimus error ; that when the man dies, 
his notions, their truth and their falsehood, their wisdom and their 
folly, all die with him ; and though some truths wear better than 
others, and keep in fashion for twenty or thirty centuries, while the 
greater part of our notions do not last longer than the small ephemeral 
insects of the Nile, yet that in the end they all sink into one common 
Lethe : — 

animas quibus altera fato 

Corpora debentur. 

The opposite philosophy to this, although stigmatized as " a meta- 
physical jargon and a false morality, which can only be dissipated by 
etymology," I feel myself constrained to adopt, from the utter repug- 
nance of the former to my faculty of reason. I cannot conceive that 
the objects of intellection and science are mutable in any possible 
number of years, or in any imaginable conjuncture of circumstances. 
I cannot, for instance, believe that in a square the diagonal ever was, 
or will be, or can be, commensurable with one of the sides. These 
two magnitudes are not incommensurable because Euclid happened to 



CHAP. IX.] OF VERBS. 143 

think so, or because his doctrine on the subject has prevailed for 
above two thousand years. Their incommensurability is a truth as 
independent of that lapse of time, as any two things can possibly be 
of each other. The opposite to it cannot be conceived by the human 
mind. The existence of this truth, therefore, is justly styled im- 
mutable. 

281. Of such immutable existence the Present tense is usually Preset- 
considered the proper exponent, because, in most languages, it is 
among the simplest forms of the verb, and in particular has no dis- 
tinct mark of time about it. There is no reason, a priori, that there 
should not be a separate inflection of the verb to distinguish per- 
petual, absolute, immutable existence, from that which is predicated 
with reference to some certain time ; but as no language, that I know 
of, has adopted any such form, and as absolute existence is naturally 
contemplated under the form of a time perpetually present, I regard 
the expression of immutable existence as one of the uses of the present 
tense. 

The other use of the present tense depends on the nature of 
mutable existence. Now, mutable objects exist in time. When, 
therefore, we declare them to exist, that is, whenever we employ a 
verb active, or passive, or neuter, we must declare them to exist in 
some time. But time is distinguishable as to its periods into present, 
past, and future ; and as to its continuity into perfect or imperfect : 
and though the present, from its nature, must be definite and positive, 
yet the other two periods may be stated indefinitely and with relation 
to some different time. From these sources, and from the differences 
of mood already noticed, may be derived all the tenses, which appear 
in use, in different languages. And first, as to the present, considered 
as marking a certain portion of time ; it is manifest that we may 
consider as present to us a greater or less portion of time. Time flows 
on continuously, and has in itself no stops or periods ; but the mind 
dwells on certain portions, and gives them a distinct expression in 
language. The names of these portions are various, as an age, a year, 
a day, an hour, a moment ; but it has been well shown by Mr. Harris 
that the present time, strictly speaking, is not cognizable by any 
human faculty ; for it is 

Like the lightning, which doth cease to be, 



BC- 



Ere one can say it lightens. 

Let us suppose," says he, " for example, the lines AB- 




144 OF VERBS. [CHAP. IX. 

" I say, that the point B, is the end of the line AB, and the beginning 
of the line BC. In the same manner let us suppose AB BC to repre- 
sent certain times, and let B be a now, or instant, which they include ; 
the first of them is necessarily past time, as being previous to it ; the 
other is necessarily future, as being subsequent." Hence he con- 
cludes, that time present has at best but a shadowy and imaginative 
existence ; and, of course, as sensation refers only to time present, 
that sensible existence is itself altogether imperceptible, eluding the 
steady grasp of thought, and approaching to absolute nonentity. This 
will, doubtless, appear strange to the modern philosophers, who hold 
that sensible existence is the only existence ; but let them meditate 
on what they mean by the words now, or instant, or moment ; let them 
consider how difficult it is to arrest the fleeting progress of time, and 
fasten it down to the periods indicated by those terms ; and they will, 
perhaps, perceive that their notions are not quite so clear as they 
have hitherto fondly imagined. 

We will assume, that in the above diagram the perfect present is 
correctly indicated by the point B. At that moment, I open my eyes 
and I contemplate, at one view, a large theatre crowded with nume- 
rous happy faces, with splendour and beauty, with the diversities of 
age, and sex, and condition, with mirth and gravity, and all the pas- 
sions, which, though not meant to be brought into public, could not 
entirely be thrown off and left at home, like an unvalued garment. 
Or, perchance, I am on a proud hill-top, from whence, at one glimpse, 
I behold mountains and valleys spread in rich perspective before me, 
with the near cottages, and the distant town, and, beyond all, the 
remote and hazy ocean. I see the variegated foliage, and the ripening 
corn, the clouds of heaven sailing high in air, the rustics at their 
labour, and the little vagrant boy picking daisies at my feet, and 
delighting in his idleness. Without any time for reflection, without 
a thought of the successive action of the machinery in this grand 
landscape, I say, u I see" all this, at the present moment, and I 
enunciate it in the present tense perfect. 

But if I wish to express a continuous action, if, for instance, I mean 
to describe myself as remaining for some time in contemplation of the 
scenes just described, I am compelled to change my expression, and 
to adopt the present tense imperfect. In that case, I say " I am 
contemplating," " I am beholding :" and the diagram before drawn 
will not then so well express the time intended to be described as the 
following one : — 



CHAP. IX.] OF VERBS. 145 

Here, the present time, designated by the letter B, extends indefinitely 
toward A and C, embracing a segment, the whole of which is viewed 
by the mind as being at once present to its contemplation, though 
without any definite boundary on either side. The English language 
easily distinguishes this sort of present tense from the other, by the 
use of the verb to be and the participle present ; but in most other 
languages the present perfect and the present imperfect have one and 
the same form, and can only be distinguished by the context. 

282. We have seen that the present imperfect implies something of Vast. 
the past, and something of the future. Modern philosophy is very well 
satisfied to pass over all the difficulties which occur in regard to the 
nature of time. We are told, " that we have our notion of succes- 
sion and duration from this original, viz., from reflection on the train 
of ideas which we find to appear one after another in our own minds," 
and that " time is duration set out by measures." This is surely 
anything but reasoning. First, it is assumed that there is a train of 
ideas which constantly succeed each other in every man's understand- 
ing. Each of these ideas, then, must either occupy an indivisible point 
of time, or it must have some distinguishable duration. In the former 
case I cannot at all understand how reflection on many indivisible 
points should afford me the notion of any continuous quantity. In 
the latter case there would be no occasion to reflect on a train ; for 
the reflection on a single idea would present to me the notion of 
duration in itself. But what are these ideas ; and how do they march 
in train ? Are they all of equal duration ? If so, or if not, what is 
it that determines the duration of each ? Is it not the voluntary act 
of the mind ? — Again : is there no interval in the train ? On the 
hypothesis above stated, it would seem that before a man could have 
any notion of duration, and consequently of time, he must have formed 
in his own mind thoughts of a certain duration ; these thoughts must 
have succeeded each other in a distinguishable order, he must have 
been fully aware of that succession, and he must afterwards have 
made it the subject of reflection. But this statement is absurd ; for 
on what is he to reflect ? On a succession which would not present 
any notion of duration unless it involved that notion in the first 
instance ; nor would the succession of any two or more ideas produce 
a notion of duration if the thoughts themselves, or the interval 
between them, did not involve it. The truth is, that the idea of 
duration, or time, is not to be made up out of any other elements, 
but is an original law, and first element of thought in the human 
mind. We perceive duration of time just as we perceive extension 
of space, because it is one of the necessary forms under which alone 
we can contemplate existence. Whilst we are contemplating the 
indivisible moment which constitutes the perfect present it has already 
melted into the imperfect present; and if we attempt to seize it 
again, it has already become the past : its distinction is then fully 
2. l 



146 OF VERBS. [CHAP. IX. 

marked ; for the past is presented to us by memory, as the present is 
by sensation. 

The past has its perfect and its imperfect, its definite and its inde- 
finite, its positive and its relative. We may speak of an action which 
was performed on a given day, at a given hour, and a given minute ; 
as of Caesar's leaping into the Rubicon, or of the first shot which 
was fired at the commencement of the thirty years' war : or we may 
speak of an action in which a person was occupied, and which was 
going on at the time to which we refer. Thus the ancient artists 
inscribed their works with the word faciebat, to indicate that they did 
not put them out of hand, as finished and perfect, but that they had 
been for some time engaged in making them, and would have carried 
further their attempts toward perfection, had time and circumstances 
permitted. Thus, too, Syrus, in the Heautontimorumenos, describing 
the work on which he found Antiphila and her servants employed, 
says — 

Texentem telam studiose ipsam offendimus : 

Anus 

Subtemen nebat : prseterea una ancillula 

Erat : ea texebat una\ 

Again, we may speak of the past time definitely, fixing the epoch 
when it happened, as — 

That day he overcame the Nervii. 
Or indefinitely, declaring that the act of which we are speaking is past, 
but not ascertaining whether the time of its performance was near or 
distant; as — 

Thou art the ruins of the noblest man 

That ever lived in the tide of times. 

Lastly, the past time may be mentioned simply as past at the present 
moment, or as past at some time preceding the present; and these 
two tenses may be reciprocally distinguished as positive and relative. 
Thus, in the positive, Macbeth says — 

I have liv'd long enough : my way of life 

Is fallen into the sere, the yellow leaf. 

In the relative, Thyrsis (the attendant spirit), in the Masque of 
Comus, says — 

This ev'ning late, by then the chewing flocks 
Had ta'en their supper on the sav'ry herb 
Of knot-grass dew-besprent, and were in fold, 
1 sate me down to watch. 

Future. 283. As the past time exists in memory, so the Future exists in 

imagination. Such is the nature of man, or he would be unable to 
attain " that large discourse, looking before and after" which the poet 
truly assigns to him. The conception of duration may be supposed 
to exist in a being which had only the perception of the present and 
the past ; but to render that conception operative and useful, to con- 



CHAP. IX.] OF VERBS. 147 

vert it it into an accurate idea of time, it is necessary that the notion 
of futurity should be superadded. It is a mistake to say that the 
present impression is distinguished from the memory of what is past 
by superior vividness and strength. It often happens that things 
present 

Pass by us, like the idle wind 

Which we regard not ; 

whilst objects of memory so fully occupy our attention, that, like 
Hamlet, we think we see them " in the mind's eye." Still we see 
them (whilst we possess our reasoning faculties) not as present, but 
as past, with a specific difference of perception. The perception of 
the future, as such, is also specifically different from either of the 
others. Reason and reflection alone could not explain to us the 
necessity of such a distinction, because it is an element of reason, so 
far as that faculty applies to events occurring in time. It would be 
as correct to say, that by reasoning on the nature of light and colours, 
we come to discover the sensations of red and green, as to say, that by 
reasoning on duration, we come to discover that there is a past, a 
present, and a future. When we treat of these portions of time, we 
treat of them with reference to some particular moment ; for as time 
is perpetually flowing on, that which was future yesterday is to-day 
present, and that which was present yesterday is to-day past. The 
particular moment which thus characterises the time, is that in which 
the speaker or writer is addressing himself to his hearers or readers. 
We have seen, however, that that moment is not always referred to 
as indivisible, but sometimes as capable of extension and indefinite 
continuance. So it was observed to be in the present and past ; and 
so it is in the future. A person may say, " I shall mount my horse ;" 
and he may say, " I shall be an hour riding from London to Richmond." 
In the former instance the tense may be called the future perfect ; in 
the latter the future imperfect. Again, the future may be definite ; 
as, "I shall mount at six o'clock ;" or, indefinite, as " I shall ride 
some time in the course of the day." * Lastly, the act may be positive, 
that is, it may be considered only as future at the moment of speak- 
ing (which is the case with all the preceding examples), or it may be 
relative, considering the act as not to take place till after some other 
which is also future. Thus, a person may say, " I shall have mounted 
my horse before the clock has struck ;" or " I shall have been riding an 
hour when I reach the next milestone." 

284. These distinctions refer properly to time. There are others other dis- 
which refer to the contingency of the act, or to its frequency and mc lons * 
habitual performance ; these seem to draw their distinctive character 

* In our English idiom, the verbs "I shall mount," and "I shall ride," appear, 
in these instances, to be equally definite, and the indefinite character of the latter 
is only to be collected from the context ; but possibly in some other languages 
there may be a formal as well as a substantial difference of tense, answering to this 
distinction. 

l2 



148 OF VERBS. [CHAP. IX. 

from the mood, or kind of verb, and, therefore, may be deemed not 
so much tenses as modifications of the tenses already named. Some- 
what more of doubt may, perhaps, be allowable with respect to those 
forms of speech which imply either the immediate intention to begin 
an act, or its recent completion. Of the first class are "I am about 
to write," " I was beginning to write," " I shall begin to write :" 
and of the second class Je viens d'ecrire, " I have just written ;" Je 
vends d'ecrire, " I had just written ;" "Eo-o/xeu yeypa<f)ioQ, " I shall 
have done writing." Yet though these forms of speech serve to mark 
given periods of time, and therefore may be called tenses, they also 
seem to go somewhat further, by including other notions not strictly 
referable to time. At all events, there must be a limit to the com- 
binations, which are distinguished as tenses. Time is capable of 
endless divisions, and language would be infinitely minute in all its 
ramifications, if it provided a separate inflection for all those separate 
modifications of thought. It is true, that idioms vary in nothing 
more than in the varieties of tense for which they provide. Some 
languages are very meagre in this respect, others luxuriant; some are 
strictly confined to differences of time, others mix up, with these, a 
variety of other considerations. Thus the English language marks a 
distinction unknown, I believe, to any other language, between the 
future of choice and the future of necessity : and what is remarkable, 
that distinction varies with the different persons of the tense. " I 
shall go" implies no particular volition, nor indeed anything but the 
certainty of the event. " I will go" implies absolute volition. On 
the other hand, '' you will go" implies no volition of any person, but 
" you shall go" implies the volition of the speaker. It is a striking 
proof how much nicety and difficulty there is in the peculiar use of 
the tenses of verbs, that scarcely a single Scottish writer, however 
eminent, will be found to have accurately observed the distinctions of 
" shall" and " will" throughout all his compositions. The reason is, 
that the writers in question have from infancy become accustomed to 
the Scottish idiom, and idiom is much less a matter of reasoning than 
of habit. A critical examination of the idioms regarded as most 
elegant, will show them to abound with the same pleonasms and 
ellipses, which are commonly considered as marks of rusticity in the 
language of the common people. The English idiom above-mentioned, 
however, is of very simple explication. It refers primarily to the mil 
of the speaker. If, therefore, he says " I will," it is to be understood 
that, so far as his power extends, the action is to be performed ; but 
if he says " I shall," inasmuch as he indicates no volition of his own, 
nothing further is to be inferred but the futurity of the action. Again, 
if he says " you shall go," he " shall go," he intimates a necessity ; for 
the original meaning of shall is that which is necessary, and must, or 
at least, ought to be done, from the Mseso-Gothic skal* But this 

* See Junius ad vocem. Also Wachter, schuld, schuldig. 



CHAP. IX.] OF VERBS. 149 

necessity, being declared by the speaker, relates to his will alone. 
Thus, in Coriolanus : — 

Sicinius. ■ : It is a mind 

That shall remain a poison where it is, 

Not poison any further. 
Coriolanus. Shall remain ? 

Hear you this Triton of the minnows ? Mark you 

His absolute shall ? 

On the other hand, when the speaker says " you will go," " he will 
go," he intimates no will of his own ; and, therefore, nothing is under- 
stood but the futurity of the action. The proper force and effect, 
therefore, of the two English futures may be thus expressed : — 

1. Future compulsory. " I will go," i. e., it is my will to go. 
" Thou shalt go," i. e., it is my will to compel thee to go. " He shall 
go," i. e., it is my will to compel him to go. 

2. Future not compulsory. " I shall go," i. e., there is some cause 
compelling me to go, independently of my will. " Thou wilt go," i. e., 
there is some cause compelling thee to go, independently of my will. 
" He will go," i. e. y there is some cause compelling him to go, inde- 
pendently of my will. The same reasoning applies to the plural 
number as to the singular; and, consequently, '* we will go," " ye 
shall go," " they shall go," belong to the first kind of future ; and 
" we shall go," " ye will go," " they will go," belong to the second. 
What I have here called the future compulsory has sometimes a 
merely permissive force, sometimes a promissive, and sometimes it is 
used in the manner of an imperative mood, as " Thou shalt not steal," 
" Thou shalt do no murder," for " steal not," " murder not ;" and this 
idiom is found both in the Greek and Latin : "'Eaeade ovv bfieig teXelol, 
Ye shall be therefore perfect, i. e., Be ye therefore perfect, St. Matt, 
ch. v. v. 48. And so Horace : Inter cuncta, leges, et percunctabere 
doctos. Lib. L Epist. 18. But though various circumstances, of the 
nature of those which have been already pointed out, do, in fact, 
enter into the composition of tenses in various languages ; yet they 
do not properly belong to the scientific division of tenses in Universal 
Grammar, which ought to regard only distinctions of time, and not 
these beyond a certain degree of minuteness and complexity. Where 
the divisions of time are very minute or complex, their expression rather 
forms a sentence than a word. It is something more than the mind can 
easily grasp or communicate in one combined form ; and which, there- 
fore, to be understood, requires to be analysed into different words. 

In a subject which has undergone such various treatment by gram- 
marians, as the distribution of tenses, I am far from arrogating to my 
own method any very superior merit ; still less do I recommend the 
name which I have given to each tense as the best calculated to express 
its distinctive character. Instead of the perfect and imperfect, some 
writers use the terms absolute and continuous ; and those tenses which I 



Harries 

scheme. 



150 OF VERBS. [CHAP. IX. 

have called positive and relative, correspond nearly with the perfectum 
and the plusquam perfectum, thefuturum, and paulo-post futurum. 

285. The arrangement proposed by the learned Mr. Harris, though 
differing considerably from that which I have suggested, is, I must 
acknowledge, entitled to great attention : and, therefore, without going 
into all his reasonings in favour of it (contained in the 7th chapter of 
the 1st book of Hermes), I think it right to state its general outline. 

" Tenses," he observes, " are used to mark present, past, and 
future time, either indefinitely, without reference to any beginning, 
middle, or end ; or else definitely, in reference to such distinctions. 

" If indefinitely, then have we three tenses, called aorists (so called 
from the Greek aopiarov, undefined, or unlimited), viz., an aorist of the 
present, an aorist of the past, and an aorist of the future. 

" If definitely, then have we nine other tenses, viz., three to mark 
the beginnings of the present, past, and future respectively, three to 
denote their middles, and three to denote their ends. 

" The three first of these nine tenses we call the inceptive present, 
the inceptive past, and the inceptive future : the three next the middle 
present, the middle past, and the middle future ; and the three last the 
completive present, the completive past, and the completive future. 

"And thus there are in all twelve tenses, of which three denote 
time absolutely, and nine denote time under its respective distinc- 
tions." 

1 . Denoting time absolutely and indefinitely : — 

1. Aorist of the present, ypa^w, scribo, I write; 

2. Aorist of the past, eypaxpa, scripsi, I wrote ; 

3. Aorist of the future, ypdxpoj, scribam, I shall write. 

2. Denoting time under the respective distinctions of inception, 
continuity, and completion, 

1. Denoting inception : — 

1. Inceptive present, fxiXk(o ypatyeiv, scripturus sum, lam 
about to write ; 

2. Inceptive past, ejneXKov ypdcpetv, scripturus eram, I 
was beginning to write ; 

3. Inceptive future, fieWrjau) ypatyuv, scripturus ero, I 
j shall be beginning to write. 

2. Denoting continuance : — 

1. Extended present, rvyxdvio ypdcjxov, scribo, or scribens 
sum, I am writing; 

2. Extended past, eypatyov, or krvyyavov ypa<pu>v, scri- 
bebam, I was writing ; 

3. Extended future, eaofiai ypdtpojy, scribens ero, I shall be 
writing. 

3. Denoting completion : — 
1. Completive present, yeypaipa, scripsi, I have written; 



CHAP. IX.J OF VERBS. 151 

2. Completive past, iyeypatyeiv, scripseram, I had done 

writing ; 

3. Completive future, eaofxat yeypatywg, scripsero, I shall 

have done writing. 

Whatever arrangement we adopt, we shall certainly not find it 
folly followed out in many languages ; for while some have great 
varieties of inflection or construction to express the different times, 
others have fewer; and yet it may happen that the idiom, which 
upon the whole is the least rich in tenses, is more minute than all the 
others in some one particular distinction. 

286. On the combination of tense with mood, much judicious Connectjonof 
criticism is to be found in various grammarians, and particularly in Mood." 1 
the work last quoted, the Hermes of Mr. Harris, who has collected 
not only his own observations, but those of the philosophers of suc- 
cessive ages : for the pure science of Universal Grammar rests on a 
knowledge of the operations of the human mind ; which (so far at 
least as regards the intellectual powers) were profoundly investigated, 
and ably explained, both by Greek and Roman grammarians. Those 
learned men were not only conversant with the intellectual philosophy 
of then time, but were themselves philosophers of no mean rank. 
Such a person was Apollonius of Alexandria, surnamed AwkoXoq, 
or " the difficult," whose four books -repi ^vvrd^ewr, " on Syntax," are 
considered to be the most philosophical of any extant on the Greek 
language. He himself says he composed them, jiera Tzhar\g afcptjScmg, 
" with all possible accuracy." Priscian, who professes to make him 
his chief guide, says of his dissertations, Quid Apollonii scrupulosis 
qwcestionibus enucleatius possit inveniri? The celebrated Theodore 
Gaza confesses that he owes to him almost everything. The learned 
Thomas Lixacer follows him, as it were step by step. And lastly, 
Harris, who quotes him liberally throughout the whole of Hermes, 
declares him to be " one of the acutest authors that ever wrote on 
the subject of Grammar." In thus tracing the literary genealogy of 
grammatical authorities, I at once prove their present title to respect, 
and show that it could not have subsisted through so many centuries, 
if it had not been originally founded on superior talent and ability. 
When, therefore, I find an author like Apollonius employing much 
learning on the illustration of the tenses, and their combination with the 
different moods, I cannot be persuaded that such speculations are 
wholly trifling or useless to those who would obtain a perfect ac- 
quaintance with the science of Grammar. Now Apollonius, observing 
on the connection above noticed between the future tense and the 
imperative mood, satisfactorily explains why in most languages there 
is not a distinct form for the future tense of that mood. The reason 
is that all imperatives are in their nature futures; for thus argues 
Apollonius : — ''E-n-l yap ^o) yivofxevoig v fir} yeyovoaiv r/ lipoara^tg' 
ra ce /urj ywofxeva ?} jjly] yeyovora, ETn-nleior-qra Ie tyowa iiq to 
eaaOai, MeXXovtoq ion. " A command has respect to those things 



152 OF VERBS. . [CHAP. IX. 

which either are not doing or have not yet been done. But those 
things which being not now doing, or having not yet been done, have 
a natural aptitude to exist hereafter, may be properly said to apper- 
tain to the future." And again, he says, "Kmavra rh TrpocrraKTiKa 
eyKEijjLivrjy e^et rr\v tov fxeWovTog Ztadeaiv — aye^bv 'yap kv 'irra) earl 
to, 6 TvpavvoKTOvvaag TificMrdb), to* rifxrjdrfcreTaij Kara tyjv yjpovov 
'ivvoiav' rfj eiackiffei rUrfWa^oe, Kadb to jj-ev 7rpo(TTaKTucbv, to he 
bpiaTiKov. " All imperatives have a disposition within them which 
regards the future. With regard to time, therefore, it is the same 
thing to say, Let him that hills a tyrant he honoured, as to say, He 
that hills a tyrant shall he honoured ; the difference being only in the 
mood, inasmuch as the one is imperative, the other indicative." So 
Priscian shows the connection of the imperative with the future. — 
u Imperativus verb proesens, et futurum (tempus) naturali quadam neces- 
sitate videtur posse accipere. Ea enim imperamus, quo? vel in proesenti 
statim volumus fieri, sine aliqud dilatione, vel in futuro." " The im- 
perative (mood) seems to receive the present and future (tenses) by a 
certain natural necessity; for, we command those things which we 
wish to be done, either immediately at present, without any delay, or 
hi future." From this reasoning, it is plain that the present tense of 
the imperative mood is a present inceptive, looking necessarily to a 
continuance or completion in futurity. It expresses on the part of the 
speaker a present will ; but on the part of the person addressed a 
future act : and that futurity may either begin from the moment of 
speaking, or at a more distant period. 

Thus, when Lear cautions Kent not to interfere between him and 
his anger to Cordelia, the will and the act are closely conjoined : — 

Come not between the dragon and his wrath ! 
But when he imprecates curses on his unnatural and cruel daughters, 
the object of his prayer is one which cannot take effect till long after- 
wards, and which may continue for a course of years : — 

. If she must teem, 

Create her child of spleen, that it may live 
And be a thwart, disnatur'd torment to her ; . 
Let it stamp wrinkles on her brow of youth, 
With cadent tears fret channels in her cheeks, 
Turn all her mother's pains and benefits 
To laughter and contempt. 

Nor is it only the imperative mood which may be connected with 
a future time. Vossius has observed, that what is commonly called 
the present conjunctive has in some instances a future import ; as, 
when Cicero says, in one of his epistles to Atticus, " Est mihi^prw- 
cipua causa manendi ; de qua utinam aliquando tecum loquarT " I 
have a particular reason for staying here, concerning which I hope I 
may some time or other talk to you ;" where utinam loquar, " I hope 
I may talk," relates entirely to a future time. It is needless here to 
follow the numerous and minute remarks of many learned critics on 



CHAP. IX.] OF VERBS. 153 

the mixed or variable times which are expressed by all the con- 
junctive tenses. Suffice it to say, that the combination of any mood 
which implies contingency or futurity, with a tense, referring to 
present or past time, must necessarily affect the expression of time, 
and, consequently, that in this respect, the tenses of the indicative 
must differ from the analogous tenses in any other mood. As, there- 
fore, in nouns, the term gender, originally used to express the mere 
distinction of sex, has been applied in use to distinguish large classes 
of words from each other, with reference only to their terminations ; 
so in verbs the word Tense, originally meaning the expression of time 
alone, has been also used in most grammars to express that concep- 
tion in combination with the others above noticed. 

287. From the remaining essential property of the verb, namely, Person, 
the expression of Attribute, arises the necessity for a distinction of 
Person ; for every attribute must relate to a subject of the first, 
second, or third person, as above distinguished. The form of the verb 
may or may not be altered on this account. We may say in Latin 
amo, amamus, amatis, amant, or in English " I love," " we love," " ye 
love," " they love;" but it is manifest that though in the examples 
cited from the latter language the form remains unchanged, the sig- 
nification is alike varied in both languages. The difference of person, 
therefore, in point of form, is merely accidental to the verb : it pecu- 
liarly belongs to the pronoun, and has been sufficiently explained in 
treating of that part of speech. In many languages, the person of the 
verb is necessarily expressed by a separate pronoun. This is univer- 
sally the case in the Chinese, for the verb being alike in all the 
persons, it would be impossible to distinguish one from the other 
without the addition of some other word. The three persons singular 

of the present tense ran thus : — 

Ngo Ngai, I love ; 

Ni Ngai, Thou lovest ; 

Ta Ngai, He loves. 
And the same occurs in the other tenses, and in the plural number. 

In English we find it partially the case ; for though in the singular 
we have three distinctions of person in the present, as " I love," 
" thou lovest," " he loves," and two in the past, as " I loved," " thou 
lovedst," yet in all other parts (with the exception of the irregular to 
he) the verb remains unaltered. Nor does this arise from any pecu- 
liarity in the original genius of our language, for the more ancient 
dialects, from which it is derived, abounded with personal terminations. 
JSow these terminations, as will be shown hereafter, were, in their 
origin, nothing more than the pronouns themselves, which, in process 
of time, coalesced with the expression of attribute, connection, asser- 
tion, and time, and so formed words, signifying at once all these 
different circumstances, together with the additional distinction of 
person. 

288. Some verbs are called impersonal, a name which only seems impersonate. 



154 OF VERBS. [CHAP. IX. 

to mean that they are not usually conjugated with distinction of per- 
sons, but remain always in the form of the third person. If they had 
no other peculiarity than that from which their name is derived, it 
might not be necessary to notice them in a treatise on Universal 
Grammar ; but, in truth, they are constructed on a principle different 
from that which has been already explained in reference to person. 
The impersonals are of two kinds, active and neuter. By active I 
mean those which require an object, as " it grieves me," "it becomes 
me," miseret me, decet me, &c. ; by neuter I mean those verbs of which 
the action terminates in itself, as " it rains," " it snows," " it is hot," 
" it is cold ;" the Latin pluit, the French il fait chaud, the Italian fa 
freddo, the German es donnert, esfriert, &c." In all these instances the 
verb contains a mere assertion of the existence of the conception • but 
does not indicate any agent. These verbs have been sometimes ex- 
plained as agreeing with a nominative implied in them : thus pudet is 
said to be a verb agreeing with the implied nominative pudor, as if 
the meaning were, " shame shames me;" but this is rather a formal 
than a substantial explanation. Pudet in reality contains, and does 
not merely imply the noun pudor : it expresses the same conception as 
the noun, and asserts its existence. It is therefore rather of the nature 
of a verb substantive, than of a verb active ; and though, in some 
idioms, a nominative is expressed, yet in reality that nominative is 
superfluous, or, at most, is only introduced to keep up the general 
analogy of the language. The nominative it in the English language, 
and il in French, have no distinct reference to any conception. They 
are pronouns, which do not stand for any noun. If any one should 
say, " It rains," we cannot, as in the common case, where a distinct 
nominative is expressed, ask ' ' what rains ?" for the answer would 
only be it; and if we were then to ask, " what is it?" we must be 
left without any answer. Hence, in translation, the nominative it is 
often lost. We do not say in Latin, Hoc pluit ; nor in Greek, TOYTO 
Xpff. The proper notion of an impersonal verb, therefore, is, that it 
asserts the existence of an action, without reference to any particular 
agent. 
Number. 289. The expression of Number is another accidental property of 

the verb ; and belongs to it only in so far as the verb may be com- 
bined with the expression of person. It is, therefore, like the same 
property in the adjective, a mere method of connecting it in construc- 
tion with the noun substantive, or pronoun, which forms its nominative. 
Accordingly, it applies to verbs in the same manner as it does to 
nouns and pronouns.. When they admit a dual number, as in Sanscrit, 
Arabic, and Greek, the verb admits the same ; when they do not, it 
has only a singular and a plural. Indeed, the matter could not well 
be otherwise, if, as has been already stated, the personal terminations 
of the verb be really the pronouns themselves coalescing with it. The 
verb is equally said to be in the singular or plural, whether it has or 
has not distinct terminations appropriated to those different numbers ; 



CHAP. IX.] OF VERBS. 155 

we call " I love" singular, and " we love" plural ; but it is manifest, 
that in all such instances the expression of number exists only in the 
pronoun. These are questions of Particular Grammar : all that can 
be laid down on the subject, as a rule of Universal Grammar, is, that 
as on the one hand there is nothing in the peculiar nature of the verb 
which involves the idea of number, so there is nothing in the idea of 
number which can prevent it from being combined with the verb, 
where the genius of the language permits such a union. 

290. Since the verb, by means of its connection with the pronoun, Gender, 
admits person and number, there is no reason why it should not also 
admit Gender ; and, in fact, this distinction obtains in the Arabic, the 
Ethiopic, and some other languages. It is, however, rare ; and as 
gender properly belongs only to nouns, or pronouns substantive, with 
respect to which it has been already discussed, we need not here 
pursue the investigation. 

291. Some writers contend, that the verb, as expressing an attri- Comparison, 
bute, is capable of Comparison ; nor does it appear that this can be 
gainsaid, if we regard only the attributive nature of the verb. There 

are, indeed, certain attributes, as has been already observed, which are 
not intensive ; and these of course cannot admit degrees of comparison ; 
neither can the assertive power be compared : for the verb must assert 
a thing either to exist, or not to exist. On the other hand, verbs 
may be compounded with conceptions implying comparison, as " to 
outdo" " to overtake" subesse, superesse, &c. They may too, in 
general, be compared by means of the adverbs of comparison, more, 
most, Jess, least, &c. ; but I am not aware that it has been attempted, 
in any language, to combine in one and the same word the assertive 
power with the comparative. It is not easy to conceive any form of 
verb which in itself would express the degrees of comparison ; and the 
reason probably is, that though the mere qualities of substance may 
be simply intensive, yet actions are intensive in various modes, as well 
as in various degrees. Of different substances, concerning which 
whiteness can be predicated, some may be more and some less white ; 
but of different beings concerning which the act of walking may be 
predicated, all equally walk, though one walks more, another less ; 
one faster, another slower, &c. : and so of mental action, several per- 
sons love, but one loves more warmly, another more violently, another 
more purely; so that there is not in actions, as there is in qualities, 
a simple scale of elevation and depression ; and, consequently, the 
mere comparison of more and less would not answer all the purposes 
of language, as applied to the verb, though it does as applied to the 
adjective. For this reason participles, when they are compared, lose 
their participial power ; for sapientior and potentior do not express 
acts, but habits, or fixed qualities, and therefore answer to the English 
adjectives "wiser," and "more powerful." 

292. Thus have we seen, that though the proper force and effect of Condition. 
the verb — that on which its peculiar character depends — is assertion, 



156 OF VERBS. [CHAP. IX. 

yet it is capable of combining therewith, and in fact it does so combine, 
not only the conception of attribute which Priscian calls the res of 
the verb, but the expression of mood, tense, person, number, and even 
gender. " Observe," says the President Des Brosses, " how, in one 
single word, so loaded with accessory notions, everything is marked, 
every notion has its member, and the analogical formulas are preserved 
throughout on the plan first laid down." Elsewhere he adds, " All 
this composition is the work, not of a deeply-meditated combination, 
nor of a well-reasoned philosophy, but of the metaphysics of instinct." 
The Goths, the Saxons, the Greeks, and the Latins, in forming the 
schemes of conjugation above noticed, were probably impelled by 
principles in the human mind, the very existence of which they hardly 
suspected. Similar principles have operated, but with endless diversity 
of application, in the formation of all the various dialects which have 
been spoken in ancient and modern times, by nations the most bar- 
barous and the most civilized ; and it is the development and explica- 
tion of these ever-operative principles which forms the proper object 
of the science of Universal Grammar. 



( 157 ) 



CHAPTER X. 

OF ARTICLES. 

293. Having explained the uses of the principal parts of speech Accessory 

■i-i- • •■ t j. .Li. • parts of 

employed in enunciative sentences, 1 come now to the accessories, speech. 
The principal parts, as has been fully stated, are those which are 
necessary for communicating thought in a simple sentence : and the 
communication of thought requires the naming of some conception, 
and the assertion of its existence as an object either of perception or of 
volition. Conceptions are named by the noun : they are asserted to 
exist by the verb ; but it often becomes desirable to modify either the 
name, or the assertion, or the union of both. How is this to be 
done ? Certain modifications may be incorporated with the noun by 
its cases, and numbers, and genders ; with the verb by its moods, 
tenses, and persons ; with the adjective by its degrees of comparison ; 
and with the participle, gerund, supine, and infinitive, by their marks 
of time, relation, &c. The same, or similar effects, may be produced 
by separate words ; and what must those separate words be ? Nouns, 
or verbs, which, appearing in subordinate characters, are no longer to 
be considered such as they were formerly. 

294. We wish to modify a conception; how can we do it but by Howmodi- 
another conception ? We wish to modify an assertion ; how can we words? 
do it but by another assertion ? It is therefore plain that the acces- 
sory words must have had originally the character of principals ; that 
is to say, they must have been either nouns or verbs. This is a truth 
extremely obvious in itself, and of which many grammarians have 
been fully aware ; but there is another truth, which seems to have 
been less apprehended, namely, that these subordinate and accessor}' 
words act as such a very different part from that which they sustained 
as principals in a sentence. The mind dwells on them more slightly ; 
they express a more transient operation of the intellect. In process of 
time some of them come to lose their original meaning, and to be 
only significant as modifying other nouns and verbs. It cannot be 
denied that the words and, the, with, and the like, have no distinct 
meaning, at present, in our language, except that which depends on 
their association and connection with other words. The etymologist 
may succeed, or he may not succeed, in his attempts to trace these 
non-significant words to the significant words from which they are 
derived ; but whether he be successful or unsuccessful, the fact will 
be no less certain, that in their secondary use they lose their primary 
character and signification ; they are no longer nouns or verbs, but 
inferior parts of speech, commonly termed articles, prepositions, con- 



nated. 



158 OF ARTICLES. [CHAP. X. 

junctions, and adverbs, each of which classes I shall examine in its 
order. 
Howtesig- 295. These inferior parts of speech have been called particles: 
and, as such, are sometimes distinguished from words, and sometimes 
treated only as separate classes of words. To explain and account 
for them seems to have given much trouble to many grammatical and 
philosophical writers : and after all, the subject has been often left in 
a state of great confusion. Mr. Locke, in his second volume, has a 
vague chapter on particles, from which it may be inferred that he 
considered nouns to be the names of thoughts, or, as he expresses it, 
of ideas. All other words serve, according to him, to connect ideas. 
The principal of these (which I call the-verb) he calls the mark of 
affirming or denying; and he says, "the words whereby the mind 
signifies what connection it gives to the several affirmations and nega- 
tions that it unites in one continued reasoning or narration are called 
particles." Elsewhere he says of these particles, " they are not truly 
by themselves names of any ideas ;" and again, " they are all marks 
of some action or intimation of the mind, and therefore, to understand 
them rightly, the several views, postures, stands, turns, limitations, 
and exceptions, and several other thoughts of the mind, for which we 
have either none or very deficient names, are diligently to be studied." 
The confusion which occurs in these passages between " ideas," 
" thoughts,' 1 and "actions or intimations of the mind," shows that 
Locke attached no distinct meaning to any of these words ; but so far 
as they lead to a grammatical doctrine, it would seem that he con- 
ceived particles not to be derived from nouns. Hoogeveen speaks 
much more intelligibly. He says, " particulas in sua infantiafuisse 
vel verba, vel nomina, vel ex nominibus formata adverbia." " The par- 
ticles were, in their infancy, either verbs or nouns, or adverbs formed 
from nouns." " Ipso? verb, quantenus particul^e, per se soloe spec- 
tator, nihil significant." " They themselves, as particles, considered 
alone, signify nothing." And again, in defining the particle, he says, 
" particulam esse voculam, ex nomine vel verbo natam." " The par- 
ticle is a small word derived from a noun or a verb." Had Mr. 
Tooke properly reflected on these passages, which he quotes from 
Hoogeveen, he would have found them to contain all that was valu- 
able in his own system, without the errors into which he has fallen. 
The term particle, indeed, is not well chosen, to include the inferior 
parts of speech ; nor do grammarians agree as to the extent of its 
signification. Locke only describes it as including " prepositions and 
conjunctions, &c. ;" leaving it to his reader's judgment to determine 
what classes of words fall under the et ccetera : Scaliger says, " ut 
omittam particulas minores, cujusmodi sunt prcepositiones, conjunctiones, 
interjectiones :" and Hoogeveen, as is seen above, seems to distinguish 
the particle from the adverb ; whilst other grammarians include in it 
all indeclinable words, and even the article, which in Greek is de- 
clinable. It is unnecessary to adopt any generic term as designating 



CHAP. X.] OF ARTICLES. 159 

all the accessorial parts of speech ; nor do I deem it advisable to dis- 
tribute them as Harris has done into two classes, which he names 
definitives and connectives. I shall, however, begin with the article, 
which he arranges under the definitives. 

296. The Article is a part of speech serving to reduce a noun sub- Use of the 
stantive from a general to a particular signification. I have already 
observed, in speaking of nouns, that by far the greater part of them 
must be what Mr. Locke calls general terms, that is to say, names 
common to many conceptions. We cannot give a distinct name to 
every distinct object that we perceive, nor to every distinct thought 
which passes through the mind ; nor are these thoughts, or even 
these objects, so entirely distinct to human conception as many per- 
sons are apt to imagine. If I see a horse to-day, and another horse 
to-morrow, the conceptions which I form of these different objects are 
indeed different in some respects ; but in others they agree. The 
one horse may be black, and the other white ; but they are both 
quadrupeds, both have hoofs, &c. The word horse is a noun, ex- 
pressing the conception which I form of all the points in which I 
perceive them to agree. This word, therefore, applies to a class of 
conceptions ; but it is necessary that I should possess some means of 
expressing the individuals of that class. Now those means are 
afforded by adding the article to the noun. To illustrate what I 
mean, let us take a general term ; for instance, the word man. The 
conception expressed by this word alone is one which exists in several 
other conceptions, as in that which is formed of " Peter," or of 
" James," or of " John." Peter, therefore, is a word expressing the 
general conception, " man," together with something peculiar to a 
certain individual ; and the same may be said of James and John ; 
but it must frequently happen that the proper name Peter, or James, 
or John, is unknown to us. How, then, are we to express our con- 
ception of either of them ? To each the term " man " belongs ; but 
it belongs to each equally ; and therefore it does not distinguish the 
individual from his class, nor one individual from another. If, there- 
fore, we use this term " man," we must also employ some other 
means of showing that we mean by it this or that man ; or at least 
some one man, as distinguished from the conception of " man " in 
general. Now, these means are afforded by the article ; and they 
are afforded in two different ways : we either speak of the general 
term simply, as applicable to a general notion of individuality, or else 
with relation to some particular circumstance which we know belongs 
only to a certain individual. In the former case we may be said to 
enumerate, in the latter to demonstrate, the person or thing intended. 
In the one we say positively " a man," in the other we say relatively 
" the man." 

297. Hence arise two classes of articles. They have been called Two classes, 
the indefinite and the definite ; but it has been justly observed by 
Harris that they both define, only the latter defines more perfectly 



Whether 
necessary. 



160 OF ARTICLES. [CHAP. X. 

than the former. It would, perhaps, be more appropriate to call the 
one positive, and the other relative, or the one numeral, and the other 
demonstrative. I shall adopt the two first of these designations, 
merely for convenience ; but I consider the names by which it may 
be thought fit to designate the different classes of words, as com- 
paratively unimportant. The most material object is to establish the 
classification itself on clear and intelligible principles. 

298. Grammarians have disputed whether the article be, or be 
not, a necessary part of speech. Before this question can be properly 
answered, it must be clearly stated. Mr. Tooke says, " in all lan- 
guages there are only two sorts of words which are necessary for the 
communication of our thoughts ; and these are, 1. noun, and 2. verb;" 
and he adds, that he uses the words noun and verb " in their common 
acceptation." It would seem from this, that he meant to describe 
the article as unnecessary ; for in common acceptation it is certainly 
not considered to be identical, either with the noun, or with the verb. 
However, he afterwards describes it as " necessary for the communi- 
cation of thought," and even " denies its absence from the Latin, or 
from any other language." Those ancient writers who considered the 
noun and the verb as the only, or, at least, as the principal and more 
distinguished parts of speech, either included the article among the 
syncatagoremata, that is, consignificant words, or else denied its neces- 
sity, and even its existence, in some languages, particularly in the 
Latin. Noster sermo, says Qutncttlian, Articulos non desiderat. 
Articulos, says Priscian, quibus nos caremus — Articulos integros in 
nostra non invenimus Lingua. And so Scaliger, Articulus nobis nullus, 
et Greeds superfluus. And Vossius, Articulum, quern Fabio teste 
Latinus sermo non desiderat, imb, mejudice,planb ignorat. From these 
authorities, and indeed from a very slight inspection of the language 
itself, it is clear that the Latin had no separate words answering to 
the articles of the English and other languages ; nor is it less clear, 
that the Greek had only the relative article 6, rj, to, and was entirely 
destitute of our positive article. Mr. Tooke is undoubtedly right in 
inferring, from the necessity of general terms, the necessity of the 
article ; if we thereby understand the necessity of some means to 
apply general terms to their individual instances. He is, however, 
wrong in supposing that this purpose is always effected either by a 
distinct word, or by some prefix or termination added to words : nor 
is the ingenious but fanciful Cour de Gebelin less erroneous in 
asserting that the article was supplied in Latin by the termination ; 
for the termination in no manner whatsoever defined whether the 
word was to be taken in a more or less general acceptation. It indi- 
cated the case, the number, and the grammatical gender ; but it did 
nothing else. Homo signified "Man" in general, or "a man," or 
" the man" before spoken of; and the termination afforded no help 
toward determining in which of these three senses the word was to 
be taken in any particular passage. This was to be discovered in 



CHAP. X.] OF ARTICLES. 161 

Latin, as in some other languages, merely by the context. If, 
therefore, the question, whether the article be necessary, mean 
whether a separate class of words performing the function of the 
article be necessary, it must be resolved in the negative ; because no 
such class is to be found in the Latin and some other languages. If, 
on the other hand, it mean whether in all languages there must be 
some mode of performing the function of the article, it must be 
answered affirmatively ; and this is a question which, as it relates to 
the operations of the Mind, properly falls within the scope of pure 
Grammatical Science. 

299. Even though a particular language may have no class of Distinguish* 
words called articles, the persons speaking that language must cer- individual, 
tainly distinguish, in their conceptions, the general from the individual. 
In treating of the noun, I have already spoken of the different grada- 
tions of conception ; but it is necessary to advert again to the grounds 
of this distinction. The inattentive observer of external objects be- 
lieves that their forms are always impressed distinctly on the eye ; 
and that every superficies is bounded by a visible outline. A more 
reflecting and more accurate philosophy teaches us, that even in con- 
templating the objects which we most admire, imagination does more 
than mere sensible impression toward supplying us with a knowledge 
of their forms ; and that, in a sense not merely poetical, 

We half create the wondrous world we see. 

In like manner, the inattentive observer of the operations of Mind, as 
they relate to language, is apt to suppose that all his thoughts or 
conceptions are definite and distinct ; and, consequently, that the 
words which serve to name these thoughts are so too ; but this is far 
from being the case. Let us consider each of the three classes of 
conception before noticed, viz., the conception of a particular object, 
that of a general notion applicable to many particulars, and that of an 
idea or universal truth. The first and last of these are in themselves 
perfectly definite. No man can have two distinct ideas of " virtue," 
considered absolutely and in the primary signification of the word : 
and the same may be said of " squareness," " power," " duration," 
"space," "wisdom," &c, &c. In like manner we cannot have two 
distinct conceptions of a particular person or thing, and, therefore, 
when we know its proper name, as " George," " Louis," " London," 
" Paris," " Alexander," " Bucephalus," " Europe," " Guildhall," &c., 
&c, it is unnecessary to prefix thereto any other word for the sake of 
more clearly showing the individuality of our conception. Hence we 
see the reason why neither proper names nor universal terms do of 
necessity require to be used with an article, either positive or relative. 
The idiom of a particular language may, indeed, sanction such a 
construction ; but this depends on separate considerations, to which I 
shall hereafter advert. Generally speaking, such idioms as the fol- 
lowing cannot be necessary to intelligibility in anv language : " the 
2. m 



General 
terms. 



162 OF ARTICLES. [CHAP. X. 

George reigns in the England," or "a Guildhall is situated in a 
London :" or, " the virtue produces a happiness ;" or " an Alexander 
aimed at the glory ;" and the reason is obvious, because it is not 
necessary to define or distinguish, in such sentences, one George from 
another George, one England from another England, one virtue from 
another virtue, &c. 

300. But the remaining class of conceptions, though general in 
their nature, serve to communicate the greater part of our knowledge 
respecting particular objects. We have often no other conception of 
the individual than that he belongs to such or such a species. We 
know the man only by his profession, the soldier only by his regiment, 
the officer only by his rank. Hence the great use of general terms in 
all languages ; and hence, too, the necessity for individualizing them, 
either tacitly in the mind, or expressly in language. When this pro- 
cess of individualization is effected by a separate word, we call that 
word an article ; and thus we say, that it is necessary, in English, 
to add the article "a" or "the" to the general term "man," in 
order to designate an individual of the human species. 
Universale 301. It is to be observed, that, in a secondary sense, all words of 
the other two classes may be considered and treated as general terms ; 
and, consequently, may require the use of the article to individualize 
them. For, first, the idea expressed by an universal term, such as 
" virtue," " truth," and the like, may be considered as existing sepa- 
rately in each subordinate conception of quality, action, &c, in which 
it is involved. If we speak of virtue simply, as opposed to vice, or 
in any other manner which regards the pure idea of virtue, without 
any modification, it is an universal term which needs not the aid of 
an article ; but if we speak of those subordinate ideas, such as 
justice, prudence, temperance, fortitude, in each of which the higher 
idea of virtue is involved, as the conception of man is in the concep- 
tion of Peter or John, we may consider the word virtue, in a secondary 
sense, as applicable to each of them separately, and therefore may 
call each " a virtue," or " the virtue." And not only does this apply 
to subordinate conceptions of the same kind and nature as their 
superior, but sometimes to others, in which that superior is equally 
involved. The conception of injustice is of the same kind and nature 
as the conception of vice. They are both ideas, both universal, both 
regard qualities of the mind ; but the conception of an unjust action 
partakes, though in a remoter degree, of both these ideas, and there- 
fore it is sometimes called " an injustice," or " a vice." Thus Hamlet, 
on Horatio's saying that he is not acquainted with Osric, replies, 
" Thy state is the more gracious, for 'tis a vice to know him." And 
so Bassanio, urging the Duke to wrest the law to his authority, ex- 
claims— • 

To do a great right, do a little wrong. 
It is only in this secondary sense that such words as virtue and vice, 
right and wrong, can be employed in the plural number ; and hence 



CHAP. X.J OF ARTICLES. 163 

arises in all languages a vast class of general terms, which unhappily 
are but too often perverted in use. The idea of crime does not always 
agree with our conceptions of crimes : and we often find an opposition 
between the notions of right and rights, honour and honours. 

302. Secondly, a proper name, which, in its primary sense, desig- Proper 
nates only an individual man, may be made to stand for a conception names 
common to many other individuals ; because we can suppose, how- 
ever contrary it may be to fact, that there is a class of men, each pos- 
sessing those qualities and powers which make up all that we know 

of a certain individual. Thus the word Shakspeare primarily means 
that wonderful poet who wrote Hamlet and the Midsummer Night's 
Dream, who could portray the characters of Othello and Falstaff, 
Richard II. and Richard III, and who as much excelled every 
writer of his day in the sweetness and facility of his language, as he 
did in richness of imagination and in profound knowledge of the 
human heart. It is in vain to expect another being so endowed to 
arise before the return of the fancied Platonic year ; and yet we may 
suppose a whole club of such dramatists, like the " cluster of wits " in 
Queen Anne's time ; we may imagine one from every country under 
heaven; and therefore we may talk of "a French Shakspeare," or "a 
German Shakspeare," "the Shakspeare of Tennessee," or "the Shak 
speare of Timbuctoo." 

303. The words which answer the purpose of individualizing Articles 
general terms, in the two modes above described, were originally der!"e! 
pronominal adjectives. In some instances they have undergone a 
change of form, by becoming articles ; in others, they remain un- 
changed. The French le and un, are the Latin ille and unus ; the 
English the and a are the Anglo-Saxon thcet and ane. Hence, it is 

not surprising, that many grammarians comprehend, under a common 
designation, the demonstrative pronoun and the article. Such was 
the doctrine of the Stoics, some of whom gave to both these kinds of 
words the common name of article, calling our pronoun the definite 
article ; and our article, the indefinite article ; whilst others consi- 
dered both as pronouns, and only denominated our articles, articular 
pronouns. " AHiculis autem pronomina connumer antes" says Priscian, 
"finitos, et articulos appellabant ; ipsos autem articulos, infinitos articulos 
dicebant ; vel ut alii dicunt, articulos connumerabant pronominibus, et 
articularia eos pronomina vocabant." 

304. There are, however, some marked differences between the Difference 
pronominal adjective and the article, which may justify us in consi- noim. a Pr °" 
dering the latter as a separate part of speech. In our own language, 

the same words which act as pronominal adjectives may also be used 
substantively ; and, in particular, the words that and one, are some- 
times to be considered as substantive pronouns, as when we say, 
" that which I love," " one whom I respect ;" but we cannot, in like 
manner, say, "the which I love," "a whom I respect." This dis- 
tinction, however, depends on the idiom of the English language, 

m2 



164 OF ARTICLES. [CHAP. X. 

and, therefore, will not afford a discriminating characteristic between 
the separate parts of speech in Universal Grammar. But the case is 
different, when we consider the manner in which the pronominal 
adjective and the article respective!)- affect the meaning of a general 
term. They both individualize it : but the article performs this func- 
tion simply ; the pronominal adjective does more ; it marks some 
special opposition between different individuals. When we say, 
"the man is good," there is no opposition implied in the word "the," 
although there may be in each of the other words. We may say, for 
instance, 

1. " The man is good ; but the ooy_ is bad." 

2. " The man is good ; but he was bad." 

3. " The man is good; but he is not wise" 

On the contrary, when we say " that man is good," we imply no op- 
position to the other words in the sentence, but only to the word 
" that." We intimate not only that there is a particular individual 
who is good, but also that there is some other, who is not good. 
This distinction is strongly marked in Latin by the pronominal adjec- 
tives hie and Me; as when Ovid says, 

dissimiles Hie vir, et Ille puer. 

Where the English article the is used, the Latins, who have no such 
article, do not supply its place by the pronominal adjective, but use 
the noun alone, as 

Blessed is the man that walketh not in the counsel of the ungodly, 

Beatus vir, qui non dbiit in consilio impiorum ; and not Beatus ille vir. 
It is manifest, that the act of the Mind is very different in the two 
cases here spoken of. Simply to individualize, is a more transient 
operation than to individualize and at the same time to contrast. 
Hence, the word the is less susceptible of accentuation than the word 
that. It resembles, in this respect, those Greek pronouns which are 
called enclitic. When the oblique cases of the personal pronouns, in 
that language, were used by way of contradistinction, they were 
strongly accented, and were called by Grammarians opdorovovfihai, 
uprightly accented ; but when they were merely subjoined to verbs, 
without any emphasis being placed on them, they were called 
'Ey/cXiriKat, that is, leaning, or inclining. Thus the Greeks had, in 
the first person, 'Ejuov, 'E/zoi, 'E^tt, for contradistinction, and Mov, 
Mot, Me, for enclitics ; whence Apollonius proposes, instead of the 
common reading, in the beginning of the Iliad — 

Yloubu. c\ fio) Xinrcan — 

to read 

Hx72x %' ip.01 Xutrairt. 

For it is plain, argues he, that a distinction is intended by the Poet 
between the words 'Yfxiv and 'Ejuot ; and therefore the enclitic fiol is 
improper. The principle in the human mind, which converts the 



CHAP. X.] OF ARTICLES. 165 

contradistinctive pronoun into an enclitic, is no other than the eager 
desire of hastening toward the object of its wishes — 

ad eventum festinat ,• 



and the same principle it is, which converts the demonstrative pro- 
noun into an article. Instead of "this horse," or "that horse," we 
say "the horse :" shortening the article in pronunciation, because we 
dwell but little upon it in thought. In the Anglo-Saxon language, 
the word that appears to have been shortened into the ; and we have 
retained the longer word for our pronoun, whilst we use the shorter 
for our article. 

305. Since it has appeared that some languages do not employ Not super- 
separate words to perform the office of the article, it may be thought Q0US ' 
that those words when so employed in any language are superfluous; 
but this would be a great error. Articles add much to the clearness, 
the strength, and the beauty of a language : and to be perfectly fur- 
nished with them it is necessary to possess both positive and relative 
articles. The Latin language had neither : the Greek had only the 
latter of the two ; but most of the modern European languages have 
both. It follows, that in this respect the Latin was less perfect than 
the Greek, and the Greek than either the French or the English ; and 
Scaliger was, therefore, wrong in denying the use of this part of 
speech altogether: Articulus, says he, nobis nullus, et Greeds super- 
fluus ; and his sarcasm on the French nation was somewhat misap- 
plied, when he called the article otiosum loquacissimce gentis instru- 
mentum. 

306. Yet it must be allowed, that in many European languages, Sometimes 
and in none more frequently than in the French, instances occur in ** use 
which the article is employed superfluously. This circumstance is, 

for the most part, attributable to an elliptical mode of speech, which 
is sufficiently capricious. In English, we generally prefix the relative 
article to the names of our rivers, but seldom to those of our moan- 
tains. We say, " the Thames," " the Tweed;" i.e. the river 
Thames, the river Tweed ; but we never say a Thames, a Tweed : 
nor do we say the Snowdon, the Skiddaw ; or, a Snowdon, a Skid- 
daw. In French, the superfluous use of the relative article is very 
frequent ; but it is to be explained on the same principle of ellipsis. 
" Ilseroit a souhaiter" says Condillac, "qu'on supprimdt V article, toutes 
lesfois que les noms sont suffisamment determines par la nature de la chose, 
ou par les circonstances ; le discours en seroit plus vif. Mais la grande 
habitude, que nous nous en sommesfaite, ne le permit pas: et ce rtest que 
dans des proverbes plus anciens que cette habitude, que nous nous faissons 
un hi de le supprimer. On dit : Pauvrete" n'est pas vice, au lieu de dire, 
La pauvrete n'est pas un vice" "It is to be wished that the article 
were suppressed whenever the noun is sufficiently determined by the 
nature of the thing, or by the circumstances ; the style would thereby 
be rendered the more lively. But the great habit that we have ac- 



166 OF ARTICLES. LCHAP. X. 

quired of using it, does not permit this change ; and it is only in old 
proverbs, more ancient than this habit, that we make a rule of sup- 
pressing it. We say, Pauvrete riest pas vice, instead of saying, La 
pauvrete n'est pas un vice." It is here to be observed, that the pro- 
verbial expression, which Condillac seems to recommend, is as much 
defective as the common expression w T hich he blames is redundant. 
The article la before pauvrete is superfluous, and originates in an 
ellipsis of some word answering to " state " or " condition ; " so that 
"the poverty," means "the condition of poverty:" but, on the other 
hand, the word " vice" properly demands the article un ; for it is not 
meant to deny that poverty is the idea of vice, which nobody would 
have asserted ; but to deny that poverty is one of those states which 
necessarily include the idea of vice. The most accurate and philoso- 
phical mode of expressing this sentence would therefore be, if the 
idiom of the language permitted it, 

Pauvrete n'est pas un vice ; 

answering exactly to the English idiom in such phrases. 

As the French often employ the article redundantly with an uni- 
versal term, and with the names of places, so the Italians employ it 
with the names of persons : "II Tasso," "La Catalani," meaning "the 
famous poet Tasso," " the celebrated singer Catalani." It is obvious 
that these expressions are to be accounted for on the same principle 
of ellipsis already explained. The article in all such cases does not in 
reality serve to modify the proper name expressed, but the general 
term understood. 

Special effect. 307. There is a particular use of the relative article, with a gene- 
ral term, to which I have before alluded, but which, as it tends to 
individualize a general term in a peculiar manner, I must here more 
particularly notice. Certain individuals, having obtained celebrity for 
their peculiar excellences, have been denominated from this circum- 
stance, as 6 7rotrjryg, the poet, means Homer ; 6 pfirwp, the orator, 
Demosthenes; 6 SeoXoyog, the theologian, St. Gregory Nazianzen; 
6 ysioypcKJiog, the geographer, Strabo ; 6 AeurpoarotyigTrjg, Athenaeus, 
author of the work entitled " The Feast of the Sophists; " but this 
is no more than we daily practise, when we speak of " the king," 
" the queen," "the prince regent," meaning the king of England, the 
queen of England, and the prince regent of England ; just as we hear 
in private families and narrow circles of society, of " the captain," 
" the doctor," " the parson," "the squire," &c, the particular applica- 
tion of which general terms is settled, as it were, by a common un- 
derstanding among the parties; since each of the individuals thus 
honourably distinguished has his little sphere of celebrity. " Plurima 
ejusdem farina " (says Viger) "ubique obvia." 

P °t si -iL ve ^8. * ^ ave before observed that the Numerals may be employed 

as nouns substantive, as pronouns substantive, or as pronouns ad- 
jective; but the numeral one, when used as a pronoun adjective, 



CHAP. X.J OF ARTICLES. 167 

approaches in signification so nearly to a positive article, that in lan- 
guages which have no such article, it supplies the vacant place ; and 
in other languages the positive article is the numeral itself, only 
varied, and most commonly abbreviated, in pronunciation. In French, 
the numeral un, " one," is spelt in the same way as the article un, 
" a," or " an," but in the latter it is pronounced more slightly. In 
English the word has been not only abbreviated in point of quantity, 
but changed in articulation, from "one" to "a." The mental opera- 
tion, however, is nearly the same in both instances. The conception 
of one is expressed by the article a, not in opposition to that of two, 
three, or any other conception of number, but as distinguished from 
all the other individuals of the same class. In the Scottish dialect, 
ane was retained as an article to a late period ; thus Nicol BuRisrE, in 
his "Disputation," A. D. 1581, says, " Tertullian provis, that Christ 
had ane treu body, and treu blude." And on the other hand, in the 
old English, the numeral pronoun one was sometimes abbreviated to 
o, as we read in Chaucer — 

Sithe thus of two contraries is o lore ; 
and so in the more ancient MS. Poem of the Man in the Moon — 

He hath his o foot his other to foren ; 

but it was still accented as a separate word ; whereas the article a 
(as was before observed of the other article the) is passed over hastily 
in pronunciation, as a mere prefix to the general term, which it serves 
to individualize. Again, the numeral one (like the relative that) is 
capable of being used alone, which the article a or an is not. We 
may say, "one seeks fame, another riches, and a third, the wisest of 
the three, content ; " but if we use the article, we must add its sub- 
stantive, as "a man should seek content, rather than fame, or riches." 

309. It is unnecessary to enter into those distinctions of the article, other dis- 
which do not coincide with the definition above given of this part of 
speech. Such is the distinction often found in the Greek gramma- 
rians between the prepositive and subjunctive articles. The preposi- 
tive, viz. 6, ?;, ro, is what I have called the relative article : the sub- 
junctive, viz. oc, ?/, 6, is what I have called the subjunctive pronoun. 
The latter, it is manifest, has no effect whatever in individualizing a 
general term ; because it is only employed in a dependent sentence, 
with reference to a term which must have been individualized in the 
prior or leading sentence. The learned Hickes, in that valuable work 
the Thesaurus linguarum Septentrionalium,, suggests that the Anglo- 
Saxon sum, which answers nearly to the Latin quidam, should be 
considered as an indefinite article. It appears to me rather to belong 
to the class of pronouns ; yet in this and some other instances, the 
two classes of words approach very nearly together, 
And thin partitions do their bounds divide. 



tmctions. 



( 168 ) 



CHAPTER XI. 

OF PREPOSITIONS. 

Connectives. 310. From the consideration of the Article, which Harris ranks 
among the Definitives, I proceed to the Prepositions and Conjunctions, 
which together form his class of Connectives. His reasons for adopt- 
ing such a class are these. As in nature a substantive coalesces at 
once with its attribute, an action with its agent, a passion with its 
patient, and even a primary attribute with a secondary, so in gram- 
mar, the substantive may coalesce at once with its adjective, as "a 
wise man," a "fierce lion;" the verb transitive may coalesce at once 
with its nominative and accusative, as " Alexander vanquished 
Darius ; " and the adverb with the verb or adjective which it modi- 
fies, as "he fought bravely" "he was completely victorious." But 
when it is necessary to make any other union of conceptions, it can 
only be done either by a combination of words ; by a change in the 
word which requires to be modified; or by a separate word, which, 
as it serves to connect the others, may be called a connective. Omit- 
ting for the present the two first methods, let us observe how connec- 
tives may be used. If in addition to the assertion that Alexander 
vanquished Darius, I wish to assert that he also vanquished Porus, I 
can effect this purpose by the connective " and," as " Alexander van- 
quished Darius and Porus." If I wish to state the motive of Alex- 
ander's fighting, I may say " he fought for fame." The word " and" 
is commonly called a conjunction ; the word "for," a preposition: 
and it is true that they are both employed to connect words which 
would otherwise remain unconnected ; but there is this important dif- 
ference between them — the conjunction connects, and does nothing 
more ; the preposition introduces a further conception, namely that of 
the particular relation in which the connected conceptions stand to 
each other. In the example given, I do not merely connect, in the 
mind of the hearer, the conceptions of Alexander, or of fighting, with 
the conception of fame ; for they would be equally connected if fame 
had been the unexpected and unthought-of consequence of his fighting ; 
but I show that fame stood towards the action in the particular rela- 
tion of a motive. I therefore consider that the word which thus shows 
a distinct relation between two conceptions may be justly deemed a 
separate part of speech. 

Preposition. 31 1. This part of speech has been called a Preposition, because in 
the Greek and Latin languages the words so employed were com 
monly (though with some exceptions) proeposita, placed immediately 



CHAP. XI.] OF PREPOSITIONS. 169 

before the substantives to which they referred. In those languages, 
too, the words in question were subject to few variations in point of 
form. These circumstances, though merely accidental, were unfor- 
tunately selected by some grammarians as essential properties of the 
part of speech under consideration ; and hence originated the well- 
known definition, Proepositio est pars orationis invariabilis, quce prcepo- 
nitur aliis dictionibus. The Greek grammarians, whom Harris followed, 
ranked both the preposition and conjunction under the common head 
of 1iVvhea/j.og, or the connective; and the Stoics, adding this cir- 
cumstance to the ordinary position of the preposition in a sentence, 
called this part of speech SvvfcafioQ UpoderLKog, the "prepositive 
connective." Another accidental peculiarity of most of the words 
which were used as prepositions in Greek and Latin, as well as in 
some modern languages, was that their original and peculiar meaning 
had, in process of time, become obscure ; and from hence some persons 
were led to think that these words had no signification of their own. 
The learned Harris gives the following definition, " Apreposition is a 
part of speech devoid itself of signification, but so formed as to unite two 
words that are significant, and that refuse to coalesce or unite of them- 
selves." Campanella also says of the preposition, Per se non significat ; 
and Hoogeveen says, " Per seposita et solitaria nihil significat. " Under 
the same impression, the Port Eoyal grammarians say, " On a eu 
recours, dans toutes les langues, a une autre invention, qui a ete dHnventer 
depetits mots pour etre mis avant lesnoms, ce qui les a fait appeller pre- 
positions." And M. de Brosses says, " Je rfai pas trouve quil fut 
possible oVassigner la cause de leur origine ; tellement que fen crois la 
formation purement arbitraire." 

312. Now in all this there was much inaccuracy of reasoning, as Errors 
applied to Universal Grammar. The position of this sort of words in 
a sentence, had the fact been so in all known languages, must have 
been owing to accidental causes ; but the fact is otherwise. Even 
in Latin the preposition tenus was always placed after the noun which 
it governed ; so Piautus uses erga after a pronoun, as in mederga, for 
erg a me ; and cum is employed in like manner in the common ex- 
pressions mecum, tecum, nobiscum, vobiscum. These and other examples 
of a like kind induced some authors to make a class of postpositive 
prepositions. " Dantur etiam," says Caramuel, " Postpositiones, 
quse proepositiones postpositivoe solent dici ; " but I shall elsewhere 
show that there are languages in which all the prepositions, so to 
speak, are postpositive. Some writers, who for this and similar 
reasons reject the word preposition, have adopted in its stead that of 
adnomen, adnoun ; but as their example has been seldom followed, 
and as it is my object to change as little as possible received modes 
of expression, I shall adhere to the ordinary grammatical term, pre- 
position, only reminding the reader that it is not to be taken as 
expressing an essential property of the part of speech in question. 
That prepositions are indeclinable may be the case in most languages, 



rejected. 



Definition. 



Examples. 



Sentence 
complex. 



170 OF PREPOSITIONS. [CHAP. XI. 

but is certainly no necessary part of their definition. That they sig- 
nify nothing of themselves, if it were true in any degree, would be 
only part of their history, and would throw no light whatever on the 
grammatical principles which regulate their use. It is not surprising 
that Mr. Tooke should ridicule these postpositive prepositions, and 
nonsignificant words which communicate signification to other words ; 
but unfortunately he only substitutes worse errors of his own, when 
he asserts that prepositions are always names of real objects, and do 
not show different operations of the mind. 

313. The real character and office of the preposition have been 
stated with a nearer approach to accuracy by Bishop Wilkins and 
Vossius ; but neither of them seems to have given a full and satis- 
factory definition of this part of speech. Wilkins says, " Prepositions 
are such particles whose proper office it is to join integral with integral 
on the same side of the copula, signifying some respect of cause, place, 
time, or other circumstance, either positively or privatively." Vossius 
says, Prcepositio est vox per quam adjungitur verbo nomen, locum, 
tempus, aut caussam significans, seu positive seu privative." It 
suited Wilkins's scheme of universal grammar to call the preposition 
a particle ; but however appropriate this may be to a theoretical view 
of language, such as it never did, and probably never will exist, it is 
inconsistent with those philosophical principles on which the actual 
use of speech among men depends ; neither is it material on which side 
of the copula a preposition may be placed by the idiom of any par- 
ticular language. On the other hand, as Wilkins includes under the 
term integral both the noun and the verb, he is in this respect more 
accurate than Vossius, for the preposition does not merely join a noun 
to a verb, but sometimes to another noun. I therefore, with that 
diffidence which becomes all persons who endeavour in any degree to 
clear the path of science, shall propose the following definition : — 
A preposition is a part of speech employed in a complex sentence, and 
serving to express the relation in which the conception named by a noun 
substantive stands to that named by another noun substantive, or asserted 
by a verb. 

314. Thus, if I say, " he hired a house with a garden," " Solomon 
was the son of David," the words with and of are prepositions, the 
former expressing the relation of contiguity between the substantives 
" house" and " garden," and the latter expressing the relation of filial 
descent between the substantives " son " and " David." Again, if 
I say, " he spoke concerning the law," " he marched from Capua to 
Kome," the words concerning, from, and to are prepositions, the first 
expressing the relation of subjectivity in which the noun " law" stands 
to the verb " spoke," and the two others expressing the different rela- 
tions of locality in which the nouns "Capua" and "Rome" stand to 
the verb " marched." 

315. In developing the above definition, I first observe that the 
sentence in which a preposition is employed must be a complex one : 



CHAP. XI.] OF PREPOSITIONS. 171 

and this is evident ; for, in addition to the assertion of a connection 
between a subject and its attribute (which together forms a simple 
sentence, as " John walks," or " John is walking"), the preposition 
expresses a conception of relation, which conception, if added to the 
attribute and assertion in the verb, forms another simple sentence. 
If I say, " John walks before Peter," I, in effect, make two assertions, 
first, that John is walking, and, secondly, that the walking is before 
Peter. In the language of lawyers, I present two issues ; for it may 
be admitted that John walks, and denied that the walking is he/ore 
Peter ; and this latter may chance to become an important question 
affecting rights not only of precedence and station in society, but also 
of property, and not only between individuals or families, but between 
nations. In the secondary question, the relation of locality is ex- 
pressed by the preposition before, which is necessary to connect the 
assertion "walks" with the name "Peter;" for if it were omitted, 
and I should say, " John walks Peter," the sentence would be unin- 
telligible. In like manner, if the conception of relation be added to 
one of two connected substantives, as " Solomon was the son of 
David," the sentence involves two assertions, viz., that Solomon stood 
in the relation of a son, and that that relation connected him with 
David; and the word expressing the connection is the preposition 
" of." 

316. It follows, from the nature of connectives, as stated by Verb neuter. 
Mr. Harris, that where a verb is neuter it may be connected imme- 
diately with a following substantive by means of a preposition. Thus 

the neuter verb " walks" is immediately connected with the following 
substantive "Peter" by means of the preposition "before;" but if 
the verb be transitive it cannot be immediately connected with a 
substantive by means of a preposition, but must first be followed by 
its proper accusative, that is to say, by the substantive expressing the 
recipient of the action, ex. gr. : — 

Now with strong pray'r, and now with stern reproach, 
He stirs their valour. 

Here the sense would have been wholly lost if the accusative " valour" 
had been omitted : and the same rule applies where the relation is 
marked by an inflection of the substantive, as in the original of the 
passage just quoted — 

Nunc prece, nunc verbis virtutem accendit amaris, * 

where the ablatives prece and verbis amaris show the relation of 
instrumentality, in which the conceptions expressed by them stand to 
the verb accendit ; but those ablatives would have been unmeaning 
had not the verb been followed by its proper accusative, virtutem. 

317. In languages which admit of compounding a verb with a pre- compound 
position, there may be differences of idiom. The verb, if neuter, verb ' 

* Virg. Mn. 10, 368. 



Relation. 



Its founda- 
tion. 



172 OF PREPOSITIONS. [CHAP. XI. 

usually assumes a transitive character, as when Satan, who is described 
as forcing his way into Paradise, 

at one slight bound, high overleaped all hound. * 

If the verb be transitive, then (according to the idiom of the language) 
the related substantive may be either inflected in accordance with the 
preposition in the verb or else accompanied with a separate pre- 
position. When inflected, it adopts a case which is said by gram- 
marians to be governed by the preposition in composition, as — 

Nam tibi Thymbre caput Evandrius ahstulit ensis ; f 
where the preposition abs (though governing an ablative when alone) 
may be said, as forming part of the verb abstulit, to govern the dative 
tibi ; and where both the preposition and the dative inflection express 
the relation of objectivity, in which the person (Thymbrus) stood to 
the act signified by the verb abstulit and its accusative caput, as if the 
phrase had been " abstulit caput abs te." 

318. The next point to be considered in the definition of a pre- 
position above given is the nature of the relations which it serves to 
express. Now, Relation, which is the fourth of the logical predica- 
ments, supposes three things, the subject, or thing related, the object, 
or correlative, and the relation itself, or circumstance existing in the 
subject by means of which it is related to the object, and which 
logicians call the foundation. When we say, " John is before Peter," 
" John" is the subject, "Peter" is the correlative, and "before" is 
the foundation, or, as I have been accustomed to speak, the concep- 
tion of a particular relation, expressed prepositionally. 

319. It is manifest, that the circumstance, whatever it be, that 
forms the foundation of a logical relation, or (which is the same 
thing) that constitutes (when expressed in language together with its 
subject and object) a preposition, may either be common to the two 
terms (as they are called) of the relation, or it may belong to one of 
them exclusively. If I say, " John is with Peter," the relation ex- 
pressed by the preposition with belongs equally to Peter and to John ; 
but if I say John is before Peter, the relation expressed by the pre- 
position before belongs exclusively to John. In the first case it is 
perfectly indifferent whether I say " John is with Peter," or " Peter 
is with John ; " it is perfectly indifferent which I make the subject 
and which the object of the relation : but in the other case, if I were 
to say " Peter is before John," I should not only vary the assertion, 
but I should directly contradict it. Still the foundation of the rela- 
tion would be the same ; for, as a great philologist has observed, 
" at the bottom of every preposition, in its original sense, there exists 
a relation between two opposite conceptions."! Thus before implies 
behind, and over implies under. We may illustrate this with the 
trivial comparison of two children playing at see-saw. If John and 

* Milton, P. L. 4, 181. f Virg. Mn. 10, 394. 

I Bopp, Comp. Gram. 1. 377. 



CHAP. XI.] OF PREPOSITIONS. 173 

Peter be equally balanced at the opposite ends of a plank, John is 
ley el with Peter, and Peter is level with John, and the plank is the 
measure or standard of the level ; but if John be lighter than Peter, 
John at once rises above Peter, and Peter sinks below John, and the 
same plank measures the elevation of one and the depression of the 
other. What the supposed plank is to the boys, the preposition is 
to the substantives related; and hence we may easily explain not 
only certain diversities in the idioms of different languages, but some 
apparent contradictions in the same idiom. Thus Mr. Tooke makes 
the following just observation on the Dutch preposition van : — " The 
Dutch," says he, " are supposed to use van in two meanings, because, 
it supplies indifferently the places both of our of and from. Notwith- 
standing which, van has always one and the same single meaning. 
And its use, both for of and from, is to be explained by its different 
apposition. When it supplies the place of from, van is put in apposi- 
tion to the same term to which from is put in apposition. But when 
it supplies the place of of, it is not put in apposition to the same 
term to which of is put in apposition, but to its correlative. The 
same observation may be made on the prepositions at and to, which 
in correct modern English express different relations of place, though 
they both answer to the Latin ad, the French a, and the German zu, 
e. gr. : " Verres ad Messanam venit," Verres came to Messina; 
" Mihi quoque est ad portum negotium," I also have business at the 
port : " II reste a la maison ;" " II est alle a la campagne ; " — " He 
remains at home;" "He is gone to the country:" " Komm zu 
mir," Come to me;" " zu Windsor," at Windsor. In Anglo-Saxon, 
oet, at, was also used where we employ from ; as " animath that pund 
cet him,"* take the talent from him, In Old English, we find it 
employed where we should use to — 

The sext maister rase vp onane. 
Sir, he said, if thi will were, 
Tak thi son to me, at lere.f 

i. e., Put thy son to me to learn, " ad discendum." And still in the 
Devonshire dialect, we hear " he lives to Exmouth" for " at Ex- 
mouth." 

320. Nor is it only the different use of prepositions in the same Apparent 
or different languages which is thus to be explained, but even apparent tfon?^' " 
contradictions. The prepositions for and after are of directly contrary 
origin and signification, being (as will hereafter be fully shown) the 
same as the words fore and aft. Nevertheless we say, " to seek for 
that winch is lost," and " to seek after that which is lost." The 
thing sought is considered as before the mind of the seeker, and con- 
sequently the seeker is considered as after, or behind the thing 
sought ; when, therefore, we use the word before, we specify the 
relation of which the thing sought is the subject ; but when we use 

* Matt. c. 25, v. 28. f Romance of the Seuyn Sages. 



mind. 



174 OF PREPOSITIONS. [CHAP. XI. 

the word after, we specify a relation of which the subject is the 
seeker : or, to use Mr. Tooke's phraseology, we put before in apposi- 
tion with the thing sought, and after in apposition with the seeker. 
From this statement it appears that the subject of the relation specified 
may or may not be the logical subject of the preposition enunciated in 
the sentence. In the sentences, " John seeks for Peter," and " John 
seeks after Peter," John is the logical subject ; but the former sen- 
tence involves the expression of a relation of which Peter is the 
subject, the latter of one the subject of which is John. The relation 
of foreness exists in Peter ; the relation of afterness exists in John. 

An act of the 321. M. Condillac says, as we haye seen, that the relation 
between two sensations is not a direct sensation; and thence he 
infers that a relation cannot be expressed in our mind, unless by an 
artificial sign.* What he means by " expressed in our mind" I do 
not pretend to understand ; but he is certainly right in saying, that a 
relation is not a direct sensation, for it is no sensation at all. " Every 
kind of relation," as Lord Monboddo justly observes, " is a pure idea 
of intellect, which can never be apprehended by sense :" and when 
Mr. Houne Tooke denies this proposition, he shows strange ignorance 
of the human mind. Sense, taking that term in its widest accepta- 
tion, can only apprehend an external object ; it can apprehend the 
thing which is before another, or the thing before which another is : 
but the relation of place, time, order, causation, or the like, which we 
express by the word before, is discerned not by a simple operation of 
sense, but by means of an exercise of our comparing and judging 
faculties. It is most extraordinary that Tooke, who asserts uni- 
versally that a prepositions are the names of real objects" should say 
of the preposition for, " I believe it to be no other than the Gothic 
substantive fairina, cause." What real object is Cause ? How is 
causation to be apprehended by sense ? That we have a conception 
of cause is certain ; but it is equally certain that we come at it by 
means of our mind, and that it is in truth " a pure idea of intellect/ 
which sense alone never did and never can give. 

Classification, 322. To suppose that the prepositions necessary to any language 
could be enumerated a priori would certainly be absurd. Tooke has 
ridiculed the grammarians who have attempted to enumerate them, as 
matter of fact and history. It has been said, that the Greeks had 
eighteen prepositions, the Latins, forty-nine; and the French (ac- 
cording to different authors) thirty-two, forty-eight, and seventy-five. 
It is certainly possible to ascertain what words have been used as pre- 
positions in a dead language ; but in a living language it is quite 
impracticable to determine how many should be so used; for every 
day may enhance their number, by new combinations of thought and 
expression. A preposition is not like a piece of money stamped to 
pass for a certain sum, and which cannot change its denomination or 
value. It is a word to which a transient function is assigned, and 
* Supra, s. 55. 



CHAP. XI. j OF PREPOSITIONS. 175 

which, as soon as it has discharged that office, becomes available 
again for its former purposes, as a noun, verb, or other part of speech. 
But although it be not possible to enumerate prepositions, yet they 
may be subjected to a general classification, according to the great 
distinctions of relation in human conceptions. M. Cour De Gebelin 
has attempted something of this kind, and Bishop Wilkins has also 
given an arrangement of thirty-six prepositions, " which," he says, 
" may, with much less equivocalness than is found in instituted lan- 
guages, suffice to express those various respects, which are to be 
signified by this kind of particle." It may be doubted whether 
either of these schemes be sufficiently comprehensive, or perfectly 
philosophical. Prepositions must be classed, if at all, by their signi- 
fication, according as the relation which they express is of a corporeal 
or mental nature. 

323. It has been already seen that the relation of attribute to sub- Corporeal, 
stance, that of secondary attribute to primary, and that of action to 

the agent doing and the object suffering the act, are sufficiently 
shown by the words expressing the related conceptions, without the 
need of any connecting link : and that all other relations require a 
separate word or words to connect the subject and object of relation. 
For the sake of distinction, I shall call relations of the former kind 
primary, and those of the latter secondary. The secondary, again, 
are either corporeal or mental. In considering them grammatically, I 
will notice first the nature of the relations in question, and then the 
different modes of expressing them. The corporeal demand our first 
attention ; for as in the opening of our faculties the earliest concep- 
tions which we form are those of bodily existence, so the earliest 
relations which we perceive are those of bodily substance. But 
bodily substances exist only in place and time; relations of place 
and time therefore are the earliest of which we become conscious : 
and of these (as far as we can speak with certainty on so obscure a 
subject) we may not unreasonably believe the relations of place to be 
first perceived by the infant mind ; inasmuch as they originate in 
mere present Sensation, whereas the very conception of Time neces- 
sarily involves also Memory of the past and Imagination of the future. 

324. By the word Place, I mean a portion of that space which to Place, 
our finite apprehension appears to be infinitely extended in the three 
several dimensions of Length, Breadth, and Depth ; and in which all 
bodies either move or are at rest. The place of a body may be con- 
templated by the mind with more or less extent of limits. Thus I 
may say, that a student is at his desk, or at his rooms, or at his 
college, or at the university ; that he has just risen from or is going to 

his desk ; or is coming from or going to his rooms, or his college, 
or the university. In short, we may illustrate the conceptions of 
place as to its limits, by the same diagrams which were applied in 
paragraph 281 to illustrate those of time; considering the place to 
which the relation applies either as the mere point B of the angle 



176 OF PREPOSITIONS. [CHAP. XI. 

A B C in the first diagram, or as the whole or any part of the seg- 
ment A B C in the second. Relations of place are either positive or 
comparative. The positive either imply rest, as at; or motion, as 
from and to ; and in forming these conceptions we contemplate a 
single body : for instance, the sun, which we may regard as issuing 
from the east, blazing at the meridian, or declining to the west. The 
comparative are formed when we contemplate the position or move- 
ment of one or more bodies with reference to that of one or more 
others. Hence prepositions of place have been ingeniously illus- 
trated by a sort of diagram in which a central human figure is alter- 
nately the subject and object of relation ; and lines drawn from it in 
different directions indicate the relations of place which it bears to 
various other bodies over and under it, before, behind, and beside it, 
&c. &c. It is manifest that the relations of place, both positive and 
comparative, may admit of numerous modifications; as I maybe near 
a place though not at it ; or going toward thought not to it ; so one 
object, though not directly over another, may be above it ; or though 
not directly under, may be below it. Again, one body may be moving 
along another, or around it, or about it, or standing or moving with 
it, or passing through it, or between two, or among several: it may 
be in or out of a definite space, beyond a certain point, on this or that 
side of it, or against it. Various languages have brought into com- 
mon use, as prepositions, words expressing still more specific rela- 
tions of place ; as the French chez in " chez moi " at my house, the 
English aboard in " aboard ship;" and it is manifestly impossible to 
lay down rules beforehand, either extending or limiting the number 
of words, which may be so employed. 

Time. 325. Though the relations of place seem, on a careful observation 

of the development of our faculties, to be of a more simple nature than 
those of Time, yet there is always either a striking analogy, or an exact 
coincidence between relations of these two classes. At any given mo- 
ment of time, a given body must necessarily be at some certain point of 
space : and if it has moved, or is to move, the motion must he from 
some instant of time to some other instant of time, as well as from some 
point of space to some other point of space. Indeed, space is our only 
measure of time. Ages, years, days, minutes, seconds are measured by 
the space, which the earth passes over in its equal and unremitting 
course. At the instant of my uttering a syllable the earth is at a 
certain point in its orbit ; before that instant the same point was be- 
fore the globe ; after the instant of utterance, the point first taken as 
a term of measurement will have fallen behind (that is, after) the 
globe : and thus three instants of time are found exactly to coincide 
with three points of space, and are therefore marked by the same pre- 
positions, " at," " before," and " after." By a less strict analogy, a 
man is said to be beyond his time, to be near the appointed time, 
&c. &c. 

Mental. 326. The secondary mental relations between our conceptions are 



CKAP. XI.] OF PREPOSITIONS. 177 

numerous. It may suffice to mention the relation of cause to effect, 
of means to end, genus to species, and whole to part : and to re- 
mark that the conceptions, to which these relations apply, may be 
corporeal, mental, or spiritual. The slightest knowledge of human 
nature will convince us that mankind do not become aware of any 
mental relations till long after the relations of place and time have 
been familiar to them. Yet between the corporeal and mental rela- 
tions, there will be found to exist the same sort of coincidence or 
analogy, as has been already observed between the relations of place 
and time. First, let us consider the relation of cause, as applied to a 
corporeal effect, in the ordinary instance of a billiard ball set in 
motion, on being struck by a mace. Here the motion begins from a 
certain point of space, and from a certain instant of time; what more 
natural than to say that the motion results, as an effect, from the 
stroke, as a cause ? Again, considering the motion as an end pro- 
duced by some instrument as the means, we perceive that when the 
motion began, the body close by the ball was the mace : it is natural 
then to infer that the motion was produced by the mace as an instru- 
ment. Let us next apply the relation of cause to a mental effect — for 
instance, learning. As this effect began to be produced from the 
time that the learner applied himself to study, the reasonable infer- 
ence is that the learning resulted from study, as a cause. Or let us 
consider the relation of cause as applied to a spiritual effect. " Every 
good gift " (says St. James) " and every perfect gift is from above, 
and cometh down from the Father of lights." * Hence we may say, 
that as corporeal motion proceeds from a corporeal cause, and as the 
mental acquisition of learning proceeds from a mental cause, so all 
spiritual excellence proceeds from a spiritual cause, namely, God: 
and thus have I traced the analogies between the secondary relations, 
corporeal and mental, in their several gradations. 

327. There are three modes of expressing these secondary rela- Expression 
tions ; first by a combination of words, secondly by a separate word, y P *' 
and thirdly by a variation in the form of a word. The separate 
words used for this purpose are those called prepositions ; but to un- 
derstand them fully we must compare their use with the two other 
modes. I shall begin with an example of the first mode : — 

Mark what radiant state she spreads 
In circle round her shining thione, 
Sitting like a goddess bright 
In the center of her light, f 

Here the corporeal relation of place is set forth by two combinations 
cf words, viz., " in circle round," and " in the centre of." Again, in the 
letter which Hotspur reads—" I could be well contented to be there 
in respect of the love I bear your house," J the mental relation of 
cause is set forth by a combination of the words " in respect of." 

* St. James, i. 17. f Milton, Arcades. % Shaksp., Hen. IV. Part i. 

2, K 



178 OF PREPOSITIONS. [CHAP. XI. 

The love which the writer alleges himself to bear to the house 
of Percy is the cause of the contentment which he says he might 
feel in repairing to the proposed meeting of the insurgents. Now, 
such a combination of words constitutes a phrase, or clause, in 
a complex sentence, introduced solely to express some secondary 
relation of a substantive to a verb, or to another substantive. 
As these phrases serve the purpose of prepositions, they may be 
termed prepositional phrases; and their place may for the most "part 
be supplied by prepositions in the same, or a different language. 
Thus, for the phrases " in circle round " and " in the center 
of," we may substitute (though less poetically) the prepositions 
<l around" and " amidst:" and for the phrase " in respect of," we 
may substitute in English the preposition " for," and in Latin the 
preposition propter. 
"and, 328. Prepositional phrases may be further distinguished as sub- 

adjectival. s tantival or adjectival, according as the word expressing the relation 
is in the form of a substantive or adjective. It is true that these 
combinations are merely idiomatical, and will be noticed more parti- 
cularly hereafter ; yet it may be proper here to illustrate my meaning 
by a few short examples. 

i. Under the head of substantival phrases, we may place the above- 
mentioned combinations, in which the relations are expressed by the 
substantives " circles," " centre," and " respect." So the Greek 
phrase npog f$iav e/xou, answers to the English phrase " in spite of 
me," and to the Italian phrase a mio mal grado ; the words fiia, 
spite, and grado, being all substantives. 

ii. Those prepositional phrases may be called adjectival, in which 
the relations are expressed by words elsewhere used as adjectives, 
such as " contrary to," " in contrar," " en contre " " counter to," &c. 
Milton, in his Essay on the Reason of Church Government" says, " If 
the course of judicature to a political censorship seem either tedious 
or too contentious, much more may it to the discipline of the church, 
whose definitive decrees are to be speedy, but the execution of rigour 
slow, contrary to what in legal proceedings is most usual." We find 
the adjective contrar used prepositionally in the Scottish acts of par- 
liament, in the phrase " in contrar the command." In old French 
there was also the prepositional phrase en contre, which now exists 
only as a substantive, signifying an adventure : nor is the verb en- 
contre at present in use, though the substantive rencontre, and the 
verb rencontre both are so ; and though in English we retain encounter 
and rencounter, both as substantives and as verbs. It is probably 
from rencounter that we originally took the expression of running 
counter to ; as in Locke — 

He thinks it brave at his first setting out to signalize himself in 
running counter to all the rules of virtue. 

Where, as the words counter to, perform the function of a prepo- 



CHAP. XI.] OF PREPOSITIONS. 179 

sition, they may justly be described as a prepositional phrase, of the 
adjectival class. 

329. The next mode of expressing secondary relations is by a sepa- Expression by 
rate word. Some prepositional phrases occurring frequently in con- ? re P° sltlons - 
versation naturally lead to abbreviations and ellipses in their ex- 
pression, and thus ultimately leave but a single word which consti- 
tutes the part of speech called a Preposition. The words so retained 

are those expressing the particular relation contemplated. They may 
be divided into two classes, of w T hich the first continue to be used 
with little or no difference of meaning in the same languages as nouns 
substantive, nouns adjective, verbs, particles, or prepositions ; but, in 
the second class, the original nouns or verbs, from which they are de- 
rived, have become obsolete, or can only be traced by analogy and 
the skilful comparison of kindred dialects. 

330. Among words of the first class w T e have few substantives in Substantival, 
modern English that are employed alone and without some small 
inflection, as prepositions. Dryden, indeed, uses the substantive 

cross in this manner : — 

Betwixt the midst and these, the gods assign'd 

Two habitable seats to human kind ; 

And cross their limits cut a sloping way." * 

But with the prefix, a, we have across, aboard, and some others. In 
German, statt, which is our substantive stead, is used prepositionally 
statt meiner, " instead of me :" and in a manner not very dissimilar 
we use the Latin substantive vice, in the official notices of appoint- 
ments to office ; as " X. Y. to be captain by purchase vice T. B. pro- 
moted." In French the substantive gre is explained " bonne, tranche 
volonte, qu'on a de faire quelque chose ;" as " il y est alle de son 
gre, de son plein^re;" " ils ont contracte ensemble de gre a gre ;" 
" il le fera bon gre, mal gre. Savoir gre is "to be satisfied with " a 
person's conduct, to be obliged to him for it : lui savoir un gre infini, 
" to be infinitely obliged to him." Thus, in a letter written by order 
of the king of France, in 1814, to the author of certain political 
works, it is said, " Sa majeste vous sachant un gre infini de la ma- 
niere dont vous avez pris, dans des temps difficiles, la defense de ses 
justes droits," &c, and this same substantive, with the adjective mal 
prefixed to it, forms the preposition malgre, as in the old French 



song- 



Malgr€ la bataille, 
Qu'on donne demain, 

Ca, faisons ripaille, 
Charmante Catin ! 



331. We use many adjectives prepositionally, either without, or Adjectival. 

* Has inter mediamque, duse mortalibus asgris 
Munere concessae Divom, via seeta per ambas, 
Obliquus qua se signorum verteret ordo." 

Virg. Georg. i. 237. 
N 2 



180 OF PREPOSITIONS. [CHAP. XI. 

with the prefix a, ex. gr. round, as in " all friends round the Wrekin," 

a phrase well known to Shropshire men. So — 

merely to officiate light 

Round this opacous earth, this punctual spot.* 

But in modern usage around is the more prevalent form, as in the 
song — 

Ere around the huge oak which o'ershadows yon mill 
The fond ivy had dared to entwine, f 

The adjective near is used prepositionally both in its positive and 
comparative degree : — 

No grief did ever come so near thy heart. \ 

He is not one jot nearer the end. § " 

Verbal. 332. We have many verbs, which the generality of grammarians 

admit to be occasionally used as prepositions : e. g., " save" and 
" except." Dr. Johnson (by oversight, I presume) calls the word 
save an adverb. Mr. Tooke, in his chapter on Prepositions, more 
correctly mentions it thus : — 

" Save. The imperative of the verb. This prepositive manner 
of using the imperative of the verb to save afforded Chaucer's Somp- 
nour no bad equivoque against his adversary the Friar : — 
God save you all, Save this cursed Frere. 

Here the construction is " Save (set aside or except) this Friar ; 
and then I hope that God will save (deliver from evil) all the rest of 
you." 

So in the Squire's Tale, — 



This strange Knight that came thus sodenly 
All armed, sane his hedde. 

That is, the Knight was entirely armed, but when you say entirely, 
you must save (or except) his head. 

The words " save and except " are often used synonymously in 
many of our legal instruments : we shall not therefore be surprised 
to find except reckoned by Dr. Johnson among prepositions — 

" Except, preposit. [from the verb.] This word, long taken as 
a preposition or conjunction, is originally the participle passive of the 
verb, which, like most others, had for its participle two terminations, 
except or excepted. All except one, is all, one excepted. Except may 
be according to the Teutonic idiom, the imperative mood: all, ex- 
cept one ; that is, all but one, which you must except." 

" i. Exclusively of; without inclusion of. 

Richard except, those, whom we fight against, 
Had rather have us win than him they follow. 

Shakspeare, Rich. III. 



Participial. 333. Participles being merely adjectives, with the additional 

* Milton, P. L. viii. 22. t Opera of The Fanner. 

J Shakspeare. § Locke. 



ox- 



CHAP. XI.] OF PREPOSITIONS. 181 

pression of action superadded, we cannot be surprised to find them 
used, as the pure adjectives have been shown to be, in performing the 
function of a preposition. Such is the case with our participles 
saving, barring, during, &c. In old Scottish statutes " saving " is 
written saufande. Thus, in the act of 1455, we find " saufande the 
poynts quhilks ar neidful for the conservacion of the treaty." So we 
say in colloquial language " barring accidents." In the Scottish Act 
of 1456, the participle belangande occurs with the same prepositional 
construction. " As to the thirde artikill, belangande the sending to 
France." In the Act of 1524 we meet with the expression " en- 
during the time of his office ;" where, in modern English, we should 
use during. In legal phraseology, the ablative absolute durante vita, 
is rendered '■''for and during the term of his natural life ;" where, as 
the word during and the word for are used with exactly the same 
force in the sentence, it is plain, that if for be a preposition, during is 
one also. It happens that our lexicographers have only acknowledged 
those participles to be prepositions which are most frequently so em- 
ployed ; such as touching and concerning, which are thus noticed by 
Dr. Johnson : — 

" Touching, prep. [This word is originally a participle of touchy 
With respect, regard, or relation to." 

Touching things which belong to discipline, the church hath au- 
thority to make canons and decrees, even as we read in the apostles' 
times it did. Hooker, book iii. 

" Concerning, prep, [from concern : this word, originally a par- 
ticiple, has before a noun the force of a preposition.] Relating to, with 
relation to." 

There is not anything more subject to errour, than the true judg- 
ment concerning the power and forces of an estate. Bacon. 

Many other participles, however, might be pointed out in various 
languages, which are plainly used as prepositions, and some of them 
so recognised by grammarians. Thus Cour De Gebelin ranks 
among prepositions the present participles pendant, durant, touchant, 
moyennant, nonobstant, suivant, and the past participles, attendu, vu, 
and hormis. So we use pending, during, hanging, living, failing, con- 
sidering, omitting, regarding, respecting, and anciently moiening. 
At whose instigacion and stirring, I have me applied, moiening 
the helpe of God, to reduce and translate it. B. Copland. 

The participle hanging is used, in one of our earliest English 
statutes, as we now use pending, and the French pendant ; and cor- 
responding to the ablative absolute pendente lite. " The said accompt 
to be ij or iij yere hanging," Stat. 1. Rich. III. c. 14. 

334. Hitherto I have spoken of those single words used as pre- Less obvious 
positions, and also as other parts of speech, in which the identity of 
meaning is more or less obvious. There is no absolute line to be 
drawn in matters of this kind between that which is discoverable at 
first sight, or on a short reflection, and that which it requires some 



182 OF PREPOSITIONS. [CHAP. XI. 

study to make out ; because the different capacities, and the different 
experience, of different men, must influence the degrees in this scale. 
But we may proceed by almost imperceptible degrees from that 
which almost all men think clear and self evident, to that which 
almost all will admit to be involved in obscurity, and yet the ana- 
logical principle, discreetly used, will give us scarcely less confidence 
in the latter than in the earlier stages of this progress, 
with. 335. Following this clue, I come to the preposition with, which 

will probably be deemed more obscure in its derivation than any of 
the words hitherto examined. There are no less than three ety- 
mologies, to which it has been thought necessary to resort, in order 
to account for the different uses of this one -preposition : — 

1. The Gothic verb withan, to bind, or join together. 

2. The Gothic preposition withra, toward, or against. 

3. The Anglo-Saxon verb wyrthan (or rather the Gothic 

wisan), to be. 
I am inclined to regard the first and second of these etymologies, 
though at first sight so widely different in signification, as originally 
the same. When any two visible objects are nearly connected, in 
local situation, they must appear to be placed in apposition to each 
other, if both be viewed from a distant point ; but if one be viewed 
from the other, it will appear to be placed in opposition. Now, the 
preposition with, both in Anglo-Saxon and in English, expresses these 
different relations of apposition and opposition : it is therefore probable, 
that the original radix of the word, (so far as these two significations 
are concerned,) expressed the idea common to both, namely, the idea 
of connection. To exemplify this observation, let us suppose that 
John and Andrew are seen at the distance of half a mile by Peter ; 
they appear to be close together, to be joined with, or bound to each 
other ; but on approaching them he finds that there is a considerable 
interval between them, and the one either stands opposite to the other, 
or comes toward him, or stands against him resisting, or draws back 
from him. Now all these conceptions of being joined with, standing 
opposite to, coming toward, resisting, and drawing back from, with 
others of a like kind, will be found to be expressed in different Teu- 
tonic dialects by words obviously related to our preposition with. 
This will appear more at large as we separately examine the above- 
stated etymologies. 
withan. 336. The idea of connection, or joining together, was expressed by 
the Mseso-Gothic verb, withan, of which the past tense, gawath, 
occurs in the following passage of the Codex Argenteus. Thata Goth 
gawath, Manna ni skaidai, " What God hath joined together, let not 
man put asunder." (St. Mark, x. 9.) Hence, as a particular kind 
of weed is called bindweed, because it twists round and binds together 
other plants ; so a particular kind of tree (the willow) was called the 
with-tree, or withy-tiee (in old German, weide-haum, or wette-haum) ; 
because its tender twigs were used to with, (that is, to bind together,) 



CHAP. XI.] OF PREPOSITIONS. 183 

t 

many objects in rustic economy. The twigs so used for binding were 
also called withs, or wythes ; and a with or wythe was a term given to 
anything that bound either the body or the mind. 
Mortimer, in his Husbandly, speaks of the tree : — 

Birch is of use for ox-yoaks, hoops, screws ; wythes for faggots. 
Lord Bacon uses this word to signify the twig : — 

An Irish rehel put up a petition, that he might he hanged in a with, 
and not a halter ; because it had been so used with former rebels. 

The two words with and halter are simply binder and holder ; but use, 
it appears, had appropriated the former, to a binder made of willow 
twigs ; and the latter, to a holder made of hemp. 

King Charles employs the same word metaphorically : — 

These cords and wythes will hold men's consciences, when force 
attends and twists them. 

In different Anglo-Saxon glossaries, we find withig, the willow ; 
withthe, a hoop, or band ; cyneuiththe, the diadem, the king's band, or 
" golden round," as Shakspeare calls it. 

In an Alamannic glossary, " Ubi recensentur res pistrini atque 
horrei," says Junius, " with exponitur torta? 

" Danis quoque," says the same author, " widde est copula viminea; 
potissimum tamen, ut videtur, copula ex salignis viminibus contexta, 
contortave." 

In Dutch, the willow is called wiede, wiide, weyde, wiie. 

Our word icillow itself originally conveyed the same notion of bind- 
ing ; it being derived from the Anglo-Saxon wilig, which came from 
the verb wilan, as withig did from the verb withan ; and both withan 
and wilan signified to bind. Wachter derives the German weide, 
and Frankish wida, a willow, from the old verb wetten, to bind ; " Ab 
usu, quern arbor officiosa praebet colonis et hortulanis in jungendis et 
alligandis rebus ;" and he suggests, that the Latin vitis, a vine, is so 
named from its binding round other trees. Weiden also he explains, 
to bind, and weid, wied, wette, a bond. The Frankish languuid, is a 
waggon-rope. Wette also signifies, metaphorically, the law, which 
binds ; and this in Dutch is wet, whence wet-boek is a law-book ; wet- 
steller, wetmaaker, wet-geever, a legislator ; wethouders, magistrates ; 
wetgeleerde, a lawyer ; wetbreker, a lawbreaker ; wetloos, an outlaw ; 
wettig, legitimate, &c. The verb wetten is not only to bind, but to 
bind in wedlock "Oritur," says Wachter, "a wette, vinculum, 
copula, ligamen, unde reliqua, tarn verba, quam substantiva, tanquam 
ex matrice prodierunt." 

From all these authorities we may safely conclude, that we have 
ascertained the proper origin of our common preposition with, in the 
sense of association, e. gr. : — 

n all thy humours, whether grave or mellow, 

'hou'rt such a touchy, testy, pleasing fellow ; 

last so much wit and mirth, and spleen about thee, 

'here is no living with thee, nor without thee. Taller. 



184 OF PREPOSITIONS. [CHAP. XI. 

ii. It is obvious that in several of the other uses of this preposition, 
which Dr. Johnson points out, it really expresses no more than the 
same conception of joining or binding together, modified by the nature 
of the objects spoken of. Such are the following: — " in company," 
— " in partnership," — " in appendage," — "in mutual dealing," — for I 
am joined with those with whom I am in company ; — I am bound to 
one with whom I am in partnership; — a thing is joined to that of 
which it is an appendage ; two persons, who mutually deal together, 
are bound by the laws of honesty to each other ; and so of similar 
cases. It is remarkable that Johnson himself gives the two following 
senses of this preposition, in immediate succession. 

4. On the side of; for — 

•• madness of discourse ! 

That cause sets up with, and against thyself. Shakspeare. 

5. In opposition to ; in competition, or contest — 



I do contest 



As hotly and as nobly with thy love, 

As ever against thy valour. Shakspeare. 

vvithra. 337. This illustrates the transition before mentioned, from withan 
to withra, i.e. apposition to opposition; and hence Johnson says, " With, 
in composition, signifies opposition or privation." Instances of this 
use of the word in modern English are, withdraw, withhold, and with- 
stand. 

Barbour uses withsay — 

With richt or wrang it have would thay ; 
And if anie would thame withsay, 
Thay would sa do, that thay suld tine 
Eyther land or lyfe, or live in pine. 

This is in German widersagen : as in the old baptismal formula, 
"Wider sag estu dem Teufel und alien seinen werhen?" "Dost thou 
renounce the devil and all his works ?" And in this sense absagen is 
also used. 

It is observable that the modern German, which does not use with, 
or any similar preposition in the sense of association, has wider to 
signify opposition, both in the simple form, and in a great number of 
compounds, — as wiederhalten, to resist ; widerlegen, to refute ; wider- 
reden, to reply ; wider-sprechen, to contradict, &c. ; and so widerschein, 
a reflected light ; widersinn, an absurdity ; widerschall, an echo, &c. 

In the Anglo-Saxon, with and wither are both used in the sense of 
opposition, or reflecting back from ; as withstandian, to resist ; with- 
coren, wither-coren, cUrsed ; with-secyian, withersecyian, to contradict ; 
with-loedan, to lead back ; with-scufian, to repel. In the laws of 
Canute we find witersacan, apostates. In the old English laws we 
have withernam, in the barbarous Latin of that day, withernamium, a 
reseizure. This last word is said to have given an easy victory to an 
English lawyer in Italy, at an epoch when it was the custom for 



CHAP. XI. J OF PREPOSITIONS. 185 

scholars to offer public challenges for disputation on any given subject. 
As the party who accepted the challenge had the choice of a subject, 
our lawyer proposed, as his question, An averia capta in withernamio 
replegiari possint ; to which his antagonist, as he did not understand 
what withernamium meant, was unable to give any reply. 

In the Icelandic, we find both vid and vidur signifying against. In 
the Frankish, vid and with are " against," as with thenne Divvel, 
" against the Devil." But in most of the other Teutonic dialects, 
when the sense is contra, or retro, the letter r is found in the word. 
In the Gothic of Ulfila withra signifies both toward and against, as 
alia so baurgs usiddya withra Jaisu, " all the city went out toward 
Jesus." Saei nist withra izwis, faur izwis ist ; " He that is not against 
us, is for us :" and so in the compounds withrawairthan, " opposite," 
" over against ;" withraidya, "he met;" withragamotyan, " to meet." 
In the Frankish, uuidrunpiotan, is to write in reply. In the Alamannic, 
uuidartragan, is to carry back. In the old Salic laws, widredo is a 
repeater of his oath, from eid, an oath. In the Lombard laws, wider- 
ooran is a manumitted slave. This last word is also written guiderbora, 
as in the laws of Luitprand (circ. a.d. 720), " Si quis aldiam 
alienam aut suam ad uxorem tollere volluerit, faciat earn guiderboram." 
Another remarkable instance of the use of wider in composition, is hi 
widrigildum, which some writers confound with wergeldum ; but 
Eccardus accurately distinguishes these words, observing that the 
latter properly signifies the price, ransom, or value of a man ; the 
former, any composition by which a loss is paid back, or compensated. 
Weregelt is well known to the old English and Scottish law ; (see 
Fleta, and the Regiam Majestatem). Weregeltthef, according to Fleta, 
is " Latro, qui redimi potest." Hence Somner derives wer-geld from 
wer, a man, and gelt, price. On the other hand, Grotius (in the 
preface to the Gothic writers) defines wedrigeldium " quod pro talione 
datur ; " and this word is properly derived by Wendelinus from the 
Teutonic weder contra, vicissim, and gelt, eestimatio. It is differently 
written, widrigilth, widrigildum, guidrigild, wedrigildum, wedrigeldum, 
widrigild. 

Widrigilth secundum quod appretiatus fuerit. 

Deer. Childeb. II. (a.d. 711.) 
Suum widrigildum ornnino componat. 

Deer. Ludov. II. (a.d. 879.) 

Si stupri crimine detectae fuerit componat guidrigild suum. 

Capitul. Arech. Princ. Benevent. 
Juxta quod widrigild illius est. 

Capit. Lotharii, Imp. (a.d. 824.) 

338. Perhaps the most remarkable derivation from the word wither, Guerdon, 
or wider, now remaining in our language, is guerdon ; and the more 
so, as the English etymologists in general have entirely mistaken its 
origin. 

The English word guerdon is a mere adoption of the French 



186 OF PREPOSITIONS. [CHAP. XI. 

guerdon, of which Menage thus speaks : — " Je croy qu'il vient de 
werdung qui signifie pretii cestimatio, et dont les escrivains de la basse 
Latinite ont fait aussi werdunia pour dire la mesrae chose. De 
guerdon les Espagnols ont fait galardon, et les Italiens guiderdone." 
Skinner cites this ; but prefers the derivation of guerdon by Mylitjs 
from the Dutch weerderen, waerderen, aastimare, censere ; and* this from 
weerd, waerd dignus, et weerde, valor, pretium. Junius cites the 
French guerdon, Italin guiderdone, Spanish galardon, and Welsh 
wherth; "quae omnia," says he, "valde affinia sunt Teutonico 
vxerde weerdiie" What is meant by galardon being " valde affine," 
to weerde, I cannot guess ; any more that I can tell how the Italians 
formed guiderdone out of guerdon : and as to the base Latin werdunia, 
I never happened to meet with that word. The real history of the 
word guerdon, however, may, I apprehend, be very satisfactorily 
traced, as follows : — 

i. Widerdonum. This word is correctly explained by Du Cange, 
" Vox ibrida, a widar Teutonico, contra, et donum Latino, munus." 
This mixture of Teutonic participles with Latin substantives or verbs, 
is a fact, which, properly considered, may cast some light on the true 
principles of etymology. Thus we find our word miscreant to be 
compounded of the Teutonic mis (our verb, to miss,^ and the Latin 
credere : and the French have many such compounds, e. gr. mecompte, 
meconnoitre, mecontent, mesaventure, mesoffrir, mesestimer, medire, me- 
faire, &c. Widerdonum occurs in the Tabularium Casauriense, (a. d. 
'876). 

Quia tu dedisti mihi, pro memorata convenientia, widerdonum, 
caballum unum et argentum solidos centum. 

ii. Guiderdone, or guidardone. This is merely the word widerdonum 
with the Italian articulation gui for m, as in guidrigild and guiderbora 
above noticed, for widergild and widerbora. The Latin termination 
um was universally changed into o by the elder Italians ; and in 
modern writing it is softened still more into e ; whence we find in the 
Vocabolario delta Crusca, guiderdone and guidardone, with their deriva- 
tives, guiderdonare, guidardonare, guiderdonato, guiderdonatrice, guidar- 
donatrice, guiderdonamento, guidardonamento, &c. 

E come i falli meritan punizione, cosi i benefici meritan guiderdone. 

Boccaccio, (circ. A.D. 1350.) 
E per guidardone del vincitore apparecchio Ghirlande. Idem. 

iii. Guizardonum. This is evidently a mere provincial corruption 
of pronunciation from guidardonum. 

Item quod nullum munus, guizardonum, vel xenia aliqua recipiet. 

Statut. Massil. (circ. A.D. 1220. 

iv. Guiardonum. 

Non currant aliquse poena?, usurse, guiardona, vel expense. 

Statut, Vercel. 

This word is thus explained in an old glossary: — " Guiardonum, re- 



CHAP. XI.] OF PREPOSITIONS. 187 

muneratio ; Ital. guidardone, nostris guerredon. (Vide Glossar. Pro 
vine. Lat. ex cod. Reg. Paris, No. 7657.) 

v. Guiardon, in the Provencal dialect, prsemium. 

vi. Guerredon. The old French word above alluded to, which is 
also found in the verbal form, guerredonner. 

Se Dieu sauve le baron, 

lis en auront bon guerredon. Roman D'Athis. 

Voulons, pour ce, yceulx guerredonner, et poursuir de faveur especial. 

Chart. Phil. VI. (a.d. 1330.) 

vii. Guerdon, In the old French translation of the passage above- 
cited from the Statutes of Marseilles, the words " Guizardonum vel 
xenia," are rendered " guerdon, ou estrenne." 

In English, guerdon is used to signify a just recompense either for 
good or bad deeds. 

He shall by thy revenging hand at once receive the just guerdon 
of all his former villainies. Enolles, Hist. Turk. 

Fame is the spur that the clear spirit doth raise, 

(That last infirmity of noble mind) 
To scorn delights, and live laborious days ; 

But the fair guerdon when we hope to find, 
Comes the blind Fury, with th' abhorred sheers, 

And slits the thin-spun life. Milton. 

339. Having examined two derivations of our modern preposition Wyrthan. 
with, I come to the third, which is thus stated by Mr. Horne Tooke. 

" With is also sometimes the imperative of wyrthan, to be. Mr. 
Tyrwhit, in his glossary, (art. But,) has observed truly, that ' by 
and with are often synonymous.' They are always so, when with is 
the imperative of wyrthan : for by is the imperative of beon, to be. 
He has also in his glossary (art. With) said truly, that * with 
meschance, with misadventure, with sorwe : 5316, 7797, 6916, 
4410, 5890, 5922, are to be considered as parenthetical curses.' 
For the literal meaning of those phrases is (not God yeve, but) be 
mischance, be misadventure, be sorrow, to him or them, concerning 
whom these words are spoken. But Mr. Tyrwhit is mistaken when 
he supposes — 'with evil prefe, 5829; with harde grace, 7810; 
with sory grace, 12810;' to have the same meaning; for in those 
three instances, with is the imperative of imthan ; nor is any paren- 
thetical curse or wish contained in either of those instances." 

There is something ingenious in connecting with and wyrthan ; and 
it was probably suggested to Mr. Tooke by the analogy which with- 
out and with-in bear to the Scottish " but and ben ;" i. e. be-out and 
be-in. The Anglo-Saxons also used with-jeondan, for be-yond ; and 
indeed they employed the separate preposition with so loosely, as to 
afford room for supposing that it was only equivalent to the general 
expression of existence, be : for Hickes, in his Grammatica Anglo- 
Saxonica, explains with by the Latin words, juxta, cum, contra, ad- 
versus, pro, circa, circiter, erga, a, ab ; and one of his examples is 



188 OF PREPOSITIONS. [CHAP. XI. 

remarkable, as using with for by in the sense of near to. " With tha 
see Adriaticum, juxta mare Adriaticum." 

Still it may be doubted whether the Anglo-Saxon wyrthan affords 
the proper solution of this question ; since we do not find the r ever 
introduced before the th into either the Anglo-Saxon or English pre- 
position : in other words, we do not find wyrth used as a preposition 
in Saxon, or worth in English ; and though worth is certainly used for 
be in the parenthetical curse wo worth I and in the parenthetical bless- 
ing well worth ! it is not quite so clear that with is thus used in the 
expressions " with meschance, with misaventure, or with sorwe." 

In the vision of Piers Plowman we have the verb worth, to be. In 
Chaucer we have wo worth, and in Piers Plowman, well worth, and 
much wo worth. 

And said, Mercy, madam, your man shall I worth. 

Piers Plowman. 

Wo worth the faire gemme vertulesse ! 

Wo worth that hearbe also that doth no bote ! 
Wo worth the beauty that is routhlesse ! 

Wo worth that might that trede ech under fote ! 

Chaucer. 

Much wo worth the man that misruleth his inwitte ! 

And well worth Piers Plowman that pursueth God in his going ! 

Piers Plowman. 

The Anglo-Saxon wyrthan, wurthan, or weorthan, and the English 
worth, are from the Gothic wairthan ; but perhaps the Anglo-Saxon 
and English with, used synonymously with be, are rather from the 
other Gothic verb substantive, wisan : for the different Teutonic tribes 
used three verbs substantive, (as they are called,) viz. beon, wisan, and 
wurthan ; of which we retain traces in the different tenses of our verb, 
to be ; namely, be, was, and were. 
other _ 340. These etymological disquisitions on the word with belong 

TT /» T X 1 11 

properly to the History of Language. I use them in this place 
merely to illustrate the principles before stated, viz., first, that even 
in the less obvious instances, words used as prepositions are significant 
of certain relations between our conceptions corporeal, mental, or 
spiritual ; and secondly, that though signifying the same relations as 
when used in the form of nouns or verbs, their force and effect in the 
construction of a sentence are so different as justly to entitle them to 
the character of a separate part of speech. It will be seen in another 
part of this work, that the same inference is to be drawn from the 
etymological investigation of our other ordinary prepositions, by, for, 
out, in, of, to, at, from, through, before, behind, after, &c. ; from the 
obsolete and foreign prepositions mid, emb, anent, ohne, wegen, von, 
van, &c. ; and, in short, from all prepositions in all languages, so far 
as they can with any confidence be traced, in the history of speech. 
Expression by 341. I have said, that the third mode of expressing the secondary 
relations of substantive to substantive, or of substantive to verb, is by 



prepositions. 



variation. 



CHAP. XI.] OF PREPOSITIONS. 189 

a variation in the form of a word, as foresee is varied from see, and 
Ccesaris from Ccesar. Here are obviously two kinds of variation, 
which may be distinguished as composition and inflection. The term 
composition may be applied to those instances in which a preposition 
(that is, a word capable of being used separately as a connective 
expressing relation), or, at least, a particle (or portion of a word), 
having a like signification, is added to a simple noun substantive or 
verb, as the particle fore is added to the simple verb see ; and these 
variations in most known languages are usually made by way of 
prefix. The term inflection may be applied to those instances in 
which a particle, incapable (at least in the same language) of being 
used as a preposition, is added to a simple or complex noun, consti- 
tuting a case thereof, as the particle is is added to Cossar. These 
variations are generally made by way of suffix, or termination. Pos- 
siblv, however, by future etymological researches, all inflections may 
be resolved into compositions. 

342. With those compound words which signify primary relation Prepositions 
I have at present no concern. Those which signify secondary re- skion? P °" 
lations, whether nouns or verbs, are for the most part compounded 

(as I have said) with prepositions ; for instance, the noun "overseer," 
and the verb " overtake," are compounded with the preposition over, 
the noun superstitio, and the verb supervenio, with the preposition 
super, and the like. In some cases, however, they are compounded 
with a particle, the separate use of which, though it may perhaps be 
discoverable in some kindred dialect, is either wholly wanting in the 
language in which the compound is used, or at least is wanting in the 
signification which it bears in the compound. Pre is not used at all 
as a preposition in French, but enters into many compound verbs, as 
prevoir, predire, &c. Ver does not seem to be used in modern 
German as a preposition, but is frequent in compounds, as verstehen, 
verloren, &c. ; and we have seen that with is not used in the sense of 
opposition as a modern English preposition, though it is in the verbs 
withstand, withhold, &c. These are indeed matters of idiom, but a 
mistaken view of them might tend to mislead the grammarian, in 
point of principle ; and the same may be said of an erroneous view of 
the effect of " a preposition in composition," which, when united 
with a verb, is commonly said to " govern " the same case which it 
does alone ; whereas, in truth, this notion of government is equally 
erroneous in both instances. The rule of the Latin grammar on this 
point, as laid down by Messrs. de Port Royal is, that " the preposi- 
tion preserves its force even in composition ; so that the verbs with 
which it is compounded take the case which belongs to the preposi- 
tion ;"* but, before I examine this rule, it will be necessary to say 
something more of cases. 

343. We are told, that "the Indian grammarians take up the Case. 

* P. Royal L. G., b. v. r. 22. 



190 OF PREPOSITIONS. [CHAP. XI. 

declinable word in its primary form, i, e., in the state when it is des- 
titute of all case termination ;" and that " this bare form of the word 
is given also in their dictionaries."* In other words, they fix their 
first attention on the root, or simple radical sound, and consider all 
inflections, whether of verb or noun, to be so many off-shoots or 
branches from the parent stock. This method of investigating lan- 
guages and forming dictionaries is certainly more philosophical than 
any method pursued by either Greek or Latin grammarians. Applying 
it to the inflections of nouns, it will at once be seen that, as well in 
Greek and Latin as in the Sanscrit, Zend, Lithuanian, and other 
languages of a like construction and origin, there are case terminations 
expressing both the primary and secondary relations. Thus, if we 
suppose the root man in Latin to signify " hand," it may be combined 
with us and mto, signifying the primary relations of agent and object, 
and the inflections manus and manum will respectively form the 
nominative and accusative case singular ; and again, it may be com- 
bined with u or ibus, signifying (inter alia) the secondary relation of 
instrumentality, and will form the ablatives singular and plural. So, 
in Sanscrit, the root sunu, son, gives primary relations in the nomi- 
native and accusative, sunus and sunum ; and secondary relations in 
the instrumental singular sunund, dual sunubhydm, and plural 
sunubhis.\ 
Combined 344. But though a preposition alone, or a preposition in compo- 
sition with a verb, or the case inflection of a noun, may each sepa- 
rately express a secondary relation, we find sometimes two, and 
sometimes all three of these modes employed together to signify one 
and the same relation. We may say, for instance, in Latin, with 
only a case inflection (ine), damnari crimine, to be convicted of a 
crime ; or, with a case inflection (ate), and a separate preposition 
(de), damnatus de majestate, convicted of treason ; or, with a case 
inflection (ibus), and a preposition in composition (ad), accusari 
criminibus, to be accused of crimes ; or, with a case inflection (e), a 
separate preposition (ex), and a preposition in composition (ex), 
excessit ex urbe, he went out of the city. It may perhaps be asked, 
in all but the first of these examples, why such various expressions 
are employed to express a single relation. To this, different answers 
may be given. In the first place, the case inflection does not always 
express a definite relation. The termination ibus, for instance, in the 
word criminibus, may be that of the dative or ablative plural, and, in 
both cases, it may signify several relations. The particular relation 
intended may in some instances be sufficiently shown by the significa- 
tion of the verb, as feci manibus meis, " I made it with my hands," 
where the relation intended by the case termination ibus is shown by 
the verb feci to be that of instrumentality. But, in other instances, 
the particular relation intended may not be quite clear without the 

* Bopp, Comp. Gram. 1, 112. f Ibid., 1, 254. 



modes. 



CHAP. XI.] OF PREPOSITIONS. 191 

aid of a preposition, as effugit e manibus meis, ' ' he escaped out of my 
hands," where, without the preposition e, it would not be clear that 
the relation intended was not that of instrumentality. Secondly, a 
different reason may sometimes be assigned for the apparent redun- 
dancy of prepositions ; for they may be employed to add greater 
intensity of feeling to the expression. It is manifest, that to repeat 
and dwell upon expressions, often gives energy and weight to dis- 
course, whatever may be the part of speech reiterated. Thus 
Shakspeare reiterates the adverb too in those exquisite lines of 
Hamlet : — 

! that this too too solid flesh would melt, 
Thaw, and resolve itself into a dew ! 

And frigid indeed is the criticism of Dr. Johnson, that this reduplica- 
tion is harsh ! Increase of feeling naturally prompts additional 
emphasis of expression ; and this is true not only of vehement passion, 
but of the finer shades of emotion. Thus may we understand why 
a preposition in composition is followed by the same preposition 
separate. In the Andria of Terence, we find — " Quid tibi videtur ? 
adeon' ad eum ?" So Cicero says " Nihil non consideratum exibat ex 
ore ;" in both which instances it is impossible not to see that the 
repetition of the preposition is a great beauty. Nor is this observa- 
tion to be confined to the repetition of the same preposition ; for it 
applies substantially to all prepositions, and even adverbs, of similar 
meaning: as in Terence — "Nonne oportuit prcescisse me ante?'''' — 
M Multa concurrunt simul" So in Virgil — " Metro sublapsa referri? 
Grammarians of repute, it must be allowed, have censured these 
redundancies of expression, which may perhaps be regarded as excep- 
tions from a general rule, and ought not to enter into the ordinary 
construction of a sentence. But the censure, when directed against 
such passages as I have cited, rather shows an acquaintance with 
technicalities than a nice feeling of the higher powers of language. 
Whether a particular language will or will not admit of such combi- 
nations is a matter of idiom ; and accordingly, we often find that 
they cannot be transferred from one language to another by a strictly 
literal translation. We cannot, for instance, render into English the 
lines 



quum frigidus olim 



Jam cadit, extremoque inrorat Aquarius anno* 

by translating inrorat ondews, or overdews ; because we have no such 
verbs, any more than we can translate anno by the word year with 
any case termination. 

345. The omission of a preposition arises sometimes from a Omission, 
defective construction ; but it has been often supposed by gram- 
marians to exist where there was no necessity for such an hypothesis. 

* Virgil, Georg. 3, 303. 



192 OF PREPOSITIONS. [CHAP. XI. 

The omission of the preposition of is undoubtedly awkward in the 
following instances : — 

That every person comyng to suche feires shulde have lawefull 
remed of all maner contractes. Stat. 1 Pic. III. c. vi. M.S. 

But God that is of maist pouste 

Reserued to his majestie ; 

For to knaw in his prescience, 

Of all kind time the first movence. Barbour. 

The kyng Rohert wist he was there 

And what kind chiftains with him were. Idem. 

Then should they full enforcedly 

Right in mids the kirk assail 

The Englishmen. - Idem. 

So, in old French, the preposition de is often awkwardly omitted : — 
Wrepoch ah Edenauct, &c. oveke tot le orgoyl de Gales — descendi- 
ient a la terrenostre seigneurs le rei. 

Let. P. De Mounfort, a.d. 1256. 

Qui la maison son voisin ardoir voit, 
De la sienne douter se doit. 
Faut noter — la maison son voisin estre diet a la fagon ancienne ; 
au lieu de dire " la maison de son voisin." H. Estienne. 

So, also, in Italian, the authors of the Vocabolario delta Crusca 
observe, on the word casa : "Nome, dopo cli cui vien lasciato talvolta 
dagli autori, per proprieta di linguaggio, l'articolo, o il segnacaso." 
E si sen' andaron di concordia a casa i prestatori. Boccaccio. 

Cominciano a chiedere il Gonfalone che stava in casa Germanica. — 
" Vexillum in domo Germanici situm flagitare occipiunt." 

Davanzati, Tacit. Ann. 

On the other hand, though in the construction of the Latin lan- 
guage, some grammarians contend, that where a noun is commonly 
said to be governed by another noun, or by a verb, it is proper to 
consider that a preposition has been suppressed; as, "Cicero fuit 
eloquentior (prse) fratre ;" yet this seems an unnecessary refinement 
in grammar ; for the particle or in eloquentior, and the termination e 
in fratre, sufficiently show the relation between eloquence and frater, 
which is all the effect that a preposition could produce. 

The same observation may be made on the expression ire rus, 
do?num, Romam, Hierosolymam, where Vossius supposes, unnecessarily, 
an omission of ad or in ; but he adds, " Latinis tarn usitata est hgec 
ellipsis, in exemplis allatis, ut vulgo naturalis sermo existirnetur." 

It may, however, be doubted whether such constructions as alias 
res improbus, ccetera latus, and the like, are not to be ranked among 
the negligences of composition, though sanctioned by names of high 
repute in Roman literature : — 

I lie earn rem adeo sohrie et frugaliter 

Accuravit, ut alias res est impense improbus. 

Plant. Epid. iv. 1. 
Excepto quod non simul esses, cetera loetus. 

Ilorat. Ep. i. 10. 



CHAP. XI. J OF PREPOSITIONS. 193 

Similar observations may be made on the Greek writers, who are 
often censured for the omission of prepositions ; and the remark is 
sometimes just, though in general the relation is sufficiently expressed, 
and the preposition would therefore be superfluous. The learned 
Lambertus Bos says, " Prsepositionum ellipsin tantopere amant 
scriptores Graeci ut interdum duse prsepositiones in una orationis parte 
omittantur. Aristoph. Nub. v. 1083. "Hv tovto viK-ndrje e/jtov: Si 
(in) hoc (a) me victus fueris. Plene : r)v eig tovto viK-ndijg v-k efiov." 
In this instance it would perhaps have been better, had the rhythm 
allowed it, to express the first of the two prepositions*; but the 
relation of e/xov to viK-nSijg is sufficiently denoted by their respective 
terminations. 

346. We sometimes find prepositions accumulated together, either Accumuia- 
as separate words or as compounds, and, of course, modifying each 
other. In the earlier, and less cultivated periods of a language, such 
cumulations of words may be expected to be more common ; but as 
grammatical accuracy and elegance of style prevail, the prepositions 
(considered as distinct words), are confined more strictly to their 
separate use. We find, even in Milton, the combination at under, 
as " some trifles composed at under twenty ;" but, in the present day, 
such a construction would hardly be tolerated by the critics. In 
more ancient times this sort of construction was still more prevalent ; 
and we find numberless such expressions as " of beyond," "for 
against," and the like : — 

Artificers and other straiingiers, from the parties of beyonde the see. 

Stat. 1 Bio. III. c. ix. 

The shiref of the seid countie of Northu.mbreland, or wardeyn of the 
est and middell marchees for ayenst Scotlond. Stat. 11 Hen, VII. c. ix. 

Where the combination has been such as to present to the mind 
the ready conception of a new relation, it has generally been received 
in language as a new preposition, as throughout, into, overthwart ; and 
so perhaps the Latin intra, extra, &c. Custom, too, has sometimes 
given a distinct force to compounds, which appear originally to have 
had no signification different from that of the simple preposition 
which formed their basis. Thus we have in English distinguished 
within from in, without from out; and more slightly unto from to, 
untill from till, &c. So in French we find en and dans, avant and 
devant, vers and devers, pres and aupres, with more or less of dis- 
tinction in their modern use and application ; and, in like manner, the 
Italians, from the Latin ante, have formed innanzi, formerly inanti, 
and dianzi ; as, from pressus, they have formed appresso and d?ap- 
presso : — 

L'alma Ciprignia inanti i primi albori 

Eidendo empia d'amor la terra e'l mare. Annibal Caro. 

Toma amore a l'aratro, e i sette colli, 

Ou 'era dianzi il seggio tuo maggiore. F. M. Molza. 

2. o 



194 OF PREPOSITIONS. [CHAP. XI. 

Io pur douena il mio bel sole, io stesso 

Seguir col pie, come segu'hor col core ; 
E le fredde Alpi, e'l Rhen, ch'aspro rigore, 

Mai sempre agghiaccia rimir d'appresso. F. M. Molza. 

i^dWerenU' ^^ ' There is one circumstance in the use of prepositions, which, 
though really dependent on usage in every language, must not here 
be overlooked ; since it seems, at first sight, contradictory to the 
notion that this part of speech can correctly express the actual 
relations which it is supposed to signify. We see, in fact, that 
various prepositions are sometimes used indifferently in a sentence ; 
and at other times a particular preposition is absolutely essential to 
the sense. This circumstance depends on the nature of the relation 
intended to be expressed. In general, -the external and physical 
relations of objects must be expressed by their own proper and pecu- 
liar words. Thus we cannot substitute in for out, or after for before, 
in speaking of visible objects and bodily actions : but the case is 
different when we come to speak of the mind ; for, as the analogy of 
its states and operations to those of the material world are very loose 
and general, so we may adopt almost any external relation of things 
as a symbol whereby to explain mental relations. Thus we may say 
that a person did a certain act in envy, or out of envy, or through 
envy, or from envy, or for envy, or with envy ; but we cannot say of 
the same man, under the same circumstances, that he was in his 
house, and out of his house, passing through the town, and distant 
from the town, walking with another person, or a mile before him. 
Still there are limits, fixed by custom, to the use of each preposition ; 
but these limits vary much in different languages; and hence a 
translation, correct in substance, often appears literally inaccurate. 
Thus the French " sous peine," answers to our " on pain," and to the 
old English " up peine." 

No more up peine of lesing of your hed. Chaucer. 

How a particular preposition may be employed, in this respect, is 
mere matter of idiom, and depends solely on custom : — 
Quern penes arbitrium est, et jus, et norma loquendi. 

But it will generally be found that the prepositions of most frequent 
use are employed with the greatest latitude, in the earlier stages of a 
language, and so continue, until their equivocal signification gives rise 
to inconveniences which are only to be remedied by confining them 
to certain forms of construction. 

Custom also varies in the course of time ; as may be seen in many 
examples which have now become obsolete, as "to learn at," " to 
accuse for" &c. But it must not always be supposed that the force 
of a preposition is varied, because the application is different ; for the 
difference may arise from the other words in the sentence : thus the 
French oter a, and donner a, are our " take from? and "give to;" 



CHAP. XI.] OF PREPOSITIONS. 195 

but in both cases a retains its primary force, and the apparent oppo- 
sition depends on the contrariety between oter and dormer. 

348. From all that has here been said of prepositions, the neces- Conclusion, 
sity, and even beauty, of such a part of speech in all cultivated 
languages is sufficiently manifest. " Though the original use of 
prepositions," says Harris, "was to denote the relations of place, they 
could not be confined to this office only. They, by degrees, extended 
themselves to subjects incorporeal, and came to denote relations, as 
well intellectual as local." " But how," says Cour De Gebelin, 
"can such words introduce into the pictures of speech so much 
harmony and clearness, and become so necessary, that without them, 
language would present but an imperfect delineation ? How can 
these words produce such powerful effects, and diffuse throughout 
discourse so much warmth and delicacy ?" The reason, he adds, is 
simple : " There is no object which does not suppose the existence of 
some other object to which it is bound, with which it is connected, 
to which it in some way or other bears relation. A valley supposes 
the existence of a mountain, a mountain that of less elevated lands : 
smoke implies fire, and there is ' no rose without a thorn.' It is of 
necessity, then, that different objects should be bound together in 
speech as they are in nature ; and that we should have words to 
express the relations which exist among things." 

After this, it may be unnecessary to remark on Mr. Tooke's 
sweeping censure of the philosophers, that " though they have pre- 
tended to teach others, they have none of them known themselves 
what the nature of a preposition is." 



02 



( 196 ) 



CHAPTER XII. 



OF CONJUNCTIONS. 



Objection to 
the name. 



Are a part ol 
speech. 



349. A simple sentence, as we have seen, may be formed by a 
noun and a verb alone, as " John walks." The sentence may be 
complicated by the introduction of an adverb, which modifies the 
verb, as " John walks foremost ;" and if may be rendered still more 
complex, by substituting for the adverb a preposition, which shows 
the relation of the noun or verb to another noun, as " John walks 
before Peter." But in the communication of thought, sentences, 
whether simple or complex, must be connected together. When the 
connexion is effected by a single word, such word belongs to the part 
of speech, which is usually denominated a conjunction. Thus, if I 
say " John walks and Peter rides," the word and is a conjunction ; or 
if I say John walks but Peter rides, the word but is a conjunction. 

350. Mr. Tooke objected, but most illogicahy, to this designation. 
"Conjunctions" (said he), "it seems, are to have their denomination 
and definition from the use to which they are applied, per accidens 
essentiam /" What he meant by the essence of a part of speech, 
apart from its use, it is not easy to conjecture. To conjoin is the 
essence of a conjunction and not an accident of it. Accidens essentia; 
junctum contingenter. Take away the accident, and the essence still 
remains ; but if we take away from a conjunction its use in conjoining, 
the essence of the conjunction is gone. Besides, this objection in- 
volves Mr. Tooke in a gross inconsistency. He admits that a noun 
differs from a verb ; but how does it differ, if not in use ? How does 
the noun love differ from the verb love, or the noun whip from the 
verb whip, but in use ? And if a noun differs from a verb in its use 
alone, why should not a conjunction differ from both, in the same 
manner ? Parts of speech are distinguished essentially by their use 
alone ; any other distinctions which they may happen to have, are 
accidents, which vary in different languages and at different times and 
places, without altering their grammatical character. The English 
conjunction, and, is essentially the same as the Greek tea), and the 
Latin et , though it differs from them in the accidents of sound ; but 
there is no more reason for calling the sound of a word its essence, 
than for giving that appellation to the colour of the ink with which it 
is printed. 

351. Mr. Tooke's objections to conjunctions, however, lay deeper 
than to their mere name. " I deny them" (said he) " to be a separate 
sort of words, or part of speech by themselves." Such were the 
bold, but absurd or unmeaning propositions which obtained for this 



CHAP. XII. J OF CONJUNCTIONS. 197 

etymologist the reputation not merely of a grammarian, but of an 
absolute inventor of the science of grammar ! He himself told us, 
that " he meant to discard all mystery." Why, what greater mystery 
can there possibly be, what greater confusion in the mind of a student 
of grammar, than to be told that there is no order, no classification, 
among words, — that if is derived from give, and therefore if and 
give are words of the same sort, nay identically the same in all then: 
uses — that they do not indicate by their use, any different " turns, 
stands, postures, &c, of the mind?" The mystery here discarded is 
the mystery of learning. The student is stopped on the veiy threshold 
of his studies, by being assured that there is nothing for him to leam. 
And the sage who gives him this precious information, sets up for 
the great illuminator of mankind in this very branch of learning! 
" I believe I differ from all the accounts which have hitherto been 
given of language," said Mr. Tooke. Very true : and every patient 
in Bedlam differs from all other persons who give any account of his 
state of mind. It is somewhat strange, that in support of his title to 
absolute originality and exclusive knowledge of grammar, this writer 
should quote the following (among other) expressions of Lord Bacon : — ■ 
" Quae in natura fundata sunt, crescunt et atjoentur ; qua? autem in 
opinione variantur, non augentur." The science of grammar, which 
is " founded in nature," was taught, as has been shown above, by 
Plato and Aristotle. Since their time it has " grown and been 
increased" by the labours of grammarians in a great variety of lan- 
guages down to the present day ; and now we see it illustrated by 
application to languages dead and living, polished and barbarous, to 
the Sanskrit, Hebrew, Latin, and Gothic, as well as to the English 
and French, the Soosoo, and the Chinese : and we find certain great 
leading principles operating on them all. Why ? Because language 
is the expression of human thoughts and feelings ; and there are 
certain main channels in which human thoughts and feelings have 
throughout all ages necessarily flowed. "When, therefore, at the close 
of the eighteenth century of the Christian era, an individual professed 
to set aside every trace and vestige of the knowledge which preceded 
him, his doctrine was not an augmentation, but a variation, and we 
may be well assured that it was " founded" not in nature, but in the 
mere opinion of its pretended inventor. 

352. It was Mr. Tooke's opinion, and nothing more, that a con- Opinion ex- 
junction is not a separate part of speech. Now, what is opinion ? sdlnce ft ° m 
Mr. Tooke presumed to ridicule Lord Monboddo's account of it, 
derived from the Platonic philosophy, simply because Mr. Tooke 
could not or would not understand that philosophy. Plato says that 
the subject of opinion is neither to ov nor to jirj ov, but a medium 
between both.* Now this, however paradoxical it may appear to 
any person who will not take the trouble to reflect upon it, will be 
found extremely clear, with the help of a slight degree of attention. 
* Repub. 1. 5. 



198 OF CONJUNCTIONS. [CHAP. XII. 

By 7-0 ov Plato meant that which is, in the absolute sense of the 
word — that which is, always, and certainly, and without any variation. 
By to fxrj ov he meant that which is not at any time, or in any 
manner, and cannot be conceived to be. Thus it is always and cer- 
tainly true that in our idea of a circle all the radii are equal; and it is 
not at any time or in any manner true that we can form an idea of a 
circle with unequal radii. But there is a third case which is conti- 
nually occurring to us, namely, that an object is presented to our 
observation which may correspond more or less accurately with a 
given idea. We may see, for instance, a coach-wheel, or the dome of 
St. Paul's church, but we can only form an opinion how nearly either 
of these approaches to our idea of a perfect circle ; for the life of man 
would not suffice to prove such coincidence beyond the possibility of 
a doubt. Now, Plato distinguished this class of objects by the 
expression to yiyvo/dEvov, which he opposed to to ov, as in the 
following celebrated passage of the Timceus — Eorti/ ovv h) /car' e/urjv 
Zo^av 7rpu>TOV Zlclioeteov Tads' t'l to *0N jj.ev 'aft, yeveaiv o"e 'ov^' 
e\ov KaL TL T0 TirNO'MENON \xev, ov Se 'ovIettote' to jxev h^ 
NOFTSEI, fXETCt Xoyov TTEOtX-qirTOV, 'ael Kara ravra ov. to dav 
AO£?H, fXET atad}](TE(i)£ aXoyov, co'Za&TOV, yiyvdfievov kclI curoXXv- 
jjlevov ovtojq oe 'ovIettote ov — which passage Cicero has thus freely 
rendered : — " Quid est, quod semper sit, neque ullum habet ortum ? 
et quid est, quod gignatur, nee unquam sit ? Quorum alteram 
intelligentia et ratione comprehenditur, quod unum semper atque idem 
est : alteram quod affert opinionem per sensus ratioms expertes, quod 
totum opinabile est; id gignitur et interit, nee unquam esse vere 
potest." And the general sense of both these great writers is, that 
science is founded on that which is ; opinion on that which seems : 
science relates to that which is distinctly apprehended, because it is 
permanent, immutable, and consonant to the necessary laws of human 
existence ; opinion to that which is vague and indistinct, arising from 
sensible impressions, and the casual accidents of time and place. 
What Mr. Tooke called his " general doctrine," was of this latter 
kind : it was an opinion derived from comparing the sound of words, 
not only without regarding, but often in direct opposition to their 
sense. Should any one for a moment conceive that I am speaking 
without due respect to the literary reputation of Mr. Tooke, I beg to 
remind him that I speak of a passage in which Mr. Tooke himself 
treated the profound wisdom of a Plato and a Cicero with the most 
sovereign contempt, and even represented Lord Monboddo as an idiot, 
for quoting their very words. Elsewhere he said that the learned 
Lord was " incapable of writing a sentence of common English;" but 
this is nothing to his abuse of one of his critics, the late Mr. Windham, 
an accomplished scholar, and as honourable a man as ever existed, 
whom Mr. Tooke called in his chapter on conjunctions, a " cannibal," 
and " a cowardly assassin." 
Derivation. 353. Mr. Tooke rested his opinion respecting conjunctions on their 



CHAP. XII.] OF CONJUNCTIONS. 199 

derivation. ■"' There is not such a thing" (said he) " as a conjunction 
in any language, which may not, by a skilful herald, be traced home to 
its own family and origin." This may, or may not, be the case ; but 
it is part of the history of language, and has nothing to do with the 
science of grammar. Mr. Tooke has accurately " traced home" some 
conjunctions : in regard to others, he has been mistaken ; but whether 
right or wrong in the particular instances, his " general doctrine" can 
derive no benefit from them. To prove that a word performs one 
function at one time, does not disprove its performing another func- 
tion at another time. Many of Mr. Tooke's etymologies in this part 
of his work are borrowed from former writers ; but those writers 
never conceived anything so absurd, as that derivation was the whole of 
grammar. 

354. Having disposed of these preliminary objections, I come to the Definition 
definitions which have been given by different authors of this part of 
speech. It has been seen that the early Greek grammarians included 
what we call prepositions and conjunctions in the class of ^vvleajioL 
(connectives). Subsequent writers observed, that while the preposi- 
tion expressed a relation of word to word, the conjunction expressed a 
connection of sentence with sentence. Hence Aldus Manutius, a very 
able grammarian of the fifteenth century defines a conjunction, " Pars 
orationis indeclinabilis adnectens ordinansque sententiam." Scaligee, 
in the sixteenth century, says, " Conjunctio est quae conjungit orationes 
plures." Sanctius, towards the end of that century, more briefly, 
" Conjunctio orationes inter se conjungit." Vossius, in the seventeenth 
century, " Conjunctio est quaa sententiam sentential conjungit :" Harris, 
in the eighteenth, " The conjunction connects not words but sen- 
tences ;" and some years after him, Cour De Gebelin, in his figurative 
manner, says, " Une conjonction est unmot, qui de plusieurs tableaux 
de la parole fait un tout," meaning by the word tableau not a single 
object, or word, but such a combination as is properly called a 
sentence. Agreeing with all these authorities in their common prin- 
ciple, I would suggest, as the definition of a conjunction, a part of 
speech serving to show the particular mode in which one sentence is connected 
with another sentence. I designedly omit to notice, as characteristics 
of the conjunction, its being " indeclinable," as stated by Manutius; 
or " void of signification," as stated by Harris. Nor do I think it 
proper to say with Frischlin and others, quoted by Vossius, " that it 
conjoins verbs and sentences, actually or potentially." According to 
the definition of a sentence above given, it is clear that the con- 
joining of verbs must be the conjoining of sentences. And as to the 
words " actually or potentially," they seem merely to have relation 
to those constructions of speech, which are explainable by the figure 
commonly called Ellipsis. On the other hand the expression " ad- 
nectens ordinansque sententias," which was adopted by Manutius 
from the old grammarians, Comminianus and Palaemon, appears very 
material, and suggests the propriety of noticing that sentences are 



200 OF CONJUNCTIONS. [CHAP. XII. 

connected by conjunctions not simply and in an uniform manner, but 
diversely according to their particular modes of connection. 
Do not con- 355. Here again Mr. Tooke objected that there were cases in which 
words. " ' the words, commonly called conjunctions, did not connect sentences, 
or show any relation between them. " You, and I, and Peter, rode 
to London, is one sentence made up of three. Well !" (said he) " So 
far, matters seem to go on very smoothly. It is, You rode, I rode, 
Peter rode. But let us now change the instance, and try some others, 
which are full as common, though not altogether so convenient. Two 
and two make four ; AB and BC and C A form a triangle ; John and 
Jane are a handsome couple. Does AB form a triangle, BC form a 
triangle ? &c. Is John a couple ? Is Jane a couple ? Are two, 
four ?" This objection of Mr. Tooke's seems to have induced Mr. 
Lindley Murray, after defining a conjunction as " a part of speech 
chiefly used to connect sentences," to add, " it sometimes connects 
only words." Now, if it could be shown that the word and, or any 
other word generally used as a conjunction, was occasionally used 
with a different force and effect, that circumstance would not make it 
less a conjunction, when used conjunctionally. In the instances cited, 
however, by Tooke, the word and serves merely to distribute the whole 
into its parts, all which bear relation to the verb : and it is observable, 
that though the verb be not twice expressed, yet it is expressed 
differently from what it would have been, had there been only a 
single nominative. We say, " John is handsome," — " Jane is hand- 
some ;" but we say John and Jane are a handsome couple. In this 
particular, the use of the conjunction differs from that of the pre- 
position : it varies the assertion, and thus does in effect combine 
different sentences ; for though AB does not form a triangle, yet AB 
forms one part of a triangle, and BC forms another part, and CA the 
remaining part ; and these three parts are the whole. So, when 
Perizonius says, " Emi librum x drachmis et iv. obolis," although the 
buying was not wholly effected by the ten drachmas, nor by the four 
oboli ; yet the purchaser did employ ten drachmas in buying, and he 
did also employ four oboli in buying. The meaning, therefore, if fully 
developed, would exhibit two sentences connected by the conjunction 
and. Since the first publication of the passages immediately pre- 
ceding, I have been glad to see the view here taken confirmed by the 
authority of Dr. Latham, in one of his valuable grammatical works.* 
He says, " Although the statement that conjunctions connect not 
words but propositions, and that exclusively, is nearly coeval with 
the study of grammar, it is not yet sufficiently either believed or 
acted upon. ' What,' I have been frequently asked, ' are we to do 
with such expressions as John and Thomas carry a sack to market, 
three and three make six, &c. ? Surely this does not mean that John 
carries one sack and Thomas another ; that one three makes one sum 

* Latham, First Outlines, p. 21. 



CHAP. XII.] OF CONJUNCTIONS. 201 

of six, and another three makes another sum of six, &c.' The answer 
to this lies in giving the proper limitation to the predicates. It is not 
true that John and Thomas each cany a sack ; but it is true that they 
each of them carry. It is not true that each three makes six ; but 
it is true that each three makes (i. e. contributes to the making). As 
far then as the essential parts of the predicate are concerned, there are 
two propositions ; and it is upon the essential parts only that a gram- 
marian rests his definition of a conjunction." It may perhaps be 
asked what is here meant by the essential part of a predicate ; for 
instance, what is the essential part of the predicate in the proposition 
AB, and BC, and CA form a triangle ? I apprehend that the learned 
author last quoted would consider the essential part of the predicate 
to be expressed by the word form ; for it is meant to assert first that 
the line AB essentially forms some part of a figure, say the base ; 
and that BC essentially forms another part, say the perpendicular; and 
that CA essentially forms a third part, say the hypothenuse : and the 
result of these three propositions is, that the three lines/arm a triangle ; 
but this is a result which cannot be obtained, but by expressly or 
tacitly assuming the three first propositions to be true. So, when I 
say John and James are a handsome couple, I mean to assert tha: 
John is handsome and also that Jane is handsome, which two 
assertions are both implied by the conjunction and. 

356. The view which I have here taken of conjunctions leads me Sentences 
to consider first the nature of connected sentences ; secondly, the connectet;U 
different modes of connecting them in point of signification ; and 
thirdly, the expression of such connection by phrases or separate 
words. And first as to the sentences connected. These it has been 
shown must be either enunciative or passionate : in the former the 
verb, in the latter the interjection which stands in the place of a verb, 
is to be taken as the hinge on which all the rest of the sentence turns. 
By means of this we form an unity of thought, a distinct perception 
of some fact, or a feeling of some sentiment, connected with a distinct 
object. But thoughts and sentiments do not always succeed each 
other in the mind as detached and perfectly separate things, but 
more commonly with associations of similarity or contrast, with rela- 
tions of cause and effect, and with a thousand other modifications and 
mutual dependencies. Hence these first and elementary unities be- 
come parts of larger unities : the simple sentence forms only a phrase 
or paragraph in a more comprehensive sentence; and the longest 
sentence is more or less closely connected with what precedes or 
follows it, in a long discourse or poem. Nor are the enunciative 
capable of being connected with enunciative only, or the passionate 
with the passionate ; but we pass naturally from a strong feeling to 
contemplate its consequence, as in the beautiful anthem, " O that I 
had wings like a dove ! Tlien would I flee away, and be at rest ;" * 

* From Psalm lv. 6. 



Length of 
passages. 



Modes of 
connection. 



202 OF CONJUNCTIONS. [CHAP. XII. 

where then, though adverbial in form, acts as a conjunction, by 
showing the dependence of the second sentence on the first. 

357. How far these connections may go, that is to say, how many 
conjunctions may be admitted into one comprehensive sentence, is a 
matter not to be determined by any grammatical rule, but must 
depend on the taste and judgment of the writer ; and great writers, 
more particularly great poets and orators, often seem to indulge in a 
more than common degree of continuity. Thus Milton — 

Now, Morn, her rosy steps in th' eastern clime 
Advancing, sow'd the earth with orient pearl, 
When Adam wak'd, so custom'd ; for his sleep 
Was airy, light, from pure digestion bred, 
And temp'rate vapours bland, which th' only sound 
Of leaves and fuming rills, Aurora's fan, . . 

Lightly dispers'd, mid the shrill, matin song 
Of birds on ev'ry bough. 

Thus, too, Cicero — 

Potestne tibi hujus vitse lux, Catilina, aut hujus cceli spiritus esse jucundus, cum 
scias, horum esse neminem qui nesciat, te pridie Kalendas Januarias, Lepido et 
Tullo Consulibus, stetisse in comitio cum telo ; manum consilium et principuni 
Civitatis interriciendorum causa paravisse ; sceleri ac furori tuo non mentem ali- 
quam aut timorem tuum, sed fortunam Populi Romani obstitisse ? 

And it is to be observed that, after each of these instances, the next 
following sentence begins with a distinct expression of relation to that 
which preceded it. Milton, having described Adam's sleep as light, 
goes on to say, " so much the more his wonder was" to find that the 
rest of Eve had been unquiet : and Cicero having briefly alluded to the 
former atrocities of Catiline, proceeds, " ac jam ilia omitto." Indeed 
there are some writers whose sentences, for whole pages together, are 
connected, and it is difficult to detach a short passage so as to show its 
whole force and effect, without referring to the previous and subse- 
quent parts of the discourse. For instances of this continuous style, 
I may particularly refer to the Sermons on the Creed by the cele- 
brated Dr. Isaac Barrow ; who, it must be confessed, carried this 
method to an excess ; for even in a continued argument the mind 
seems to require some short pauses, and resting places, as it were, to 
enable it to pursue its steps with regularity and firmness. 

358. A slight degree of reflection must teach any one, that the 
modes of connecting sentences, in point of signification, must be very 
various, and consequently that conjunctions may in this view be 
classed under several different heads. It is clear, too, that the grounds 
of distinction between the classes ought to be adopted with care, 
and explained with perspicuity ; so as to prevent the student from 
employing one conjunction, when a very different one may be required 
by the context. Accordingly, the best grammarians have philoso- 
phically investigated the different modes in which one sentence can 
be said to depend on, or be related to another ; and the result of 



CHAP. XII.] OF CONJUNCTIONS. 203 

their labours has been to throw great light on the proper use of con- 
junctions. Mr. Tooke, unable to estimate, or unwilling to acknow- 
ledge the value of these researches, thus endeavoured to depreciate 
them. — " We shall get rid of that farrago of useless distinctions into 
conjunctive, adjunctive, disjunctive, subdisjunctive, copulative, negative- 
copulative, continuative, suhcontinuative, positive, suppositive, causal, 
collective, effective, approbative, discretive, ablative, presumptive, abne- 
gative, completive, augmentative, alternative, hypothetical, extensive, 
periodical, motival, conclusive, explicative, transitive, interrogative, com- 
parative, diminutive, preventive, adequate-preventive, adversative, condi- 
tional, suspensive, illative, conductive, declarative, &c. &c, which explain 
nothing ; and (as most other technical terms are abused) serve only 
to throw a veil over the ignorance of those who employ them." As 
this mode of treating a scientific subject is extremely flattering to the 
indolence of mankind in general, the above passage may not impro- 
bably have produced an injurious effect, in deterring the grammatical 
student from investigations which it falsely describes as unprofitable : 
and I therefore think it proper to examine a declamation, which in 
any other point of view would be totally beneath notice. In the first 
place, there is a manifest want of good faith in heaping together a 
number of words, " conjunctive, adjunctive," &c. &c. &c, which are not 
to be found in any one grammatical writer, and presenting the whole 
as a " farrago" common to such writers. This is a mere trick, and a 
trick extremely unworthy of any man with the least pretension to 
literary reputation. The thirty-nine terms above cited are indeed a 
" farrago ;" they have no meaning as they stand, they are placed in 
no order, and they have no relation to each other ; but whose fault is 
that ? Undoubtedly Mr. Tooke's, for he was the sole author and 
inventor of the " farrago" which he pretended to ridicule. " Most 
other technical terms," says he, " serve only to throw a veil over the 
ignorance of those who employ them." A profound remark ! So, 
the geometrician must not tell us of & parallelogram, or of a rhomboid; 
a surgeon must not speak of the metacarpal bone, or of the arterial 
tube ; nor an engineer of a counterscarp, or a ravelin, because these 
are all technical terms ; and technical terms are a mere veil for 
ignorance ! Mr. Tooke, however, was not original, in applying this 
sort of reasoning to grammar. That philosophic statesman, Jack 
Cade, thus reproaches his prisoner Lord Say, " It will be proved to 
thy face, that thou hast men about thee, that usually talk of a noun 
and a verb, and such abominable words, as no Christian ear can endure 
to hear." Admitting, however, that some technical terms may be 
properly employed, Mr. Tooke asserted that the terms applied to 
classify conjunctions form only a " farrago of useless distinctions." 
Now, this it would have been better for him to prove than to assert : 
only assertion was the easier process of the two, and presented the 
shorter road to celebrity as a grammatical reformer ! If Mr. Tooke 
had submitted to the labour of attempting this proof, he would have 



204 OF CONJUNCTIONS. [CHAP. XII. 

found that some, at least, of the terms which he has specified, serve 
to mark useful distinctions ; and that that utility had been in many 
points well marked out by Mr. Harris, an author whom Mr. Tooke 
affected to hold in so much, but such undeserved, contempt; for 
whatever may have been the errors of Harris, they were not a 
thousandth part so gross, or so injurious to the science of grammar, 
as those into which Tooke himself had fallen. 
SheSe! ^59. The following is a comprehensive view of Mr. Harris's scheme 

for an arrangement of the species of conjunctions, according to their 
signification :• — 



{1. copulative 
fl. suppositive 
2. continuative <J [1. causal 



1. copulative 

[1. suppositive 

2. positive < 



collective. 



2. Disjunctive 



{1. simple 
(1. absolute, or comparative 
2. adversative 1 

[2. adequate, or inadequate. 



360. This scheme, it will be observed, is confined to enunciative 
sentences. The first distinction (though not clearly so stated by 
Harris) is substantially into connexive and disjunctive conjunctions. 
Conjunctions (says he), while they connect sentences, either connect 
also their meanings, or not." And. so says Scaliger, " Aut sensum 
conjungunt ac verba, aut verba tantum conjungunt, sensum vero dis- 
jungunt." Vossius, recognising the same distinction in principle, 
applies to the first class the designation of copulatives. " Alias" (says 
he) " sunt copulatives, ut, et, que, ac ; alias sunt disjunctivce ut vel, aut." 
The former of these terms, he adds, is used in a strict sense, " Nam 
omnis quidem conjunctio copulat ; sed has simpliciter id praestant 
citra disjunctionem sententiae, aut caussalitatem, vel ratiocinationem." 
On the other hand he defends the expression of disjunctive conjunctions, 
because by them " conjunguntur voces materialiter, disjunguntur 
formaliter." And Boethius gives the same reason in different words, 
where he says, " Conjunctionem ea quae conjungit inter se, disjungere 
in tertio." " I do not cite these expressions of Vossius and Boethius 
as most happily chosen to illustrate the distinction in question ; yet 
that distinction is no less obvious than fundamental. Every one 
must perceive at first sight, the marked difference between these two 
passages : — 

1. Caesar was ambitious, and Rome was enslaved. 

2. Caesar was ambitious, or Borne was enslaved. 

In each passage, there are two propositions joined together by a 
word, which we call a conjunction, and which does not enter into the 
construction of either proposition. In the first passage, the joining 
word (and) is a connexive conjunction : it merely adds the one pro- 
position to the other, in the flow of discourse, without intimating that 
the facts asserted in them relate at all to each other. In the second 



CHAP. XII.] OF CONJUNCTIONS. 205 

passage, the joining word (or) rs a disjunctive conjunction : whilst it 
joins the one proposition to the other, as successive parts of the same 
argument, it disjoins the facts asserted in them, as standing on dif- 
ferent though indefinite grounds of belief ; for the meaning is, I do not 
assert positively that Csesar was ambitious, nor do I assert that Rome 
was enslaved; but I assert that if Csesar was not ambitious, then 
Rome was enslaved, and vice versa. Gellius uses the word connexiva 
for that sort of conjunction, which Vossius calls copulativa ; and the 
former term seems better suited than the latter to the scheme adopted 
by Harris, who divides " the conjunctions, which conjoin both sen- 
tences and their meanings," (i. e. those which I call connectives,') into 
copulatives and continuatives. The copulative conjunction " does no 
more," according to him, "than barely couple sentences; and is 
therefore applicable to all subjects whose natures are not incompatible. 
Continuatives, on the contrary, by a more intimate connection, consoli- 
date sentences into one continuous whole ; and are therefore applicable 
only to subjects which have an essential coincidence. To explain by 
examples, — 'Tis no way improper to say Lysippus was a statuary, 
and Priscian was a grammarian — The sun shineth, and the sly is clear. 
But 'twould be absurd to say Lysippus was a statuary because 
Priscian was a grammarian — though not to say the sun shineth 
because the shy is clear. The reason is, that, with respect to the 
first, the coincidence is merely accidental ; with respect to the last, 
'tis essential and founded in nature." The Greek name for the copula- 
tive (in this sense) was ^vvheafxog avjj.TrKeKTt.K6Q ; for the continuative 

GVVCLTTTIKOQ, 01* TTapaaVVaTVTLKOQ. 

361. The continuatives are subdivided by Harris into suppositive Continua- 
and positive. The suppositives are such as if; the positives, such as 
because, therefore, as, &c. The former denote (necessary) connection, 
but do not assert existence ; the latter imply both the one and the 
other. The Greek term avvcnrTiKOQ and the Latin continuaiiva was 
applied to the suppositive conjunctions, which extend not only to 
possible but even to impossible suppositions, as, " if the sky fall, we 
shall catch larks ; the positives were called irapauvvcmrLKbi or sub- 
continuativo3, and assumed the actual existence of the primary fact ; 
and this either where the connection is strictly and logically necessary, 
or where it is mere matter of analogy, the former case being ex- 
pressed by because, &c, the latter by as, &c. Of the suppositives, 
Gaza says, vTrap^iv fiev ov, uKokovdiav £e riva, kou ra^tv crjXovaiv : 
Priscian says they signify to us " qualis est ordinatio et natura 
rerum, cum dubitatione aliqua essentia^ rerum." And Scaliger says, 
they conjoin "sine subsistentia necessaria; potest enim subsistere, et 
non subsistere, utrumque enim admittunt." The positives are either 
causal or collective. The causals are such as because, since, &c, which 
subjoin causes to effects ; e. gr. the sun is in eclipse, because the moon 
intervenes. The collectives are such as subjoin effects to causes; 
e. gr. the moon intervenes, therefore the sun is in eclipse. The causals 






206 OF CONJUNCTIONS. [CHAP. XII. 

were called in Greek 'AirwXoyucoi, and in Latin causales or causativce ; 
the collectives were called in Greek HvWoyigrtKoi, and in Latin col- 
lective or illativae. 

Disjunctives. 362. The disjunctive conjunctions are in like manner divisible into 
various classes. Their first distinction is into simple and adversative. 
A simple disjunctive conjunction, disjoins and opposes indefinitely as 
either it is day, or it is night. An adversative disjoins with a positive 
and definite opposition, asserting the one alternative and denying the 
other; as it is not day, but it is night. Again, the adversatives, 
according to Harris, admit of two distinctions, first as they are either 
absolute or comparative, and secondly as they are either adequate or in- 
adequate. The absolute adversative is where there is a simple oppo- 
sition of the same attribute in different subjects, or of different 
attributes in the same subject, or of different attributes in different 
subjects; as 1. Achilles was brave, but Ther sites was not ; 2. Gorgias 
was a sophist, but not a philosopher ; 3. Plato was a philosopher, but 
Hippias was a sophist. The comparative adversative marks the equality 
or excess of the same attribute in different subjects, as Nireus was 
more beautiful than Achilles — Virgil was AS great a poet AS Cicero was 
an orator. These relate to substances and their qualities, but the 
other sort of adversatives relate to events, and their causes or conse- 
quences. Mr. Harris applies to these latter the terms adequate and 
inadequate ; he however confesses that this is a distinction referring only 
to common opinion, and the form of language consonant thereto ; for 
in strict metaphysical truth no cause that is not adequate is any cause 
at all. Thus we may say, Troy will be taken unless the Palladium be 
preserved ; where the word unless implies as matter of opinion, that 
the preservation of the Palladium will be an adequate preventive of the 
capture of Troy. On the other hand, when we say, Troy will be 
taken although Hector defend it, we intimate an opinion that Hector's 
defending it, though employed to prevent the capture, will be an 
inadequate preventive. 

Subdisjunc- 363. Priscian introduces a distinction which he calls subdisjunctiva, 
and in which he is followed by Scaliger and Vossrus. According 
to these authorities, the Latin sive, answering nearly to the Greek 
eir ovv, is a subdisjunctive conjunction, inasmuch as it disjoins not 
the meaning of any sentence, but merely different names given to a 
conception involved in a sentence. Thus " Alexander sive Paris " 
signifies the same person who is sometimes called Alexander, and 
sometimes Paris. " A globe or sphere " means the same figure, which 
some call a globe, and some a sphere. " John Brown alias Thomas 
Webb " means the same individual who has gone at different times 
by these different names. But if the words sive, or, and alias are 
here to be deemed conjunctions, it must be by a very different ellipsis 
from that employed in the case of a disjunctive. When we say dis- 
junctively " every number is even or odd," the ellipsis if filled up 
would be " every particular number is either an even number, or 



tive 



CHAP. XII. J OF CONJUNCTIONS, 207 

else it is an odd number." But when we say " Alexander or Paris 
fled from the field of battle," the ellipsis if filled up would be a 
person fled from the field of battle, who was called Alexander, or else 
he was called Paris. Unfortunately we employ our English word or 
in both characters, disjunctive and subdisjunctive, which sometimes 
occasions no small obscurity, especially in narratives. It were to be 
wished that we had two different words for these two different pur- 
poses ; but since that is not the case, it becomes the more necessary 
to distinguish the different functions of the same word by appropriate 
designations. 

364. It must be observed that many old grammarians not only other 
classify conjunctions differently from the scheme above adopted, and 
give other names to the different species than those here employed ; 
but when they use the same terms, it is sometimes with a different 
force and effect. Thus Apollonius divided causal conjunctions into 

five species, viz., continuatives, subcontinuatives, proper causals, ad- 
junctives, and effectives, and in this he was followed by Manutius. It 
would be endless, however, to note all these diversities of arrange- 
ment; and as Mr. Harris's scheme is one of the simplest, I have 
chosen to follow it, with some small correction. 

365. Having thus seen how sentences may be connected together Conjunc- 
in point of signification, I come now to consider how they may be phrases, 
connected in expression. Now it is manifest, that one sentence may, 

and generally speaking, in a long discourse, the majority of sentences 
must, serve to lead the mind from what precedes to what follows. It 
would, however, be endless to attempt to point out all the means by 
which this is effected ; nor would such an explanation, if practicable, 
properly fall within the scope of grammar. The remark nevertheless 
is important ; for a sentence is in this respect only the development 
of an operation of the mind more briefly effected by a word or a 
phrase. In treating of prepositions, I first considered prepositional 
phrases, and then showed how those phrases were gradually com- 
pressed into words constituting that class to which the name of pre- 
position is usually assigned. In like manner, I here think it advisable 
to examine first the Conjunctional phrases, and then the separate words 
called Conjunctions. It seems probable that in the early attempts to 
form a connected discourse, the junction of sentences, which is now 
performed by a single word, could not easily be effected by unprac- 
tised speakers, except by the more circuitous mode of whole sen- 
tences, or phrases. In process of time these were contracted by 
means of ellipses, that is, by dropping out those portions of the sen- 
tence or phrase which were easily supplied by the intelligence of the 
hearer, and retaining only the word which most distinctly marked in 
the one sentence the sort of dependence on or relation which it bore 
to the other. Hence it is, that even at this day there are certain 
conjunctional forms, concerning which it is not always easy to deter- 
mine whether they should be regarded as words or phrases. Thus 



208 OF CONJUNCTIONS. [CHAP. XII. 

R. Stephanus says of quamobrem, that it is " unica dictio, quibus- 
dam etiam tres :" and Vossius says " quamobrem, quasobres, propterea, 
quare, et similia, non videntur hujus esse classis (sc. conjunctionum) 
quia non tarn vox unica sunt, eaque composita, quam plures." And 
again, " Vix caussa apparet cur quamobrem magis sit vox unica, quam 
earn ob rem : vel quare quam ea re ; ut illo Tulliano, Ea re ad te 
statim Aristocritum misi. n * So Lucretius : — 

Quas ob res, ubi viderimus nil posse creari 
A nihilo.f 

In our own language several of the conjunctions now considered as 
single words, were formerly phrases ; such are because, therefore, where- 
fore ; and such too are the following in Old English, Scottish, and 
French, Howe be it— for ate moche — at least waye — not forcing whether 
■ — contrariwise — insafer as— pur ceo que — cest asavoir — and over that — 
coment que — how often, so often — no the less — neuerthelas — not for thi — 
nought gaynstandand—forfered that — set in cais — put the cais—forseing 
that, &c. &c. 

Howe be it, the kynge held styll his siege. Berners' Froissart. 

Bot for als moclie as sum micht think or seyne 

Quhat nedis me apoun so lytill evyn 

To writt all this ; I ansuere thus ageyne. The King's Quair. 

This geare lacketh wethering ; at least waye it is not for me to plough. 

Bishop Latimer. 

These words goe generally to all the king's tenante — not forcing wlietlier he haue 
the reuersion by dyseent. Sir W. Staunford, A.D. 1590. 

Contrariwise, certain Laodiceans and lukewarm persons think they may accom- 
modate points of religion by middle ways. Bacon. Essays. 

And decemis the saidis actis and euery ane of thame to be abolishit and extinct 
for euer, insafer as ony of the saidis actis ar repugnant and contrarie to the eonfes- 
sioun and word of God foirsaidis. Scot. Act. Pari. A.D. 1567. 

E pur ceo qe aucunes gentz de nre Roiaume se doutent qe les aides &c. pussent 
turner en servage a eus e a leurs heirs avoms graunte pur nous et pur nos heires qe 
mes tieles aides &c. ne treroms a custume. Stat. 25 Edw. I.c.l, A.D. 1297. 

Meismes les chartres en toutz leur pointz en pies devaunt eus e en jugementz les 
facent alower, cest asavoir la grand chartre des franchises come ley commune, e la 
chartre de la forest solom 1' assise de la forest. Ibid. 

That — the same fyne be openly and solemply rad and proclaymed in the same 
court — And in the same tyme that it is so redd and proclaymed all plees cesse ; 
and over that a transcript of the same fyne be sent by the seid justices unto the 
justices of assisez. Stat. 1 Ric. III. c J 7, MS. 

II de common droit poit distreiner pur le rent aderere, coment que tiel done fuit 
fait sauns fait. Littleton, sect. 214. 

Hov: often his eye turned to his attractiue adamant, so often did an vnspeakeable 
horrour strike his noble heart. Sir P. Sidney's Arcadia. 

What ansuere thei bare the sothe can I not say 

JS T o the les of fele this was the com on sawe. R. De Brunne. 



* Epist. ad Fam. 14, 3. -J De Rer. Nat. 1, 155. 



CHAP. XII.] OF CONJUNCTIONS. 209 

Youe knowe, Lordes Syracusans, that we haue hytherto done in thys warre, as 
men of honestie : neuerthelas, leste there be anny that vnderstandeth not fullye the 
affayre, I wolle well declare yt vnto hym. JS T icolls's Thucydides, fo. 191. 

Was mad another statute, that non erle no baroun 
Xo other lorde sfoute ne fraunkeleyn of toun 
Tille holy kirke salle gyne tenement rent no lond. 
Not for tM he wille that alie religioun 
Haf and hold in skrlle that gyuen is at resoun. 

E. De Brunne. 

Item it is ordanyt that all craftis &c. be distroyit nought gaynstandand ony priui- 
legis or fredome geifyn in the contrare. Scot. Act. Pari. A.D. 1424. 

He slogh him sone that ilk day 

Forfered that he sold oght say. The Seuyn Sages. 

With stout eurage agane him wend I will 

Thocht he in proues pas the grete Achill, 

Or set in cais sic armour he weris as he, 

Wrocht be the handis of God Vulcanus sle. Gaicin Douglas. 

And put the cais that I may not optene 

From Latyne land thaim to expell all clene, 

Tit at leist thare may fall stop or delay. Idem. 

It may be ordered that ii or iii of our owne shippes do see the sayde Frenche 
soldiers wafted to the coast of France ; forseing that our sayd shippes entre no 
hauen there. Q. Elizabeth to Sir W. Cecil. 

It is plain, that these phrases operate, with relation to the sen- 
tences between which they show a relation, exactly in the same 
manner as the words do, which we call conjunctions. A phrase is 
first abbreviated into its principal words, and these are again con- 
tracted into one short word. Thus the French c'est asavoir above 
quoted was probably first translated into English, " it is to know," 
or " it is to wit," whence we now have in our legal documents the 
abbreviated phrase, " to wit ;" as from the Latin videre licet comes 
videlicet, which we have adopted into the English language. These 
abbreviations and contractions are very arbitrary in their use ; and 
the longer sometimes supersedes the snorter. Our ancestors in the 
fifteenth century used to say where, for that conjunction which we 
now express by whereas, i. e. where that. 

Wher in a statute made in the xvij yere of the reign of King Edward the iiijth 
hit was ordeigned, &c. &c. Please it therefore youre highnesse &c. to ordeign. 

Stat. 1 Hie. III. c. 6 > MS. 

366. I have before observed on the erroneous notion entertained by conjaat*i©»s» 
some grammarians, that men at any period, of history set to work 
" to invent little words" (d'inventer des petits mots), to be employed 
merely as prepositions : and ■ the same remark is applicable to con- 
junctions. It is true, that of some few conjunctions we cannot trace 
the origin with perfect certainty ; but even these are manifestly con- 
nected more or less closely with significant words in different lan- 
guages or dialects : and the far greater number are distinctlv seen to 
have been used as nouns or verbs, somewhat differing perhaps in 
form, but showing a clear analogy in signification. This will be 
2. p 



210 OF CONJUNCTIONS. [CHAP. XII. 

rendered sufficiently clear, by tracing the etymology of two or three 
of the principal conjunctions ; the others being reserved for their 
appropriate place in a future part of this treatise. 

And. 367. " The principal copulative," says Harris, " is and" which 
answers to the Greek kcll and the Latin et, and is found substan- 
tially in all cultivated languages. Vossius considers the Latin et to 
be derived per apocopen from the Greek hi, prceterea, insuper ; or, 
more properly speaking, to be the very word en, only pronounced 
more briefly by the Latins. It is remarkable that in the most 
ancient remains that we have of the Latin language, the fragments of 
the laws of the Twelve Tables, et rarely if ever occurs, but its place 
is supplied by the enclitic que, which is probably of the same origin 
as the Greek ical. The force and effect'of all these words, as simply 
coupling together sentences, will be fully understood from what has 
been already said of the copulative conjunctions. Mr. Tooke derives 
our common word and from An-ad, which he says in Anglo-Saxon 
signifies dare congeriem. This etymology is altogether obscure. It 
has even been doubted whether Anan, which he expounds dare, to 
give or grant, had any such meaning ; and as to the syllable ad, which 
he translates congeriem, it signified a funeral pile. However, with 
his usual confidence in his own judgment, he elsewhere says, " I have 
already given the derivation which I believe will alone stand exami- 
nation." Skinner, more modestly, but with at least as much plausi- 
bility, says, ' ' And — nescio an a Lat. addere, q. d. add, interjecta per 
epenthesin n, ut in render, a reddendo." A word of this very ancient 
use can only be guessed at with much doubt, and may possibly be 
itself one of the original roots of language. We find terms of some 
analogy to it in the early Gothic dialects. In the Frankish and Ala- 
mannic it is written indi, inti, enti, unte, unde ; in the modern German 
und ; in Icelandic end, in Lower Saxon un. Adelung, considering 
(like Skinner) that the letter n is often inserted in one dialect, while 
it is omitted in another, is of opinion that the Latin et, and Greek hi 
are identical in origin with the Teutonic enti, unte, &c. It is possible 
too, that our word and may have a connection with the Masso-Gothic 
and, which is used as a preposition answering to the Greek kv, etg, 
£7n, Kara; or with the word, andar, which in the same language 
means " other." Upon the whole, Skinner's suggestion is probably 
not very remote from the truth ; for the meaning of and is clearly add ; 
nay, in separate sentences we may always substitute the imperative 
add for the conjunction and, with little if any difference in the force or 
intelligibility of the sentence. Thus, " John rode, add Peter walked, 
add James sailed," will not only convey the same notions, but will 
connect them nearly in the same manner, as if it had been more 
elegantly written, " John rode, and Peter walked, and James sailed." 

.If. 368. I come now to the continuative conjunctions, that is to say, 

those which not only connect sentences and their meanings by coupling 
them together, but mark a dependence of one on the other ; and this, 



CHAP. XII.] OF CONJUNCTIONS. 211 

first as suppositives — if is called by Mr. Harris a suppositive conjunc- 
tion : some other grammarians term it a conditional ; but however it 
may be designated, the general force and effect of such a conjunction 
is obvious in most languages. It serves to mark the certain de- 
pendence of one event on another, without asserting the absolute 
existence of either. We therefore intimate, that if the one be, the 
other must necessarily result from it ; that when we are sure of the 
one, then we may reckon upon the other also ; or that the former 
being given as a datum, the latter follows by the power of reasoning. 
Hence the Greek ei, and the Latin si merely expressed being ; for u 
is part of the verb ew or eifii, and si is part of siet or sit. The power 
of the conjunction ei is thus elegantly illustrated by Plutarch, ac- 
cording to the free translation of the old English folio : "In logike, 
this conjunction EI (that is to say if, which is so apt to continue a 
speech and proposition) hath a great force, as being that which giveth 
forme unto that proposition, which is most agreeable to discourse of 
reason and argumentation. And who can deny it? considering that 
the very brute beasts themselves have in some sort a certeine know- 
ledge and true intelligence of the subsistence of things ; but nature 
hath given to man alone the notice of consequence, and the judgement 
for to know how to discerne that which followeth upon every thing. 
For that it is day, and that it is light, the very woolves, dogs, and 
cocks perceive ; but that if it be day, of necessitie it must make the aire 
light, there is no creature, save onely man that knoweth." The Greek 
or Latin construction, therefore, is " be it that there is day there must 
be light." Again, the German conjunction answering to our if is 
wenn, which also signifies when. Hence the expression, " Wenn man 
dich fragt, so antworte," which signifies " if any one asks you, answer 
thus," may be rendered with little difference of meaning, " when any 
one asks you, answer thus." The etymology of our English conjunc- 
tion if has of late been matter of dispute. Skinner first traced a 
connection between it and the Anglo-Saxon verb gifan, to give. Gif 
the Anglo-Saxon conjunction, he says, was used in his time in Lin- 
colnshire for if Tooke, it seems, was struck with this suggestion of 
Skinner's; insomuch that (as has been well observed) "this word 
was probably the foundation of his whole system."* Believing that 
if was the imperative of give, " he naturally enough concluded that 
other particles might be accounted for by the same process. Accord- 
ingly he expended a profusion of labour and perverse ingenuity in de- 
tecting imperatives where none ever existed, or possibly could."j 
Dr. Jamieson conceives that neither the Gothic jdbai (as he writes it), 
nor the Alamannic ibu, ob, oba, nor the Icelandic if or ef can be 
formed from the verbs denoting to give, in those languages.! Else- 
where it has been remarked, " that the great variety of ancient forms 
makes it difficult to determine the precise etymon. Some are not 

* Quart. Rev., No. 108, p. 316. f Ibid. 

% Scottish Diet., art. Gif. 

p2 



212 OF CONJUNCTIONS. [CHAP. XIT. 

unlike the Sanscrit iva — (sicut) — others have the form of nouns. The 
old German ibu, ipu, may be resolved into the ablative or instru- 
mental of ipa, iba, (dubium) : and the Icelandic ef (if,) appears to be 
connected with the substantive eft, a doubt, and efa, to doubt, in that 
language."* With all due deference to the learned authors of these 
arguments, it appears to me that they are not quite conclusive. It 
surely does not follow that because a suppositive conjunction in one 
language is not connected with a verb of a particular signification in 
that language, a similar conjunction cannot possibly be connected with 
a verb of like signification in another language. It does not follow, 
that because h is not connected with ^i^oj/it in Greek, nor si with 
dare in Latin, there can be no connection in Maeso-Gothic between 
the conjunction jabai or yabai, and the verbs and' nouns gibai, giba, at- 
giban, gaft, atgaft ; nor in Anglo-Saxon, between the conjunction gif 
or gyf, and the imperative gif or gyf the infinitive gif an or gyf an, the 
preterite gaf or geaf, or the substantives gifa or gyfa, gift or 
gyft, &c. ; nor again in English between the conjunction if (written 
or pronounced in old or provincial English and Scotch, yf yiff, yiffe, 
yef yive, geve, gef gyf, gif, gif, gin), and the verbs, nouns, and 
participles gave, yeve, gyf, gaf, giftys, yarn, yevyth, yeftys,yeft, yiftis, 
yevours, yevers, given, geven, yeven, yeoven. It is to be remarked that 
whatever may be the origin of the various Teutonic words signifying 
to give, they have manifestly undergone many changes of pronuncia- 
tion both in the consonants and vowels ; and the same is observable 
in the Scandinavian dialects. Of the German verb geben, the two 
first persons present are ich gebe, du gibst, the past indicative is ich 
gab, the conjunctive ich gabe, and the imperative gib; and the noun 
(gift) is gabe. In the Frankish and Alamannic, we find as nouns or 
verbs gaba, geba, heba, Mb, gheban, ghibu, gibu. In the Icelandic, 
Swedish, and Danish, gafwa, gifwa, gifva, gofwa, gaf, gave, give. It 
is also to 'be remarked that this variety has been increased by the 
different force and effect given to the Gothic letter (J and the Anglo- 
Saxon 3, of which the first was taken from one form of the Roman 
G, of the lower empire, and the other from another form of the same 
letter. The different powers of these letters have been expressed in 
different dialects by g, j, y, and z. Hence the Anglo-Saxon geboren 
(born) answers to the modern German geboren, and old English 
yborn ; the Anglo-Saxon daeg to the modern English day, the Frisiac 
jern to the Anglo-Saxon georn and English yearn, and the Anglo- 
Saxon gear to the English year, and the old Scottish word written (if 
■not pronounced) zeir. A third remark is also material, namely, that 
it is not only the imperative of the verb to give, which has been used 
with a conjunctional force, but also the past participle given of the 
same verb. Keeping in view these remarks, I proceed to the following 
examples of the connection between the nouns, verbs, and participles, 
alluded to, with the different forms of the conjunction in question. 
* Quart. Rev. ut. sup. 



CHAP. XII.] OF CONJUNCTIONS. 213 

i. Mceso-Gothic. — Here the conjunction which Di\ Jamieson reads 
jabai (if) being spelt with Q, would more agreeably to our pronun- 
ciation be read yabai, and is connected with gibai, giba, gaft, &c, 
just as our provincial word yate is with the ordinary word gate. 

Yabai afletith mannam missadedins ize. — If you pardon men their misdeeds. 

Matt. vi. 14. 

Gibaiizai afstassis bores. — Let him give her a bill of divorce. Matt. v. 31 » 

Atbair tho giba theina.' — Present thy gift. Matt. v. 24-. 

Wato mis ana fotuns meinans ni gaft. — Water to me for my feet thou gavesi 
not. Luke, vii. 44. 

Atgaf siponyam seinaim. — He gave to his disciples. Mark, viii. 6. 

Hlaif unsaruna thena sinteinan gif uns himmadaga. — Our constant bread give us 
this day.. Matt. vi. 11. 

ii. Anglo-Saxon. — Here the z is equally used for words which 
answer to our g and y : — 

Zif ze that secan willeth. — If (pro v. gif) ye will seek that. 

Alfred's Bede, 1. 1. c. 1. 

Se cyhing his zife sealde. — The king presented his gifts. Ibid. 1. 2, c. 3. 

He forgeaf thone anweald his apostolon. — He gave the power to his apostles. 

Ibid. 1. 3, c. 7. . 

iii. . Old English and Scotch : — 

Hartely myght thei warry me, 
That of ther gud had ben so fre, 

To gyffe me and to sende. Sir Amadds. 

Sir Amis answerd tho 

Sir, therof give Y nought a slo 

Do al that thou may. Amis and Amiloun. 

Not Avarice the foule caytyfe 

Was halfe to grype so ententyfe, 

As Largesse is to yeue & spende. Chaucer. ■ 

And with hys hevy mase of stele 

There he gaff the kyng hys dele'. Richard Coer de Lion. 

And truely in the blustring of her looke, shee yarn gladnes & comforte sodainly 
to all my wittes. Chaucer, Test. Lov. 

The remedy by the seid estatutes is not verray perfite nor yevyth certeyn ne 
hasty remedy. Stat. 11 Hen. VII. c. 22, MS. ■ 

He gaf gyftys largelyche 

Gold & syluer & clodes ryche. Launfal Miles. 

For gret yeftys that she gan bede, 

To londe the schypmen gonne her lede. 

Octouian Imperator. 

Every astate, feoffement, yeft, relesse, graunte, lesis and confirmacidns of 
landys. Stat. 1 Rich. III. c. 1. MS. 

Provided that this acte — extend not — to any graunte or grauntes, yeft or yiftis, 
had or made by the kinges letres patentes to the same Anthony. 

Stat. 11 Hen. VII. c. 31. MS. 
Ayenst the sellers, feffours, yevours or grauntours, and his or their heires. 

Stat. 1 Rich. III. c. 1. MS. 



214 OF CONJUNCTIONS. [CHAP. XII. 

That no artificer ne laborer herafter named take no more ne gretter wagis then in 
this estatute is lymytted, upon the payne assessed as well unto the taker as to the 
yever. Stat. 11 Hen. VII. c. 22. MS. 

Which lawe by negligence ys disused, and therby grete boldnes ys goven to sleers 
and murdrers. " Stat. 3 Hen. VII. c. 2. MS. 

Yeoven under our signet. Q. Elizabeth, Let. to Sir W. Cecil. 

If the seid lessee or lesses within viii daies warnyng to theym yeven by any of 
the seid justices of the peas. Stat.. 11 Hen.. VII. c. 9, MS. 

Or yit gewe Virgil stude well before. Gawin Douglas. 

Eorthliche knyght, or eorthliche kyng 

Nis so swete in no thyng ; 

O-ef he is God,. he is mylde. Hyng Alisaunder. 

He askyd at all the route, 

Gyff ony durste com and prove 

A cours for hys lemannes love. Richard Coer de Lion-. 

For giff he be of so grete excellence, 

That he of every wight hath cure & charge, 

Quhat have I gilt to him, or doon offense ? 

K. James I. The King's Quair. 

The domes and law pronoun cis sche to thaym then, 

The feis of thare laubouris equalye 

Gart distribute. Gif dout fallis thareby 

Be cut or cavill that plede sone partid was. Gawin Douglas. 

Ich am comen hider to day, 

For to sauen hem, yiue Y may. Amis and Amiloun. 

Tef thou me louest ase mon says, 
Lemmon as y wene ; 
Ant yef hit thi wille be 
Thou loke that hit be sene. 

MS.Harl. No. 2253, fol. 80.- 

Wurthe we never for men telde,. 
Sith he hath don us thys despyte, 
Tiffe he agayn passe quyte. Richard Coer de Lion. 

He thought yif ich com hir to, 

More than ichaue ydo, 

The abbesse wil souchy gile. Lay Le Freine. 

The lawe of the land ys that yf eny man be slayne in the day, and the felon not 
taken, the townshipp wher the deth or. murder is done shal be amerced. 

Stat. 3 Hen. VII. c. 2, MS. 

Gin living worth cou'd win my heart,. 

You wou'd na speak in vain. Scots Song. 

It can hardly be doubted but that these words geve, gef, gyff, giff, 
gif, give, yef, yiffe, yiff, yif, yf, which in the last eleven examples are 
conjunctions, are the same in origin with the preceding verbs geve, 
yeve, gyffe, gaff, yave, yevyth, and the nouns giftys, yeftys, yeft, yiftis, 
yevours, yevers ; and it seems still plainer that the conjunction gi'n is 
merely a different application of the participle goven, yeoven, or yeven, 
which is the. modern given. But this change in the use of the words 
if, gif, g'in, &c. causes them to express a new "posture, stand, turn,. 



CHAP. XII.] OF CONJUNCTIONS. 215 

or thought of mind " (as Mr. Locke speaks), and thus to perform a 
different function in language, or become a different " part of speech," 
namely, a conjunction. Mr. Tooke, therefore, is right so far as he 
follows Skinner, who first showed the connection between if and 
give : but he is wrong, when, trusting to his own theory, he says, 
" our corrupted if has always the signification of the English impe- 
rative give, and no other''' In short he is right where he is not 
original, and original only where he is not right. Nor is his " addi- 
tional proof" of much relevancy. " As an additional proof," says 
he, " we may observe, that whenever the datum upon which any 
conclusion depends, is a sentence, the article that if not expressed is 
always understood, and may be inserted after if : as in the instance — 

— — — My largesse 

Hath lotted her to be your brother's mistresse, 

Gif shee can be reclam'd ; gif not, his prey. 

Sad Shepherd, act 2, sc. 1. 
The poet might have said, 

Gif that she can be reclam'd, &c. 
But the article that is not understood, and cannot be inserted after if 
where the datum is not a sentence but some noun governed by the 
verb if or give. Exam. ' How will the weather dispose of you to- 
morrow ?' ' If fair, it will send me abroad, &c.' " So far Tooke. 
Now the whole of this observation turns on the peculiar idiom of the 
English language, which admits one form of ellipsis and not another ; 
for all these constructions are elliptical ; and the word that, which is 
a conjunction as well as if, has not the least pretension in such sen- 
tences to be called an article. I shall have occasion hereafter to notice 
some other uses of this conjunction, when I speak of the phrases 01 
si — ! gin, an if as if, &c. 

369. Of the disjunctive conjunctions, I will here only instance Though. 
Though, a word of the class which Harris calls inadequate adversa- Althou ? h ' 
tives ; that is to say, conjunctions uniting two sentences, one of which 
states an event or circumstance, and the other states another event or 
circumstance as inadequate to prevent the former : ex. gr. " Troy will 
be taken although Hector defend it," where the conjunction although 
serves to show that Hector defends Troy with a view to prevent its 
being taken ; but that this preventive is inadequate to produce the 
intended effect. We may, however, observe that the same conjunc- 
tion is used, and by a just analogy to mark an apparent incongruity 
of qualities, where the possession of the one does not, in fact, pre- 
clude the existence of the other, as, " though brave, yet pious ;" though 
learned, yet polite." But a more forcible illustration of the true 
nature of our adversative conjunction, though, cannot be given than in 
the daring speech of Macbeth — ■ 

Though Birnam wood be come to Dunsinane, 

And thou oppos'd being of no woman born, 

Yet will I try the last. 



216 OF CONJUNCTIONS. [CHAP. XII. 

If we examine the real force of the word though in these and similar 
passages (and although is merely an intensive form of the same con- 
junction), we shall find that it does not imply an absolute inadequacy 
to produce a given effect, but such an inadequacy as may be thought 
to exist. It might have been thought, for instance, that Troy could 
not fall, if it was defended by Hector. It might have been thought, 
that a particular individual distinguished for bravery was therefore 
unlikely to be very pious ; or that one absorbed in the pursuit of 
learning would pay little attention to the minutiae of politeness. 
Above all it might have been thought, that when events apparently 
miraculous, and on whose impossibility a man of strong feelings like 
Macbeth had staked his rank, his honour, and his life, did really come 
to pass, he would have been utterly prostrated with terror, and 
unable to strike a blow in his own defence. Judging from the ordi- 
nary course of human affairs, such thoughts would not have been 
unreasonable. The conjunction though, therefore, merely indicated an 
unexpected difference between truth and probability : and being 
directly connected with the probable, it required another conjunction, 
such as yet, or nevertheless, to denote the true. Mr. Tooke says, 
" Tho' or though is the imperative thaf or thqfig, from the verb thafian, 
or thafigan to allow." This is one of the few instances in which he 
ventured on an original etymology : it appears indeed at first sight 
plausible, but I fear it will scarcely bear examination. The proper 
meaning of the verb thafigan, thafian, or gethafian is to permit, as by 
a superior to an inferior. In a charter of William the Conqueror we 
find, " Ic nelle gethafian thaet aenig man this abrecan;" which in the 
ancient Latin version is thus rendered, " Ego nolo consentire ut aliquis 
istud frangat :" and the same clause occurs in two other charters, one 
of Henry I., the other of Henry II., in the latter of which the verb 
is spelt gethauian, i. e., gethavian. If this had been the origin of ; our 
conjunction, we should find an Anglo-Saxon conjunction thafig, or 
thaf; but there is no such conjunction in that language ; the corre- 
spondent Anglo-Saxon conjunction is theah, a word plainly connected 
with the Anglo-Saxon substantive theaht, as our conjunction though 
is with our corresponding substantive thought. Neither do we find 
the/*, or v, of thafian or thavian, in the analogous conjunctions of any 
of the other German dialects, Teutonic or Scandinavian. Ademjng, 
under the German word doch, says, " In Low Saxon this particle is 
sounded doch and dog, by Ulphila thau, by Ottfried thoh, by Willeram 
doh, in Anglo-Saxon theah, in Dutch doch, in English though, in Danish 
dog, in Swedish dock." 

In old English and Scottish we find it written very variously, thah, 
thau, thaugh, thoffe, thof, thocht, and thought : — 

Ei chard thah thou be euer trichard 
Tricchen shalt thou neuer more. 

Song on Battle of Lewes. 



CHAP. XII.] OF CONJUNCTIONS. 217 

Ant for ir feirnesse, thau ho be comen of threlle, 
Hire wedlac ne seal ho nout lesen all. 

Vita Sanctce Margaretce. 

Thaugh me slowe feole of heom, 

They si owe mo of the kyngis men. Kyng Alisaunder. 

Thoffe T owe syche too. Sir Amadas. 

Thof men wolde alle the londe seche. 

MS. Hart. 7333, fol. 125. " 

Bot tliocht I failyeit of rhyming, 
Forgif me for my will was gude. 

Scottish Horn, of Alexander. 

ThocM be na reson persaue I mycht but fale 

Quhat than the force of armis cond auale. Gawin Douglas. 

Tliocht he remission 
Haif for prodission, 
Schame and suspission 

Ay with him dwells. Dunbar. 

The king — woll — that suche possession — Teste and be — holy in the 
other persone — in like wise as thought he had never be enfeoffed. 

Stat.l Ric.III.cbyMS. 

It is to be observed that Gawin Douglas and other Scottish writers 
spell tliocht, the past tense of the verb, to think, exactly as they do this 
conjunction : — 

So that we thocht maist semelye, in ane field, 

To de fechtand ennarmed vnder schield. Gawin Douglas. 

But said they sould sound thair retreit, 
Because they thocht them nae ways meit 

Conducters unto me. Alex. Montgomery. 

Add to this that the Anglo-Saxon athoht, or gethoht, the Dutch 
gedocht, and the German gedacht, all answer to our substantive thought; 
and upon the whole it may be reasonably concluded that our pre- 
sent conjunction though, is not derived from the Anglo Saxon verb 
thafigan, or thafian ; but comes to us, through various modifications, 
from the Anglo-Saxon conjunction theah, connected with the Anglo- 
Saxon substantive theaht, which we have in like- manner modified 
into thought. 

In confirmation of this etymology, it may be observed, that the 
word suppose is often used in the Scotch dialect for though : — 

Yone slae, suppose thou think it sour, 

May satisfie to slokkin 
Thy drouth now. Alex. Montgomery. 

Stories to rede ar delectabil 

Suppois that they be nocht but fabil. Barbour. 

370. The instances here given of and, if, and though, may suffice ordinath-es. 
to show how the part of speech called a conjunction, has arisen, in 
the development of the powers of language, out of more circuitous 
modes of expression, by whole sentences or phrases. In another part 
of this work, the same principle will be illustrated by tracing histo- 



218 OF CONJUNCTIONS. [CHAP. XII. 

rically the growth of our other conjunctions. There is a class of 
words, however, which demands notice here, and which Mr. Harris 
says " may be properly called adverbial conjunctions, because they 
participate the nature both of adverbs and conjunctions — of conjunc- 
tions as they join sentences ; of adverbs as they denote the attributes 
of time and place." Such are when, where, whence, whither, whenever, 
wherever, &c. Upon the principle which I have adopted, these are 
to be called conjunctions when they conjoin sentences ; but the name 
adverbial is not at all distinctive, because many other conjunctions 
have occasionally an adverbial use ; and many prepositions when 
used conjunctionally serve to mark time or place. The scheme of 
arrangement which Harris has followed, is principally directed to the 
logical connection of sentences ; but the connections of time and place 
are merely physical, and should therefore form a class apart. The 
term ordinative, which Vossius applies to deinde, postea, &c, may not 
improperly designate the whole of this class. 

Thus, among ordinatives of time we should reckon whiles, till, o that,, 
or, be : — 

His Lord nold he neuer forsake 

Whiles he ware oliue. Amis and Amiloun. 

Full ofte drinkes shee, 
Till ye may see 

The teares nan down her cheeke. 

Gammer Gurton's Needle. 
Al the day and al the nyht 

that sprong the day lyht. Geste of Kyng Horn. 

Sathanas Y bynde the, her shalt thou lay, 

that come Domesday. Christ's Descent to Hell. 

He it is my dedly foo ; 

He schal abeyen it or he goo. Richard Coer de Lion-. 

Your madynis than sail haue your geir 
Put in gude ordour and effeir 

Ilk morning or yow ryse. Philotus-i- 

The supper done than vp ye ryse, 
To gang ane quhyle as is the gyse ; 
Be ye haue rowmit ane alley thryse 

It is ane myle almaist. Ibid. 

So, where is an ordinative of place in the following passage :-=- 

He rails 

Even there, where merchants most do congregate. Shakspeare. 

The ordinals, which I have included in the class of pronominal 
adjectives, such as first, second, &c, necessarily imply connection, and 
consequently the adverbs formed from them, are easily employed with 
a conjunctional force, as primb, secundo, tertib, when placed at the 
beginning of sentences. The same also is to be observed of the 
adverbs used as relatives to these antecedents, such as deinde, item, 
puis, next, syne, lastly, &c. "Deinde," says Vossius, "cum verbo 



CHAP. XII. J OF CONJUNCTIONS. 219 

jungitur, ad circumstantiam tempons indicandum, adverbium est: 
Gonjunctio autem, ciim tantum ad orationis jnncturum pertinet." 

Accepit conditionem ; dein quaestum occipit. Terentius. 

Pergratum mihi feceris ; spero item Sesevolae, &c. Cicero. 

lis font estat d'aller a Orleans, a Blois, puis a Tours. Diet, de V Academie. 
First ae caper, syne anither. Burns. 

371. It remains to be observed, that some conjunctions are used R«dm>D- 
singly, and others in a succession of two or more. Thus we may 

say, " John and William came," or " loth John and William came," 
or loth John and William, and also James came. — " It is ordained 
that proclamation be made, and that the judgment be recorded, 
and furthermore that the record be transmitted." Where two or 
more succeed each other with a mutual relation, there is sometimes 
a fixed order in the succession; ex.gr. " as — so" "so — that:" 
" when — then" &c. On this subject Vossius thus speaks — " Con- 
junction! etiam accidit ordo ; secundum quem alias sunt prcepositivce, 
ut et. nam; alias postpositivce, ut quoque, autem ; alias communes, 
ut equidem, itaque. Igitur ssepius postponitur. Enim etiam est par- 
ticula prsepositiva, Terent. Phor. act v. sc. viii. Enim nequeo solus." 
Ad postpositivas etiam pertinent encliticas. Ex his, que interdum 
alteri verbo jungitur quam nativus verborum ordo exigebat : ut apud 
Hokat. lib. ii. od. 19 : — 

Ore pedes tetigitque crura. 

Pro cruraque tetigit. These however are matters depending on the 
particular idiom of each language, and not governed by the philosophy 
of general grammar. 

372. The case is different with the pleonasms and cumulations of Cumulations, 
conjunctions. These occur in all languages, and they therefore clearly 

arise out of principles common to the human mind in different 
countries. Hence Vossius speaks of expletive conjunctions — " Ex- 
pletives sunt, quae nulla, necessitate sentential, sed explendi tantum 
gratia usurpantur. Ut quae metri vel ornatus caussa, inseruntur. 
Sallust in Catil. Verilm enimverb is demum mihi vivere, etfrui animd 
videter; ubi verum redundat." Virgil in xii: — 
Equidem merui nee deprecor inquit. 

Plena fuerit sententia, licet equidem tollas." To this head are to be 
referred such expressions as " an if:" — 

■ Well I know 

The clerk will ne'er wear hair on's face that had it. 
He will an' if he live to be a man : 

where either an or if is redundant ; for they both signify the same, 
and Johnson is wrong in supposing that an 1 in this instance is a con- 
traction of and. Vossius refers these redundancies to the custom of 
ancient writers, " Nempe is veterum mos fuit, ut interdum conjunge- 
rent voces idem signiflcantes." But they are not peculiar to any age 



220 OF CONJUNCTIONS. [CHAP. XII. 

or nation : they are the result of hasty and inconsiderate habits of 
speech, which, it is true, are more common in the first formation of a 
language, than in more cultivated and civilized periods of history. 
Cumulation, however, is not always redundancy . When we find a 
sentence beginning thus — " but nevertheless if" the conjunction but 
connects it with what goes before, and if with some subsequent sen- 
tence, and the word nevertheless alone may be called redundant, and 
yet not strictly so, since it adds a great force and emphasis to the 
word but.. In the Greek language, this cumulation of conjunctions is 
frequent ; and it is sometimes explained by an ellipsis. Thus Hoogeven 
says — " Hoc modo a\Xa vvvye redditur nunc maocime, suppressa per 
ellipsin vocula, elt: ore. Ita Sophocl. in Electr. v. 413 : — 

' Q, Qioi <xu.tqoooi ffvyyivitrQi y aXXoc vvv ! 

v O Dii patrii, adeste nunc maxime, vel nunc saltern!: 

Plenior structura est "£2 Qeol 7rarpwot, enrors avyyiveadi fxoi> aXKa 
vvvye avyykveade\ — Dii patrii, si unquam alias mihi adfuistis, at 
nunc adeste saltern ! 

And so much for the conjunction, which receives its grammatical 
character neither from the form nor position of the word, but from its 
office in connecting sentences with each other, enunciative or pas- 
sionate, according to their different modes of relation. 



( 221 ) 



CHAPTER XIII. 



OF ADVERBS. 



373. Different grammarians have arranged the Adverb in different Order of 
parts of their systems. Apollonius, followed by Priscian, treats of them? 8 
it after the preposition and before the conjunction and interjection. 
Scaliger also places it after the preposition. Manutius places it 
between the verb and the participle ; Harris after the participle and 
before the article. Most of the ancient grammarians, however, rank 
it as next preceding the preposition, conjunction, and interjection. In 
this order they are followed by Vossius : and I am not sure that it 
may not be the best arrangement ; but in our own language, and per- 
haps in others, there are many words used as adverbs, the explanation 
of which may appear more obvious and intelligible, when they are 
employed as prepositions or conjunctions. In this view, therefore, it 
may not be amiss that the consideration of the adverb should be post- 
poned to that of the other two classes ; but as there is no absolute 
dependence of any one of these classes on either of the two others, the 
order of their arrangement is comparatively unimportant. 

374. Mr. Tooke advanced a far more serious objection against the Tooke> 
prevalent doctrines concerning this part of speech, when he asserted, ° jec lon ' 
" that neither Harris, nor any other grammarian, seemed to have any 
clear notion of the nature and character of the adverb." After this 
he proceeded to give his own notions, not of the adverb in general, 
but of a number of adverbs in particular, from which, and from what 
he had before said of the conjunctions and prepositions, he left his 
readers to collect that knowledge which, in his opinion, no gramma- 
rian beside himself had ever acquired. As this does not appear to 
be a very fair way of treating the grammatical student, I shall endea- 
vour to pursue a more satisfactory method, even at the hazard of 
adopting, from the ancient grammarians, some of those notions which 
appeared to Mr. Tooke so obscure, 

375. The adverb was originally so called, because it was added to Definition, 
the verb, to modify its force and meaning ; hence the Greek writers 
defined it thus : ^Trtpprjfxa tan fxepog \6yov ukXltov, IttI to prj/Jia 
tyiv avcKpopav typv. — " The adverb is an indeclinable part of speech, 
having relation to the verb." The question of its being indeclinable or 
not, is unimportant in the present investigation, since this circumstance 
depends on the idiom of a particular language ; but the relation which 
the adverb bears to the verb depends on the Science of Universal 
Grammar : and this relation is stated by most of the ancient gram- 
marians as the peculiar property of the adverb. Donatus makes it 



222 OF ADVERBS. [CHAP. XIII. 

the only characteristic of this part of speech : Adverbium est pars 
oratlonls, quce adjecta verbo slgnlficatlonem ejus aut complet, aut mutat, 
aut mlnult. " The adverb is a part of speech, which being added to 
a verb, either completes, or diminishes, or alters its signification." 
Vossius, however, observes, that the adverb is added not only to 
verbs, but to nouns and participles; and, consequently, that its name 
must be understood to have been given to it, not from the use to 
which it is always applied, but from that for which it most generally 
serves. Non soils adjlcltur verbis, sed etlam nominibus et partlclplls : 
nomen igltur acceplt non ex eo quod semper, sed quod plurimum fit. By 
the word nouns, Vossius, as he afterwards explains it, means adjec- 
tives, both nominal, pronominal, and participial. " We say," adds he, 
" bene dlsserens, as well as bene dicer e, and bene doctus" And so we 
may say, prorsus meus, propemodum suus, et magls nostras, as well as, 
prorsus amicus, propemodlum liber, magls Romanus, &c. For want of 
a clear and intelligible definition of the adverb, some writers have un- 
doubtedly exposed themselves to the sarcasm of Tooke, who thus 
•translates a sentence of Servius : Omnls pars oratlonls, " every word," 
quando deslnlt esse quod est, " when a grammarian knows not what to 
make of it," mlgrat In adverbium, " he calls an adverb." It is impos- 
sible to avoid these errors, unless we first establish a definition of the 
adverb, to which, as a test, the various classes of words properly com- 
prehended by different grammarians under this common designation 
may be applied. I venture therefore, with all becoming diffidence, to 
propose the following : — An adverb is a part of speech added to a 
perfect sentence, for the purpose of modifying primarily the conception 
expressed by a verb, an adjective nominal or pronominal, or a participle ; 
or secondarily, that expressed by another adverb. In explicating 
this definition, I shall consider, first, the sort of sentence to which 
an adverb may be added ; secondly, the modifications which it may 
effect ; and, thirdly, the modes by which such modifications may be 
expressed. 
Sentences 376. I. — First, I say, the adverb is added to a perfect sentence, con- 

added, verting it, if categorical, from a pure into a modal one : and by a 

perfect sentence I here mean one which either enunciates some truth, or 
expresses some passion with its object. Therefore, even to a simple 
imperative the adverb may be added, since a perfect sense is expressed 
without it, and its addition only serves to modify the verb. Thus the 
word " fly !" is, in effect, a perfect sentence, for it implies an agent and 
an act, and it couples the conception of the act of ■flying with the con- 
ception of the person addressed, if not in the perception of the speaker, 
at least in his volition. To this sentence, therefore, an adverb may be 
added consistently with my definition, and we may say, " fly quickly !" 
After this explanation of the passionate sentence, it is scarcely necessary 
to explain the enunciative. When the verb expresses action or passion, 
there can be no difficulty : thus when Macbeth says : — 
After life's fitful fever he sleeps well, 



CHAP. XIII.] OF ADVERBS. 223 

there can be no difficulty in understanding that the adverb well modifies 
the verb sleeps. A question, however, may arise, where the verb 
merely expresses existence ; as, in the line just quoted, if the expression 
had been " he is well," it might be questioned whether well was an 
adverb or an adjective. A similar remark may be made on such 
expressions as " he is asleep" " he is awake" &c. It is true that in 
the English language these and many other such words have an 
adverbial form, and cannot be employed in immediate connection with 
substantives, as "a well man," an " asleep man," or an " awake man;" 
yet where they thus form the predicates of verbs, they are, in effect, 
adjectives. "He is well" corresponds exactly with "he is healthy" — 
" he is asleep" with " he is sleeping " — " he is awake " with, " he is 
waking :" and in a question of Universal Grammar, the idiomatic form 
of the words cannot at all decide the question. When I say the sen- 
tence must be perfect, I mean it must be perfect in the mind; in 
expression, a part or even the whole of it may be understood. A part 
is understood when the mind evidently supplies what is necessary to 
complete the sentence, as in the animated lines of Sir Walter 
Scott : — 

On Stanley I— On !— 

Were the last words of Marmion. 

Here the adverb on manifestly refers to some verb understood in the 
mind, such as "march," "drive," "rush," or the like. The verb is 
suppressed, because it is indifferent to the speaker; the adverb is 
expressed, because it is of the utmost importance ; because to the 
thoughts and feelings of the dying hero the mode of getting at the 
enemy was immaterial ; but to get at them by some means or other 
was his most eager wish. The whole of the sentence is understood, 
when the adverb is responsive : as, " Will you come ? — Yes." " When 
will you come? — Presently." "How often did he come? — Once." 
For these answers mean, " I will come certainly "■ — " I will come 
presently " — " He came once." And consequently the adverbs, yes, 
presently, and once, are to be taken as modifying the verbs " will come " 
and " did come," respectively. 

377. II. — The adverb, I say, is used to modify primarily a verb, an Modification, 
adjective nominal or pronominal, or a participle ; or secondarily, another 
adverb. As Harris calls the verb, adjective, and participle, " attributives 
of the first order," he, by parity of reason, denominates the adverb "an 
attributive of a secondary order," or "an attributive of an attributive." 
Harris, indeed, justly argues that the word 'ETrtppfytm is of the same 
force and meaning as these phrases ; for I have already shown that the 
word r Pr/fta is used by many writers to signify not only what is com- 
monly called a verb, but also what are called adjectives and participles. 
Thus Ammoxius says, /caret tovto to an ^air 6 fxtvoy, to pev KAAOS, 
teal AIKAI02, icai oaa TOiavTa 'PHMATA \eyeo§ai, teal ovk 
'ONOMATA. — "According to this signification" (that is, of denoting 
the attributes of substance and the predicates in propositions), " the 






224 OF ADVERBS. [CHAP. XIII. 

words, fair, just, and the like, are called verts and not nouns." And 
so Ppjscian, speaking of the Stoics, says, " Participium connumerantes 
verbis, participiale verbum vocant." "Beckoning the participle 
among verbs, they call it a 'participial verb." Whatever may be 
thought of this reasoning, it at least agrees with the proposition, that 
the adverb is employed to modify the participle, the adjective, and the 
verb. On the other hand, the adverb is not emploj^ed to modify the 
substantive ; because that is the function of the adjective, or of the 
article. Let us then consider the parts of speech which are primarily 
modified by the adverb, viz. : the verb and the adjective, taking the 
latter term in its widest sense. 
Of the srerb. 378. The verb, it must be remembered, asserts or manifests exist- 
ence, either simply or together with some attribute of action or passion. 
The adverb, therefore, may either modify the attribute involved in the 
verb, or it may modify the mere assertion of existence. When it 
modifies the attribute, its operation is exactly similar to what will pie- 
sently be described in regard to the adjective. The conception of 
running is modified by the adverb swiftly, in the proposition " he runs 
swiftly," precisely as it is by the adjective swift in the proposition "he 
is a swift runner." The case is somewhat different when the adverb is 
considered as modifying the assertion of existence. If this be done 
with reference to the corporeal conceptions of place and time, we have, 
as to place, such positive conceptions as those marked by the adverbs 
here and there ; and such relative conceptions as those marked by the 
adverbs where and whence. If I say that a given event happened 
here, my assertion is positive and is limited to a certain point of 
space, and by necessary implication contradicts the assertion not only 
that it did not happen at all, but that it happened at any other place 
than the one indicated. So with regard to time : if I say that a 
certain event is happening now, my assertion is positive and is limited 
to the present time ; if I say it happened yesterday, it is equally posi- 
tive and limited to a certain time past. Again, if I say the event in 
question happened where some other event had occurred, the local 
adverb where is relative ; and if I say it happened when some other did, 
the temporal adverb when is also relative. It is scarcely necessary to 
add that local and temporal conceptions may be adverbially expressed 
under an endless variety of circumstances. The event in question may 
occur aboard, or ashore, aloft, or below, abroad, or at home ; the ship may 
be cut a drift ; the army may be marching homewards ; the battle may 
cease awhile, it may be begun anew, it may terminate suddenly, &c. &c. 
&c. So, the assertion of existence contained in a verb may be modified 
by various mental conceptions, and these also may be expressed 
adverbially. Thus, in a proposition, the assertion if not simply affir- 
mative (which of course needs no modification) may be modified by a 
negative as not, ne, nee ; or it may be modified as to certainty, if clear, 
by the adverbs indeed, certainly, and if doubtful by the adverbs perhaps, 
forsan, &c. ; or, as to mode, by the adverbs thus, so, as, &c. : or the 



CHAP. XIII.] OF ADVERBS. 225 

assertion may be put interrogatively by the adverbs how, why, where, 
when ; or responsively by the adverbs yes or no. The connection of 
propositions in an argument, and particularly of the premises with the 
conclusion, may be marked by such words as ergo, consequently, there- 
fore, which some grammarians treat as adverbs, though others (and 
perhaps more accurately) hold to be conjunctions; a remark which 
applies generally to the adverbs called relative. 

379. The term adjective, as I have said, is here to be taken in its Of the _ 
widest sense, as including not only the adjective simple, or proper, but 3ec lve " 
also the participle, or participial adjective, and the pronominal adjec- 
tive. It is manifest that all the attributes which these various classes 

of words express are capable of modification. Thus, a house which is 
" loftv," may be " surprisingly lofty," or " very lofty," or " moderately 
lofty." And in like maimer we may speak of " a remarkably intelli- 
gent youth," an " over indulgent parent," " a truly affectionate friend." 
So, when we use a participle, or a pronominal adjective, we may 
modify it by the aid of an adverb, as " much obliged," " greatly in- 
debted," " wholly yours," " absolutely mine," " nobly born," " well bred," 
" highly girted," " universally respected," " little moved," " less affected," 
" not so energetic," " equally judicious," " how admirable !" " thus far," 
" no further." In all these instances, it is obvious, that the attribute 
expressed by the adjective undergoes some modification from the 
adverb. In truth, we form a double conception, as, first, a conception 
of loftiness with reference to the house, and, secondly, a conception of 
surprise with reference to the loftiness ; so that the sentence " the 
house is surprisingly lofty" resolves itself into these other two sen- 
tences, " the house is lofty," and " the loftiness is surprising." Mr. 
Han-is, therefore, had great reason to call the adverb an attributive of an 
attributive ; for, in the latter of these two sentences, we find the word 
" surprising" represents an attribute of that loftiness, which, in the 
prior sentence, was considered as an attribute of the house. It is not 
the house altogether which excites surprise, but only its quality of lof- 
tiness. A house may be both lofty and surprising, without being sur- 
prisingly lofty. These modifications of an attribute may regard either 
its quantity or its quality. Its quantity may be modified positively, 
that is, simply ; or relatively, that is, comparatively. The adverbs thus 
used positively in regard to quantity continuous, are such as, much y 
little, sufficiently, parum, satis, &c. ; in regard to quantity discrete, such 
as twice, thrice, semel, decies, &c. Those used relatively, if by way of 
intension, are such as more, nimis, valde, &c. ; if by way of remission, 
such as less, vix, &c. The quality of an attribute may be modified 
positively by such adverbs as well, ill, nobly, bene, male, fortiter, &e. ; 
or relatively, in regard to degree, by such as rather, potius, excessively, 
&c. ; and in regard to similitude, by as, so, adeb, &c. 

380. Such being the primary uses of the adverb, it is easy to con- Secondary 
ceive that the secondary use is similar. As the adjective modifies the u>e ' 
substantive, and the adverb modifies the adjective, so mav a second 

2. Q 



Advert 



226 OF ADVERBS. [CHAP. XIII. 

adverb be applied to the former with the same power of modification. 
As the word admirably may be prefixed to good, so may very be pre- 
fixed to them both together ; and we may say " a very admirably good 
discourse ;" in which, and the like instances, the analysis is similar to 
what I have before stated. The discourse is good, the goodness is 
admirable, the admiration is extreme. 
improper 381. To the classes of words which have been properly compre- 

hended under the title of adverbs, some grammarians have added 
others which have no legitimate title to that appellation. Hence 
among the twenty-eight classes enumerated by Hickes, the twenty- 
seven by Manutius, the twenty-one by Charisius, and those of other 
writers, we find enough to justify the sarcasm of Tooke, and to 
explain, if not to justify, the grave designation of the Stoics, who called 
this part of speech liavMKrrjy ; because, as Charisius says, " Omnia in 
se capit, quasi collata per satiram concessa sibi rerum varietate." 
Thus some reckon as adverbs, the nouns substantive Roma?, domi, casu, 
and the like ; some the nouns adjective vili, caro ; some the pronouns 
mecum, tecum, nobiscum, vobiscum ; some the verbs used interjectionally, 
age, amabo, quceso, and some the mere interjections heus ! utinam I 
ecce ! &c. These aberrations from grammatical principle may perhaps 
be accounted for, in part from the want of a clear and intelligible 
definition of the part of speech called an adverb, and in part from 
a mistaken impression of some writers, that adverbs and interjections 
are words of too insignificant a character to deserve serious attention. 
" Interjectio " (says Caramuel) " posset ad adverbium reduci, sed quia 
majoribus nostris placuit illam distinguere, non est cur in re tarn tenia 
haereamus." " The interjection might be reckoned among adverbs, 
but since our predecessors have been pleased to distinguish it from 
them, we need not hesitate about so trifling a matter." However these 
errors may have arisen, it must be confessed that they have been 
shared by writers of no mean reputation. Vossius says, " Interjec- 
tiones a Grsecis ad adverbia referuntur, atque eos sequitur etiam 
Boethius." Ben Jonson says, "Prepositions are a peculiar kind of 
adverbs, and ought to be referred thither ;" and Bishop Wilkins says, 
that " the difference between prepositions and adverbs is so nice, that 
it is hard in some cases to distinguish them." Yet it is manifest that a 
preposition can no more be considered as a peculiar kind of adverb, 
than a substantive can be considered as a peculiar kind of adjective or 
verb : for the proper function of the preposition is to modify a concep- 
tion of substance ; and the proper function of the adverb is to modify 
a conception of attribute, either alone, or combined with an assertion : 
but the part of speech which names a conception of substance is the 
noun substantive ; the part of speech which names a conception of 
attribute is a noun adjective ; and the part of speech which asserts is 
the verb. Again, as to interjections, they do not serve to modify either 
noun or verb ; but are interjected, as it were, between different nouns 
or verbs, and as Vossius says, " Citra verbi opem, sententiam complent ;' 



CHAP. XIII.] OF ADVERBS. 227 

for though, in certain instances, the interjection may, both in signification 
and construction, supply the place of a verb, yet this, in no respect, 
modifies the signification of the following verb, but merely affects its 
construction in the sentence. Those authors, too, who do not differ in 
regard to the characteristics of whole classes, often seem to err strangely 
in allotting a particular word to its proper class. Dr. Johnson, a 
scholar certainly of great acquirements, designates as nouns substantive 
the words pell-mell, ding-dong, handy -dandy, pit-a-pat, and see-saw, 
when in the very examples which he quotes they are used as adverbs ; 
and this is the more remarkable because he designates other words, of 
the very same formation and use, adverbs ; ex. gr. helter-skelter, which 
certainly approaches as nearly to pell-mell, in its grammatical use, as it 
does in the mode of its formation, and in its general import. The 
acute and ingenious De Brosses calls the French chez an adverb, 
which is most manifestly a preposition, for chez moi, and apud me v are 
phrases exactly similar in construction. Even the learned Vossius calls 
the Latin mecastor an adverb, and R. Stephanus terms it " jurandi 
adverbium." Now mecastor is either from the Greek fia, and Castor, the 
name of a deity, and then it is literally, "No, by Castor!" or else it is 
" Me Castor adjuvet /" So help me Castor ! and in either case it is an 
inter jectional oath, used as a common expletive in conversation. Thus 
we find in Terence, ' ' Salve, mecastor, Parmeno ;" where mecastor can- 
not by any ingenuity be made to modify the verb salve, or indeed any 
other word ; but is truly and properly an interjection, which all words 
of the same kind must be, such as Gadso ! which though Mr. Tooke 
distinctly calls an oath, yet he preposterously reckons amonoj the adverbs. 
Gadso ! and ' Odso ! were abbreviations of " by God it is so !" or " is 
it so, by God ?" for men happily shrink from their own profaneness, 
and rather reduce their words to unmeaning exclamations, than advert 
seriously to their original import. As to the obscene Italian expression 
to which Tooke alludes, it had probably nothing to do with the inter- 
jection Gadso, however it may have furnished a hint to the unpolished 
satire of Ben Jonson, in the passage quoted from one of his plays. 

382. III. — Having thus considered the various modifications of an Adverbial 
attributive, which adverbs are calculated to effect, I come to examine p ^ 
the different modes by which such modifications may be expressed ; 
and as I have spoken of prepositional and conjunctional phrases, so I 
think it advisable here to notice certain adverbial phrases, which in 
process of time have become, or may become adverbs. By an 
adverbial phrase, I mean any combination of words, which in a complex 
sentence may stand in the place of an adverb. Thus we may say 
" this happened afterwards," or " this happened long afterwards," or 
" this happened many days afterwards," or " this happened not many 
days afterwards." In the first case the adverb afterwards modifies the 
verb " happened ;" in all the other cases the same adverb afterwards 
is modified, first by the adjective long used adverbially, then by the 
adjective and substantive many days forming an adverbial phrase, or 

Q2 



228 OF ADVERBS. [CHAP. XIII. 

standing in the place of an adverb ; and lastly by the adverb, adjective, 
and substantive, not many days, which in like manner may be said to 
form an adverbial phrase, or to stand in the place of an adverb. So in 
Lord Berners' translation of Froissart, executed by command of 
King Henry VIII., and printed in his reign, the following passage 
occurs, fol. cxcix. b. " Nowe the Duke of Berrey commauncleth me the 
contrary ; for he chargeth me incontynent his letters sene, that I shulcle 
reyse the syege." In this passage incontynent is an adverb modifying 
the verb reyse ; and the letters sene is a phrase, (similar in construction 
to the Latin ablative absolute, as it is termed, visis epistolis,) which 
modifies the adverb incontynent, a word at that time used where we 
should say immediately. 

Thus, in the romance of The Foure Sonnes of Aimon, printed in 
1554, we find — 

Now up Ogyer, and you Duke Naymes, light on horseback incontinent. 

Adverbial phrases are in another point of view material to the con- 
sideration of adverbs properly so called. By comparing different 
languages, we not only find that a certain phrase in one language cor- 
responds to a different phrase in another language ; but that phrases in 
the one correspond to words in the other. Thus in comparing the 
French with the Italian we not only find such expressions as a chaudes 
larmes, answering to a dirotte lagrime ; or a gorge deploy ee, to alia 
smascellata ; but we also find a tatons rendered by tentone, a peu pres 
by quasi, &c, &c. The variety of phrases which may be found in dif- 
ferent languages corresponding to one and the same adverb, is truly 
remarkable ; of which those answering to our adverb suddenly afford a 
pregnant example. The striking expressions of St. Paul, 'Ev arofiw, 
iv piirr} 6(f)da\ij.ov — "in momento," " in ictu oculi,"* have, of course, 
been imitated in most European languages ; as the English "in a 
moment" — " in the twinkling of an eye;" the French, " en un din d'ceil ; 
the Italian " in un hatter d'occhio ;" and to these may be added many 
analogous expressions, as the Spanish " de repente ;" the Italian " di 
primo lancio," and " tutto ad un tratto ;" the French " tout d'un coup," 
" en un tourne main," " sur le champ ;" the Latin " e vestigio;" the old 
English "in a trice? "as who saith treis" " at a thought,'''' "in the 
space of a luke" " all anone" "all at once" &c. &c, of which I shall 
hereafter give examples. 
Compound 383. The first step towards expressing more briefly the modification 
of an attributive, may be observed in certain compound words, which 
unite the principal conceptions expressed in a phrase. Of such our 
old English writers present some examples which have now become 
obsolete, such as foot-hot, sothfast , and others still in use, as forthwith, 
peradventure, &c. 

The maister hunte anon, fotehote, 

With his home blewe three mote. Chaucer's Dream 

* 1 Corinth, xv. 52. 



words. 



CHAP. XIII.] OF ADVERBS. 229 

" Foothot" says Mr. Tooke, "means immediately, instantaneously," 
and so far he is undoubtedly right; but whether hot, means, as he 
supposes, heated, or as Waeton suggests, hit against the ground, that 
is, stamped, may be matter of doubt. " In the twinkling of an eye," 
" in the space of a look," are expressions used to express the shortest 
possible lapse of time : and " a stamp of the foot," may well be sup- 
posed to convey a similar idea of brief duration. 

Dunbar, in his Goldin Terge, has the following lines : — 

And suddenlie, in the space of a hike, 

All was hyne went, titer was but wilderness ; 
Ther was nae mair but bird, and bank, and brake. 
In twinckling of an ee, to scbip they went. 
Sothfast is the substantive sooth, compounded (as in the word sted- 
fasfy with fast, i. e. firm, and so means truthful, or as sure as truth. 
In a sort of dramatic poem, probably of the thirteenth or fourteenth 
century, on Chris? s Descent into Hell (Harl. MSS. 2253, f. 55. b.), are 
these lines, in which it is used adverbially : — 

And so wes seyde to Habraham, 
That wes sothfast holy man. 

In the Pricke of Conscience (see Warton, v. i. p. 258), it is used 
adjectivally : — 

Thou mercyfull and gracious God is, 

Thou rightwis, and thou sothfast. 

Adverbs may be compounded of two or more words. "Utin aliis 
classibus," says Vossius, " ita quoque in adverbiis, compositorum alia 
fiunt e duobus, ut perdiu, abhinc, alia e pluribus ut forsitan. Nam, ut 
for sit ex fors et sit, quasi forte sit ; acforsan ex fors et an, quod et in 
fortassean ; ita forsitan ex tribus istis fors, sit, an. And thus it is in 
English. We have together formed of to and gather; and we have 
altogether formed of all, to, and gather. So in French tout a fait, 
" altogether," from tout, a, and fait ; in Italian nondimeno, " neverthe- 
less," from -non, di, and me.no, &c. ; in German vielleicht, " perhaps," 
from viel, much; and leicht, easily; nimmermehr, "nevermore," from 
nie, immer, and mehr, &c. 

In forming compounds of this nature, all parts of speech (except 
interjections) .are employed. " Nulla est vocum classis," says Vossius, 
" ex qua non adverbium componatur." Thus a composite adverb may 
be formed in any of the following ways : — 

i. From a pronoun and substantive, as quare, from qua and re. 

ii. From an adjective and substantive, as postridie, from postero and 
die. 

iii. From an adverb, substantive, and adjective, as nudiustertius, from 
nunc, dies, and tertius 

iv. From a substantive and verb, as pedetentim, from pede and tentare. 

v. From a participle and substantive, as perendie, from peremptd and 
die. 






230 OF ADVERBS. [CHAP. XIII. 

vi. From an adverb and adjective, as nimirum, from ne and mirum. 
vii. From a preposition and substantive, as obviam, from 6b and viam. 
viii. From a pronoun and adverb, as alibi, from alio and ibi. 
ix. From a pronoun and preposition, as adhuc, from ad and hoc. 
x. From two verbs, as scilicet, from scire and /kce£. 
xi. From two adverbs, as etiamnum, from etiam and ramc. 
xii. From an adverb and a verb, as deinceps, from dein and capio. 
xiii. From a preposition and adverb, as abhinc, from ab and Tmzc. 
xiv. From a conjunction and adverb, as etiam, from e£ and jam. 
Vossius ranks among compound adverbs those which might other- 
wise be said to be inflected, that is, formed from other words, by the 
addition of an adverbial particle, like our prefix a, or termination ly ; 
as tantisper, from tantus and per ; quandoque, from quando and que, 
&c. So we find not only scienter, from sciens and ter, but even 
Catiliniter, from Catilina ; not only jucunde, from jucundus, but 2W- 
liane, from Tullius. 
Words em- 384. Thus by degrees we arrive at those single words which, 
Adjectives, whether compound or simple, are called adverbs, and constitute, as 
such, a distinct part of speech. If it be asked what sorts of words 
may be employed, as adverbs, to modify other attributives, the proper 
answer is — all sorts. For the expression of Servius, though ridiculed 
by Tooke, is literally true : " Omnis pars orationis migrat in adverbium." 
" Every part of speech is capable of being converted into an adverb." 

From what has already been said, it is manifest that an adjective 
may be used adverbially. Let us suppose that it is necessary to enun- 
ciate these three propositions successively : — 
i. A certain quantity exists, 
ii. The quantity is large, 
iii. The largeness is sufficient. 
We have here three conceptions, viz., quantity, largeness, and 
sufficiency. The first is only considered as a substance ; the second is 
considered as an attribute in one instance, and as a substance in th( 
other ; and the third is only considered as an attribute. Now, if w< 
unite these three sentences in one, and say there is " a sufficiently largt 
quantity," we, in fact, convert the adjective "sufficient" into an 
adverb. In some instances this difference in the employment of the 
word, is attended with a correspondent inflection or change in the 
form — as in English the adjective sufficient is inflected or changed into 
the adverb sufficiently ; but this neither prevails in all languages nor in 
all adverbs of the same language : and is, indeed, a circumstance often 
appearing to be perfectly accidental or capricious. Again, the adjec- 
tives thus employed sometimes remain unchanged in form, but lose in 
practice theii adjectival use, either partially or altogether. These 
circumstances, it is true, depend on the idioms of particular languages ; 
but it is not the less important to notice some of them, because there 
is no more common source of error among grammarians than the con- 
founding of what is universal in language with what is particular, the 






CHAP. XITI.l OP ADVERBS. 231 

scientific rule with the accidental exception. This will appear from 
many instances in the class of words now under consideration, namely, 
the adjectives proper, when used as adverbs ; and in order to consider 
them the more distinctly, I shall notice first the simple miinnected 
adjectives, then those which have been inflected or changed in form, 
and lastly those adverbs formerly employed as adjectives, but which at 
present have wholly or partially lost that character. In the first class 
may be reckoned such words as much, full, right, scarce, &c. ; in the 
second such as aloud, around, along, wisely, prudenter, male, &c. ; and in 
the last such as very, well, &c. Many of these will hereafter receive 
particular notice : at present it may suffice to consider one of each 
class. 

385. Much, which in old and provincial English and Scotch appears Much, 
under the forms of moch, muche, moche, mochell, mochil, muchele, mychel, 
meikill, michle, muckle, received, in those dialects, a larger adjectival 
construction than is the modern authorised usage, as may be seen in 
some of the following examples : — 

Whan the Abhot seeth ham flee, 

That he holt for moch glee. Descript. of Cokaygne. 

With muche Ost he is comyng. Rom. of Kyng Alisaunder. 

Hye and low louyd hym alle, 

Moche honoure to hym was falle. Lyfe of Ipomydon. 

Ther nas nother old neyynge 

So mochell of strength. Rom. of Octovian Imperator. 

Undir heuen nis lond iwisse 

Of so mochil ioi ant blisse. Descript. of Cokaygne. 

And yeld here servise ofte, mid muchele wowe. 

Life of St. Margaret . 
Dieu mercy, to mychel harme 
Many knighth there gan hym wime. 

Rom. of Kyng Alisaunder. 

And gif ye will gif me richt nocht, 

The meikill devill gang wi' you. Peblis to the Play. 

Mony a little maks a mickle. North Country Proverb. 

The muckle devil blaw ye south, 

If ye dissemble. Burns. Earnest Cry. 

In the present use of the word much, it has considerable analogy to 
the Latin multus and multum, the Italian molto and molti, the old 
French moult, the Portuguese muito and muita ; but though they may 
all flow from one common source, yet, if so, the channels have mani- 
festly been divided at an early period : the ch, which distinguishes our 
much and the Spanish mucho, marking one branch, as distinctly as the 
It, which characterises the other. Hence it happens that our idiomatic 
use of much diners in many points from the use of multus or multum. 
Though we use much as an adjective, in connection with an ideal con- 
ception, such as " much honour," " much glee," " much joy," " much 
money," we cannot so employ it with a collective term, such as " a 



232 OF ADVERBS. [CHAP. XIII. 

much army," " a much sum ;" nor with a word designating an indi- 
vidual object, as "the much Devil;" neither can we translate the 
Latin " multo mane,"* " much morning," or ''multa nocte',"f "much 
night ;" nor can we employ it adjectivally with a plural substantive, 
as " multi ignes," J " much fires." The adverbial use in English seems 
somewhat capricious. Though much may be always combined with 
adjectives in the comparative or superlative degree, as " much wiser," 
"much the bravest," and also with some in the positive, as "much 
like," "much unlike," we cannot say "much brave" or " much wise." 
In regard to position, too, there are some differences. The adverb 
much is placed before a present or past participle, but generally 
(though with some few exceptions) after a verb : — 

Sad, from my natal hour, my days have ran, 

A much afflicted, much enduring man. Pope. 

It grieveth me much, for your sakes. Ruth, i. 13. 

He doth much keep the statutes of Omn. Micah, vi. 16, marg. 

Mr. Tooke, who says that this word much has " exceedingly gra- 
velled all our etymologists," derives it from the Anglo-Saxon verb 
mawan, " to mow," of which, he says, the regular praeterperfect is 
mow, and the past participle mowen. " Omit the participial termina- 
tion en," continues he, " and there will remain mow, which means 
simply that which is mown ; and, as the hay, &c, which was mown, 
was put together in a heap, hence, figuratively, mowe was used in 
Anglo-Saxon to denote any heap ; and this participle, or substantive, 
call it which you please — for however classed, it is still the same 
word, and has the same signification — was pronounced, and therefore 
written ma, mo, &c, which, being regularly compared, gave ma, maer, 
maest, mo, more, most, &c. ; and much is merely the diminutive of mo, 
passing through the gradual changes of mokel, mykel, mochill, muchell, 
moche, much." Such is the substance of an etymological disquisition, 
in the course of which Mr. Tooke takes upon him to speak with great 
contempt of Junius, Wormius, Skinner, and Johnson, and pretends to 
remove all those difficulties which have so " exceedingly gravelled " 
other etymologists ! The leading principle in this disquisition is an 
extraordinary one. It assumes that in the formation of language, the 
conceptions of distinct action must necessarily have obtained a name 
before those of quality. Indeed, it is not very clear that Mr. Tooke 
conceives mankind ever to have acquired conceptions of quality at all. 
However that may be, the basis of his argument in the present in- 
stance is a mere arbitrary assumption, neither confii'med by history, 
nor supported by any rational system of philosophy. The reasoning 
relative to the words more and most would be at least equally satis- 
factory if its order were exactly reversed, and the premises made the 

* Alteras (epistolas) Furius multo mane mihi dedit. Cicer. Att. 5, 4. 

f Multa nocte veni ad Pompeium. Cicer. Quint. 2, 8. 

i Hi tanti ignes, tamque multi (sc. sidera). Cicer, N. D. 2. 36. 



CHAP. XIII.] 0.F ADVERBS. 233 

conclusion. It is probably true that more is the comparative and most 
the superlative of an old word ma or mo, which we may admit to have 
been used as an adjective signifying much. We might argue, therefore, 
that when much of anything was heaped together it was adjectivally 
said to be mo ; and thence a heap was substantively called a mowe ; 
but as hay, when it is cut down, is, in the very act of cutting, heaped 
together, to cut hay was called to mow, and the hay that was cut was 
said to be mowed. These opposite trains of reasoning agree in this, 
that all names must necessarily be supposed to have been given to the 
conceptions of the human mind, in some one certain order — that is to 
say, either proceeding from the more general to the more particular, or 
the contrary. I do not know that this can be positively asserted ; but, 
if it may be so, still I should incline against Mr. Tooke's etymology. 
According to him, our rude ancestors could not have informed each 
other whether a thing was much or little, until after they had invented 
the art of making hay, had regularly conjugated their verbs, added the 
participial termination en, taken it away again, and compounded the 
word (thus unnecessarily prolonged and curtailed) with a syllable im- 
plying diminution, which was subsequently dropt ; and after all, they 
could never alter the signification of the word ; but if they talked of 
much money, or much wisdom, much acuteness, or much absurdity, 
the word much would only signify the cutting of hay ! Such is his 
theory : as to his facts, it would be difficult to discover where or 
when ma was used for a hay-mow, or a barley-mow ; and when we 
come to derive mokel, muchel, or michil, from mo, we shall be " ex- 
ceedingly gravelled " to account for the unlucky k and ch which happen 
to be inserted before the syllable said to be expressive of diminution. 
That there may be some affinity between mo and much is probable ; 
but it is not probable that much is an abbreviation of muchel. On the 
contrary muchil has the appearance of being derived from much. At 
least, it is certain, that we find much, or mich, as early as we do 
muchil. Wachter, speaking of these words, says, Simplicissimum est 
mich quod in antiquissimis dialectis ponitur pro magno et multo, " The 
most simple is mich, which, in the most ancient dialects, signifies 
great and much." Thus, in the old Persian, mill was great, mihter 
greater, mihtras greatest ; whence the sun was called Mithras. The 
aspirate h was easily converted into the guttural ch, and the palatine k 
or g. Hence the Greek /ney, in fiiyag ; and the Latin mag, in magnus, 
magister, &c. ; and as that which is great is usually powerful, we have 
an infinite number of words from this radical, signifying power, as the 
Mseso-Gothic and Anglo-Saxon mag an, to be able, which supplies our 
auxiliaries may and might, the old German machen, and Anglo-Saxon 
mahan, to make, &c, &c. Again Wachter, speaking of the ancient 
word mich, says postea invaluit michel, eodem sensu. " Afterwards 
michel came into use, in the same sense." Hence the Gothic mikils, 
the Anglo-Saxon micel, the Alamannic mihhil, the Icelandic mikiU, and, 
possibly, the Greek ^yaKr]. There is no ground for supposing that 



234 OF ADVERBS. [CHAP. XIII. 

the final syllable el or le is meant, in any of these words, to express 
diminution ; mucliel is no more the dimimnutive of " much," in signifi- 
cation, than handle of "hand," or spindle of "spin;" but much and 
muchel are used eodem sensu, and so were anciently lite and litel. I 
have at least shown, that much is to be found in English as early as 
muchel, and that these two words were used indifferently by our most 
ancient writers. And upon the whole, it is clear, from these authori- 
ties, that much is the name of a conception of greatness in quantity, 
quality, or power ; and that when this conception is viewed as the 
attribute of any substance, the word much is an adjective ; when as 
the modification of an act or quality, it is an adverb. 
inflected. 386. Certain adjectives are found in our own and other languages, 

which when combined with or varied by a particle, as our prefix a, 
our termination ly, the Latin termination ter, or e, or the Italian mente, 
lose their adjectival, and receive an exclusive adverbial character. 
Vossius ranks these among compounds, and perhaps (as I have before 
observed of inflections in general) further research into the origin of the 
particles so employed may show that all such adverbs are true com- 
pounds : for the present, however, I shall consider them as inflected ; 
and of these the class formed by our termination in ly may afford a 
sufficient illustration. The particle ly is an abbreviation of the adjec- 
tive like; and the words wisely, gratefully, judiciously, &c, were 
originally the compound adjectives wiselike, gratefullike, judiciouslike, 
&c. The termination lyk or lich is common in old English. Thus, in 
Kyng Alisaunder, we have the adjectives eorthliche (earthly, mortal), 
ferliche (strange, wonderful), and the adverbs gentiliche (gently), 
sikerlyk (securely, certainly), theofiiche (like a thief), quyUiche (quick- 
ly), stilliche (quietly), skarschliche (scarcely), aperteliche (openly). 
So, in Syr Launfal, 

He gaf gyftys largelyche, 

Gold, and siluer, and clodes ryche. 

And again, in the same poem — 

The lady was brygt as blosme on brere, 
With eyen gray, with louelych chere. 

This word louelych is the identical word leflich which occurs in one 
of the most ancient love-songs now existing in English, composed pro- 
bably about the year 1200. The song begins, " Blow, Northerne 
Wynd," and the lover describes his mistress 
With lokkes lefliche and longe. 

Chaucer writes our word, "early," erliche ; as in the Knight's Tale, 
And tellin her erliche and late. 

In the Description of Cokaygne occurs the adverb meklich (meekly). 
In the Geste of Kyng Horn we find evenliche (evenly, straightly) used 
as an adverb : — 

T hou art fair & eke strong. 

& eke euenliche long. 



CHAP. XIII.] OF ADVERBS. 235 

This termination, therefore, is not less distinguishable in the old 
English than it is, as Mr. Tooke observes, in the sister languages — 
German, Dutch, Danish, and Swedish. The connection of meanings 
seems to be this : first a substantive conception of the body, then an 
adjectival or attributive conception of likeness to the body, and lastly 
an adverbial use of the conception of likeness applied adverbially to an- 
other attributive. The body (particularly the corpse) is in Mseso- 
Gothic leik ; ex. gr. " usnemun leik is " — " they took away his body." * 
In the Anglo-Saxon version of the same text it is &e 5 " hys lie namon." 
In Frankish and Alamannic a dead body is luhe ; and lih ; in Icelandic 
lijk; in German leiche ; in Dutch lyk; in Swedish lih; and in old Scotch 
lyke, whence lykeicake, now corrupted to late icake, the watching of a 
corpse. The German adjective gleich (like) is, as Wachter observes, 
the old compound ge-leich, abbreviated; in old German it is lich, 
gelich ; in Anglo-Saxon lie, gelic ; in Swedi sh lik; in Danish lig ; in Icelandic 
likr, glikr ; in Dutch lyk. The adjectival or adverbial termination is in 
German lich, as lieblich; in Dutch lyk, aslieflyk ; in Swedish and Danish 
lig, as liufiig, lifiig ; in Icelandic legr and ligt, as lieufegr, frithsamlegt. 
That the name of the conception which we have of " body " should be 
transferred to the conception of " likeness," is not at all surprising ; for 
what is so like any person or thing as the very body of that thing, or 
of that person? Hence, Shakspeare, meaning to intimate that the 
use of the drama is to represent the exact likeness of living manners, 
says, it is "to show the very age and body of the time, its form, and 
pressure ;" as if he had said, " the drama holds up a mirror to the 
present time, exhibits its age of manhood or decrepitude, represents its 
very body, the shape which it bears, and the impression which it pro- 
duces on the mind of the observer, as a seal does on wax, or a statue 
on the plaster from which a cast is to be taken." Neither is it sur- 
prising that the adjective "like" should enter into composition with a 
great number of other adjectives ; for if any attribute could not be 
exactly predicated of a particular substance, something like that attri- 
bute might be so ; if a person or thing could not be said to possess 
exactly a certain quality, it might be said to possess a quality similar, 
or nearly the same ; if it was not great it might be greatlike ; if not 
good, godlike, &c. In the Anglo-Saxon we find the termination lie 
used both adjectively and adverbially, as in the translation of Bede's 
Ecclesiastical History (book hi. c. 3), " tha lifigendan stanas thsere 
cyricean, of eorthlicum setlum, to tham heqfonlicum timbre, gebaer ! " 
" the living stones of the church, from earthly seats, to the heavenly 
building, it bore." And again (loc. tit.), "tha cyricean wundorlice 
heold & rihte : " " the church he wondrously held and ruled. The use 
of this temiination extends indeed much further ; for it contributes to 
the formation of our pronominal adjectives such, each, and which ; the 
original signification of these being so-like, one-like, and what-like ; as 
I shall briefly show : — 

* Mark, vi. 29. 



236 OF ADVERBS. [CHAP. XIII. 

i. In the Mseso-Gothic swa is " so," and swa leik is " such.' , In 
the Anglo-Saxon it is contracted to swylc, in the old English to swylke 
and swiche, and thence to sich and such. And the same is found in the 
cognate languages : in the old English and Alamannic, it is solich, 
sulich ; in the Dutch zulk ; in the Swedish slyk ; and in the modern 
German solche. 

In the romance of Richard Coer de Irion, we have : — 

Kyng Alysaundre ne Charlemayn 
Hadde neuer swylke a route. 



And Chaucer says : — 

In sioiche a gise as I you tellen shal. 

ii. The words ilk and ilka are to be found in our old writers, and 
still exist in the Scottish dialect. Ilk was sometimes written iliche, 
and has been abbreviated to each. The following lines occur in a 
satirical poem entitled Syr Peni; or, Narracio de Domino Denario 
(MSS. Cotton. Galb. E. 9) :— 

Dukes, erles, and ilk barowne 
To serue him er thai ful boune 
Both biday and nyght. 

In another part of the same poem are these lines : — 

He may by both heuyn and hell 
And ilka thing that es to sell 
In erth has he swilk grace ; 

where we see swilk used for " such," and ilka for " every," as it is by 
Bukks, in his " Twa Dogs :"— 

His honest, sonsie, baws'nt face 
Aye gat him friends in ilka place, 

iti. Which is, in the Anglo-Saxon, hvilc ; in the Mseso-Gothic 
hweleiks, from hwas, or hwe, "whom," and leiks, "like." In the 
Alamannic it is huuielich ; in the Danish huilk ; in the Dutch welke ; 
in the German welche. The word whilk, .anciently written quhilk, was 
common in Scotland to a late period, and perhaps still exists in some 
remote parts of the country. It is .uniformly used in the " Disputation " 
of Nicol Burne, A. D. 1581 : as, " I micht produce monie siclyk places, 
quhilk I never hard zit cited be zou ;" that is, "I might produce many 
such places (of Scripture), which I never heard yet cited by you." 

iv. Agreeing with these is the old English thilke, still retained in the 
Wiltshire dialect, and pronounced thik, for " that." Thus Spenser, in 
his " May," says : — . 

Our blonket liveries been all too sad, 
For thilke same season, when all is yclad 
In pleasance. 

Chaucer, in his translation of Boethius, says, " Certes yet liveth 
in good point thilk precious honour of mankind." 



CHAP. XIII.] OF ADVERBS. 237 

And in the poem on Christ's Descent into Hell are these lines : — 

The smale fendes that bueth nout stronge 
He shulen among men yonge 
Thilke that nulleth ageyne hem stonde 
Ichulle he habben hem in honde. 

That is, " the small fiends that are not strong shall go among mankind, 
and those persons who will not stand against them, I am willing they 
should have in hand." 

Thus have I traced a substantive (signifying tody) through its 
transitions, first into an adjective proper (like), thence as part of the 
compound adjectives proper and pronominal (lovelike and solike), and, 
lastly, into the termination Qy), which is still used both in adjectives 
and adverbs, though with idiomatic differences in respect to particular 
words, some being only considered as belonging to the one class, and 
some to the other. Goodly, for instance, though not much used in the 
present day, and rather as an adverb than an adjective, is employed by 
Shakspeare in the latter character, through all its degrees of com- 
parison : — 

i. In Hamlet: — 

I saw him once, he was a goodly king. 

ii. In Ms Well that Ends Well:— 

If he were honester he were much goodlier. 

iii. In King Henry VIII. : — 

She is the goodliest woman that ever lay by man. 
So the word kindly is commonly considered to be an adverb, but Burns 
uses it as an adjective in Poor Maine's Elegy : — 

Thro' a' the toun she trotted by him ; 
A lang half-mile she cou'd descry him ; 
Wi' kindly bleat, when she did spy him, 
She ran wi' speed. 

On the other hand, the word lonely is treated in the English dialect as 
an adjective ; but Bums, in the same poem, employs it adverbially : — 

Our bardie, lanely, keeps the spence 
Sin' Mailie's dead. 

Godly, lovely, portly, and some other such words, are for the most 
part employed in modern times, as adjectives ; but it is observable that 
godly has obtained by custom a different meaning from the identical 
adjective godlike. We have, too, some of these words in one form of 
composition, and not in its correspondent compound. Thus we say 
ungainly for awkward ; though the word gainly, formerly in use, has 
become obsolete. Dr. Henry More, a very learned writer of the 
seventeenth century, says, " She laid her child as gainly as she could, 
in some fresh leaves and grass." (Conj. Cabal.) 

387. Of the words formerly in common use as adjectives, but now Very, 
employed almost exclusively as adverbs, the word very is an obvious 
instance. Very is correctly stated by Mr. Tooke to be the Latin 



23S OF ADVERBS. [CHAP. XIII. 

adjective verus, and Italian vero, " true," changed, in old French and 
old English, into veray, which, in modern French, is vrai. The 
adjectival use of this word still remains in the Nicene Creed as rendered 
in the Liturgy of the Church of England, " very God of very God." 
Chaucer uses it as an adjective both in the positive and comparative 
degree. In his translation of Boethius, On the Consolation of Philo- 
sophy (b. iv.), " It is clere and open that thilke sentence of Plato is 
very and sothe." And again (b. hi.), " which that is a more verie 
thinge." In these instances it retains the signification of mere truth ; 
but in a secondary sense it expresses eminence in degree, and is even in 
this respect employed as an adjective positively, comparatively and 
superlatively. 

My faithfulness shalt thou establish in the very heavens. Psalm lxsxix. 2. 

• Was not my love 

The verier wag o' the two ? Shakspeare. 

Were he the veriest antick in the world. Ibid. 

The secondary sense alone of the adjective survives in the modern 
use of the adverb ; nor is it surprising, that an adjective primarily 
signifying " true," should, in a secondary sense, form an adverb 
expressing eminence of degree, as applied to all other qualities ; for a 
thing that is very good or bad, i. e., good or bad in an eminent degree, 
may be said, kot k'&xw'-, to be truly good or bad. The Italians 
express the same modification of qualities by molto, " much," the 
French by fort, " strong," the Latins by multum, " much," and valde, 
from validus, " strong :" and our ancestors by a variety of attributives, 
as swythe, sothfast, right, full, strong, well, &c. From the old adjective 
veray we have also our inflected adverb verily, and the obsolete verra- 
ment (the modern French vraiment), as in the above-quoted romance of 
Kyng Alisaunder : — ■ 

By the steorres and by the firmament 
He him taughte verrament. 
And again : — 

Ther ros soche cry verrement, 
No scholde mon yhere the thonder dent. 
Participles. 388. It is not only the adjective proper which serves to modify- 
other adjectives, or verbs. The participle performs the same office, 
and in the same manner ; and this (in English) either by a participle 
of present or of past time. Of the former class we have " scalding 
hot," " staring mad," " roaring drunk," and, in Shakspeare, more 
elegantly, " loving jealous." 

Warm cataplasms may discuss, but scalding hot may confirm the 
tumour. Arbuthnot.. 

In came Squire South, stark, staring mad. Ibid. 

' I would have thee gone, 

And yet no further than a wanton's bird, 

Who lets it hop a little from her hand, 

Like a poor prisoner in his twisted gyves, 

And with a silk thread pulls it back again, 

So loving jealous of his liberty. Shakspeare. 



CHAP. XIII.} OF ADVERBS. 239 

Of the past participles some are used without, but more with the 
prefix a, answering to the Anglo-Saxon and German ge. Bums thus 
employs brent, from the the Scotch bren to burn : — 
Nae cotillons brent-new frae France. 

Milton has adrift from drive ; Ben Jonson, agone (now written ago) 
from go ; Chaucer, of ret, either from the- verb freight, or, more pro- 
bably, from the verb fret : — 

Then shall this Mount 

Of Paradise, hy might of waves, be mov'd, 
With all his verdure spoil'd, and trees, adrift 
Down the great river. Milton. 

Is he such a princely one 

As you speak him long agone ? B. Jonson. 

For round environ her crounet 

Was fulle of rich stonys afret. Chaucer. 

In all these and the like cases, however, the notion of time which 
specifically characterises the participle does not attach to the same 
word when it becomes an adverb ; because it either modifies a verb, 
and then the time is expressed by the verb itself; or else it modifies 
an adjective, and then no expression of time is necessary. 

389. The pronouns adjective supply, either with or without some Pronouns 
slight change of form, many adverbs of frequent use ; especially those sSve, &c 
pronouns which I have called demonstratives, partitives, distributives, 
general and numeral, subjunctives, and interrogatives ; but as the words 
constituting these several classes are in all languages among the 
simplest and most ancient that exist, we must not be surprised to find 
some difficulty in tracing the pronominal adverbs to their proper 
origin. In this respect, very great praise is due to several recen: 
German philologists, particularly to Professors Bopp, Pott, and 
Jacob Grimm ; who have thrown important light on a part of the 
science of language previously quite dark, and still involved in con- 
siderable obscurity. I shall consider together the classes just specified, 
reserving only the numerals for a separate notice. With this excep- 
tion, the words in question furnish, in most languages, a number of 
adverbs connected together by various relations, and for the most part 
of an elliptical construction. The words here and there, hence and 
thence, hie and illic, hinc and Mine, for instance, are manifestly in their 
origin demonstrative pronouns, equivalent to the words this and that ; 
but, by use, they have come to signify " at this place," " at that place ;" 
" from this place," " from that place ;" the substantive " place " being 
clearly understood by the mind. Neither can it be doubted that the 
Latin adverbs quum and quo are the subjunctive pronoun qui, with the 
terminations of the accusative and ablative case ; which word qui is 
probably the same in origin with the Gothic hwo, the Saxon hwa, the 
Scottish quha, and the English who. 

It happens, that the English language is not perfectly systematic in 



240 OF ADVERBS. [CHAP. XIII. 

regard to the pronouns which it has adopted for adverbial purposes; 
and the same may be said of most other languages. We have the 
simple adverbs just mentioned, which form three distinct classes, with 
reference to place, distinguishing the place where we are, from another 
definite place, and supplying an interrogative for the place which we 
know not, which interrogative is also a subjunctive. 

The first of these is here, the second there, and the third where. It 
happens too, with regard to place, that each of these three forms has 
three varieties to express " at a place," " from a place," and " to a 
place ;" and all these are variously compounded with several other 
words or particles, fore, ever, soever, &c. Some of the verbs which 
form adverbs of place, also become adverbs of time, manner, cause, &c. ; 
but these latter ideas have a few adverbs which are peculiar to them- 
selves, agreeing nevertheless, in principle and derivation, with the 
adverbs of place. Hence may be formed the following table of the 
simple adverbs of this kind : — 

{here . . . there . . . where? 
hence . . thence . . whence? 
hither . . thither . . whither? 

Time then . . . when? 

Manner thus . . . how? 

Cause why? 

The three classes into which I have distributed these adverbs, have 
not always been thus accurately distinguished. In our old language, we 
shall find the prepositive forms here and there often interchanged with 
the subjunctive or interrogative form where ; yet it is clearly evident 
that these distinctions must have always existed in point of significa- 
tion, however inaccurately or imperfectly expressed. 
Here. 390. The word here is not only used in its simple form, but in a 

variety of compounds, as, hereafter, hereabout, hereat, hereby, herein, 
hereinto, hereof, hereon, hereupon, hereto, hereunto, heretofore, herewith, 
heirfoir, heirintill, &c. In the simple form it is principally confined to 
the signification of " this place;" whereas, in the compounds, it 
generally signifies " this time," " this thing," " this event," or the like. 
The cognate word hier, in German, does not follow exactly the same 
variations of meaning. Both in its simple and compound forms it 
principally refers to place, as hieran, hieraus, hierdurch, hierein, hierin- 
nen, hierober, hierunter, &c. ; and so, heran, herebey, herein, &c ; though 
some compounds are more general in their application, as, hierum, 
hiervon, hierzu. In both languages, however, it is manifest that the 
word here, hier, or her, intrinsically signifies no more than the word 
this; and that the other significations, such as " place," " time," 
" event," " reason," or the like, are supplied by the mind, according to 
the context. It can hardly be doubted but that the elements of the 
word here are to be discovered in he and er, which occur in many of 
the Northern languages, as signifying this person or these persons, this 
thing or these things ; so that the radical conception is what we express 






CHAP. Xni.] OF ADVERBS. 241 

by the word this. The element he occurs, in Anglo-Saxon and old 
English, in the words signifying he, she, they, and their respective 
cases. The Anglo-Saxon pronoun personal is he, heo, hi, he, she, they ; 
and the very word here occurs for the genitive plural, as heom does for 
them. The same or similar words are frequent in old English writers. 
In the Vision of Piers Plouhman — 

Hermets on a heape with hoked staues 
Wenten to Walsingham, and her wenches after. 
****** 

Cokes and lier knaues cryden, hote pyes, hote : 

that is, " their wenches," and " their knaves," or " boys." 

In Chaucer's Parson's Tale, " Certes this vertue makith folk under- 
take hard and greuous things by her own will ;" that is, " their own." 
In an ancient ballad, probably of the thirteenth century, beginning 
" In May, hit muryeth," (Harl. MSS. 2253. fol. 71)— 

Ynot non so freoh flour 

Ase ledies that beth biyht in hour, 

With loue who mihte hem bynde : 

That is, "I know no flower so fresh as ladies who are bright in bowers, 
to those who may bind them with love." In a dialogue between a 
body and a spirit, of the same date (ibid. fol. 57), " he wolleth " occurs 
for " they will." This word was sometimes written heo, as, in a 
satirical poem against the ecclesiastical lawyers, (ibid. fol. 71) — 

Heo shulen in helle on an hok 
Honge there fore. 

And sometimes hi, as in another manuscript in the Harleian collection 
(No. 2277, fol. 195)— 

Tho hi dude here pelrynage in holie stedes faste, 

So that among the Sarazyns ynome hi were atte laste : 

that is " they did their pilgrimage, so that they were taken at last." 

In the Lai le frain, which is a translation from the Norman-French 
of the celebrated poetess Marie, we have he and hye for " she ;" and 
him for " her :" — 

The maiden abode no lengore, 
Bot yede hir to the chirche dore ; 

* * * * 

Lord, he seyd, Jesu Crist, &e. 

* * * * 

Hye loked vp, and by hir seighe 

An asche, by hir, fair and heighe. 

***** 

A litel maiden childe ich founde, 
In the holwe assche therout, 
And a pel him about. 

The other element, er, is found in the modem German er, he, and 

in the Icelandic er, am, is, and who ; as in the Edda of Snorro, " Feyma 

heiter su kona er of ram er svo sem ungar meyar eru. n " Feyma is 

called the woman who modest is, as the young maidens are." In the 

2. R 



242 OF ADVERBS. [CHAP. XIII. 

Frankish and Alamannic, the demonstrative and relative pronouns of 
the third person are er, her, and ir. Thus, in the Frankish of Otfrid 
the Monk, " Er gibot then uuinton," " He commanded the winds ;" in 
that of Tatian, " Er quam in sin eigan," "He came to his own." In 
the Alamannic of Isidore, " Dhaz ir Jhesus uuardh chinennt" " That 
he Jesus was named." These two elements, then, viz., he and er, are 
identical in signification; and are only redoubled for the sake of 
emphasis, which is a habit common to barbarous nations, and to the 
illiterate in all countries. Hence it is, that the French have their ce-ci 
and ce-la, and even ce-lui-ci and ce-lui-la ; and that our own rustics 
commonly say this here, that there, thick there, &c. From this source 
undoubtedly come the Gothic, Anglo-Saxon, Danish, and Icelandic her, 
the Frankish and Alamannic hier, Mar, hiera, the modem German and 
Dutch hier, and the English here, all used to signify, " at this place," 
although the simple and radical meaning of them all is simply " this J 3 
The various explanations which are given of the adverb here by 
Dr. Johnson only serve to show that the conception of a distinct and 
particular place is no necessary constituent in the meaning of the word. 
Thus here is opposed to a future time, as well as to a different place, 
by Bacon, in his advice to Villiers: " You shall be happy here and 
more happy hereafter ;" which might be paraphrased " in this life and 
in a life after this " — " in this world, and in a world after this " — " in 
this state of existence, and in a state of existence after this," always 
retaining, however, the conception expressed by the word this. So 
when the words here and there are explained by Johnson " dispersedly ; 
in one place and another ;" as in another extract from Bacon : " I 
would have in the heath some thickets made only of sweet-briar, and 
honeysuckle, and some wild vine amongst ; and the ground set with 
violets ; for these are sweet, and prosper in the shade ; and these to 
be in the heath here and there, not in order." The words here and 
there are still to be explained this and that ; for the imagination forms 
conceptions of places separate from each other, although quite indeter- 
minately as to any specific external situation, and even as to number, 
except that the place signified by the word here is in imagination 
separate from that expressed by the word there. The indistinct process 
of the imagination, therefore, in the passage above cited, may be 
explained by supposing an individual carelessly wandering over the 
ground which is to be ornamented, and occasionally stopping to say, I 
will have a thicket planted in this place and another in that place. The 
same expression occurs in a beautiful sonnet of Shakspeare — 
Alas ! 'tis true, I have gone here and there ; 

which corresponds with the expression a ranged," in the preceding 
verses — 

As easie might I from my selfe depart, 

As from my soule, which in thy brest doth lye : 

That is my home of loue. If I haue rang'd, 

Like him that tranels, I returne againe. 



CHAP. XIII.] OF ADVERBS. 243 

Here and there are doubtless used indefinitely in such phrases ; but not 
more indefinitely than the pronouns this and that might themselves be 
used, as in the song — 

This way, or that way, or which way you will ; 

and in Drayton's pleasing description of a winter evening's chat with 

his friend — 

JSTow talk'd of this, and then discours'd of thai, 
Spoke our own verses, 'twixt ourselves, &c. 

Nay, even the pronoun personal is sometimes used with the same 
uncertainty of application ; as in Chaucer's spirited description of a 
tournament, in the Knyghfs Tale — 

He rolleth under foote, as dothe a hall, 
Te foyneth on his feet with a tronchoun, 
nd he hurleth with his horse adoun, 
He through the hody is hvrt and sith ytake. 

In none of which instances is there any certain antecedent to the word 
he ; and yet it stands first for one man, then for another, then for a 
third, and lastly for a fourth. 

Hence and hither maj be considered as cases of the word here ; but 
perhaps it would be more accurate to treat these three w r ords as 
different compounds of the element he, with er, an, and der. Hence 
is the Anglo-Saxon heonan, and the Frankish hina. It seems to be 
connected with the Icelandic han, he, and hin, it ; and with the syllable 
hin, which, in various German compounds, signifies " from this place," 
" " from this time," " at this time," " to that place," &c. ; and which is 
used alone to signify anything that is " gone hence ;" " lost," or " anni- 
hilated ;" as in the Leonore of Burger — 

mutter, mutter, hin ist hin! ... \ 

■ Verlohren ist verlohren I 

So they say er ist hin for "he is dead :" hinrichten is to execute justice 
on any one, to put him to death ; hindag is " this day ;" hinfort, 
" henceforth," " from this time forth ;" which is also expressed 
forthin. Immerhin is an exclamation answering to our " let it go," 
and meaning "be it ever thus, I care not;" as, er mag immerhin 
schreyen, " he may bawl as long as he likes." So hinauf and hinab, 
" above and below ;" hinein and hinaus, " within and without," mean 
respectively above this place, below this place, within this place, out of 
this place. Hinfahren is to go away, to go from this place ; and, in 
the Frankish, hinafahrt is " death." Our English word hence, in old 
writings, is hen, han, hin, hennes. In the romance of The Seuyn Sages, 
we find — 

A fend he is, in kinde of man ; 

Binde him, sire, and lede han. 

Chaucer, in the Knyghfs Tale, says — ■ 

The fires whiche on min auter hrenne 
Shal declaren er that thou go henne 
This auenture of loue. 

r2 






244 OF ADVERBS. [CHAP., XIII.' 

So in Christ's Descent into Hell — 

Bring vs of this lothe lond 
Louerd hcnne into thyn hond. 

In the Scottish Act of Parliament, A. D. 1438, " that all the kinge's 
hegis be vnharmyt & vnscaithit of the said house & of thaim that 
inhabits theirin fra hyn furth." 

Hither is the Anglo-Saxon and Gothic hidre. In the old English 
too it was often written with ad; as in Chaucer's Monk's Tale — 

And if you list to herken hiderward. 
So in two manuscript poems in the British Museum (Harl. MSS. 
2253, fol. 64 and fol. 124)— 

Herketh hideward, and booth stille. 
* * * * 

Herkneth hideward horsmen 
A tidyng ichou telle. 

And, in the poem on Christ's, Descent into Hell, Satan says — 

Ne may non me worse do, 
Then ich haue had hiderto. 

There. 391. There, thence, thither, are manifestly constructed on the same 

principles, and applied in the same manner as here, hence, and 
hither ; and as we suppose the first element of here to be he, so we 
suppose the first element of there to be the, which, in the Anglo-Saxon, 
was prefixed as an article to substantives in all cases, and in both 
numbers ; and which appears in various dialects under the forms of 
thei, thy, tho, tha, all relating to the pronoun that. Thei is the Gothic 
conjunction " that." Thy, in the old English compound forthy, signifies 
" for that," viz. cause. Tho is explained by Junius, qui, illi, and tunc, 
viz. "that person," in the plural; and " that place" used adverbially; 
and he adds, that the Anglo-Saxon tha admits all these signifi- 
cations. 

Tho for " then" (see Warton, vol. i. p. 161) — 
The messengers tho home went. 

Tho for " when" (Harl. MSS. 2253, fol. 37)— 
Tho Jhesu was to hell ygan. 

Tha for " those" (The Seuyn Sages, v. 3901)— 

Al tha wordes ful well he knew, 
He was so ferd him changed hew. 

Thae for " those." See the second volume of The Antiquary, (one 
of the novels which so accurately delineate the manners and language 
of Scotland,) p. 297— 

Time's your landward and burrowstown notions. 

Tho for « those" (Harl. MSS. 2253, fol. 55, 56)— 

Parmafey ich hold myne 
All tho that bueth her ynne. 



.CHAP. XIII.] OF ADVERBS. 245 

There seems to be compounded of the and er ; as here of he and er ; 
but however this may be, there manifestly agrees with the German der, 
which is a demonstrative and relative pronoun, as well as an article, 
and consequently answers to our the, this, and who. In like manner, 
the Anglo-Saxon thaere or thcer formed the genitive of the article, and 
also the demonstrative and relative adverb ; as in the 4th chapter of 
Joshua, " Nyman twelf stanas on middan thcere ea, thcer tha sacerdas 
stodon, & habban forth mid eow, to eowre wicstowe, & wurpan hig 
thcer." " Take twelve stones from [the] midst [of] the water, where 
the priests stood ; and have [them] forth with you, to your abiding- 
place, and cast them [down] there ;" in which passage we see thcere 
and thcer, answering to the, ichere, and tJiere, successively. So in the 
old English, there is often used in two connected sentences, for there 
and where ; as in Chaucer's Wife of BatKs Tale — 

There as "vront to walken was an elfe, 
There walketh now the limitour himself. 

It might not unreasonably be surmised, that where the operations 
of the mind are so distinct, as those indicated by a demonstrative and 
a subjunctive pronoun or adverb are, they would necessarily require 
expressions equally different ; but a careful attention to the history of 
language will show us that it differs very widely in this respect from 
its philosophy. It is for want of having sufficiently considered this 
circumstance that we find grammarians so often at a loss to account 
for different idioms, and giving reasons for them which are purely 
imaginary, not to say absurd. It is, no doubt, a great excellence in a 
language to mark, by distinct expressions, the distinct operations of 
the mind, and the more nicely this is done, the more accurate and ex- 
pressive does a language become ; but this is generally the result of 
time and of an undefinable sense of inconvenience, which induces men 
to inflect and vary words, as it were, insensibly, and to assign to the 
various inflections, though of similar origin, different effects. In no 
language, however, has this principle been carried into full operation ; 
and hence we see the different meanings of a word, and the different 
parts of speech which it constitutes, passing into each other by grada- 
tions, which, at first sight, it is not always easy to explain. Thus, in 
Greek, the subjunctive pronoun, or, as some call it, the subjunctive 
article, og, is sometimes said to be used for the prepositive 6 ; some- 
times for rig interrogatively ; and sometimes for avrog. Again, "Oang 
sometimes answers to the Latin relative quis, and sometimes to quis- 
quis. The adverb "Ottov, besides the common signification " where," 
answers to " whither ;" and, in argument, to " since ;" and in descrip- 
tion, to " in this place," or " in that place." So, ore, " when," sig- 
nifies also " since," like the. Latin cum : and the examples of this kind 
are infinite. We shall not, therefore, be surprised to find considerable 
diversity from the modem idiom in the following, and many similar 
instances : — 



246 OF ADVERBS. [CHAP. XIII. 

Ther is used for the, that, or them ; as, in The Seuyn Sages, therwhile 
for the while : — 

Therwhile, sire, that I tolde this tale, 
Thi sone rnighte tholie dethes bale. 

Gawin Douglas has " thare aboue" for " above that;" and " tharon" 
for " on them." 

In the old Scottish dialect thir was used for these or them ; as in the 
act of 1424, " thir ar taxis ordaynt throu the counsaile of Parliament." 
So in Dunbar's Goldin Terge, written about a century afterward — 

Full lustiely thir ladyis all in feir 
Enterit into this park of maist pleseir. ' 
* * * * . * 

And every ane of thir in grene arrayt 

And harp and lute full mirreyly they playt. 

In the same dialect" we find thairto and thai? fra, thairfoir and 
thairefter, tharapone, thairuntill, &c. 

Chaucer uses therto in the sense of " moreover," or *' in addition to 
that" as in the Rime of Sir Thopas — 

He couthe hunt at the wilde' dere 
And ride an hauking forby the riuere 

With grey goshauke on honde : 
Therto he was a good archere. 

Therefore, which, in modern times, is commonly used conjunctively, 
occurs in a rude old English poem before quoted (Harl. MSS. 2253, 
fol. 71), as signifying for that — 

Heo shulen in helle on an hok 
Honge there fore. 

In short, comparing the different authorities, ancient and modem, 
we find that the word there, however variously spelt, did not originally 
relate to place exclusively, but was equally applied to time, to persons, 
and to events : and the same may be said of thence and thither. 
Thenceforth, which we use with reference to time, agrees with the old 
Scottish phrase fra thin furth, as in the following passage in the Act 
of 1503, which is, on many accounts, worthy of notice: — 

It is statute and ordanit that fra thin furth na baroun, frehaldar, nor vassal, 
quhilkis ar within ane hundreth merks of this extent that now is, be compellit to 
cum personaly to the parliament, bot gif it be that our souerane Lord write speciale 
for thame. And sa (sal) not be unlawit for thair persons, and thai send thair 
procuratours to answer for thame, with the baronis of the schire, or the maist 
famous personis. And all that ar aboue the extent of ane hundreth merks to cum 
to the parliament, vnder the pane of the auld vnlaw. 

Thither was, in the Anglo-Saxon and old English, thider, as in the 
poem often quoted (Harl MSS. 2253, fol. 55)— 

God for is moder loue, 
Let us neuer thider come. 

And as they had hide ward for " hitherward," or " toward this place," 



CHAP. Xffl.] OF ADVERBS. 247 

so they had thederwart for " thitherward," or " toward that place :" as 
in the ludicrous poem called " The Huntyng of the Hare :" — 

Thei toke no hede thederwart, 
But euery dogge on oder start. 

392. Where, whence, and whither. These words have also a similar Where, 
malogy, together with this further peculiarity, that they serve in- 
differently for interrogatives and subjunctives. Thus in the interro- 
gative : — 

They continually say unto rne, where is thy God ? Psa. xlii. 3. 

And he said, Hagar, Sarai's maid, whence earnest thou ; and whither 
wilt thou go ? Gen. xvi. 8. 

And again in the subjunctive — 

Let no man know where ye be. Jer. xxxvi. 19. 

I wist not whence they were. Josh. ii. 4. 

He went out, not knowing whither he went. Heb. xi. 8. 

We have already seen that the subjunctive force of the word where 
was not peculiar to it, but was sometimes expressed by the word 
there. We do not find this to be the case in English with the inter- 
rogative force of the same word ; but in Greek the relative pronoun rig 
is also an interrogative ; as in St. Mark's gospel, c. ii. v. 6, 7 : T Hffa*> 
2)£ TINES tu)v ypanfiaTEuiv ktcet tcad^/JLevoi kcli cWAoyi^ojuevcu kv rate; 
Kapdiaig clvtojv' TI' ovtoq ovtoj XaXei /3\a(T(pr]ixiag ; TIS hvvarai 
cupiivai a/j,apriag, el /nrj lig 6 Qeog ; — " But there were certain of the 
scribes sitting there, and reasoning in their hearts, why doth this man 
thus speak blasphemies ? Who can forgive sins, but God only ?" — 
Hence it is clear, that the interrogative effect of a word does not 
require a peculiar form, any more than the subjunctive. So the Latin 
quidam, which means " a certain person," and " aliquis," which means 
" some one," are reciprocally connected with the interrogative quis, and 
the subjunctive qui. Scaliger was of opinion that the Latin quis and 
qui were the Greek kcli oq and /ecu o ; and Tooke, probably thinking 
to improve on this etymology, has only gone further in error. He 
says, "As ut (originally written uti) is nothing but on ; so is quod 
(anciently written quodde) merely ical brl : — 

Quodde, tuas laudes cidpas nil proficis hilum. Lucilius. 

" Qu in Latin being sounded not as the English, but as the French 
pronounce qu, that is, as the Greek K ; kcli, by a change of the cha- 
racter, not of the sound, became the Latin que, used only enclitically 
indeed in modern Latin. Hence kcil 6tI became in Latin qu'otti, 
quoddi, quoddz, quod." — The only foundation for all these conjectures 
seems to be, that in the very nature of a subjunctive pronoun some- 
thing equivalent to a conjunction is implied ; and as to the assertions 
respecting the Roman pronunciation they are perfectly gratuitous. It 
is not very probable that the ancient pronunciation of qu was the 
same as of K ; on the contrary, it more probably resembled that of 



248 OF ADVERBS. [CHAP. XIII. 

X, or rather of the Gothic O, which our Anglo-Saxon ancestors 
expressed by hw, the old Scottish writers by quh, and we by wh, 
Scaliger and Tooke forgot, that if their explanation might be thought 
to account for the subjunctive pronoun, or conjunction, it left the inter- 
rogative pronouns and adverbs quite unexplained ; and the fact seems 
to be, that the Latin language originally agreed with the Gothic and 
other northern languages in employing the articulation markedly the 
iEolic digamma, where the softer Greek dialects omitted that articu- 
lation ; thus the Greek oivoq was the Latin vinum and Gothic weinj 
the Greek Si was the Latin vce and Gothic wai; and lastly, the 
Greek aspirated pronouns fj, 6, were the Latin quce, quo, and the 
Gothic hwa, hwo. 

It is manifest that where did not originally refer to place alone, any> 
more than here or there did ; but, like those words, was originally a 
pronoun signifying this or that ; for in its composite forms it often sig- 
nifies no more than those pronouns, the substantive to which it refers 
being usually expressed, but sometimes understood. Thus we have 
whereabout, for "about which business" — 

Let no man know any thing of the business whereabout I send 
thee. 1 Sam. xxi. 2. 

Whereto, for " to which thing " — - 

It shall prosper in the thing whereto I sent it, Isaiah Iv. 11. 
Whereby, for "by which name" — 
; There is none other name under heaven given among men whereby 

we must be saved. Acts iv. 12. 

Wherefore, for " for which cause " — 

What is the cause wherefore ye are come ? Acts x. 21. 

All these compounds may be employed interrogatively, (and indeed 
the subjunctive use of some of them has at present become rather ob- 
solete,) but in this form also they are not necessarily significant of 
*' place." — Thus whereby is used for " by what means ? " — 

Zacharias said unto the angel, whereby shall I know this ? Luke i. 18. 
Wherefore, for " for what reason? " — 

Now he is dead wherefore should I fast ? 2 Sam. xii. 23. 

It is to be observed, however, that there are certain adverbs com- 
pounded with where, which cannot be used interrogatively, such as 
whereas, wherever, wheresoever ; but the reason is, that in these, as well 
as in whensoever, whithersoever, &c, the pronoun as and so, and the 
word ever, necessarily give them a relative force and effect : — 

Have ye not spoken a lying divination, whereas ye say, The Lord 
saith it ? Ezeli. xiii. 7. 

Ye have the poor with you always : and whensoever ye will ye 
may do them good. Mark xiv. 7. 

The Lord preserved David whithersoever he went. 2 Sam. viii. 6. 
It would be impossible to express these passages interrogatively, 



.CHAP.. XIII.] OF ADVERBS. 249 

" whereas say ye ? " " whensoever will ye ? " " whithersoever did he 
go?" not on account of the meaning of the words "where," "when," 
or " whither," but of the others with which they are compounded. 

From what has been said, it is abundantly clear that the adverbs 
here, there, where, hence, thence, whence, hither, thither, and whither, 
although in their modern and uncompounded use they principally 
express a conception of "place," yet did not really include the name 
of any such conception in their original signification, but were the 
mere pronouns he, this, and what, diversely compounded, and assigned 
by use to separate and distinct significations. 

393. The very same is to be observed of the adverbs Then and TW 
When, which have been above noted, as principally signifying time. 
We have not, indeed, the word Hen for "at this time," though it 
occurs in old English for hence, i. e., from this place. Thus, in the 
scoffing ballad made on the defeat of Henry III. at Lewes, in 1264, 
and which, from its tenor, must have been composed very soon after 
the event, we find the following lines — 

He hath robbed Engelond the mores ant the ferine 
The gold ant the selver ant yboren henne. 

Hann, in the Icelandic, is " he," and hun is " she ;" and Stiern- 
helm (Gloss. Ulph. Goth., p. 85), speaking of the Gothic word hana, 
as in hana hrukida, " the cock crew," (Matth. xxvi. 74,) says, Omnis 
avis mascula dicitur hana, ab han, Me, et fcemina hona, ab HON, ilia; 
" every male bird is called hana, from han, he ; and every female 
bird hona, from hon, she." Hence we may infer, that the element en 
was compounded in some of the northern dialects, as we have already 
seen that er was, viz., with he, the, and who, producing hen, then, and 
when, as well as here, there, and where, all of them originally pro- 
nouns, and all used in a restricted sense by an ellipsis of the words 
time, place, &c, as adverbs. 

In the Gothic, Than is both "then" and "when," and yuthan is 
used for "now." Than is also used for autem, Si, " but;" and it is 
manifestly nothing more than the article or pronoun thana, or thanei, 
answering to the Greek rov, or qv, as Seimon tkan A.haitanan Zeloten, 
Si/nova TCTN KaXovfjLevov Zrj\(OTi]v, " Simqn, who (was) called 
Zelotes," (Luke vi. 15); thanei wildedun, tv ON ij$e\ov, "whom they 
would," (Matth. xxvii. 15). Thon, for "those," is still used in many 
parts of Scotland ; thynfurth we have seen in the old dialect of that 
country, for " thenceforth," which, in the parliamentary articles of 
1461 above quoted, is written " thensforth :" and as henne was used, 
in old English, for " hence," so thenne was used for thence, i. e., from 
that place; as in Christ's Descent into Hell — 

Xas non so holy prophete, 

Seththe Adam & Eue the appel ete, 

Ant he were at this worldes syne, 

That he ne moste to helle pyne : 

Ne shulde he neuer thenne come, 

Nere Jesu Crist Godes sone. 









250 OF ADVERBS. [CHAP. XIII. 

When is the Gothic hwan, which is used for the Latin quando, quo- 
niam, quantum, quam, and is manifestly the same as hwana, quern, 
"whom;" as hwana soktt, " whom seek ye ? " (John xviii. 4.) As 
the Gothic than and hwan, and the old English there and where were 
often used convertibly, so were then and when ; and in the Harleian 
MSS. (No. 2253, fol. 55, b.) we find the for when- 
ce he com there, tho seide he. 

wl »y- 394. It will not be necessary to use much argument in proof of the 

identity of origin between Why and the words before mentioned, 
where, when, &c. ; it is manifestly only another form of the pronoun 
who. In modern usage we do not oppose thy (in the sense of this 
cause) to why ; but this mode of expression occurs in the old words 
forthy and withthy. Forthy occurs in the Scottish Act of 1424, in 
the two senses of "because" and "therefore." So in Barbour's 
Bruce — 

But God that most is of all might 

Preserved thame in his forsight 

To venge the harm and the contrair 

That those fell folk and pantener 

Did to simple folk and worthy, 

That couth not help themselven ; forthy 

They were like to the Maccabeis. 

The same author seems to use nought for thy in the sense of 
" nevertheless," as — 

And nought for thy, thocht they be feil, 
God may richt weil our werdes deil. 

And not for thy thair faes then were 
Ay twa for ane that they had there. 

So he uses with thy for " provided," or "on this condition" — 

And I sal be in your helping 
With thy ye give me all the Ion; 1 
That ye have nou into your hond. 

In all which instances thy is simply this, viz., cause, reason, or con- 
dition, those substantives being understood by the sort of ellipsis 
already explained. 
Ho *- 395. How is simply the pronoun who, or hwa, sometimes written in 

old English ho ; as in the Harleian MS. 2277, fol. 1— 

Seinte Marie day in Leynte, among 

Alle other dayes gode 
Is ryt forto holde heghe 
. Ho so him vnderstode. 

And as we have seen the pronoun that, and the adverb as, used con- 
vertibly, so we find hou in the old Scottish dialect used where we 
should employ so, or as ; e. g. housone, for " so soon as" — 

That housone ony truble, questioun, or causis happynnis to be 
movit — than incontinent it salbe lesum, &c. 

Scottish Acts, a.d. 1554. 



. 



CHAP. XIII. J OF ADVERBS. 251 

396. I have thus traced, at some length, the English adverbs of General 
place, time, &c, have shown them to be no other than the demonstra- 
tive and subjunctive pronouns, appropriated by custom to certain dis- 
tinct significations ; but though the particular applications are matter 

of mere idiom, and vary, as has been seen, considerably in the same 
country at different periods ; yet in most, if not all languages, the 
same general principle is to be traced. In most, if not all, the words 
which are employed as adverbs of time, place, manner, and cause, are 
pronouns with little or no variation of form. 

In Latin, from the pronouns is, ea, id, come the adverbs ibi, alibi, 
ibidem, hide, provide, ita, itaque, ideo, iccirco, eo, adeo, eorsurn, uspiam, 
nusquam, &c. From hie, hcec, hoc, come him, hue, adhuc, huccine, 
horsum, hodie, antehac, posthac, hacpropter, &c. From ille, ilia, illud, 
come illic, illico, illuc, illinc, olim, &c. From qui, quae, quod, come 
quo, quoque, quam, quando, quia, quamvis, quare, quin, quidem, cum, 
cur, and probably ubi, ubivis, alicubi, &c. 

It is needless to trace the pronominal adverbs in Greek ; but it 
may be somewhat curious to observe the same principle in the Persian 
language, in which the pronouns are een, this ; aim, that ; ke, who ; 
che, which. 

From een, " this," are derived eenjd, " here, 7 ' eensu, " hither." 
From aun, "that;" dnjd, "there;" dnsu, "thither;" angdh, 
"then. 7 ' 

From ke, "who;" cu or cujd, " where," " whither." 
From che, "which;" chan, "how, or when?" chend, "how 
many?" chera, "wherefore?" hemchun, "so as," &c. (See Sir 
William Jones's Persian Grammar; and compare pages- 32 and 33, 
with 93, 94, 95, and 96.) 

397. The numeral pronouns supply a class of adverbs, which are Numerals. 
not very numerous in any language. Verbs of action represent con- 
ceptions which may be often repeated. If it be meant to limit the 
action to a single instance, the conception of the number one must be 
expressed, and so of any other number, and to this is added, either 
expressly, or, at least, in the mind, the conception of time. Thus we 

say "he marched six times through Spain;" he conquered more than 
twenty times in pitched battles;" "he was twelve times crowned wuth 
laurel." In most languages it is unnecessary to express the conception 
of time in connection with the lower numbers, the numerals them- 
selves supplying an inflection, by which that conception is perfectly 
understood. Thus are produced our adverbs once, twice, thrice, which 
are no other than the old genitives onis, twyis, threyis. The Latin 
language is more felicitous in this respect ; it has decies, vicies, centies, 
and millies, to express ten times, twenty times, a hundred times, and 
a thousand times. 

In a poem of the time of Henry VI., entitled, " How the wyse man 
taght hys son" (Harl. MSS. 1596), is the line— 
For and thy wyfe may onys aspye. 



252 OF ADVERBS. [CHAP. XIII. 

In Kyng Alisaunder — 

Ta-yes is somer in that londe. • ' .' . 

# * * 5!: 

Ye haveth him twycs overcome. 

With respect to the adverb once, however, it is to be noted, that as 
one is not always opposed to two or three, or any specific number, but 
sometimes merely to many ; so once does not always signify " at one 
time," as opposed to two, three, or any other number of times, but 
merely " at some time " different from the present. Thus, when the 
poet Wordsworth says of Venice, 

Once did she hold the gorgeous East in fee, 

he means to contrast the greatness of a former time with the degrada- 
tion of the present. As if he had said, although at this present time 
she lies so low, there was one other period, at least, in her history, 
which presented a far different picture. At that time she was rich 
and great, famous and powerful — 

> Now lies she there, 

And none so poor to do her reverence. 

Nor is this signification confined to the time past. Once equally 
means some uncertain time as applied to the future. Thus, in the 
Meny Wives of Windsor — 

I pray thee, once to night, give my sweet Nan this ring. 

Nearly the same effect is given in Latin to the adverb olim, which 
means some one point of time, either past or future ; and seems to 
have the same connection with the relative article, as our word once 
has with the positive ; for olim appears to be derived from olle, which 
the early Romans used for ille, and which, in the plural, was written 
oloe, as in the Royal Law : Si parentis puer verberit, ast oloe ploras- 
sint. The numerals here spoken of are those called cardinal ; but the 
ordinals also supply a certain class of adverbs, as thirdly, fourthly, 
ffthly, &c, which are formed from the adjectives third, fourth, fifth, 
&c., by adding the termination ly, before explained. In the Latin 
language, the correspondent words tertib, quarto, &c, are manifestly 
the adjectives tertius, quartus, &c, with the termination of the abla- 
tive case. In English, too, we use the adjective first, adverbially, 
without any alteration. It has been observed above that the first 
two of the ordinal numbers generally appear not to be taken from the 
names of the cardinal numbers ; thus we do not say in English the 
oneth, the twoeth, nor in Latin unitus, duitus, nor in Greek evorog, 
civirog ; but in these languages respectively, first, second, primus, secun- 
dum, ttowtoq, SsvTepoQ : and when we look to the etymology of these 
words, we shall be inclined to suspect that they are in their origin 
simpler, and therefore, perhaps, earlier than the adjectives taken from 
the ordinal numbers. The word first is manifestly the superlative of 
fore, the first, being, of course, the for-est, or that which is before all 



CHAP. XIII.] OF ADVERBS. 253 

others. The Latin primus is in like manner the superlative of the old 
word pri. Scaliger, speaking of the word primus, says, Superlativum 
est ; nam pri vetus vox fuit, sicut NT : postea latiore vocali fusse sunt 
ne, pile, wide Adverbium, pridem ; comparativum, prius ; superla- 
tivum,, primum. So the Greek Trpwrog is the superlative of the prepo- 
sition 7rpo, being formed thus, irporarog, irpoarog, and (the 6a shown 
by the circumflex accent to be contracted into w) 7rpu>Tog. As to the 
preposition irpo, it answers exactly to the Latin pro?, before, primarily 
with regard to time or place, and secondarily to order, or what we 
call preference. The word irpib, indeed, is used for the first dawn of 
day ; but this appears to be merely a contraction from 7rpm, which, 
however, is undoubtedly connected with irpo ; nor can there be much 
doubt that the three radicals to which I have alluded, viz., pri, pro, 
and for, have all one common origin. 

398. If there be a doubt whether any one particular class of words Verbs. 
can be used adverbially,, that doubt must apply to the Verbs. In 
English, the words to which this doubt applies are either of uncertain 
etymology ; or else their use is rather conjunctional or interjectional 
than adverbial. The adverb Yet has been considered to be the imperative 
mood of the Anglo-Saxon verb gytan, or getan, to get ; but it is not 
very evident how this imperative can be applied to the different senses 

in which the word yet is used. The adverbs ado and together have an 
obvious affinity with the verbs do and gather ; but it is not easy to 
trace them directly to any particular part of those verbs. Ado is well 
known in English from the name of the popular drama, Much Ado 
about Nothing. In the Scottish dialect too it is very ancient. In the 
preface to Gawin Douglas's translation of the iEneid we find the ex- 
pression " it has nathing ado therewith." The adverb Together has a 
manifest relation to the verb gather, which, however, we now use with 
some diversity of meaning. The adverb and the verb rather, seem to 
refer to some common origin, which does not exist in English, but ap- 
pears in a more simple form in Dutch, in which gade is a consort, as 
een duyf en haare gade, " a dove and her mate ;" gadeloos, matchless ; 
gadelyk, sortable, &c. 

399. Yes and No may be referred to the class of verbal adverbs, if Affirmative 
they properly belong to this part of speech, which I am inclined to Negative, 
think they do ; though a very able philologist considers them as 
"referable to none of the current parts of speech," but requiring 

by accurate grammar to be placed "in a class by themselves." * 
Doubtless they stand alone in construction, and are equivalent, each of 
them, to a whole sentence ; but that sentence is elliptical, and, I appre* 
hend, that the verb understood in it is modified by the adverb expressed. 
In the language of gesture nothing can be more simple, more universal, 
or more frequent than the expressions of assent or dissent, the former 
by a nod of the head, the latter by a shake of the head. In the words 

* Latham, Eng. Lang. § 259. 



254 OF ADVERBS. [CHAP. Xllli 

of our Saviour, too, the verbal expressions are as short and distinct as 
possible : "Ecw cie o \6yoe. vfiwv Nat, va\, "Ov, ov. " Sit autem 
sermo vester, Est, est, Non, non. " Let your communication be Yea, 
yea, Nay, nay." In the Gothic, " Siyai than waurda izwar Ta, ya, 
Ne, ne." Yet it is remarkable, that in classical literature generally 
such simple expressions of assent or dissent seldom or never occur, at 
least in the plain and direct mode in which we constantly employ 
them. One would expect to find frequent use of them, if anywhere, 
in Plato's Dialogues, where the reasoning of Socrates is so generally 
carried on by interrogation. But, on the contrary, the answers are for 
the most part given in such terms as"E<77-i ravra, " These things are 
so;" 'Ovk loriv, "it is not;" IIwc <Toir, "how not;" r\ f.njv, "what 
else?" Haw jiev ovv, "wholly so ;" T Ev Xeyetg, "you say well;" 
qvtuq, "just so ;" ovdafxojg, " by no means;" 'Eoike ye irwg, "at least 
'tis rather probable ;" ovk eoikev, " 'tis not probable ;" tyaa\ yovv, " so 
at least they say ;" 'E^et yap \6yov, " why, 'tis reasonable." Some- 
times, indeed, the answer is by the short word Nat ; but this, though 
translated " yea," in the text above quoted, conveys to a classical ear, 
somewhat of a less positive assertion; implying, when used respon- 
sively, rather a submission to the person addressed than a confident 
assertion of the party using it : ex. gr. 'Ovkovv 6p$tig z$r\v (b Adel- 
ftavre; Nat, ?) c)' 6c, "'Was I not right,' said I, 'O Adimantus?' 
' Certainly,' said he."* To understand the nature of the responsive 
words yes and no, we must advert to what has before been said of 
interrogative sentences, and the interrogative mood of verbs. The 
interrogator states a fact as unknown to or doubted by himself, in its 
general existence, or in some of its circumstances ; and he requires from 
the respondent an assertion affirming or denying that which he has 
stated as doubtful or unknown. The question proposed is simple or 
complex. If simple, the answer may be in the same words, mutatis 
mutandis, as the question: if complex it cannot. The Greeks and 
Romans called the simple question 'Epuj-j^a, interrogation and the 
complex, Jlv(Tfxa, percontatio ; which distinction may be illustrated by 
comparing the proceedings on a criminal trial by jury with those on a 
coroner's inquest. The simple question put to the jury in the former 
case is an 'Epwr/^a, " Is the prisoner guilty?" and the answer may 
be given in the very same words transposed, " The prisoner is guilty." 
The complex question in the other case is a Uvcr/ia. How did the 
person, whose body you are to examine, come by his death? Which 
may branch into many simple questions, as did he die by the act of 
God ? or by his own hands ? or by the hands of another ? If by his 
own hands, was he at the time sane, or insane ? If by the hands of 
another, is that person known or unknown ? If known, was it A., B„, 
or C, &c, all, or which of them ? And whatever the state of the facts 
may be, the complex question first proposed cannot be answered by 
transposing its terms, nor by any other simple response. With 
* Plato, Rep. L 4. 



CHAP. XIH.] OF ADVERBS. 255 

complex questions, the words yes and no have nothing to do ; but sup- 
posing a simple question to be put, and answered affirmatively, by 
transposing its terms, as "Is there peace at present between France 
and England ?" — " There is peace at present between France and 
England," — it must immediately occur to any one that the answer would 
be perfectly intelligible, if all the words after " there is " were dropt as 
superfluous ; and equally so if the answer were " there is not? So, if 
it were asked, " Is it true that A. B. is guilty of the felony of which 
he stands indicted?" the full answer would be, " It is true that A. B. 
is guilty of the felony of which he stands indicted," but it would be 
equally intelligible to say briefly "it is" or "it is not." The super- 
fluous words then would not long be retained in use ; and the brief 
answers given would be exactly equivalent to yes or no : hence it is 
probable that these two words may have had some connection, histori- 
cally, with the assertions " there is " and " there is not," or " it is " 
and " it is not." 

400. We have in modem English three forms of the affirmative Yes.' 
word in question, viz., Yes, Yea, and Ay ; which last, from its imme- Ay?' 
mortally exclusive use in Parliamentary voting,, may probably have 
been at an early period of our history the most prevalent form. Be 
this as it may, I shall first examine certain explanations which 
have been given of yes, the word at present used on all ordinary 
occasions, for affirmation. Mr. Tooke labours to derive yes from the 
French ayez, "have it," "enjoy it." This is not the happiest of his 
etymologies, at least it is not one of the best supported ; for he quotes 
Chaucer's Romaunt of tlie Rose very much at random, in support of his 
conjecture : — 

And after, on the daunce went 

Largesse, that set al her entent 

For to ben honorable and fre ; 

Of Alexander's kynne was she ; 

Her most joye was ywis, 

Whan that she yafe, and sayd HAUE THIS. 

Where Mr. Tooke says, " Which might, with equal propriety, have 
been translated : — 

When she gave, and said yes." 

The most frigid critic could not well have missed the spirit of his 
author more completely. Largesse, or liberality, is personified, like 
Timon, scattering her gifts on all sides, and not waiting for any 
demand, to which she might answer, " yes." So we find, from the 
admirable scenes with Lucullus and Lucius, that Timon had been in the 
habit of surprising them with unexpected presents : — 

^ Lucullus. One of Lord Timon's men ?— A gift, I warrant. Why, this hits 
right : I dreamt of a silver bason and ewer to-night. Flaminius, honest Flaminius, 
you are very respectively welcome, sir. (Fill me some wine.) And how does that 
honorable, complete, and free-hearted gentleman of Athens, thy very bountiful 
good lord and master ? 



25G OF ADVERBS. [CHAP. XIII. 

Flam. His health is well, sir. 

Lucul. I am right glad his health is well, sir — and what hast thou there, under 
thy cloak, pretty Flaminius ? 

# * # * * * 

Serv. May it please your honor, my lord hath sent — 

Lucius. Ha ! What hath he sent ? I am so much endeared to that lord : he is 
ever a sending- How shall I thank him, thinkst thou ? — And what hath he sent 
now? 

In like manner, Largesse set all her pleasure in free, spontaneous, 
and unexpected acts of bounty, with the munificence of a mighty 
monarch, another Alexander, surprising those whom she benefited by 
the sudden exclamation, " Have this !" If ouf yes were derived from 
ayez, we should find the latter word use'd in that sense in some of the 
French dialects ; but this circumstance nowhere occurs.. Nor is it 
very clear, that the word ayez was used in French before yes was used 
in English ; since it appears to be a corruption of avez ; which was 
taken from havez, or habez, part of the very ancient verb haben,. of 
which the radical hab, in the sense of our word have, was common to 
the Latin with all the Gothic languages ; for the Latin verb was 
habere, the Mseso-Gothic haban, the Anglo-Saxon habban and hcebban, 
the Frankish, Alamannic, and modern German haben, the Icelandic 
hafa, the Danish haffne, the Swedish hafwa, the Dutch hebben ; and it 
even seems to have been used in one dialect of the Greek language ; for 
Hesychius and Phavorinus prove that a/Sets was used for e'x^c, par- 
ticularly by the Pamphylians, and from this root an infinity of nouns 
are derived in the northern languages, as well as in the Semitic from 
the Hebrew niH havah. It would therefore require some diligence of 
investigation, to discover at what period in the history of the Frankish 
or French language, the distinctive b or v of the radical word was 
dropped in the imperative ayez ; and it could not have been long after 
that period, if at all, that the imperative was converted, by common 
use, into an adverb among the French ; and again, at a much later 
period, that this adverb was, adopted from the Norman-French into 
the Norman-Saxon, from whence it must have descended to the 
modern English ; not one of the steps in which supposed progress has 
Mr. Tooke attempted to verify; nor is it probable that the attempt, 
if made, would have led to any confirmation of his conjectural 
etymology of the word yes. Dr. Johnson derives yes from the Anglo- 
Saxon yise, and indeed the word is found in that language written 
yise, yese, yyse, with the Saxon 3. Supposing then that our yes may 
be immediately derived from yese, it remains to be seen whether the 
latter word can be traced to a higher source ; and here I should be 
disposed to avail myself of the suggestion of Junius (who explains yes 
as a contraction of yea is), so far at least as to derive the Saxon yese 
from yea, which seems to have been a very ancient affirmative in that 
language, and is identical with our present yea. Mr. Tooke indeed 
suggests that yes and yea are of very different origin, the one being 
from the French verb avoir, the other from some northern verb (he 



HAP. XIII.] OF ADVERBS. 257 

does not exactly determine which) that signifies " to own." Now, 
verbs of this signification are also very numerous, as well as the adjec- 
tives and substantives derived from them. Thus the Gothic verb is 
aigan, the Anglo-Saxon agan, whence our verb to owe is derived ; the 
Icelandic eiga, the Swedish cega, the Alamannic eigan, and with these 
probably the Greek 'iyeiv has some affinity. Nor is the adjective less 
general, with the sense of own, proprius. In Gothic it is aigin, in 
Anglo-Saxon agen, whence the old Scottish awin, and old English 
owen, the Alamannic eigan, the Danish eget, the Icelandic eyga, and the 
Dutch eygen. It does not, however, happen in these languages gene- 
rally, that the affirmative adverb, or interjection, has the form of any 
part of the verb, or indeed much resemblance to it. Our yea is 
undoubtedly the Mseso-Gothic ya, yai, old German ya, yo, Anglo- 
Saxon ya, yea, Icelandic, Swedish, Danish, German, and Dutch, ya ; 
from which various words are derived in several of those languages, as 
the Gothic yaiilian, to approve, and frayethan, to disapprove ; the 
Icelandic yaord, consent, oeyahen, to affirm ; the Swedish beyaka, to 
affirm ; the German yaher, a complyer ; yawort, a consent, &c. It 
seems also to be connected with the Sanscrit affirmative particle (as it 
has been called) ya, yai* Some grammarians derive it from the 
Hebrew jah (or yah) Jehovah ; but this can hardly be taken in its 
plain and literal sense. The Hebrews surely would not have profaned 
the name of the Almighty by introducing it into common and trivial 
discourse ; and the heathens, who could learn the sacred appellation 
only through the Hebrews, can less probably be supposed to have 
adopted it. The only way in which it seems that this etymology can 
be at all supported is by reference to the verb fT>n hay ah, to be, with 
which the name of the great " I Am" has no doubt a connection, as 
the Being of Beings, He who alone is of himself, and the cause of 
being to all things that exist. In the Maeso-Gothic there is an evident 
connection between ya and the pronouns and adverbs of pronominal 
origin, so, it, this, and that : — 

Ya-in s (ille ) ' ' this man , " 

Ya-ind (illuc) " to that place," 

Ya-thau (forsan) " it may be so" 

Ya-u (si) " be it, that," 

Yu (ja m ) " a t this time." 

In point of signification ya or yea agrees with the Greek ovtmq, and 
the Latin sic ; both which are connected with pronouns, and both 
employed as words of responsive affirmation. Thus Socrates, arguing 
with Alcibiades that the soul, and not the body, is the true self, says, 
' Ogtiq apa rwr rov a(o jj-citoq yivojaicet, ra avrov, aXX ovy avrbv 
eyvwKEv — " Whosoever then knows his body, knows what belongs to 
himself; but does not know himself :""j" to which Alcibiades replies 
Ovtwq ; as if he had said, " it is so ;" " it is as you say." The Latin 

* Bopp, Comp. Gram. §§ 371, 385. t p lato, First Alcih. 

2. . S 



258 OF ADVERBS. [CHAP. XIII. 

sic, like the modern Italian si, was used as we employ yes. The gra- 
dations by which it reached this power of expression, may be collected, 
from the following passages in Terence, to be sic est factum — sic est 
■ — sic. 

i. " Quid narras ? Sic est factum.'" — What (tale) do you 

tell? The fact is so* 
ii. "Datur ilia Pamphilo hodie nuptum ? Sic est." Is she 

given to Pamphilus to be married ? It is SO.f 
iii. " Itane ais — Phanium relictam solam ? Sic." What do 
you say — that Phanium was left by herself? — So 
(i. e. yes, I say so).J 

The Greek ovtioq is a mere adverbial form of the pronominal ovtoq, 
" this person :" and the Latin sic is in like manner connected with the 
pronoun se, which in the dative is si-bi, and with the verb sit, which 
was anciently written si-et. 

Besides the mere expression of acquiescence in a question or de- 
mand, yea has, in its modern use, a particular force which answers to 
the Latin imo ; and imo, it is to be observed, is really the pronoun 
im, which occurs constantly for eum in the remaining fragments of the 
Laws of the Twelve Tables ; as, " si im aliquips occisit, joure ccesus 
esto," where Macrobius says : ab eo quod est is, non eum, casu accu- 
sative), sed im dixerunt. In this sense of the word yea, Milton says, 

They durst abide 

Jehovah thund'ring out of Sion, thron'd 
Between the cherubim — yea, often plac'd 
Within his sanctuary itself their shrines. 

It is somewhat remarkable, in the English idiom, that the word nay 
(the antipodes, as one would think, of yea) is used in the very same 
sense as that which we have just described. Thus Dryden says, 
" This allay of Ovid's writings is sufficiently recompensed by his other 
excellences ; nay, this very fault is not without its beauties." What 
is still more singular, Ben Jonson uses both yea and nay with the 
same augmentative force in one and the same sentence : "A good 
man always profits by his endeavour ; yea, when he is absent ; nay, 
when dead, by his example and memory." In all these passages, yea 
seems still to bear its relation to the pronoun this ; for the meaning is, 
" they durst abide Jehovah thundering out of Sion ; this they did and 
often more." " A good man profits by his endeavours ; this he does 
when present, and even when absent :" and the word nay only serves 
still further to complete the same sense ; for, in the instances above 
quoted, the meaning is, " the allay of Ovid's writings is recompensed 
by other excellences : this is the case, and not only this, but the very 
fault has its beauties." " A good man profits us by his endeavours 
when absent: this he does, and not only this, but even when he is 
dead, we profit by his example and his memory." 

* Adelphi, a. 3, sc. 4. f And., a. 2, sc. 1. \ Phorm., a. 2, sc. 2. 



CHAP. XIII.] OF ADVERBS. 259 

There is still one more use of yea, which confirms the view here 
taken of its import ; as in the third chapter of Genesis — " Yea ? Hath 
God said, ye shall not eat of every tree in the garden ?"* Here the 
word yea has an interrogative force ; and means " is this so V Do you 
say this — namely, that God hath forbidden you to eat of every tree ? 

In fine, the conception always expressed by yea is that of true and 
affirmative existence. Hence Dr. Hammond, explaining the passage 
" all the promises of God in him are yea and amen" (2 Cor. i. 20), 
says, " that is, they are verified, which is the importance of yea ; and 
confirmed, which is meant by amen." Now, the conception of positive 
existence, as applied to a particular thing or event, is expressed by the 
words " it is," or " this is ;" and if there be an ellipsis of either word, 
the same conception may be expressed by the other word. In this 
view of the subject, it seems not unreasonable to conclude that the 
word ya may have been originally used either as a pronoun, or as a 
part of the verb of existence ; and it is to be remembered, that in 
many, perhaps in all languages, the verb of existence is merely ex- 
pressed by a pronoun. 

Ay appears to be merely yea, a little varied in pronunciation, Dr. 
Johnson, indeed, suggests that it may be derived from the Latin aio ; 
but it is more probable that the Latin aio and nego, and the English 
ay and nay, are derived from some more ancient common origin. Ay 
has some slight differences of application from yea, as yea has from 
yes ; but this is no more remarkable than the different force and effect 
which, as we have already seen, is given in different cases to the same 
word, yea, In the following passage from Shakspeare's Henry VI. ay 
expresses somewhat more of passionate and proud reproof, than if the 
word yea were employed :■ — 

Remember it ; and let it make thee crest-fall'n ; 
Ay, and abate this thy abortive pride. 

As yea appears to have been a variation of ay, so was ay varied into 
/; but without any change of meaning : — - 

Hath Romeo slain himself? Say thou but /; 

And that bare vowel, I, shall poison more 

Than the death-darting eye of cockatrice. Romeo and Juliet. 

With respect to the other adverb aye, always (for it is a totally 
different word), we shall have occasion to consider it hereafter. 

401. Our No and Nay belong to a very large class of negatives, No. 
which are found in almost all the languages which have been called Nay " 
Indo-European, ex. gr. the Sanskrit and Zend na, Persian ne, Latin 
ne, ni, non, Russian, Polish, and Bohemian ne, nie, neni, Gothic and 
old German ne, Anglo-Saxon na, ne, no, Low Saxon neh, Icelandic, 
Danish, and Swedish, ney, Dutch neen, German nein, nie, Italian no, 
non, French non, nenni, Spanish ne, &c, with all their compounds and 
derivatives. The conception which enters into the signification of all 

* Genes, iii. 1. 

s2 



260 OF ADVERBS. [CHAP. XIII,. 

these words is an universal and primary one in the human mind ; 
being, as it were, the bound and limit of all other conceptions. The 
following are the remarks of the President De Brasses on this subject : 
" Man, in order to communicate his perceptions, has occasion to 
express, not only existing objects, and the manner of their existence, 
but also in what manner they do not exist. And so with regard to 
feelings, he has occasion to make known whether they are agreeable 
to his will, or not agreeable to it. It is necessary then, that besides 
the different radicals serving to express positive ideas, and different 
classes of objects, he should have another radical, which may serve to 
express a negative idea ; appropriated merely to indicate that what he 
describes is not in what he wishes to describe. One single radical 
will always suffice for that effect, to whatever object it may be applied. 
Negation being an absolute and privative sensation, a mere counter- 
assertion, it is quite enough that we have one vocal sign, one organic 
articulation, to advertise the hearer, that what we say is not in the 
subject of which we speak." Having already adverted to the concep- 
tion of negation generally, it is sufficient here to observe, that every 
child, in the first glimmering of reason, must necessarily form such a 
conception, and that it does in fact acquire, among its first articulate 
sounds, the sound which expresses that conception. The child has as 
distinct a conception that its nurse is not present, or that its food is 
not agreeable to its palate, as it has of the opposite circumstances. It 
may perhaps be urged, that this negative conception is in its very 
nature adjectival ; that it can only be applied in the manner of an 
attribute to some other conception which is of a substantive nature. 
" II est impossible" says De Brasses, " de former un Nom absolument 
privatif; cest a dire, une locution, qui ne contienne pas une idee vraiment 
positive.'''' " It is impossible to form a noun (substantive) absolutely 
privative ; that is to say, an expression which does not contain an 
idea really positive." Be it so ; but at least the adjectival conception 
may be applied, in the manner of all other conceptions of the same 
class, to modify substantives, adjectives, verbs, and adverbs : thus we 
may apply the negative words or particles no, not, and un, to modify 
the substantive man, the verb is, the adjective wise, or the adverb 
always, in the following phrases': — 

No man is always wise. 

Man is not wise always. 

Man is always unwise. 

Man is never wise (i.e. at no time wise). 

The different forms of negation are confounded in most languages or 
dialects. The Latin ne, non, and nee were in early times used indif- 
ferently, and so were the English ne, no, not, nor. In a fragment of 
the Laws of Numa Pompilius, preserved by Fulvius Ursinus, we 
find nei for ne :- — • 

Set JTomimm folminis occisit, im sopera genua nei tolito. } 



CHAP. XIII.] OF ADVERBS. 261 

Again, in a fragment of the first Tribunitian Law, nee is used for ne — 
Sei quis aliuta faxsit cum pequnia familiaq sacer estod: sei quis 
im oxcisit paricida NEC estod. 

Again, in the Laws of the Twelve Tables — 

Patris familias quel en do testato monitor quoique souos lieres NEC 
escit. 

In old English ne was used for not and for nor. 

i. For not in the Harleian MS. 2253, fol. 70, b.— 
Ne ruai no lewed lued libben in londe. 

ii. For not in the Prophecy of Thomas De Essedoune, in the same 
volume, fol. 127 — 

Whenne skal this be ? 

Nouther in thine tyme, ne in myn. 

No was used in the same two senses. 

i. For not in the romance of Alisaunder — 
Alisaunder and his folk alle 
No had noght passed theo halvendall. 

ii. For nor, in the Description of Cokaygne — 
Ther nis halle, bure, no bench. 
In the Scottish dialect nae or no is used for not, and nor for than — 
They're nae sae wretched's ane wad think. 

Bums. Two, Dogs. 
Compleitly, mair sweitly 

Scho fridound flat and schairp, 
Nor muses, that uses 

To pin Apollo's harp. Alex. Montgomery, circ. 1597. 

The particle ne, which forms part of our modern words none, never, 
&c. was anciently incorporated with many verbs, as, I not, for " I ne 
wot," or " know not ;" I naboe, for " I ne have ;" I nulle, for " I ne 
will ;" I nolde, for " I ne would;" it nis, it nas, it nere, for " it ne is," 
" it ne was," " it ne were :" — 

The hors vanisheth I not in what manere. 

Chaucer. Sq. Tale. 

I nul soffre that no more. Ibid. fol. 55, b. 

Uch a srewe wol hire shrude 

Tha he nabbe nout a smok, &c. Ibid. fol. 61, b. 

Whil God wes on erthe 

And wandrede wyde, 

What was the reson 

Why he nolde ryde ? 

For he nolde no grome 

To go by ys syde. Earl. MS. 2253, fol. 124, b. 

Ther nis londe vnder heuenriche. Earl. MS. 913. 

that he nas wenemyd anon. Lyf of Seint Patrik. 

Wymmen were the best thing 
That shup our heye heune kyng 

Yef feolc false nere. Earl. MS. 2253, fol. 71. 

402. It is sufficient for the general purposes of communicating 









262 OF ADVERBS. [CHAP. XIII. 

Negative, thought, that the negative conception should be once expressed in a 
simple sentence ; but we generally find it redoubled in old English, a 
circumstance derived from the Anglo-Saxon idiom, as, Ne om ic na 
Crist, "lam not the Christ" (John i. 20). The same idiom prevails 
in the modern French, although it was not always observed in that 
language at an earlier period. In the sixteenth century they said, 
" Vhabit NEfaict le moyne :" at present the same proverb is expressed 
thus, " Vhabit NEfait pas le moine." It is difficult to account for the 
reduplication of the negative upon any other principle than that of the 
eager desire, which we commonly see in barbarous and ignorant people, 
to give utterance to their strong feelings and imperfect conceptions, 
and which usually leads to much tautology in their discourse. This 
genuine result of barbarism, however, has been sometimes mistaken 
for a proof of extraordinary learning ; and critics have dignified it with 
the title of an Archaism, a Hellenism, or some such pompous appella- 
tion. " The editor of Chaucer," says Hickes, " knowing nothing of 
antiquity, asserts that the poet imitated the Greeks in using two 
negatives to express negation more vehemently; whereas Chaucer 
was entirely ignorant of the Greek language, and only used the two 
negatives according to the prevailing custom of his own times, when 
the language had not yet lost its Saxonisms, as, " I ne said none ill." 
In the Saxon writers, indeed, three and even four successive negatives 
are sometimes to be found, as, " ne yeseah n,efre nan man God :" 
" no man ever saw God" (John i. 18). And again, " Ne nan ne 
dorste of iham dcege hyne nan thing mare axiyean ;" " and no man 
durst from that day forth ask him any more questions" (Matth. xxii. 
46). It is to be observed, however, that some of the best of these 
writers, and particularly the royal translator of Bede's Ecclesiastical 
History, generally employ but a single negative ; and such also is the 
uniform style of that venerable monument of Gothic literature the 
Codex Argenteus. 

Substantive. 403. The last class of separate words, which I shall notice as used 
adverbially, are nouns substantive. It is manifest that substantives 
may be used in the formation of compound words to express the attri- 
butes of attributes. Thus stone, in its primary sense, is a substantive, 
and blind is an adjective ; but in the compound stone-blind, the former 
part of the word modifies the latter, as much as if we were to say, " a 
stony, or stonelike blindness." In like manner, substantives standing 
alone may be taken adverbially, as modifying either a verb or an 
adjective. The latter mode is the less common in modern English, 
but it occurs not unfrequently in the older dialects : the former mode 
is common in most languages. The adverbial use of the substantive 
to modify a verb, somewhat resembles the ablative absolute of the 
Latin grammarians. It expresses a conception simply, without 
asserting it to exist or not to exist. The construction is consequently 
elliptical, and the sense may always be more fully expressed by adding 
the assertion. I shall illustrate this by a single example. 



CHAP. XIII.] OF ADVERBS. 263 

404. While is the Gothic and Anglo-Saxon hwila, and Alamannic while. 
uuila, time, or a certain space of time, which seems to be of the same 
origin as our wheel, in the Anglo-Saxon hweol, Danish and Swedish 
hiul, Icelandic hiool, and Dutch wiel, which are derived, by J. Davies, 
from the Welsh chwyl, turning, and seem to have some affinity with 
the Latin volvo, and Gothic ivalwyan, to roll ; nor is there any more 
apt or more common symbol of time than the continual rolling of a 
wheel. Be this as it may, the word while in English and iveile in 
German is used substantively for a space of time, as in German es ist 
eine gute weile, "it is a good while," or "a long time." So in the 
relation of the meeting of Joseph with his father Jacob (Gen. xlvi. 29), 
" he fell on his neck, and wept on his neck a good while" We find 
the English adverb while used to modify verbs with reference to various 
portions of time, ex. gr. : — 

i. During the whole continuance of a given time. 

ii. During a certain time to be terminated in future. 

hi. At different intervals of time. 

iv. For a short space of time. 

" I will sing praises unto my God, while I have any being," (i. e. 
during the whole time that I exist), Psalm cxlvi. v. 2. 

In the Scottish Act of Parliament, 1587, the enactment is ordained 
to last " Ay, and quhil His Hienes nixt parliament." So in Alexander 
Montgomery : — 

Cum se now, in rae now 

The butterflie and can dill 

And as scho flies quhyl scho be fyrt. 

In this sense, which at present exists only in provincial usage, while 
states a time with a definite future termination, ex. gr. until the 
meeting of the Parliament, or until the insect be burnt. 

The third use is also provincial, and answers to our word " some- 
times," as in the well-known anecdote of an English traveller, who had 
been confined at a village in Scotland several days together by the 
rain, and who, at length, losing his patience, asked the landlord pet- 
tishly, "What! does it rain here always?" To which the other 
replied with a smile, " Hoot, na ! it snaws whyles." 

The fourth use occurs often in our translation of the Scriptures, as 
when Samuel said to Saul, " Stand thou still awhile that I may show 
thee the word of God" (1 Sam. ix. 27). The same idiom occurs in 
the Goldin Terge of Dunbar : — 

Acquentance new embrasit me a quhyle, 
And favourt me till men micht gae a myle, 
Syne tuk bir hef, I saw hir nevir mair. 

In a very ancient English love-song, whyle is used in this sense without 
the article. (Harl. MSS. 2253, fol. 63, b.) 

Betere is tholien whyle sore 
Then mournen euermore. 






264 OF ADVERBS. [CHAP. XIII. 

It is somewhat remarkable that though in the German language the 
substantive weile is not used adverbially in the same senses as while is 
in English, yet it has the same adverbial, or rather conjunctional sense, 
that we give in matters of reasoning to since. Thus the German weil 
implies the consequence or dependence of one fact on another, as 
Weil ers verlanget, so soil ershaben: " since he desires it he shall 
have it." The word since has the primary signification of time, from 
the Anglo-Saxon sith, and old English sithe, as in Chaucer — 

And such he was iproved ofte sithes. 

The word season is also used by old authors to signify time, as is 
the obsolete word stound. 

In the Morale Proverbes of Crystyne, printed by Caxton, a.d. 1478, 
we find the expressien long saison for "a long while," or "a long 
time :" — 

A temperat man cold from hast asseured 
May not lightly long saison be miseured. 

So in the Dictes and Sayings of Philosophers, printed 1477, " There 
was that season in my company a worshipful gentleman called Lewis 
de Bretaylles." 

Stound occurs adverbially in Octouian Imperator — 

Men blamede the bochere oft stoundys 
For his sone. 

The compounds of while still in use such as meanwhile, erewhile, re- 
quire no explanation. They plainly express the conception of time, 
and signify "in the meantime" "sometime before," &c. Erewhile 
was anciently written whilere, and so we find in the different old 
dialects whilom and umquhill, which both agree with the old word 
sometime for " formerly." 
Recapituia- 405. Thus are the considerations exhausted, which arise out of the 
definition of an adverb, as above proposed. I have shown that an 
adverb is properly to be reckoned among the parts of speech ; that it 
is a word added to a sentence perfect in the expression or mind of the 
speaker ; and that it serves to modify an attributive — that is to say, 
primarily a verb or an adjective (taking the latter term in its widest 
sense), and secondarily another adverb. I have endeavoured to reduce 
those modifications systematically to certain classes (a task hitherto 
but little thought of) referring the modifications of verbs first to the 
corporeal relations of place and time, positive and relative, and then 
to the mental relations propositional or argumentative ; the former 
applying either to affirmation or negation, clear or doubtful, or else to 
interrogation and response ; and the latter to the connection of pro- 
positions, particularly of the premises with the conclusion. The 
modifications of the adjective I have considered as affecting either 
their quantity or their quality. The positive quantity is either con- 
tinuous or discrete ; the relative admits of intension or remission : 
modifications of quality are also positive or relative, and the latter 



CHAP. XIII.] OF ADVERBS. 265 

regard either similitude or degree. The secondary modifications 
(viz., those of adverbs by adverbs) follow the course of the primary:* 
and I have here noticed certain classes of words, which, as effecting 
no modification of an attribute, are in my opinion improperly admitted 
into the class of adverbs. I have next considered the methods by 
which the expression of the modification of attributives is effected in 
language, viz., by an adverbial phrase, a compound word, or a single 
word, which constitutes the part of speech we call an adverb. And 
lastly, I have shown by examples, that the words which may be em- 
ployed to perform the function of adverbs, with or without inflection, 
are such as have been or may be employed to perform the function of 
any of the necessary parts of speech, viz., adjectives proper, participial 
and pronominal, verbs (particularly as to the responsives Yes and No), 
and even nouns substantive. And so much for the adverb, which, 
with the parts of speech before examined, completes the list of those 
necessary or accessorial to the formation of enunciative sentences. 









( 266 ) 



CHAPTER XIV. 



OF INTERJECTIONS. 



The inter- 406. Certain words or sounds are generally known by the name of 
part of s 8 Interjections ; but in proposing to examine them with reference to the 
speech. science of language, we are met with an objection in limine, that they 
are not parts of speech, and therefore do not deserve the attention of 
a grammarian. The learned Sanctius - says : — " Interjectionem non 
esse partem oration is sic ostendo : quod naturale est idem est apud 
omnes : sed gemitus et signa lsetitise idem sunt apud omnes : sunt 
igitur naturales. Si vero naturales, non sunt partes orationis. Nam 
ese partes, secundum Aristotelem, ex instituto, non natura debent 
constare." The error here arises from giving too great a latitude to a 
proposition which within certain limits is true ; viz., that words are 
significant ex instituto ; for in truth this proposition applies only to 
nouns (i. e., names of distinct conceptions) and to words derived from 
them. But in the nature of the human mind, intellect is mixed up 
with feeling, the will is often confounded with the reason ; and our 
desires, or fears, unconsciously modify our conceptions or assertions. 
We express in speech the transitions and mixed states of the mind, as 
well as its clear, fixed, and determinate distinctions ; and hence the 
interjection rises, as will presently be seen, from a scarcely articulate 
sound to a passionate, and almost to an enunciative sentence. What 
we learn from Mr. Tooke on this part of our subject is as inconsistent, 
as it is vague and declamatory. "The brutish, inarticulate inter- 
jection" (says he), " which has nothing to do with speech, and is only 
the miserable refuge of the speechless, has been permitted, because 
beautiful and gaudy, to usurp a place among words." How can any 
modes of utterance be at once beautiful, gaudy, brutish, and inar- 
ticulate ? And what is meant by saying that the interjection, which 
somehow or other has been enabled to occupy a place among words, 
has nothing to do with speech, and is only the miserable refuge of the 
speechless ? 
is universally 407. Mr. Tooke himself uses such expressions as "Oh!" "Oh, 
Sir!" "Oh, my dear Sir!" " Oh, Sir, your humble servant !" Well! 
Why! Come! &c, which assert nothing, and have no connection 
either with the preceding or following sentences ; but are mere inter- 
jections, or interjectional phrases, Trape/jifioXcu as the Greeks calls them, 
thrown in between the main parts of the discourse. Yet he says 
" where speech can be employed, they are totally useless ; and are 
always insufficient for the purpose of communicating our thoughts." 
" And indeed," adds he, " where will you look for the interjection ? 
Will you find it amongst laws, or in books of civil institutions, in 



CHAP. XIV.] OF INTEEJECTIONS. 267 

history, or in any treatise of useful arts or sciences ? No : you must 
seek for it in rhetoric and poetry, in novels, plays, and romances." 
Mr. Tooke has forgotten one book, in which interjections abound, and 
fill the mind with impressions of the highest sublimity and pathos — 
that book is the Bible. But if the interjection had only to do with 
" rhetoric and poetry," surely its sphere would not be narrow. If a 
knowledge of it only led us properly to appreciate the lofty mind of 
Demosthenes or Cicero, to read with true relish the immortal verses 
of Homer, Virgil, Tasso, Milton — if it were only to be met with 
in the " plays " of Sophocles, Plautus, Moliere, Shakspeare ; or 
in the " romances and novels " of Sidney, Cervantes, Le Sage, 
Fielding, or Scott, how lamentable must be the taste, how blind the 
philosophy, which would decline the examination of this interesting 
part of speech ! And is the interjection confined to books ? No, it 
is heard in private and in public, from each sex and every age, in tones 
of the tenderest love or the most malignant hate, in shouts of joy, in 
ecstacies of pious rapture, in deep anguish, remorse, despair ; in short, 
from the impulse of every human feeling. Nay, we are taught to 
believe, that it exists in the Hallelujahs of angels, and in the continual 
Holy ! Holy ! Holy ! of the cherubim and seraphim. Now, as a 
botanist would but imperfectly teach his science, if he were to tell his 
scholars that certain large portions of the vegetable world were be- 
neath their notice, as weeds ; or as he would be a poor mineralogist 
who should disdain to cast an eye on pebbles ; so he is a miserable 
grammarian who affects to disregard the numerous interjections and 
interjectional phrases which give such force, tenderness, variety, and 
truth to the works of the rhetorician and poet, and contribute so much 
toward rendering language an exact picture of the human mind. 

408. Assuming, then, that there are many sounds or words, more Definition. 
or less perfectly articulated, which occur in human speech, evincing 
actual feeling, but not reducible to any of the parts of speech above 
discussed, I say, they form the part of speech called an Interjection. 
Its definition, indeed, is differently given by different grammarians. 
According to Charisius, Comminianus briefly defines the interjection 
thus, " Pars orationis significans adfectum animi." — Caius Julius 
Romanus thus, " Pars orationis motum animi significans ;" and 
Palaemon thus, " Interjectiones sunt quae nihil docibile habent, signi- 
ficant tamen adfectum animi." Diomedes gives the following defi- 
nition — " Pars orationis adfectum mentis adsignificans voce incondita." 
Vossius, however, observes that apage ! euge ! and many others, are 
not voces inconditce; nor is the signifying an affection of the mind 
peculiar to the interjection, for even adverbs do this, as iracunde, 
irridenter, timide, &c. He also censures the following definition, Dictio 
invariabilis quce interjicitur orationi ad declarandum animi affectum; 
for, says he, " interjections are not always thrown in between the parts 
of a sentence ; since we may properly begin a sentence with an inter- 
jection." His own definition is, " Vox affectum mentis significans, ac 



208 



OF INTERJECTIONS. 



fCHAP. XIV. 



Feelings. 



Their 
airangement. 



citra verbi opem sententiam complens." This definition agrees in the 
main with that which is to be gathered from the works of that 
excellent old grammarian, Priscian ; viz., "Vox quae alicuju spassionis 
animi pulsn, per exclamationem, interjicitur :" and on a full consideration 
of all these authorities, I would propose the following definition — An 
interjection is a part of speech showing forth any human feeling, without 
asserting its existence. 

409. To illustrate this definition, it may be necessary to explain 
the import here given to the term " human feeling," and to state the 
different modes in which such a feeling may be shown forth in language 
without asserting its existence. First, then, it is to be observed, that 
I use the term " human feeling," as Comprehending all those im- 
pressions, pleasurable or painful, which we receive through our bodily 
frame, our intellectual faculties, or our spiritual constitution : and 
these in their several degrees and modifications. In this view, so far 
is the interjection from being a " brutish " thing, that the nice and 
philosophical examination of it, as it has been practised in the different 
languages and ages of the world, would furnish matter for a better 
treatise than was ever yet written on the sensibilities and sympathies 
of human nature. Mr. Tooke declares that " the dominion of speech 
is erected upon the downfal of interjections." If so, the dominion of 
speech never was erected, nor ever will be, till the minds of all men 
are "a standing pool," incapable of being moved or incited to action 
even by the naked calculations of a cold, exclusive, hateful selfishness. 

410. I do not pretend to reduce the infinite variety of human 
feelings to a systematic arrangement. The only attempt of the kind 
in relation to grammar, which deserves attention, is that of the very 
ingenious Bishop Wilkins ; but it is a mere outline, and is meant to 
include only "rude, incondite sounds," the "natural signs of our 
mental notions or passions," and " several of which are common with 
us to brute creatures." Tt is as follows : — 

I. Solitary, the result of a surprised 
I. judgment, denoting 
i. admiration, heigh ! 

ii. doubt or consideration, hem ! hm ! hy ! 
iii. contempt, pish ! shy ! tysh ! 
ii. affection moved by apprehension of good or evil, 
mirth, ha ! ha ! he ! 
sorrow, hoi! oh! oh! ah! 



i. past < 

J. j love and pity, ah ! alack ! alas ! 

I ' * \ hate and anger, vauh ! hau ! 

( desire. O ! O that ! 



aversion, 



phy! 



iii. future 

II. Social, 

I. preceding discourse, 
i. exclaiming, oh ! soho ! 
ii. silencing, 'st ! hush ! 



CHAP. XIV.] OF INTERJECTIONS. 269 

II. beginning discourse, 

i. to dispose the senses of the hearer, 
1 1 . bespeaking attention, ho ! oh ! 
j 2. expressing attention, ha ! 
ii. to dispose the affections of the hearer, 

1 . by way of insinuation, eja ! now ! 

2. by way of threatening, vse ! wo ! 

Though this scheme in its primary distinctions refers to the different 
uses of interjections, its ramifications are determined by the sound of 
the words employed for this purpose. These considerations should 
be kept apart, as their intermixture leads only to confusion. There- 
fore, before I examine the different methods which men have followed 
in giving utterance to their feelings, otherwise than in enunciative 
sentences, I deem it proper to say something of the feelings them- 
selves ; though, for the reason already intimated, my notice of them 
must be brief. I have already observed, that in the opening of our 
faculties, the earliest conceptions which we form are those of bodily 
existence ; but even our conceptions are preceded by bodily feelings, 
each sense is pleasurably or painfully affected by external impressions, 
and these are soon distinguished from each other, and their existence 
signified to other persons by different modes of expression. When 
the mental faculties begin to expand, they connect feelings with con- 
ceptions, and so with external objects, at first by present sensation 
making us joyful or sad ; afterwards by memory causing regret or 
pleasing recollection ; and lastly, by foresight, creating in us hope or 
fear, desire or aversion. As we advance in the exercises of reason, 
we feel doubt or confidence, we are surprised at anything new or 
strange. Again, the social nature of man opens to him new trains of 
feeling, affectionate fondness, rivalry, enmity ; we approve or disap- 
prove the conduct of others, we applaud or censure, admire or despise 
them. Every such state of mind is evinced by a peculiar interjection, 
distinguished not so much by articulation as by tone, by length or 
shortness of utterance, or by the look or gesture with which it is ac- 
companied ; by the abruptness of violent and sudden passion, or the 
prolonged and gentle murmur of tender affection. Such feelings 
belong to mankind by their general constitution : others are of a local 
or temporary nature, and connected with particular objects or events, 
with religious doctrines and practices, with military ardour, with 
political party, or personal attachment ; and these add to the bound- 
less variety of interjectional cries, and words, and phrases. 

411. It remains to be seen what modes of expression, independently Modes o/ 
of sentences clearly and fully enunciative, language affords for those ex P ression - 
different feelings ; and these will be found to rise by imperceptible 
gradation from sounds scarcely articulate to clearer articulations, 
thence to words formed from these incondite sounds, so to broken 
phrases, and, lastly, to short sentences interjected without direct 
relation to those by which they are preceded or followed. 



Incondite 
Consonants. 



Vowels. 



270 OF INTERJECTIONS. [CHAP. XIV. 

412. We may observe among the interjections noticed by Bishop 
Wilkins some which not only are not words, but not even syllables, 
being designated by consonants alone, such as hm I which he states 
as expressive of doubt or consideration, and 'st ! which he calls an 
interjection of silencing. For my part, I own I should scarcely rank 
such half-uttered sounds among parts of speech ; but if they come to 
be more clearly pronounced so as to be audibly distinguishable, and 
when we find the one written in Latin hem ! and the other in French 
chut ! or in Italian zitto ! I think they may be fairly called (as they 
are by most philologists) interjections. The mere orthography, how- 
ever, will help us but little as to the feeling meant to be expressed by 
these, or indeed any other, truly incondite interjections. Hem ! it is 
true, may be sometimes taken as expressing doubt or consideration — 

Occaepi mecum cogitare, hem! biduum hie manendum est soli 
sine ilia ? Terentius, Eun. 4, 28. 

But it is as often taken to express surprise, or exhortation, or com- 
miseration, or perturbation of mind, or joy, or anger, or other 
feelings which can only be collected from the context if in writing, 
or from the look, tone, gesture, or manner, if delivered viva voce. 
Of the imperfect articulation 'st, R. Stephanus says " ST [or] vox 
est silentium indicentis. Ter. Phorm. v. 1. 16. Quid? Non is, 
obsecro, es, quern semper te esse dictitasti ?— C. 'st — S. Quid 
has metuis fores ? " The Italians use the word zitto ! and the 
French say chut ! Varchi, in his Ercolano, or Dialogo sopra le lingue, 
printed at Florence in 1570, says of this word, " II quale zitto, credo 
che sia tolto da' Latini, i quali, quando volevano, che alcuno stesse 
cheto, usavano profferire verso quel tale, queste due consonant! 'st, 
quasi come diciamo noi zitto ! " It is used substantively for the 
slightest sound possible. Thus Boccaccio says, " Senza far motto, o 
zitto alcuno;" "without uttering a word, or sound, the slightest 
possible." It is also used adjectively, with the variation of gender 
and number, ex. gr. : — 

E i buon soldati, in campo, o in citadella, 
Si stanno zitti in far la sentinella. Allegri. 

Of the French chut I the Dictionnaire de VAcademie merely says, 
11 Chut, particule dont on se pert pour imposer silence." 

413. Where the incondite sound is that of a vowel, the articulation 
is somewhat more distinct ; but, on the other hand, it may be the 
more easily adapted by the flexible organs of the voice to express 
different states of the mind : a slight degree of elevation or depression, 
of length or shortness, of weakness or force, serves to mark a very 
sensible difference in the emotion meant to be expressed. Hence 
Cinonio thus speaks of the Italian ah and ahi : — " I varj affetti cui 
serve questa interiezzione ah ed ahi sono phi di venti ; ma v'abbisogna 
d'un avvertimento ; che nell' esprimerli sempre diversificano il suono, 
e vagliono quel tanto che, presso i Latini, ah I proh ! oh ! vce ! hei ! 



CHAP. XIV.] OF INTERJECTIONS. 271 

papce ! &c. Ma questa e parte spettante a chi pronunzia, che sappia 
dar loro l'accento di quell' affettto cui servono ; e sono — d'esclama- 
zione — di dolersi — di svillaveggiare — di pregare — di gridare minac- 
ciando — di minacciare — di sospirare — di sgarare — di maravigliarsi — 
d'incitare — di dsegno — di desiderare — di reprendere — di vendicarsi — 
di raccomandazione — di commovimento per allegrezza — di lamentarsi 
— di beffare— ed altri varj." Vossius observes of the Latin ah, that 
in ancient books it is often written a without the aspiration ; as pro is 
also written for proh ; and indeed the Greeks write d without the 
breathing. Thus the 739th and the 746th lines of the Philoctetes are 
both written 7 A, d, a, d. So in the Plutus of Aristophanes, the old 
woman, alarmed lest her face should be burnt, cries — 

■— % a, 

T»jv 'hatia (in pot rtgotrtptf 

Oh ! oh ! Don't put the torch near me ! 

Priscian, too, says that a is the name of a letter, and a preposition, 
and also an interjection. I need scarcely observe that both ah ! and 
oh ! are used by English writers as interjections of pain and sorrow. 

In youth alone unhappy mortals live, 

But ah J the mighty bliss is fugitive. Dryden. 

Oh! this will make my mother die with grief. Shakspeare. 
Dr. Johnson says " Ah, interjection — a word noting sometimes 
dislike and censure — sometimes contempt and exultation — sometimes, 
and most frequently, compassion and complaint." He also says " Oh, 
interjection — an exclamation denoting pain, sorrow, or surprise." 
The Greek 'Iw and Latin Jo, varying but little in sound from O, were 
also sometimes used to denote pain or sorrow. Thus Philoctetes, in 
the agony of his bodily torture, cries tw, lib ; and Polymestor, in the 
Hecuba of Euripides, uses the same exclamation. Thus Tibullus 
says— 

Uror, io ! remove, sseva Puella faces ! Lib. ii. Eleg. 4. 

And in Claudian, Io seems to express the agony of grief : — 

Mater io ! seu te Phrygiis in vallibus Ida 

Mygdonio buxus circumsonat horrida cantu ; 

Seu tu sanguineis ululantia Dindyma, Gallis 

Incolis. De Rapt. Proserp. 

The tender and affecting force of the interjection oh ! as an ex- 
pression of deep-seated grief, was never more strikingly shown than in 
those lines of my old and ever-honoured friend, Wordsworth : — 

She lived unknown, and few could know 

When Lucy ceased to be ; 
But she is in her grave — and oh ! 

The difference to me. 

Yet ah, and oh, aspirated and unaspirated, are constantly occurring 
as marks of slight and transient feeling ; sometimes of contemptuous 
irony, as in the interjectional phrases of Mr. Tooke, above quoted ; 



272 OF INTERJECTIONS. [CHAP. XIV. 

and sometimes of grave remonstrance, as in Sidrophel's indignant 
reply to Hudibras : — 

Oh ! sir, 

Agrippa was no conjuror, 

Nor Paracelsus ; no, nor Behmen ; 

Nor was the dog a Cacodsemon. 

T° r % 414:. ^^ e trans iti° n fr° m these mere incondite consonants and 

vowels to words formed from them is simple and easily to be ac- 
counted for, since it is natural to name the cause from the effect. 
Of this we have an obvious example in the Latin vce, used only as a 
mere vocal interjection in that language, but found in many others, 
both as an interjection and also as the. root of a numerous train of 
nouns substantive and adjective, verbs, &c. Thus we find as inter- 
jections, the Greek 'Oval ; the Mseso-Gothic wai ; the Welsh gwae ; 
the Anglo-Saxon wa ; the German weh ! And in most of these 
languages the same sound becomes an interjectional noun, as in 
German, " wehe den gottlosen ! " woe to the ungodly! Frankish, 
" uue themo man ! " woe to the man ! in English, woe is me ! Hickes 
reckons wa is me ! and warn me ! among the Anglo-Saxon interjections 
of grief. In old English we find " wo the be!" — " woe worth ! " 
&c. ; and in Scottish " wae's me ! " and " wae's my heart : " — 

Wales wo the be I the fende the confound ! B. De Brunne. 

Where ar those worldlyngs now ? Wo worth them, that euer 
they were about any kyng ! Latimer. 

Ah, wae be to you Gregory, 

An ill death may you dee ! Ballad of Lord Gregory. 

Wae's my heart that we shou'd sunder ! Scottish Song. 

From wae it is probable came the verb wail, and from waile wa 
came waileway, welaway, and corruptly welladay. 

Hickes expounds the Anglo-Saxon wala wa ! heu ! proh dolor ! 
and he adds, in a note, " hsec interjectio frequenter tropice ponitur 
pro dolore, prsecipue in scriptis Satyrographi, ut : — 

Wote no wyght what war is ther that peace reineth 
Ne what is witerly weale till welaweye him teache." 

We find it written variously, weylaway, wayleway, waileway, wel 



avoaie 



Betere hem were at home in huere londe, 
Than forte seche Flemmyssh by the see stronde, 
Whare routh moni Frensh wyf wryngeth hire honde, 
Ant singeth weylaway. 

Battle of Bruges. 
Sche seyd wayleway, 

When hye herd it was so : 
To her maistresse sche gan say, 

That hye was boun to go. Sir Tristrem. 

Biclept him in his armes twain, 
And oft alias he gan sain, 

His song was waileway. Amis and Amiloun. 



CHAP. XIV.] OF INTERJECTIONS. 273 

I set hem so a worke, by my faie, 

That many a night they songen wel awaie. Chancer. 

Connected with wae and wail is the verb waiment, which Chaucer 
uses for lament : — 

The swalow Proigne with a sorrowful lay 
Whan morow come gan make her waimenting. 

Troilus, hook ii. 

Lastly, the Anglo-Saxon wala (in wala wa) seems to be still retained 
in the Scottish interjection wdly : — 

waly ! waly ! up the hank, 

And waly ! waly ! down the brae ! Scottish Song. 

Of the numerous other nouns and verbs flowing from the ancient 
and simple interjection vae, with their derivatives, and the changes of 
signification they have undergone, there will be a fitter opportunity 
to speak hereafter. 

415. A different class of interjections is formed from fragments of Fragments of 
sentences. Of this kind, alas ! which Wilkins, ignorant of its true sentences - 
origin, ranks among " rude incondite sounds, the natural signs of our 

mental notions or passions," will afford an illustration. This word 
was manifestly adopted into the English language from the French 
Iielas ! which is only a corruption of the Italian ate lasso, " ah ! 
weary ! " It does not appear to have been known in England much 
before the time of Chaucer, who frequently uses it : — 

How shall I doen ? whan shall she come againe ? 

1 note alas ! why let I her go. Troilus, hook v. 

So in the early romances : — 

Thurch the hodi him pight, 

With gile : 
To deth he him dight 

Alias that ich while ' Sir Tristrem, 

Alias that he no hadde ywite, 

Er the forward were ysmite, 

That hye ond his leman also 

Sostren were and tvinnes to. Lay Le Fraine. 

Quhat sail I think ? Allace quhat reverence 

Sail I mester to your excellence ? The King's Quair. 

Evir allace! than said scho, 

Am I nocht cleirlie tynt ? Peblis to the Play, 

The sensation of weariness, expressed in ahi lasso, is also to be found 
in the Scottish interjectional phrase " weary fa' you : " — 

Weary fa' you Duncan Gray ! Old Scottish Song. 

416. Some interjections result from the abbreviation of whole sen- Sentences 
tences, by condensing them into a single word. Thus the perfect con<iensedL 
sentence, " I pray thee to do this or that," or " not to do it," or 

" I pray thee to tell me," is condensed into the single interjection, 
prithee ! 

2. t 



274 OF INTERJECTIONS. [CHAP. XIV. 

Tooke ranks prithee! among adverbs. Johnson does not decide 
what part of speech it is, but merely calls it " a familiar corruption of 
pray thee" This corruption, however, becomes in use a real inter- 
jection. In the following instance the request is merely con- 
temptuous : — 

Poh ! prithee ! ne'er trouble thy head with such fancies ; 
But rely on the aid thou shalt have from St. Francis. 

Old Song. 

In the next, the request is more serious, but still the abbreviation of 
the phrase marks a degree of familiarity : — 

Alas ! why comest thou, at this dreadful moment, 

To shock the peace of my departing soul ? 

Away ! I prithee leave me ! * Howe. 

Again, in these well-known lines, it marks the good-humoured 
sarcasm of a friendly adviser : — 

Why so pale and wan, fond lover ? ' 

Prithee, why so pale ? Suckling. 

where it is manifest, that the full sentence " I pray thee to tell me " 
entirely loses its grave and formal character by being converted into 
an interjection, 
interjectionai 417. Lastly, a short sentence, or clause of a sentence, is often 
thrown into discourse in the manner which the Greeks call 7rapefj,fio\rj, 
and Quintilian and others interjectio, and which may be called an 
interjectionai phrase, and often answers to a real interjection in another 
language or dialect. Thus, in old English, the sentence afterwards 
furnishing the interjection forsooth was inserted at full length (but 
parenthetically) " for sothe ywis," i. e. " I know it for a truth :" — 

The pauyloun was wrouth, for sothe ywis, 

All of werk of sarsynys. Syr Launfal. 

So the Latin amabo, the future tense of the verb amo, I love, is 
often introduced interjectionally as an exclamation of fondness : — 

Vide, amabo, si non cum adspicias os impudens 

Videtur. Terentius. 

Engraphius, an old commentator on this passage, says that amabo is 
used by the poets without any meaning ; but on this Vossius justly 
remarks, " Si blandientis est, otiosum esse nequit, cum multum 
blanditise et preces valeant." 
No absolute 418. From this review of the different modes of expression by 
which feelings are signified in language, we at once perceive that no 
precise line can be drawn between interjections consisting of " incon- 
dite sounds," the " natural signs" of mental emotion, and exclamations 
derived from a partial exercise of the reasoning faculty ; for among 
the sounds enumerated by Wilkins we find alas ! (i. e. ahi lasso /) 
derived from the regular Latin adjective lassus — alack! from the 
English verb to lack, and Dutch laecken — hush ! from the Gothic verb 
hausyan — and vce ! identical with the English noun woe. That the 



CHAP. XIV.] OF INTERJECTIONS. 275 

noun and the mere incondite sound are used as equivalents, and with 
the same sort of grammatical construction, we see in the following 
lines of Butler :■ — ■ 

Intrust it under solemn vows 

Of mum J and silence, and the rose. Uudibras. 

And these are necessary consequences of the fact, on which Ij have 
often dwelt, that in the constitution of our human nature the active 
and passive principles, the feelings and perceptions, are closely 
intertwined, and pass into each other by gradations too fine to be 
perceptible. The expressions of mere sensible pleasure or pain, or 
of passion or emotion, as such, are either effected with some degree 
of volition, or they are extorted by a physical necessity ; but on the 
one hand it may be doubted whether pure physical necessity can 
operate so as to produce speech properly so called, that is, with any 
the slightest degree of articulation. To take a striking instance, that 
of the Philoctetes of Sophocles : we find him at one time exclaiming 
'A, d, d, a, at another AT, at, at, al, and again ITa7rd, 7ra7ra, Tva-rcai; 
but it is manifest that some power, beyond that of mere mechanical 
impulse, must intervene to give even the slightest of these articulations 
its difference from the rest. On the other hand, if we admit that some 
degree of thought enters into all those " voices," which express the 
emotions of the human mind, then it becomes difficult, if not impos- 
sible, for us to arrange them grammatically in classes each marked by 
distinctness of conception' — to distinguish, for instance, in this respect, 
between ! iw ! euge ! evax ! papas ! fie ! harrow ! pax ! hush ! 
hurrah ! alas ! bravo ! &c. &c. ; for such words may form an ascending 
gradation from that which is but just above mechanical impulse to 
that which is but just below the assertion of a proposition. Where, 
indeed, such an assertion takes place, that is (speaking as a gramma- 
rian) where a verb is connected with a noun, there is formed a sen- 
tence, which may be resolved grammatically into its separate parts of 
speech. But this is not all — the same difficulty which is found in the 
ascending scale of expression, occurs in the descending scale. A whole 
sentence is sometimes suddenly interposed in a discourse, by the mere 
effect of passion or strong feeling, without any direct connection with 
what goes before, or with what follows. Some such sentences become 
popular and common, they constitute interjectional phrases, expletive 
parts of the daily conversation of particular sects, parties, or classes of 
men ; they become habitual ; and then again they are abbreviated, 
contracted, corrupted ; and so remain in language as words, sometimes 
with little more articulation or distinct meaning than those other 
sounds which are ascribed to the effect of mere natural impulse. 
Here then is a wide field for interjectional forms in speech, compre- 
hending the almost involuntary exclamation, the ivord more or less 
significant, and the phrase more or less imperfect and obscure. 

419. Hence, too, the grounds of that relation, to which I have Relation to 
before adverted, between the interjection, the imperative mood, and c a s° d and 

t2 









276 OF INTERJECTIONS. [CHAP. XIV. 

the vocative case, may be easily perceived. The interjection, indeed, 
as such, neither asserts, like the verb, nor names a conception, like the 
noun. It manifests the existence of a feeling to the sympathies of 
mankind, but it does not declare that existence as a fact addressed to 
their judgment. In this respect, therefore, it differs generally from the 
verb. Again, it shows actual feeling : it does not merely name the 
conception of a feeling, but gives to that conception a vital energy as 
it were ; it shows the speaker to be affected by its impulse, and is 
thus distinguished from a noun. The limits between an interjection 
and a noun or verb, however, are not always very easy to be observed 
in practice. The imperative mood, and the interrogative form of a verb 
have so much of animation about them, that they easily pass into mere 
interjections, and the same may be said" of the vocative case of nouns. 
In practice, I should be inclined to say, that so long as a noun or verb 
(distinguishable as such) enters into construction with other parts of 
a sentence, or admits of grammatical inflection, according to its par- 
ticular application, it is to be considered as not having assumed the 
character of a mere interjection ; whilst, on the other hand, the simply 
articulated exclamation, or the noun or verb which has lost somewhat 
of its original form and signification, is entitled, so. long as it shows 
forth an actual feeling, to be called an interjection. Wilkins's scheme, 
short as it is, helps to illustrate the connection between these parts of 
speech. Wo ! which he properly ranks among interjections, is also 
used as the vocative case of a noun. — Hush ! (like hark ! lo ! oyez ! 
&c.) is also the imperative mood of a verb. The interrogative is in 
some degree implied by hem ! or hm ! which he considers as interjec- 
tions of doubt. It is more distinctly marked in French by the word 
puis, as explained in the Bictionnaire de VAcademie. " On dit, par 
ellipse, et par interrogation, et puis ! pour dire, eh bien ! qu'en 
arrivera-t-il ? que s'ensuivra-t-il ? que fera-t-on apres ? Ou bien, qu'en 
arriva-t-il ? que s'ensuivit-il ?" 
Coupled with 420. Though the interjection itself does not assert, it may be coupled 
an assertion. w ^ an asser ti n, as one subordinate sentence is coupled with another 
in a larger sentence. This I have already exemplified in the passages 
— " O ! that I had wings like a dove !" — " Oh ! that this too solid 
flesh would melt !" — in both which, the verbs (had, and would melt) 
are put in the subjunctive mood, as dependent on the interjection O ! 
— just as they would have been had the place of ! been supplied by 
a verb, such as, " I wish," " I desire," or the like. In a union of this 
kind the interjection precedes the sentence with which it is connected ; 
for it has been observed by Vossius, that though the name interjection 
is given on account of its being thrown in between the parts of a sen- 
tence, yet this is not essential to the character of an interjection. It is 
so named, not because it is always, but because it is generally so 
placed. " Interjectiones dicta? sunt quia ssepe interserantur orationi, 
non quod id perpetuum sit." — " Interjectio non semper interjicitur ; 
quia ab ea quoque recte auspicamur."— " Nee tamen de ovaia ejus 



CHAP. XIV.] OF INTERJECTIONS. 277 

est, ut inteijiciatur ; cum per se compleat sententiam, nee raro ab ea, 
incipiat oratio." 

421. The learned Wallis was in error, when he said there were interjections 
but few interjections in the English language. True it is, that with 
various contexts and accompaniments, the same interjection may express 

very different emotions. We find Wilkins describing oh ! as an 
expression of sorrow, as an exclamation preceding discourse, and as 
bespeaking attention in discourse. These variations depend not on 
the articulation, but on the intonation ; that is, not on the letters 
which go to form the word, but on the elevation or depression of voice 
in pronouncing it : but this is not peculiar to the interjection oh ! or to 
the " incondite" interjections generally ; for the same may be observed 
of any nouns or verbs used interjectionally. Thus we say, impatiently, 
well ! and what of that ?" — or, with patient acquiescence, " well ! 
never mind : it can't be helped." So there is great difference between 
the affected gravity of Falstaff 's imprecation, plague ! and the same 
imprecation seriously uttered against Apemantus : — 

Falst. A plague of sighing and grief ! It blows a man up, like 
a bladder. First Fart Henry IV. 

Caph. Stay, stay, here comes the fool, with Apemantus. 

Serv. Hang him ! He'll abuse us. 

Isid. A plague upon him ! Dog ! " Timon. 

422. Thus have I shown the propriety of ranking the interjection as 
a separate part of speech, not " brutish and inarticulate," but em- 
ployed by all mankind in all ages to express feelings, from the most 
slight and evanescent to the deepest and most overpowering. I have 
proposed a definition of this part of speech, and in developing it have 
proved that it shows forth and expresses feelings, without asserting 
their existence. I have given a short view of those nice shades and 
gradations, by which our various feelings pass into distinct conceptions 
and assertions, and of a corresponding gradation in the modes of their 
expression, from incondite sounds, consonantal or vocal, to words either 
growing out of those sounds, or adopted from mere fragments of 
sentences, and finally to interjectional phrases, approximating in part, 
or whole, to sentences purely enunciative ; whence we may easily 
comprehend how the interjection rises to a noun, a verb, or a phrase, 
and the phrase, verb, or noun sinks into an interjection. And with this 
discussion I conclude the survey of words, as distributed into those, 
which are named by grammarians, from their respective icses in the 
communication of thought and feeling, the Parts of Speech. 



( 278 ) 



CHAPTER XV. 



OF PAETICLES. 



Parts of 
words. 



Why called 
Particles. 



How far 

significant. 



423. Having treated of sentences and words, it remains to be seen 
whether the grammatical analysis cannot be carried still further, by 
examining the constituent parts of words. It has been stated above, 
that words, as to their sound, may, for the most part, be divided into 
syllables, and syllables into articulations ; but these divisions having 
no necessary relation to their signification are not here to be considered. 
The question is, whether, and to what extent, words, taken as sig- 
nificant integers, may not, in certain instances, admit of fractions (so 
to speak) which go to make up those integers, and are also themselves 
significant ? and this question is to be resolved, as I shall presently 
show, in the affirmative. 

424. The science of grammar, as hitherto cultivated, has, like most 
other sciences, obtained as yet but an imperfect nomenclature. We 
have seen that even the appellations " noun" and " verb," which are 
on all hands admitted to be applicable to the most necessary parts of 
speech, are differently understood by grammarians of note. It is not 
surprising, therefore, that the term Particle should be misapplied, as 
I think it is, when intended to signify those words which are at the 
same time recognized as accessorial parts of speech. To say, " there 
are eight parts of speech, but four of them are particles" is much like 
saying, there are eight planets, but four of them are satellites, or eight 
commissioned officers, but four of them are non-commissioned. The 
word particle, according to all analogies of derivation, ought to mean 
something less than the word part, a subdivision of a division, a part 
of a part : and as words have been called parts of speech, particles 
should be deemed parts of words, in which sense, with reference to 
signification, I shall here use the term particle. 

425. When I speak of a divisible word as an integer, in point of 
signification, I speak of it with reference to its possible effect in the 
construction of a sentence ; but when I speak of a portion of that word 
as a particle, I allude to its effect in modifying the signification or 
character of the integral word in language generally ; and some such 
effect it must necessarily have, whether or not it has any known 
signification when used separately. Thus each of the sentences, 
" Johnson was learned," " Friendship is delightful," contains, as a 
sentence, three, and only three significant integers, viz., a subject, a 
copula, and a predicate, each of which integers is a word ; but if we 
take any one of the four divisible words in these sentences, and inquire 
into its signification in the English language generally, we shall find 
that this depends on the way in which its primary portion is modified 



CHAP. XV.] OF PARTICLES. 279 

by the other portion. In " Johnson," for instance, the primary- 
portion John is modified by son : each portion has a known significa- 
tion, and the union of both produces a third signification relating to 
the two former. Again, in the word friendship there are two portions, 
friend and ship, and the relation of the word friend to friendship is 
very obvious ; but the relation of ship to friendship is not equally so at 
first sight, though it may be discovered by study and reflection, as 
will hereafter be shown. The word learned may, in like manner, be 
divided into two portions, learn and ed, of which the former has a 
clear meaning of its own ; but the latter, if it ever had a distinct and 
separate meaning, has long since lost it, and serves only to mark that 
learned is a participle of the verb to learn. The word delightful may 
be divided into delight and ful, both which are intelligible enough in 
English, or into de, light, and ful, of which the two former cannot be 
separately understood without reference to the Latin. The words 
Johnson, delightful, friendship, and learned, therefore, are in effect com- 
pounds, each consisting of a primary part, which is modified by a 
secondary part. John is modified by son, friend by ship, learn by ed, 
and delight by ful. The primary parts in such compounds are words, 
that is, when used separately, they have a plain and distinct significa- 
tion of their own. The secondary parts may or may not have such 
separate signification in present usage ; and their signification, if any, 
may be more or less obvious. These secondary parts I call particles, 
when so used in composition. Thus, I say that, in the word Johnson, 
son is a particle ; in the word friendship, ship is a particle ; in the 
word delightful, ful is a particle ; and in the word learned, ed is a 
particle. 

426. Particles modify words in three different ways, and with Three kinds, 
three different effects : — 

i. In the ordinary compounds, such as Johnson, overtake, forewarn, 
erewhile, elsewhere, there is no alteration of the principal word, either 
by changing the grammatical class to which it belongs, or by varying 
the grammatical construction of the sentence in which it is used. 

ii. In such compounds as friendship, bisyhed, avette, masterless, 
blaunchard, sweetly, &c, the grammatical class of the word is more 
or less altered; thus, from the personal substantive, friend, we form 
the ideal substantive, friendship ; from the Latin appellative apis, was 
formed the French diminutive avette; from the common adjective 
blanche, was formed the diminutive adjective blaunchard ; from the 
adjective busy, was formed the old English substantive bisyhed; from 
the substantive master, we form the adjective masterless ; from the 
adjective sweet, we form the adverb sweetly, and so forth. 

hi. In such compounds as growen, beon, makede, walked, monethes, 
children, &c, the principal word is varied in its construction by the 
particles en, on, ede, ed, es, &c. ; and thus are formed those inflections 
which grammarians call declensions and conjugations. Of each of 
these kinds I shall give one or more examples. 



280 OF PARTICLES. [CHAP. XV. 

ciaseand. 427. The class and construction of the word John remain unaltered 

unaltered. 011 in Johnson, which was manifestly in its origin nothing more than 
Johns son. Thus in all languages have been formed patronymics, the 
most ancient of all family names. The Greeks did this in several 
instances, whence such names as JEacides, Pelides, Atrides, &c. ; but 
the Romans adopted it generally at a very early period of their history. 
" Kemarquons sur les noms propres des families Romaines," (says 
M. de Brasses), " qu'il n'y en a pas un sent chez eux, qui ne soit 
termine en ius, desinence fort semblable a 1' viog des Grecs, c'est-a-dire 
filius — par ou on pourrait conjecturer que les noms des families, da 
moins ceux des anciennes maisons, seraient du genre patronimique." 
Thus Caecilius was Cceculce viog, Julius, Juli viog, AHmilius, iEmili 
viog, &c. Mr. Tooke says, " I think it not unworthy of remark that, 
whilst the old patronymical termination of our northern ancestors was 
son, the Sclavonic and Russian patronymic was of. Thus whom the 
English and Swedes named Peterson, the Russians called Peterhof. 
And as a polite and foreign affectation afterwards induced some of our 
ancestors to assume Fitz (i. e. fils or filius) instead of son, so the 
Russian affectation, in more modern times, changed of to vitch (i. e. 
fitz, fils, or filius), and Peterhof became Petrovitch, or Petrowitz." 
The Irish patronymic 0' may possibly be of the same origin as the 
Russian of. The Welsh 'P is well known to be op, an abbreviation 
of mab, a son, as Price for Ap Rhys, Powell for Ap Hoel, &c. The 
Scottish Highlanders use the cognate word mac, a son, for their 
patronymical prefix, as in Mac Donald (i. e. the son of Donald), 
Mac Kenzie (i. e. the son of Kenneth), &c. ; while the Lowland Scotch 
used still a different mode of expressing the same thing, by prefixing 
to the son's name the genitive case of the father's, as Watt's Robin, 
for Robert the son of Walter ; Sim's Will, for William the son of 
Simon, whence arose such family names as Watts, Sims, and the like : 
and so much for the particles son, ius, fitz, of, vich, mac, 0\ 'P, 
and '& The proper name, Johnson, is no less obviously a compound 
than watchman, spearman, boat-hook, and thousands of similar words in 
common use. There are also many that have fallen into disuse, 
though still perfectly intelligible ; ex. gr. nonemete, a meal formerly 
eaten by artificers at noon, but which seems to be distinguished from 
dinner : — 

Divers artificers and laborers reteyned to werke and serve, waste moch part of 
the day, and deserve not their wagis, summe tyme in late commyng unto their 
"\verke, erly departing therfro, longe sitting at ther brekfast, at ther dyner, and 
nonemete, and long tyme of sleping at after none. 

Stat. 2 Hen. VII. c. xxii. M.S. 

And as we had the word nonemete, i. e. noonmeat, so we have the 
words noontide, noonday, midday, midnight, forenoon, afternoon, &c, 
all nouns compounded on similar principles ; for as noon modifies 
meat, so mid modifies night, and fore modifies noon : and thus noon, 
mid, and fore, are equally to be considered in these three instances 



CHAP. XV.] OF PARTICLES. 281 

respectively as particles. So, in the compound verb overtake, over is 
a particle modifying take ; and in the compound noun overseer, over is 
a particle modifying seer ; and this particle, over, is sometimes cor- 
rupted into or, as in the word orlop, which is a platform of planks laid 
over the beams in the hold of a ship-of-war, so named from the Dutch 
overloopen, to run over, and anciently written in English overlopps : — 

Somuche as they shall put greater nomber of people in the cas- 
telles and ouerlopps of their shypps they shalbe the more oppressed. 
Xicolls's Thucydides, fol. 191, a. 

In Danish also this same preposition over, written ober, is used as a 
particle in compound nouns, as oberdommer, the chief justice. 

428. The grammatical class to which the woidfriend belongs is Class altered, 
that of a general appellative, and it expresses a person possessing a 

certain moral quality ; but the grammatical class to which the word 
friendship belongs is that of an universal, and expresses the ideal con- 
ception of that quality. In compounding the primary word friend, 
then, with the particle ship, an alteration of the grammatical class is 
effected. In some such compounds the particle retains a signification 
analogous to that which it has when used separately ; but in this 
particular instance, the particle ship signifies something very different 
from the ordinary English substantive ship. To understand its modi- 
fying power, therefore, we must have recourse to those cognate 
languages in which a particle of similar origin occurs. The Germans 
use the termination schaft, the Dutch schap, and the Swedes shop : 
and these are manifestly from the Gothic skapan, Anglo-Saxon scapan, 
or scyppan, Frankish and Alamannic scaffen, Dutch scheppen, Icelandic 
skapa and skipa, Danish skaher, and old English to shup, i. e. to shape, 
make, or do : — 

The shuppare that huern shupte 

To shome he huem shadde. Satire on Horsemen. 

Wymmen were the beste thing 
That shup our here heuene kyng. 

MS. Earl. 2253, fol. 71, b. 

Friendship, therefore, is the action, the work, of a friend : Chaucer 
uses gladshipe : — 

That gladshipe he hath al forsake. 

In Danish we find selkskab, a fellowship ; in Anglo-Saxon ealdorscipe, 
cynescipe, sib-scipe, &c. In German herrschaft, eigenschaft, gesell- 
schaft, &c. &c. 

The particle scape, in landscape, is the same as ship; for we find in 
Anglo-Sixon landscipe, in Dutch landschup, and in German land- 
schafft. 

Many other particles altering the class of words are to be found in 
our own and other languages, which will be more appropriately 
noticed in a future part of this work. 

429. The third mode in which particles modify words is, by alter- Construction 
ing their effect in the construction of a sentence. This use of particles, altered - 



282 OF PARTICLES. [CHAP. XV. 

which seems to have been little thought of, and scarcely suspected till 
of late years, has recently opened an immense field for the study of 
that important branch of ethnography, the connection of languages. 
Mr. Tooke, in the second volume of his Diversions of Purley, says, 
" All those common terminations, in any language, of which all 
nouns or verbs in that language equally partake, under the notion of 
declension or conjugation, are themselves separate words with distinct 
meanings." On the strength of this assertion, credit has been given 
to him as the discoverer of a great and incontrovertible principle in 
the science of language ; but his real and only merit (if merit it be) 
was in boldly stating as a general truth what more cautious gram- 
marians had shown, with great probability, to be true in a few par- 
ticular instances. As in his first volume he had built his whole 
theory of conjunctions on Skinner's derivation of the conjunction if 
from the imperative gif, so in his second volume, published several 
years after, he, in the above brief and oracular manner, asserted all 
terminations not merely to have originally teen, but still to be, separate 
words ; because Dr. Gregory Sharpe and others had suggested, " that 
the personal pronouns are contained in the Greek and Latin termina- 
tions of their verbs." Mr. Tooke adds, " These terms are all explicable, 
and ought to be explained ;" but he made not the slightest attempt 
himself to prove in detail what he had asserted as universally true. 
The productions of the illustrious German philologists, and especially 
of Grimm, Pott, and Bopp, show the result of long years of labour, 
in comparing not merely the terminations, but the particles in general, 
whether prefixed, subjoined, or inserted, of whole families of languages, 
. especially those called Indo-European. We now clearly perceive the 
operation of one and the same great principle in languages so widely 
distant from each other in time and place, as the Zend, the Sanscrit, 
the Mseso-Gothic, the Sclavonian, the Frankish, German, Anglo- 
Saxon, and English. We find in these and other dialects, not only 
that the personal pronouns supply particles by which nouns are 
declined and verbs conjugated, but that certain particles distinguish 
pronouns personal, relative, and demonstrative ; that they ' convert 
adjectives into adverbs ; give to verbs a negative, intensitive, in- 
ceptive, or frequentative character ; and, in short, enable the same 
radical word to pass through all the modifications of every separate 
part of speech. And, moreover, we perceive that the same particle, 
varied in articulation according to definite laws, performs the same 
function in many different languages, showing a connection between 
nations, of which, in many instances, history affords no other trace, 
induction. 430. The method by which Mr. Tooke arrived at his supposed 

discoveries, was certainly not *' the Baconian Induction ;" for it 
consisted in that very " leap or flight from particulars to the remote 
and most general axioms,"* which Bacon so much and so often repro- 

* Ncque permittendum est, ut Intellectus a particularibus ad axiomata remota 
et quasi generalissima saliat et volet. Org. Nov. aph. 1 04. 



CHAP. XV.] OF PARTICLES. 283 

bates, as"a rash and premature anticipation,"* and in that " induction 
by simple enumeration," which he describes as " a puerile thing leading 
to precarious conclusions, and exposed to hazard from contradictory 
proofs :" j whilst, on the other hand, the zealous and persevering phi- 
lologists above mentioned, and their fellow-labourers of perhaps equal 
ability, have pursued that which Bacon calls " the true way," J and 
" from which we may augur well for science ;" viz., " when by a just 
scale, and by continuous, uninterrupted, and unbroken degrees, we 
ascend from particulars to the minor axioms, thence to the intermediate, 
each successively superior to that which it precedes, and so at last to 
the most general."§ They have shown, that what is done in some 
languages by particles, is done in other languages by separate words : 
and as it is abundantly clear that all separate words may have been 
wholly or partially employed to signify either conceptions or emotions, 
it is reasonable to infer that the particles which stand in their place 
are significant also. Accordingly, these eminent men have explained 
the signification of almost all the particles employed in the above- 
mentioned languages to modify nouns substantive or adjective, parti- 
ciples, pronouns, verbs, or prepositions ; and the result may be illus- 
trated by the analysis of a trivial sentence : ex. gr. "The shepherdess 
says that she plainly saw those soldiers mounted on able and handsome 
horses, driving the farmer's two largest oxen over the height." I will, 
therefore, briefly notice the effect of the particles here employed, in 
modifying the different parts of speech ; reserving a fuller examination 
of them to a future period. 

431. First, as to substantives — the particles er and ess, in " soldier," Modifying 
" farmer," and " shepherdess," mark gender ; en, es, and s in " oxen," ' 
" horses," and " soldiers " mark number ; and '5 in " farmer's," marks 
case. In some languages, the gender of a noun substantive is shown 
by a separate word ; in others, by a termination. The English mas- 
culine termination er manifestly corresponds with the German personal 
(or as Dr. Latham calls it demonstrative) pronoun, er, " he:" with the 
Latin masculine termination or, and substantive vir, " man," and 
various words and particles in other languages, as will be shown here- 
after. The Latins expressed children of the two sexes by the words 
puer and puella. Puer signifies what we mean by a man-child. We 
have therefore reason to believe, that as man is a word significant of a 
male of the human kind, so er when standing alone had a similar 

* Anticipationes naturae — res temeraria et prematura. Org. Nov. aph. 26. 

f Inductio quae procedit per emrmerationem simplicem, res puerilis est, et pre- 
cario concludit, et periculo exponitur ab instantia contradictor^, lb. aph. 105. 

I Altera (via) a sensu et particularisms excitat axiomata, ascendendo continenter, 
et gradatim, ut ultimo loco perreniatur ad maxime generalia, quae Via vera est. 
Aph. 19. 

§ De scientiis turn demum bene sperandum est, quando per scalam veram, et per 
gradus continuos, et non intermissos, aut biulcos, a parti cularibus ascendetur ad 
axiomata minora, et deinde ad media, alia aliis superiora, et postremd demum ad 
generalissima. Aph. 104. 



284 OF PARTICLES. [CHAP. XV. 

signification. PueUa signifies a girl ; if we call pu-er a he-child, we 
may call pu-ella a she-child : and in fact, ilia is the Latin feminine pro- 
noun she. In like manner our feminine particle ess, as in shepherdess, 
agrees with the Latin termination ix, and the Greek ig, as 7rpo((yrJTLc, a 
prophetess, and is found in the Italian pronoun essa, she. Our plural 
termination en, which we retain in a few words only, is the ordinary 
plural termination in German, as it was in old English. Its connection 
with any existing noun, however, requires to be more fully inves- 
tigated. On the other hand, our plural termination es, of which s, 
(as in the above word soldiers) is a mere abbreviation, is found in the 
Latin and French plural termination es, the old Scotch is, as in cryis 
and dappis,* the Greek plural termination ea, as Ttrdveg, the Doric 
plural pronoun a/ieg, " we," &c, and is perhaps connected with the 
Latin pronoun singular, is. Our 's (as in the above word, farmer's) 
is an abbreviation of the Anglo-Saxon genitive termination es, or is, as 
Godes, " of God," skipis, " of a ship ;" which long prevailed in old 
English and Scotch, and has been erroneously supposed to be a con- 
traction of his. 

Adjectives. 432. As to adjectives, the particle hie and some, in "able" and 
" handsome," are connected with adjectival terminations in other lan- 
guages ; the former being derived from the Latin Mis, as in amdbilis, 
(which is doubtless connected with the pronouns ille and is), and the 
latter with the German sam, as in langsam, the Frankish leidsame, 
" loathsome," the Icelandic sam, as in samborgari, " fellow-citizen," and 
with our own pronoun same. 

Participles. 433. Our participle of present time is formed by the participle ing, 
as in " driving," and that of past time by the particle ed, as in 
" mounted." Ing is the Scottish and, as in glowand (glowing), and 
the Frankish enti, as in scinenti (shining), both which seem to be con- 
nected with the Latin ens, entis, as in the genitive placentis, and with 
endi, as in the gerund placendi : and as ens is a participle of the verb 
esse, "to be," ing has probably a similar origin. Of this termination 
ing, however, it must be observed, that in English it does not exclu- 
sively signify time present, much less is it confined to a time momen- 
tarily present. We use the infinitive noun singing, as we do the 
infinitive to sing ; for we may equally say " singing is a genteel accom- 
plishment," or " to sing is a mark of a mind at ease." So, while the 
act of building a house is going on, we say " this house is building," 
more properly than "this house is being built" In like manner, we 
say of the builder, " he has been a long time building this house." 
And again, a participle with this termination often passes into an 
adjective proper, as " this is a person of a pleasing address;" and the 
same occurs in the Latin idiom — 



Linquenda tellus, et domus, et placens 
Uxor. 



Horat. Car. 2, 14, 21. 



* Christis Kirk, stanza 14. 



CHAP. XV.] OF PARTICLES. 285 

Nor is this usage of a participle confined to the participle present ; for 
we speak of " an aged man," as we do of an old man, without reference 
to any particular time. And so does the poet — 



nequeharum, quas colis, arborum 

Te prater invisas cupressos 

Ulla brevem dominum sequetur. 



Horat. ut sup. 



434. The participle which modifies the pronoun those in the sentence Pronouns, 
above given, is simply a broad vowel exchanged for one of weaker 
pronunciation. The singular this, becomes the plural those. This 

sort of modification is common in all languages. It was carried much 
further in the Anglo-Saxon pronouns, than it is in the modern English ; 
for the pronoun answering to our this, was in the singular masculine 
thes, thises, thisum, thisne, thise ; feminine, theos, thisse, thas ; neuter, 
this, thises, thisum, thise, and in the plural thas, thissa, thissam. 

435. The modifications of the verb by particles are in most Ian- Verbs, 
guages of the Indo-European branch, except our own, very numerous. 

A short specimen of them may here suffice : — 



English. 


Latin." 


Greek. 


Gothic. 


Sanscrit. 


Zend. 


I stand 


sto 


ICTty/U 


stam 


t'istami 


histami 


Thou standest 


stas 


'iarrjg 


stas 


t'istasi 


histasi 


He standeth 


stat 


'iorari 


stat 


t'istati 


histati 


We stand 


stamus 


'iarafiEV 


stames 


t'istamas 




Ye stand 


statis 


'iarrare 


stat 


t'istata 


histatha 


They stand 


stant 


'laravTi 


stant 


t'istanti 


histenti 



It is impossible, in many of these words, not to recognise the pronouns 
me, av, it, rifj.eic, &c. In all the moods and tenses, the pronouns have 
been most carefully, and in a great measure successfully traced, in 
Bopp's Comparative Grammar. In many instances, the modification 
is by a mere change of letter, as was observed above of the pronoun ; 
and this seems to be natural to mankind, because we find it in different 
languages, and in very various ways, as rvirrio, tvttio, capio, cepi — sing, 
sang — man, men, &c, and in the above sentence, " saw," the past tense 
of see. The word " says," in the same sentence, differs only from say 
by the addition of a consonant ; but this is in reality a modern abbre- 
viation of the word sayeth. M. de Brosses, after following the radical 
sound cap through all its developments in the verb capio, concludes 
with a just observation : — " Toute cette composition est l'ouvrage non 
d'une combinaison reflechie, ni d'une philosophic raisonnee mais d'une 
metaphysique d'instinct." Now, instinct could never have led men to 
form a complicated and beautiful system out of sounds altogether un- 
meaning ; but it might easily lead to the gradual combination of known 
elements, until they formed at length the complete structure of a 
language. 

436. Of the adverbial termination ly, as in the above word Adverbs, &c. 
"plainly," I have already observed that it is the adjective "like" 



Anomalies. 



Conclusion. 



286 OF PARTICLES. [CHAP. XV. 

abbreviated, and agrees with the Gothic leik, and many other Teutonic 
words signifying a body. In the preposition over, the particle er again 
appears with a different power ; but in all probability derived, as in the 
former instances, from a pronoun. The same may be said of the ter- 
minations est in " largest," and ht in height, the former serving to mark 
the superlative degree, and the other the idea of high applied by a 
natural transition of meaning to a high land. 

437. There are numerous causes of anomaly in language, which 
render it more particularly difficult to systematise and explain the 
minor portions of speech, such as the prepositions, auxiliary verbs, and 
particles. One of these causes is a mistaken notion of analogies 
between particular words, where no such analogy exists. Thus our 
word further, which was the comparative of forth, has been supposed 
by many persons to be the comparative of far, and has therefore been 
erroneously written farther. A still more striking instance is that of 
the word coud, which we always pronounce properly, but spell could, 
inserting the I, without any reason whatever, but that there is an I in 
would and should. The two latter words are from the Anglo-Saxon 
wille and sceal, the former is from the Anglo-Saxon cwethan ; and was 
always written in old English couthe, cowthe, or coude ; — 

That though he had me bete on every bone, 

He couthe winne agen my love anone. Chaucer. 

He thowght to taste if he cowthe, 

And on he put in his mowth. Sir Cleges. 

Sir, quod this knyght myld of speche, 

Wold God I cowthe your sonne teche ! Lyfe of Ipomydon. 

Ac he no couthe neuer mo 

Chese the better of hem to. Amis and Amiloun. 

Whiche was right displesant to the kyng, but he coude nat amende it. 

~ Froissart, fol. 43. 



Another and a more effective cause of anomaly is the love of 
euphony, or easy pronunciation, which leads the ignorant especially to 
corrupt words by abbreviations and changes, as Godild ! for God yelde, 
i. e., reward him. Gossip for god-sib, &c. 

438. Allowing for the obscurities which these and other causes 
spread over the minor portions of speech, it may fairly be said, that 
in regard to particles, as well as to words, the great principle of 
transition, by which significant sounds pass from one class and 
description of signs into another, has been here established. The noun 
or verb becoming a particle, and the particle coalescing with another 
verb or noun, serve to modify their signification, and determine their 
grammatical use. And finally, we may conclude, that language is 
throughout a combination of significant sounds, fitted, to express 
thoughts and emotions, as they exist interchangeably in the human 
mind. 



( 287 ) 



CHAPTER XVI. 

OF THE MECHANISM OF SPEECH. 

439. An observation of the late M. Frederick Cuvier, on the actions Subject of 
of animals generally, is in an especial manner applicable to the exercise 
of the faculty of speech : — " The actions of animals," says he, " are 
composed of physical acts and intellectual acts, which imply the ex- 
istence of corresponding faculties. Now since the physical faculties 
are essentially passive, and depend immediately on the intellectual, 
and since the former would not manifest themselves to us unless the 
latter communicated to them their activity, we may conclude that, in 
order to study animal nature, we should begin with the active facul- 
ties, and should endeavour, from a knowledge of these, to appreciate 
the physical actions."* Such is the course of proceeding which I have 
adopted. I have hitherto considered the science of language with 
reference to the faculties of intellect and will, which direct mankind 
in communicating to each other their thoughts and feelings : it remains 
to be inquired what are the bodily organs or instruments with which 
they are furnished by an all-wise Creator for the purpose of such com- 
munication, and how these may be used. I intend not here to discuss 
the effect of looks or gestures, for though they are often more expressive 
than words, yet as the present treatise has hitherto been confined to 
the consideration of spoken language, I shall now inquire only into 
the forms and uses of the organs of speech. 

440. As the subject of inquiry in this part is different from that Mode of 
previously considered, so the mode of conducting that inquiry must be 
different. I have not now to proceed by deduction from ideas (that 
is, universal conceptions) to general conceptions, and so to particulars; 
but I must now proceed by induction from particulars to the less 
general, and so to the more general, in the manner commonly called 
Baconian, to which I before alluded. The reader, therefore, is not to 
expect that he will find in the following pages any conclusions so abso- 
lutely certain as those which constitute spiritual or intellectual truths ; 
such, for instance, as the spiritual truth resulting from the beautiful 
and striking parable of the Pharisee and the Publican, or as the intel- 
lectual truth resulting from the 47th proposition of the first book of 
Euclid. These, when once embraced by an individual mind, can 
neither be obliterated nor altered : they admit of no confusion or 
doubt ; they impress on the human mind the same conviction now 
that they did when the one fell from the lips of Christ, and the other 
was committed to writing by Euclid. It is otherwise with our con- 
ceptions of bodily existence ; they are at best what Bacon calls 
* Annales des Sciences Naturelles, 1839, vol. 12, p. 145. 



288 



OF THE MECHANISM OF SPEECH. 



[CHAP. XVI. 



Inquiry 
difficult. 



Observation 
limited. 



" axiomata quasi generalissima,"* and all that they can promise is the 
result of a cautious consideration of those particulars which our age, 
country, and other circumstances, enable us to observe. What doc- 
trines of Aratus or Hipparchus do the astronomers of the present day 
recognise as adequate explanations of the movements of the heavenly 
bodies ? Strabo was the most eminent geographer of his time ; but 
he did not so much as guess the existence of America, Australasia, or 
Polynesia. What notion had Dioscorides of the generation of plants ; 
or the acute and perspicacious Hippocrates of the different action of 
the sensitive and motor nerves ? 

441. Not only was a knowledge of the mechanism of speech almost 
unknown to the ancients, but even in our own day its acquisition is 
beset with difficulties. The particulars* from which its inductions are 
to be drawn occupy a sphere of vast but uncertain extent. All nations 
and tribes of men speak articulately, all are jj,epo7reg av6pu)7roi ; but 
how far they are capable of uttering the same articulations it is not 
yet within the compass of probable conjecture to determine. The 
Hottentots and other African tribes are said by Lichtenstein and Salt 
to produce certain smacking sounds in the mouth, which Europeans 
cannot imitate ; and the Chinese are unable to pronounce our letters 
5, g, d,j\ z, or r; but whether these facts result from a peculiarity in 
the formation either of the vocal or auditory organs, or whether it be 
the mere result of a habit acquired in early infancy, our present state 
of knowledge does not enable us to ascertain. 

442. The range of observations actually made on articulation has 
been comparatively narrow. Various governments, ancient and modern, 
have reckoned among their subjects tribes and nations speaking great 
diversities of language : yet neither Egypt, Assyria, nor Rome, in the 
height of their power ; nor Spain, when she ruled over numerous 
American tribes ; nor Russia, with her long list of Sclavonian, Tartar, 
and Finnish provinces ; nor even England, on whose colonial empire 
the sun never sets, has attempted to ascertain the diversities of articu- 
lation which have been or could be practised within the limits of their 
respective dominions. In 1815 a singular opportunity presented itself 
for comparing the articulate sounds used in all parts of Europe, and in 
a large portion of Asia ; for then were assembled in Paris, Cossacks of 
the Wolga and the Don, Russians and Poles, the Scandinavian Swedes 
and Danes, Celts of Ireland, Scotland, Wales, and Brittany, Teutons 
of Northern and Southern Germany, Bohemians and Hungarians, 
Basques, Catalonians, Castilians and Lusitanians, Greeks from Corfu, 
Maltese speaking a dialect of Arabic, Jews retaining their ancient 
Hebrew, Italians, French, and English: — 

Such forces met not, nor so wide a camp, 
When Agrican with all his northern pow'rs 
Besieged Albracia, as romances tell, 
The city of Galaphron 



Nov. Org. L. 1, aph. 104. 



CHAP. XVI.] OF THE MECHANISM OF SPEECH, 289 

Never before could so many different articulations be compared in 
sound, and traced to the operation of the organs by which they were 
respectively produced ; and that in the centre of Europe, by the 
greatest physiologists then existing. But the opportunity was lost, 
and may never again occur in the history of the world ! 

443. Attempts have no doubt been frequently made to reduce the Framersoi 
knowledge which men possessed on this subject to system, but a p a e ' 
hitherto with very partial success. At some period of unknown 
antiquity alphabetic writing was invented, and it might be sup- 
posed that its first inventors had carefully studied the organic, 
powers of human utterance ; but their ignorance on this subject is 
demonstrable. Not only was no alphabet ever invented which ex- 
pressed all the powers of articulation common to mankind in general ; 

but there never yet teas a perfect alphabet of any language. As to our 
own alphabetic system, it is the very worst, in practical application, 
that ever existed. What can be more absurd than to allot to the 
combination of the four letters, o, u, g, h, the different sounds which 
we give it in through, dough, plough, rough, and cough, in no one of 
which are the proper powers of the single letters retained? 

444. If we appeal to the authority of philologists, we obtain but Philologists, 
slight and indistinct information. " This subject," says Bishop Wil- 

kins, " has been largely debated by several authors of great name and 
reputation for learning. Besides those famous Emperors, Caius Cassar 
and Octavius Augustus, who both writ on this subject, Varro like- 
wise, and Apion, and Quintilian, and Priscian did bestow much 
pains upon the same inquiry concerning the just number of letters. 
And in later times it hath been treated of with great variety of opinions, 
by Erasmus, both the Scaligers, Lipsius, Salmasius, Vossius, J. Mat- 
thias, A. Metherchus, B. Malinchot. &c. : besides several of our own 
countrymen, Sir T. Smith, Bulloker, Alexander Gill, and Dr. Wallis."* 
Since Wilkins's time many learned men, both here and on the Conti- 
nent, have pursued the like investigation ; but their disputes on the 
Digamma, the Greek accents, the Masoretic points, and many other 
such topics, sufficiently show the obscurity still involving all these 
subjects. 

445. Mechanists of great ingenuity have devoted the labour of Mechanists, 
years to the production of machines which might imitate the sounds 

of the human voice ; and so far as they have succeeded, they have 
thrown considerable light on the operations of the natural organs of 
speech. They have indeed been but little sustained in their exertions 
either by pecuniary rewards, or by what perhaps they would have 
estimated more highly, the well-deserved applause of their fellow- 
men. A machine of this kind, which I much regret to have been 
prevented by illness and other causes from seeing, but which (as I 
have heard) evinced in its fabricator great talent, was not long ago 

* Real Char. P. 3, c. 10. 
2. U 



290 OF THE MECHANISM OF SPEECH, [CHAP. XVI. 

exhibited in London, in the same building with a deception called 
" the Mysterious Lady ;" but whilst one person attended the former 
exhibition, at least twenty flocked to the latter. " Experiments 
relative to the artificial production of the articulate sounds," says 
Miiller, " have been made by Kratzenstein,f Kempelen,| and Mr. R. 
Willis. § They have succeeded in imitating a great part of the 
sounds used in speech ; but these speaking machines are always to a 
certain extent imperfect, since every simple and independent sound 
requires a special apparatus; and the combination of the different 
kinds of apparatus with a common tube for the supply of air, so as to 
form words, is exceedingly difficult." § " Kratzenstein," says Mr. 
Mayo, ' ' found that by using little tubes of different shapes adapted 
to an instrument that could produce sound, he could determine dif- 
ferent vowel tones. De Kempelen produced vowel sounds by means 
of an Indian rubber bell similarly adapted, the shape and size of which 
he altered by the hand. But Mr. Willis's recent investigations are 
the most satisfactory. He attached to a free reed a tube which was 
capable, if immediately excited, of producing a determinate note. By 
altering the length of this tube, the original sound was made to 
assume the character of different vowels." |j " De Kempelen suc- 
ceeded in constructing a speaking machine, which was capable of 
uttering entire phrases, some of which were, Vous etes mon ami — Je 
vous aime de tout mon coeur — Leqpoldus Secundus — Romanorum Impe- 
rator, &c. Mr. Wheatstone has reconstructed this instrument from 
De Kempelen's description : and I have heard it articulate the- words 
mamma, papa, thumb, rum, summer, with great precision."^ 
Organs of 446. Though a knowledge of the physical faculty of speech has 

been in no small degree advanced by the labours of the ingenious 
persons just mentioned, the most accurate information on this subject 
can only be attained by examination of the vocal organs themselves. 
Accordingly we find that such examination has been carefully made 
as well by those who have treated of voice or sound as a branch of 
natural philosophy, or with particular relation to music, as by those 
who have considered it as part of the science of physiology. Among 
the cultivators of natural philosophy who have directed their parti- 
cular attention to the vocal organs may be reckoned Biot, Caignard de 
la Tour, Miincke, Savart, &c. : among the writers on music Chladni, 
and Gottfr. Weber; and among physiologists Haller, Cuvier, Ma- 
jendie, Mayo, and Miiller. When we come to examine the writings 
of these and other eminent persons who have treated of the vocal 
organs, we shall perceive not only that they differ in arrangement, and 

* Tentamen resolrendi problema ab Acad. Sci. Petropol. 1780. 

f Mechanisrnus der menschlichen Sprache. Vienna, 1791. 

\ Transact. Philos. Soc. Carnb. vol. 3. 

§ Miiller (J.), Elements of Physiol., transl. by W. Baly, 1837, p. 1053. 

|| Mayo, Outlines of Hum. Physiol., 4th ed. 1837, p. 376. 

f Ibid. p. 378. 



sound. 



CHAP. XVI.] OF THE MECHANISM OF SPEECH. 291 

in the use of terms, but that there are many important points of fact, 
on which they are by no means unanimous, and others which they 
confess require further examination. 

447. There is another difficulty which must not be overlooked. Organs or 
Speech is spoken to be heard. The state of the organs of hearing is heanng * 
therefore to be taken into account, as well as that of the organs of 
speech. It is possible, though perhaps not very probable, that one 

race of men may be so constituted by nature, as to distinguish by the 
ear nice shades of articulate sound, which to others are imperceptible. 
But whether it be owing to this or other causes, certain it is that the 
inhabitants of whole districts fail to perceive differences of pronuncia- 
tion, which those of other countries readily observe. In some parts of 
England individuals confound the aspirated vowels with the un aspi- 
rated. In some parts of Germany b is confounded with p, and v withy. 
In Tuscany, the lower classes, and some of superior rank, pronounce ca 
gutturally, as if written %a- These and many like defects of utterance 
may perhaps be caused either by a malconformation of the ear, or 
by an habitual inattention to certain minute distinctions of sound, 
which inattention at length incapacitates the individual for exercising 
in a correspondent manner his organs of speech. Even the ingenious, 
and generally accurate Cour de Gebelin describes the English th as 
identical in sound with the French z. This must certainly have arisen 
in him from a natural or habitual inability to perceive a difference, 
which to English ears, is most obvious. 

448. In civilised life another circumstance occurs, which tends to Written 
disturb our views of the mechanism of speech. All persons who ° 
leam to read, otherwise than as the Chinese or Mantchous do, get the 
habit of arranging their notions of articulation according to the alpha- 
betic system of their own country. It is only on this ground that I 

can account for so admirable a physiologist as Professor Muller reck- 
oning the vowel articulations at only five. This was indeed the number 
of the Latin alphabet ; in the English language six are recognised ; in 
the Greek seven ; but no one of these divisions rests on any rational 
foundation. Again, the English differ from all other nations hi 
giving to the vowel character i a sound which is really that of a diph- 
thong ; and they call y a vowel, though it is a mere repetition of t, 
and therefore an entirely superfluous letter. This latter circumstance 
may indeed be accounted for by events in the history of our written 
language ; but it nevertheless causes great confusion in the science of 
language ; and yet, perhaps, even well-educated persons in England 
seldom think of the long ; sound of i or y, but as of that of a single 
vowel. 

449. Trusting that the reader will make due allowance for the Form of 
obstacles which render it difficult to obtain an accurate knowledge of ° r ' 
the mechanism of speech, I proceed shortly to state the result of such 
investigations as I have been able to make on that subject. Speech is 

the human voice rendered more or less articulate; and voice is a 

u2 



292 



OF THE MECHANISM OF SPEECH. 



[CHAP. XVI. 



Organs 
arranged. 



species of sound produced and modified by certain organs of the human 
frame, usually designated the vocal organs. It will be necessary, 
therefore, to consider the form and uses of the organs in question, the 
general laws of sound in relation to them, and those modifications of 
the voice which we call articulations. In describing the organs, I 
pretend not to any practical knowledge of anatomy ; but 1 have col- 
lected the little information which I possess on that subject from 
a careful perusal of the accounts given by the authors above men- 
tioned, and especially by Majendie, Mayo, and Muller, assisted, as I 
have most kindly been, by the suggestions of my old and dearly- 
valued friend Sir Benjamin Brodie, of whose opinion on a similar 
subject it has been recently and most truly said, that " from his 
natural acuteness, his philosophical habits, and his vast experience, no 
opinion can be more entitled to weight." * Among the numberless 
instances in which our weak and imperfect intellect is enabled faintly 
to trace the marks of infinite wisdom in the works of creation, we 
cannot but be struck with the remark, that whilst contrivances of 
wonderful art are shown in the formation of organs for the inspiration 
and expiration of that air which is continually necessary to our vital 
existence, and for the swallowing of that food which from time to 
time is no less necessary for our bodily support, several of the very 
organs which serve both these purposes, contribute also to the faculty 
of speech, by which man becomes a social being, and is fitted to be an 
heir of immortality. 

450. The general arrangement of the principal organs may be 
understood from the following view of their relative positions : — 

Nose 1 



Mouth, viz. : 
Lips 
Teeth 
Tongue 
Palate 
Throat 



Ph 



Epiglottis 

Glottis 

Larynx 



I 

CO 



Lungs. 

Two portions. 451. It may be convenienient to distinguish these organs into two 
portions ; the lower, from the lungs to the lower opening of the pha- 

* Quart. Rev. No. 170, p. 371. 



CHAP. XVI.] OF THE MECHANISM OF SPEECH. 293 

rynx, serve principally to produce those modifications of the voice 
which are independent of articulation, such as time, loudness, and 
what has been called the pitch of the voice, answering to the high and 
low notes in music ; besides which there are some other variations, 
distinguished partly by the French word timbre, and partly by the 
English words, tone, accent, &c. The higher organs, including the 
pharynx, with the nasal and oral passages, contribute to articulation. 
I shall begin with the lower organs. The lungs receive, by drawing 
in the breath, a quantity of air, which they return by expiration 
through the trachea and larynx to the opening called the pharynx, and 
thence, by the nose and mouth, to the atmosphere. The breath is 
inspired and expired without sound, unless it be rendered audible by 
causing certain fine ligaments at the upper opening of the larynx to 
vibrate ; and then the human voice is compared by Muller to " a 
musical reed instrument with a double membranous tongue." * 

452. The larynx is bounded ~ Larynx, 

at the upper part by the glottis, 
which has a moveable cover 
called the epiglottis. *' The 
sound of the voice is generated 
at the glottis, and neither above 
nor below this point." f "By 
far the most valuable account of 
the mechanism of the human 
larynx which has been pub- 
lished," says Mayo, " is that 
given by Mr. Willis." % From 
his Essay the accompanying 
figure has been taken, represent- 
ing the cartilages and muscles of 

the larynx (omitting the cornua and the epiglottis) as seen after 
dissection, from above. The muscles are here designated by numbers, 
the cartilages by letters, viz. — 

1. The crico-thyroideus (at the rima of the glottis). 

2. The thyreo-arytasnoideus. 

3. The crico-arytaenoideus posticus. 

4. The crico-aryta?noideus lateralis. 

5. Half of the aryteenoideus transversus and of the obliquL 

A. The thyreoid cartilage. 

B. The cricoid, 

C. The arytenoids. 

F. The vocal or inferior laryngeal ligaments. 
H. The ligaments which tie the arytenoids to the cricoid. 




* Elem. Physiol, vol. i, p. 1023. 



$ Cambridge Philos. Trans. 1832. 



f Ibid. p. 1003. 



Tabular 
view. 



294 OF THE MECHANISM OP SPEECH. [CHAP. XVI, 

453. Mr. Willis's tabular view of. the action of the muscles of the 
larynx is as follows :-*- 



'a f Crico-thvreoidei, stretch the vocal ligaments (1). } Govern the 

g(j< Thyreo-arytaeroidei, relax the vocal ligaments, and put them > pitch of the 
3 [ in vocalising position (2). I notes. 



Sound. 



When 

perceptible. 



Orico-arytasnoidei postici, open the glottis (3). 

Crico-arytaenoidei laterales, compress the front ^ Govern the 

part of the arytenoids (4). I Close the > aperture of the 

Arytsenoidei transversales and obliqui, compress j glottis. glottis. 

the back part of ditto (5). J 

Mr. Mayo thinks, " that for vocalization, the ligaments may acquire 
a definite tension, joined with contact for their whole length ; and 
that to allow the air to pass without producing a laryngeal sound, the 
same tension being at the same time maintained, the ligaments may 
require to be drawn apart, and the rima glottidis to be opened at its 
posterior part." * 

454. The reed instrument (as Miiller calls it), which is formed by 
this curious adaptation of parts, produces sound, according to those laws 
of acoustic science which have been so fully and clearly explained in 
Sir John Herschel's able work on that subject. In using the word 
"sound," however, I must observe a difference between certain words 
in other languages with which it is sometimes confounded. For 
instance, the French word son has, according to Chladni, three dif- 
ferent significations : it expresses — 

i. All that we perceive by the sense of hearing, 
ii. What we perceive by appreciable vibrations of the air. 
iii. What we perceive by the recurrence of vibrations of a 
definite quickness. 

These three significations, says he, answer respectively to the three 
German words schall, Mang, and ton.* The English word sound, 
however, includes at most only the two first of these meanings. It is 
derived from the Latin sonus, which is defined to be " quicquid auribus 
percipi potest." Now this perception is occasioned, as Diomede 
says, by a " corporalis collisio ;" 'and every such collision causes certain 
vibrations of the air, distinguishable according to their duration, or to 
their force (that is, loudness), or else to a certain proportion of the 
sounds to each other, in a scale of which the relative portions are 
called in English high or low, and in French grave or aigu. 

455. Where this relation is not perceptible to the ear (though the 
loudness and duration of the sounds may be so in a great degree), we 
call the sound noise, answering to the French word bruit ; but where 
the relation is perceptible, it may be best illustrated by the example 
of an elastic string or chord, stretched between two points A and C, 

* Outlines Hum. Physiol, p. 370. f Traite' d'Acoustique, p. 5. 



CHAP. XVI.] OF THE MECHANISM OF SPEECH. 295 

B 

thus : A C. Now if the chord A C be drawn at 

D 
its middle point to B, it will form an arc or curve line ABC; and if 
then let loose, the motion which it has acquired will carry it to D, so 
as to form an arc ADC, and thence it will be forced back again 
toward B. Each of these motions is called a vibration, and every 
vibration giving an impulse to the air produces a sound. The suc- 
cessive vibrations become less and less, till the line rests in its first 
position. The number of vibrations which occur in a given time 
determines the pitch of the sound : and the frequency of the vibrations 
depends on the length of the arc ; if short they are frequent, if long 
they are few. When the arc is long, the sound is what we call low ; 
when the arc is short, the sound is what we call high. It is obvious 
that the length of the arc may be increased or diminished either by a 
minute and imperceptible gradation in the nature of a slide, or else by 
adding or deducting certain definite and proportional parts ; and that 
the sounds caused by the vibration of those arcs will vary in like 
manner. The former of these circumstances takes place in ordinary 
speaking, the latter in singing and in music generally. For the sliding 
elevations and depressions we have no strictly accurate name, but the 
definite intervals we call, in music, notes. The late Mr. Steele, in an 
ingenious essay on the measure and melody of speech, endeavoured to 
reduce the spoken rise and fall of sounds to a sort of musical notation, 
but with very partial success. 

456, The power of the human ear in distinguishing sounds by the Power of dis- 
vibrations has certain limits. " In the gravest (i. e. lowest) sounds tmsuis mg - 
perceptible to the human ear, says Chladni, the sonorous body makes 
at least thirty vibrations in a second ; and we are able to appreciate 
sharp (i. e-. high) sounds in which the vibrations are from 8,000 to 
12,000 in a second."* Musical notes, it is known, rise by octaves, 
each of which is produced by double the vibrations of the preceding. 
" The lowest note of the violoncello has 128 vibrations, the octave 
next above it 256, the third 512," &c."j" The range of the voice 
seldom exceeds two octaves and a half ; Dr. Bennati says his own 
voice extended to three octaves ; so did Zelter's ; and Catalani's 
reached to three and a half.J The action of the small muscles which 
cause these vibrations, is clearly shown in Mr. Willis's tabular state- 
ment above quoted ; and thus the quality of voice called its pitch, 
has been fully explained. The time of a vocal sound is also susceptible 
of measure ; and the general perception of measure, or, as it is some- 
times called, of rhythm, is a source of great part of the pleasure of 
poetry, and furnishes the rules of prosody, which are commonly 
deemed a part of grammar. A long or short sound, too, in most 
languages, serves to distinguish one part of speech from another, and 

* Traite d'Acoustique, p. 6. f Ibid. p. 7. 

X Miiller, p. 1031. 



296 



OF THE MECHANISM OF SPEECH. 



ICHAP. XVI. 



one noun from another noun, or one verb from another verb ; and in 
all these respects the quantity of a word (as grammarians call it) is 
material to the understanding of language. Independently of these 
latter considerations we may observe, that by the combined effect of 
the pitch of a vocal sound, though wholly inarticulate, with its 
duration and loudness, human feelings are expressed, in infancy, or in 
a state of barbarism, or of great excitement. Under such circum- 
stances, the sound forms what Mr. Majendie calls a cry, and considers 
as common to man with brute animals. To connect feeling with 
conception, recourse must.be had to the power of articulation. 

Epiglottis. 457. I have stated that the glottis has a moveable cover called the 

epiglottis. In the act of carrying food- from the mouth through the 
pharynx into the oesophagus for digestion, the larynx is raised, and 
the epiglottis brought down on it, so as to prevent the food from 
passing into the glottis. If any extraneous matter which is large passes 
into the glottis, there is danger of immediate suffocation ; if small, 
it may pass into and lodge in some of the bronchial passages, causing 
eventual inflammation of the lungs, and in course of time death. If a 
person imprudently laugh, or attempt to speak, while he is swallowing, 
or holding any loose substance in his mouth, the escape of air from 
the lungs lifts up the epiglottis, and one or other of these pernicious 
consequences may ensue. To a similar cause was owing the remark- 
able accident of Mr. Brunei, which in a manner still more remarkable, 
was relieved by the skill of Sir Benjamin Brodie. A half sovereign 
had remained for some weeks in a part of Mr. Brunei's bronchial tube, 
when Sir B. Brodie, causing him to be fastened on a board which 
moved on its centre, reversed the position of his body ; and the coin, 
by its own weight forcing open the glottis, passed into the mouth. 

458. In uttering a vocal sound, the epiglottis being raised, the air 
passes into the pharynx, which is a large cavity with an opening into 
the mouth, and another into the nose, and both of these contribute to 
render the sound articulate. The oral passage is the principal. 
Through that, the air is capable of passing directly and in an undi- 
verted stream, producing those sounds which the ancients called voccdes, 
and we call vowels, or else interrupting the stream, so as to produce 
what are called consonants. I shall consider these first in their simple, 
and then in their combined effect. 

Vowek. 459. In the production of vowel sounds, the cavity of the mouth is 

capable of assuming different forms according as it is varied by the 
action of the throat, palate, tongue, teeth, or lips ; and hence follows 
a correspondent variety in the vocal sounds, the number of which 
different writers estimate differently. It is true that, theoretically 
speaking, there can be no precise rule for fixing the possible distinction 
of vowels at a certain number, because the action of the organs may 
be indefinitely varied, according to the natural constitution of every 
human being, at every stage of his existence. All that can w T ell be 
done in the present state of science, is to adopt such divisions of 



How made 
articulate. 



CHAP. XVI.] OF THE MECHANISM OF SPEECH. 297 

vowel sound as are, or have been, in use among those nations whose 
practice in this respect we are able to ascertain. In this view I have 
found no statement more reasonable and practical than that of Bishop 
Wilkins, who says, " There are, I conceive, eight simple different 
species of vowels easily distinguishable whose powers are commonly 
used. I cannot deny but that some other intermediate sounds might 
be found, but they would, by reason of their proximity to those others, 
prove of so difficult distinction as would render them useless."* The 
eight distinctions of the learned bishop appear to be suitable to the 
Greek and Latin languages, and the different branches of the Teutonic, 
Scandinavian, and Celtic, with which I have any acquaintance ; how 
far they may serve to express the vowel sounds of other nations, I 
pretend not to say. The Bishop expresses them by the following 
marks — y, a, a, e, i, o, w, u. I take them in this order, because the 
operation of the different organs will thus be best seen, beginning 
with the sound as it enters from the pharynx, and proceeding gradually 
to the lips; and I shall explain them (as well as the consonants 
hereinafter noticed) according to the Bishop's statement, corrected in 
some important particulars by the suggestions of Sir B. Brodie. It is 
to be observed that every one of these vowels may be long or short ; 
that is, its pronunciation may occupy a greater or less portion of time, 
but this does not depend on articulation. The oral cavity continues 
to retain the same form during the whole utterance, and the time, as 
has already been shown, is a circumstance depending on the action of 
the lower organs. 

i. y is a guttural sound, for which we have no mark in English, 
but which is expressed in Welsh by this character. It is produced 
immediately at the emission of air from the throat ; the teeth are a 
little separated, the muscles of the tongue are relaxed, the tip of the 
tongue is a little below, and the posterior part of the tongue is a little 
above the level of the teeth ; the lips in this (as in all the vowels) are 
of course open. The long sound is frequent in French, as in beurre, 
meurtre ; it is less long in English, as in bird, burthen, and short, as in 
but, nut. Being so very simple in its formation, many of our other 
vowels, when short, degenerate into it ; and indeed this circumstance 
may be almost considered as a characteristic of English pronunciation, 
especially in rapid speaking, for in such a case the words honour, of, 
father, sir, are pronounced as if they were written hom/r, yv, fatbz/r, 
syr, &c. 

ii. " A" (says Wilkins) " is the most apert amongst the Lingua- 
palatal vowels. 'Tis expressed by this character, because being one of 
the Greek letters it is more commonly known. It is framed by an 
emission of the breath betwixt the tongue and the palate, the tongue 
being put into a more concave posture, and removed further off from 
the palate." Hence the oral aperture is larger than in the preceding 
vowel y ; the teeth are separated to a greater distance, the tongue is 
* Real Char. P. 3, c. 11. 



298 OF THE MECHANISM OF SPEECH. [CHAP. XVI. 

more depressed, and the surface of it is more flattened. The sound 
Is long as in all, bawl ; or short, as in poll, folly. 

iii. a. The teeth are separated to the same distance as in «, the 
tongue is rendered broader, the tip of the tongue is immediately 
behind the incisor teeth of the lower jaw ; but the rest of the tongue 
is raised above the level of the grinding teeth, so that the space 
between the tongue and the bony palate is narrower than in a. The 
sound is long in the French male and English half; it is short in the 
French mal and English hat. 

iv. e. " This vowel" (says Wilkins) " is framed by an emission of 
the breath between the tongue and the concave of the palate, the 
upper superficies of the tongue being brought to some small degree of 
convexity." Add, that the teeth are less separated than in a, the 
tongue is still broader, and the whole is elevated so that it fills the 
space between the teeth of the upper and lower jaw, leaving only a 
small space between it and the bony palate. The oral aperture is 
consequently smaller than in any of the former instances. The sound 
is long in the French pretre, and English fate, and short in the French 
trompette and English met. Many persons erroneously give the long- 
sound of this vowel to the first letter in our alphabet, whereas that 
letter has only such a sound when weakened by e after an intervening 
consonant. 

v. i. " The vowel" (says Wilkins) " is expressed by this character, 
because this letter amongst many other nations is already used and 
pronounced according to the sound which is here intended. It is 
framed by an emission of the breath betwixt the tongue and the con- 
cave of the palate, the upper superficies of the tongue being put into 
a more convex posture, and thrust up near the palate." Consequently 
the oral aperture is diminished to its least vocal extent, and the lips 
and teeth are more nearly closed than in any other vowel. The sound 
is long in the English bleed and French gite, and short in the English 
bit, but seldom so short in any French word. 

vi. o. This and the two following vowels receive their power prin- 
cipally from the position of the lips. In o the tongue and teeth are in 
the same state as in the pronunciation of « ; but the lips are contracted 
into a circle, or nearly so. The sound is long in the English bone, and 
French trbne ; it is short in the French noble and English nobility. 

vii. w. " This" (says Wilkins) " is the second of the labial vowels 
requiring a greater contraction of the lips." Their opening is, in fact, 
rather elliptical than circular. The tip of the tongue is more elevated 
and brought a little more forward than in the preceding vowel ; the 
teeth are nearly at the same distance as in o and ot. The sound is 
long in the English moon and French poule ; and short in the English 
pull and French voulez. The character vo is adopted by me because 
we have no English character for a sound so common in our own 
and most other languages ; our letter u being properly a diphthong. 

viii. u. This is what Wilkins calls " the u Gallicum or whistling u" 



CHAP. XVI.] OF THE MECHANISM OF SPEECH. 299 

He says that it cannot be denied to be a distinct simple vowel, but 
that it is of a laborious and difficult pronunciation to the English and 
other nations amongst whom it is not used. The sound in French is 
long in buse, and short in but. It is quite unknown in English, but 
the difficulty of acquiring it seems to be exaggerated by Wilkins. 
The lips must be brought into contact on each side, leaving only a 
very small aperture in the centre, the tongue and teeth remaining as 
in the preceding vowel w. 

In pronouncing any of the vowels, the soft palate is elevated so as 
to increase the posterior oral, and diminish the posterior nasal aper- 
ture. The vowels therefore are always oral sounds ; but the nasal 
sound may be added to any of them by depressing the soft palate, 
and raising the root of the tongue either before or after the vowel itself 
is uttered. 

460. The consonants are properly to be considered as expressing Consonants, 
not different vocal sounds, but merely modifications of vocal sound. 
Several of the distinctions applied to them by recent writers of emi- 
nence appear to me to rest on erroneous principles in this respect ; for 
instance, that of the strepitus cequalis, and strepitus explosivus of 
Amman, which is recognised as valid by Mtiller. The strepitus cequalis 
or continuous sound, ascribed to h, m, n, ng, f, ch, gh, sh, s, r, and 
1, is merely a continuance of the vowel sound with which these letters 
happen to be connected; for instance, in " Rule Britannia " the con- 
tinuous sound in rule is not that of R but of u. In " God save the 
King," the continuous sound in save is not that of s but of a. Other 
distinctions appear to me liable to other objections ; and upon the 
whole I think the best arrangement of consonants is to take them in 
the order of the organs by which they are formed, beginning, as I did 
in the case of the vowels, with those which are formed nearest to the 
pharynx, and uttered through the oral cavity. 

In this point of view, the first which presents itself is H, which h 
Miiller describes as M a continuous oral sound, with the whole oral canal 
open." * It has been disputed indeed whether it should be called a 
consonant, or a breathing; but as it really modifies all the vowels, I 
think it belongs to the class of consonants. Muller's account of it, 
however, is not satisfactory ; or at least it should be added that h 
receives an impulse from the larynx. In the Italian language it 
formerly prevailed much more than at present. In English it acts an 
important part, though in some dialects it is often misapplied. 

The next is %• *' Gh and its correspondent cA," says Wilkins, " are x 
both of them framed by a vibration of the root or middle of the tongue 
against the palate, the former being vocal and the other mute. They 
are each of them of difficult pronunciation ; the first is now used by 
the Irish, and was perhaps heretofore intended by the spelling of those 
English words right, daughter, &c. Though this kind of sound be 
now by disuse lost amongst us, the latter of them (ch) is now used 
among the Welsh, and was perhaps heretofore intended by the Greek 
* EealChar. P. 3, c. 12. 



300 OF THE MECHANISM OF SPEECH. [CHAP. XVI. 

letter ^." * The account given of it by Professor Miiller is more 
diffuse. He says, the sound which this consonant (ch, the Greek ^) 
has in the German language does not exist in the French, nor in the 
English, but some of its modifications are met with in the Scotch and 
Irish dialects. For its production the tongue is applied closely to the 
palate, and the air is pressed through the small space left between 
them. There are three modifications of the sound, according to the 
part of the palate to which the tongue is applied : — 

i. In the first modification, the forepart of the tongue is ap- 
plied to the forepart of the palate, as in pronouncing the 
German words lieblich and selig. 
ii. In the second the dorsum of the tongue is approximated to 
the middle of the palate : this sound is very different 
from the preceding, it is heard in the German words 
Tag, suchen, ach, &c. 
iii. The third modification of this sound is used by the Swiss, 
Tyrolese, and Dutch : to produce it the dorsum of the 
tongue approaches the back part of the palate, or the 
soft palate. The sound exists as diet (Hebr.), cha 
(Arab.), and, according to Purkinje, in the Bohemian 
language. 

It would ill become me to dispute the learned Professor's account 
of these three modifications of a sound, with which he must be so 
well and I am so little acquainted practically ; otherwise I should be 
inclined to suppose that they might be reduced to two, expressed by 
gh and ch, and differing in the manner that I shall consider under G 
and K. 
G k The consonantal powers expressed by G and K in our language are 

produced, as Wilkins says, " more inwardly by an interception of the 
breath towards the throat by the middle or root of the tongue." J In 
fact, the tongue is rendered convex and narrow, and the middle of the 
convex surface is placed in contact with the bony palate, so as com- 
pletely to interrupt the passage of the air. This position of the organs 
is the same in both cases, but the former is sounded as g in gold, the 
latter as c in cold, which difference is variously described by various 
writers ; some calling g the hard, and c the soft sound, whilst others 
reverse these designations. Be this as it may, the fact is that there 
is a certain impulse given by a movement of the larynx to several 
consonantal positions of the oral organs, which produces a very dis- 
tinguishable difference in their sound. Hence are produced the several 
pairs of consonantal positions, as 

G C, gold and cold. 

D T, do and to. 

B P, ball and pall. 

* Real Char. P. 3, c. 12. f Elem. Physiol, vol. i, p. 1048. 

\ Real Char, ut sup. 



D£C 16W48 



CHAP. XVI.] OF THE MECHANISM OF SPEECH. 301 

V F, vile and file. 

5 Z, seal and zeal. 

6 and fl, thing and this. 
C and J, nation and confusion. 

This effect being allowed for, the common position of D and T is dt 
as follows, viz. : an appulse or collision of the top of the tongue 
against the teeth or upper gums, the lips and teeth are a little sepa- 
rated, the voice passing through the mouth is completely interrupted 
by the margin of the tongue being applied to the inside of the teeth of 
the upper jaw and margin of the bony palate. 

In B -and P, the breath is intercepted by the complete closure of b p 
the lips. 

V and F. " These letters," says Wilkins, " are formed by a vf 
kind of straining or percolation of the breath through a chink between 
the lower lip and upper teeth with some kind of murmur." The 
breath is driven with considerable force through the mouth, and the 
soft palate is elevated. 

S and Z are framed by an appulse of the tongue toward the upper s z 
teeth or gums, and then forcing out the breath with a vocal sound : 
the tongue, however, is not in actual contact with the incisor teeth. 

The Greek 6 is here used for the common th in thing : and the © s 
Saxon $ for the common th in this. The sounds are produced by 
applying the tip of the tongue at once to the upper and lower incisor 
teeth, and then expelling the voice. 

C J. These characters are adopted, the former C as answering to our 
sh and the German sch ; and the latter to the French J in Jean. We 
also give these two different sounds to ti, as in nation, and si, as in con- 
fusion above cited. The sound is produced, as Wilkins says, " by a 
percolation of the breath betwixt the tongue rendered concave and the 
teeth both upper and lower." It must be added that the surface of 
the- tongue is raised so as to be everywhere nearly in contact with the 
bony palate, there being only a very small space left between them. 

In L the tip of the tongue is loosely applied to the bony palate l 
immediately behind the upper incisor teeth, so as not entirely to in- 
terrupt the passage, and the air is allowed to escape on both sides 
between the edges of the tongue and the bony palate. 

E differs from the preceding in two circumstances — the tongue is R 
applied to the bony palate more posteriorly, and the tip of the tongue 
being loose, a vibratory motion is given to it. 

All the preceding consonants are oral, I come now to those in which M 
the air passes through the nasal passages. In M the lips are closed 
nearly as in B ; the air passes entirely through the nostrils, but the 
sound is partly produced by the vibration of the air in the mouth. 

In N the sound is also nasal. In producing it the lips are open, N 
the tongue is applied to the bony palate ; the greater part of the air 
passes through the nose, but a very small portion passes through the 
mouth. 



302 



OF THE MECHANISM OF SPEECH. 



Bf 



Combina- 
tions of 
vowels. 



Combined 
consonants. 



[chap. XVI. 

A peculiar character (ex. gr. nf) seems to be wanted for expressing 
the last nasal consonant, of which there are two modifications, the 
first as in the English song, the other as in the French son. In both 
the posterior part of the surface of the tongue is applied to the 
posterior part of the bony palate, so as to prevent the air entirely from 
entering the mouth ; the whole of the sound, therefore, passes through 
the nose. And so much for the simple powers both of vowels and 
consonants, forming together the following arrangement : — . 

Vowels.— Y A a E I O W U. 

Consonants, 

i. Oral, HXGKDTBPVFSZe^CJLR. 
ii. Nasal, M N llj. 

461. I come now to the combinations, first of vowels, and then of 
consonants. When two vowel sounds immediately succeed each 
other, they are either pronounced distinctly and form separate syllables, 
or else they are melted as it were together, and are then called 
diphthongs, producing a mixed sound in which each vowel may, by a 
slow pronunciation and an attentive ear be easily distinguished. In 
particularising these, I must use the alphabetic characters above given, 
for our own alphabetic system is so extremely absurd that we express 
the diphthong yi by the single letter i ; the diphthong wa by w, as 
a consonant, and a, as a vowel; and the single vowel w by two 
vowels oo. Diphthongs are most frequently (though not always) com- 
posed of such vowels as lie at a distance from each other in the organic 
arrangement above stated ; and the stronger sounded vowel may be 
either prefixed or suffixed, thus we have as strong prefixes—* 



J 1 • 


I, try, buy 






at . 


boy. 






ai . 


ay (provincially). 


aw. 


in German 


, blau 




yw. 


in English, 


owl. 




ng suffixes : — 






iy • 


young . . . 


wy . 


work. 


ia . 


yawn . . 


wa . 


wall. 


ia . 


yarrow. 






ie . 


yellow . . 


.we . 


well. 


ii . 


ye 


,wi . 


we. 


io . 


yoke ... 


100 . 


woe. 


iw . 


you .... 


WW . 


wood. 



462. On the combination of consonants some ingenious remarks are- 
made by Dr. Latham. Having distinguished the several couples of 
consonants by the terms lene and aspirate, and each of these classes 
ao-ain into sharp and flat, he observes that certain combinations of them 
are incapable of being pronounced. Two or more mutes (says he) of 
different degrees of sharpness and flatness are incapable of coming 
together in the same syllable. For instance, b, v, d, g, z, &c, being 



CHAP. XVI.] OF THE MECHANISM OF SPEECH. 303 

flat, and p, f, t, k, s, &c. , being sharp, such combinations as abt, avt, 
apd, afd, agt, akd y atz, ads, &c, are unpronounceable."* Again : 
" Certain sounds, in combination with others, have a tendency to 
undergo changes."! Once more : letters are often inserted for euphony. 
" In English the form which the Latin word Humerus takes is number, 
in French nombre. The b makes no part of the original word, but 
has been inserted for the sake of euphony. "| I would add that dif- 
ferent nations seem to have a taste for different combinations. In 
most cases where the English use st, the Germans, though they use it 
in spelling, alter it in pronunciation. Our stand is written by them 
stehen y but pronounced shtehen. These and similar remarks will be 
found very useful in the historical investigation of language. 

463. Words are distinguished by grammarians, not only according Quantity 
to articulation, but also according to quantity and accent. Quantity 
regards the time employed in utterance, and the term is generally 
applied to the relative time employed in uttering the different portions 

of words, the rules for which constitute prosody, and are more especially 
referable to poetry in the classical languages.. These rales are well 
known : it is known, for instance, that a vowel followed by two con- 
sonants must form a long syllable, because the action of the muscles 
necessary to produce so complicated a vocal sound must require a 
longer time than if the movement were more simple. But the actual 
effect on the ear produced to a Greek or Roman hearer, as part of 
the pleasure of poetry, cannot be clearly perceived by a modern 
reader. 

464. Something of the same uncertainty hangs over the doctrine Accent. 
of Accent as applied to a comparison between the living and dead 
languages.. The subject has been learnedly investigated,* but with- 
out leading to a very satisfactory result. The rules for the use of 
accents in the Greek language are well known ; but the real effect 

of those accents on the pronunciation of vocal sounds in the classical 
ages is very uncertain. English poetry is said to be regulated by 
accent ; but accent, in this sense,, applies rather to the force with which 
a syllable is pronounced, than to that elevation or depression of voice 
on which the ancient accents are supposed to depend. This part of 
my subject, however, will be more conveniently discussed hereafter. 
For the present, enough has been said on the mechanism of speech. 

* English language, s. 76, % Ibid. s. 83. 

f Ibid. s. 77. § Foster on Accent and Quantity. 



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